Showing posts with label financial services industry. Show all posts
Showing posts with label financial services industry. Show all posts

Monday 5 December 2011

Characteristics of Financial Service firms (banks, insurance companies and investment banks) and their Value Drivers


Characteristics of financial service firms

            There are many dimensions on which financial service firms differ from other firms in the market. In this section, we will focus on four key differences and look at why these differences can create estimation issues in valuation. The first is that many categories (albeit not all) of financial service firms operate under strict regulatory constraints on how they run their businesses and how much capital they need to set aside to keep operating. The second is that accounting rules for recording earnings and asset value at financial service firms are at variance with accounting rules for the rest of the market. The third is that debt for a financial service firm is more akin to raw material than to a source of capital; the notion of cost of capital and enterprise value may be meaningless as a consequence. The final factor is that the defining reinvestment (net capital expenditures and working capital) for a bank or insurance company may be not just difficult, but impossible, and cash flows cannot be computed.

The Regulatory Overlay

Financial service firms are heavily regulated all over the world, though the extent of the regulation varies from country to country. In general, these regulations take three forms. First, banks and insurance companies are required to maintain regulatory capital ratios, computed based upon the book value of equity and their operations, to ensure that they do not expand beyond their means and put their claimholders or depositors at risk. Second, financial service firms are often constrained in terms of where they can invest their funds. For instance, until a decade ago, the Glass-Steagall Act in the United States restricted commercial banks from investment banking activities as well as from taking active equity positions in non-financial service firms. Third, the entry of new firms into the business is often controlled by the regulatory authorities, as are mergers between existing firms.
            Why does this matter? From a valuation perspective, assumptions about growth are linked to assumptions about reinvestment. With financial service firms, these assumptions have to be scrutinized to ensure that they pass regulatory constraints. There might also be implications for how we measure risk at financial service firms. If regulatory restrictions are changing or are expected to change, it adds a layer of uncertainty (risk) to the future, which can have an effect on value. Put more simply, to value banks, insurance companies and investment banks, we have to be aware of the regulatory structure that governs them.

Differences in Accounting Rules

            The accounting rules used to measure earnings and record book value are different for financial service firms than the rest of the market, for two reasons. The first is that the assets of financial service firms tend to be financial instruments (bonds, securitized obligations) that often have an active market place. Not surprisingly, marking assets to market value has been an established practice in financial service firms, well before other firms even started talking about fair value accounting. The second is that the nature of operations for a financial service firm is such that long periods of profitability are interspersed with short periods of large losses; accounting standard have been developed to counter this tendency and create smoother earnings.
a.     Mark to Market: If the new trend in accounting is towards recording assets at fair value (rather than original costs), financial service firms operate as a laboratory for this experiment. After all, accounting rules for banks, insurance companies and investment banks have required that assets be recorded at fair value for more than a decade, based upon the argument that most of a bank/s assets are traded, have market prices and therefore do not require too many subjective judgments. In general, the assets of banks and insurance companies tend to be securities, many of which are publicly traded.  Since the market price is observable for many of these investments, accounting rules have tilted towards using market value (actual of estimated) for these assets.  To the extent that some or a significant portion of the assets of a financial service firms are marked to market, and the assets of most non-financial service firms are not, we fact two problems. The first is in comparing ratios based upon book value (both market to book ratios like price to book and accounting ratios like return on equity) across financial and non-financial service firms. The second is in interpreting these ratios, once computed. While the return on equity for a non-financial service firm can be considered a measure of return earned on equity invested originally in assets, the same cannot be said about return on equity at financial service firms, where the book equity measures not what was originally invested in assets but an updated market value.
b.     Loss Provisions and smoothing out earnings: Consider a bank that makes money the old fashioned way – by taking in funds from depositors and lending these funds out to individuals and corporations at higher rates. While the rate charged to lenders will be higher than that promised to depositors, the risk that the bank faces is that lenders may default, and the rate at which they default will vary widely over time – low during good economic times and high during economic downturns. Rather than write off the bad loans, as they occur, banks usually create provisions for losses that average out losses over time and charge this amount against earnings every year.  Though this practice is logical, there is a catch, insofar as the bank is given the responsibility of making the loan loss assessment. A conservative bank will set aside more for loan losses, given a loan portfolio, than a more aggressive bank, and this will lead to the latter reporting higher profits during good times.

Debt and Equity

            In the financial balance sheet that we used to describe firms, there are only two ways to raise funds to finance a business – debt and equity. While this is true for both all firms, financial service firms differ from non-financial service firms on three dimensions:
a. Debt is raw material, not capital: When we talk about capital for non-financial service firms, we tend to talk about both debt and equity. A firm raises funds from both equity investor and bondholders (and banks) and uses these funds to make its investments. When we value the firm, we value the value of the assets owned by the firm, rather than just the value of its equity. With a financial service firm, debt has a different connotation. Rather than view debt as a source of capital, most financial service firms seem to view it as a raw material. In other words, debt is to a bank what steel is to a manufacturing company, something to be molded into other products which can then be sold at a higher price and yield a profit. Consequently, capital at financial service firms seems to be narrowly defined as including only equity capital. This definition of capital is reinforced by the regulatory authorities, who evaluate the equity capital ratios of banks and insurance firms.
b. Defining Debt: The definition of what comprises debt also is murkier with a financial service firm than it is with a non-financial service firm. For instance, should deposits made by customers into their checking accounts at a bank be treated as debt by that bank? Especially on interest-bearing checking accounts, there is little distinction between a deposit and debt issued by the bank. If we do categorize this as debt, the operating income for a bank should be measured prior to interest paid to depositors, which would be problematic since interest expenses are usually the biggest single expense item for a bank.
c. Degree of financial leverage: Even if we can define debt as a source of capital and can measure it precisely, there is a final dimension on which financial service firms differ from other firms. They tend to use more debt in funding their businesses and thus have higher financial leverage than most other firms. While there are good reasons that can be offered for why they have been able to do this historically - more predictable earnings and the regulatory framework are two that are commonly cited – there are consequences for valuation. Since equity is a sliver of the overall value of a financial service firm, small changes in the value of the firm.s assets can translate into big swings in equity value.

Estimating cash flows is difficult

            We noted earlier that financial service firms are constrained by regulation in both where they invest their funds and how much they invest. If, as we have so far in this book, define reinvestment as necessary for future growth, there are problems associated with measuring reinvestment with financial service firms. Note that, we consider two items in reinvestment – net capital expenditures and working capital. Unfortunately, measuring either of these items at a financial service firm can be problematic.
Consider net capital expenditures first. Unlike manufacturing firms that invest in plant, equipment and other fixed assets, financial service firms invest primarily in intangible assets such as brand name and human capital. Consequently, their investments for future growth often are categorized as operating expenses in accounting statements. Not surprisingly, the statement of cash flows to a bank show little or no capital expenditures and correspondingly low depreciation. With working capital, we run into a different problem. If we define working capital as the difference between current assets and current liabilities, a large proportion of a bank's balance sheet would fall into one or the other of these categories. Changes in this number can be both large and volatile and may have no relationship to reinvestment for future growth.
            As a result of this difficulty in measuring reinvestment, we run into two practical problems in valuing these firms. The first is that we cannot estimate cash flows without estimating reinvestment. In other words, if we cannot identify how much a company is reinvesting for future growth, we cannot identify cash flows either. The second is that estimating expected future growth becomes more difficult, if the reinvestment rate cannot be measured.


Financial Service Companies: Value Drivers

Equity Risk

In keeping with the way we have estimated the cost of equity for firms so far in this book, the cost of equity for a financial service firm has to reflect the portion of the risk in the equity that cannot be diversified away by the marginal investor in the stock. This risk is estimated using a beta (in the capital asset pricing model) or betas (in a multi-factor or arbitrage pricing model).  There are three estimation notes that we need to keep in mind, when making estimates of the cost of equity for a financial service firm:
1.     Use bottom-up betas: In our earlier discussions of betas, we argued against the use of regression betas because of the noise in the estimates (standard errors) and the possibility that the firm has changed over the period of the regression. We will continue to hold to that proposition, when valuing financial service firms. In fact, the large numbers of publicly traded firm in this domain should make estimating bottom up betas much easier.
2.     Do not adjust for financial leverage: When estimating betas for non-financial service firms, we emphasized the importance of unlevering betas (whether they be historical or sector averages) and then relevering them, using a firm's current debt to equity ratio. With financial service firms, we would skip this step for two reasons. First, financial service firms tend to be much more homogeneous in terms of capital structure – they tend to have similar financial leverage primarily due to regulations. Second, and this is a point made earlier, debt is difficult to measure for financial service firms. In practical terms, this will mean that we will use the average levered beta for comparable firms as the bottom-up beta for the firm being analyzed.
3.     Adjust for regulatory and business risk: If we use sector betas and do not adjust for financial leverage, we are in effect using the same beta for every company in the sector. As we noted earlier, there can be significant regulatory differences across markets, and even within a market, across different classes of financial service firms. To reflect this, we would define the sector narrowly; thus, we would look the average beta across large money center banks, when valuing a large money center bank, and across small regional banks, when valuing one of these. We would also argue that financial service firms that expand into riskier businesses – securitization, trading and investment banking – should have different (and higher betas) for these segments, and that the beta for the company should be a weighted average.
4.     Consider the relationship between risk and growth: Through the book, we have emphasized the importance of modifying a company's risk profile to reflect changes that we are assuming to its growth rate. As growth companies mature, betas should move towards one. We see no need to abandon that principle, when valuing banks. We would expect high growth banks to have higher betas (and costs of equity) than mature banks.  In valuing such banks, we would therefore start with higher costs of equity but as we reduce growth, we would also reduce betas and costs of equity.

Quality of growth

To ensure that assumptions about dividends, earnings and growth are internally consistent, we have to bring in a measure of how well the retained equity is reinvested; the return on equity is the variable that ties together payout ratios and expected growth. Using a fundamental growth measure for earnings:
Expected growth in earnings = Return on equity * (1 – Dividend Payout ratio)
For instance, a bank that payout out 60% of its earnings as dividends and earns a return on equity of 12% will have an expected growth rate in earnings of 4.8%.  When we introduced the fundamental equation in chapter 2, we also noted that firms can deliver growth rates that deviate from this expectation, if the return on equity is changing.
Expected GrowthEPS 
Thus, if the bank is able to improve the return on equity on existing assets from 10% to 12%, the efficiency growth rate in that year will be 20%. However, efficiency growth is temporary and all firms ultimately will revert back to the fundamental growth relationship.
            The linkage between return on equity, growth and dividends is therefore critical in determining value in a financial service firm. At the risk of hyperbole, the key number in valuing a bank is not dividends, earnings or growth rate, but what we believe it will earn as return on equity in the long term. That number, in conjunction with payout ratios, will help in determining growth. Alternatively, the return on equity, together with expected growth rates, can be used to estimate dividends. This linkage is particularly useful, when we get to stable growth, where growth rates can be very different from the initial growth rates. To preserve consistency in the valuation, the payout ratio that we use in stable growth, to estimate the terminal value, should be:
Payout ratio in stable growth 
The risk of the firm should also adjust to reflect the stable growth assumption. In particular, if betas are used to estimate the cost of equity, they should converge towards one in stable growth.

Regulatory Buffers

The cashflow to equity is the cashflow left over for equity investors after debt payments have been made and reinvestment needs met. With financial service firms, the reinvestment generally does not take the form of plant, equipment or other fixed assets. Instead, the investment is in regulatory capital; this is the capital as defined by the regulatory authorities, which, in turn, determines the limits on future growth.
FCFEFinancial Service Firm = Net Income – Reinvestment in Regulatory Capital
To estimating the reinvestment in regulatory capital, we have to define two parameters. The first is the book equity capital ratio that will determine the investment; this will be heavily influenced by regulatory requirements but will also reflect the choices made by a bank.  Conservative banks may choose to maintain a higher capital ratio than required by regulatory authorities whereas aggressive banks may push towards the regulatory constraints. For instance, a bank that has a 5% equity capital ratio can make $100 in loans for every $5 in equity capital. When this bank reports net income of $15 million and pays out only $5 million, it is increasing its equity capital by $10 million. This, in turn, will allow it to make $200 million in additional loans and presumably increase its growth rate in future periods. The second is theprofitability of the activity, defined in terms of net income. Staying with the bank example, we have to specify how much net income the bank will generate with the additional loans; a 0.5% profitability ratio will translate into additional net income of $1 million on the additional loans.


Little Book on Valuation
Aswath Damodaran

Sunday 21 December 2008

Financial Services Industry: How things can have gone so wrong

Op-Ed Columnist
The Madoff Economy

By PAUL KRUGMAN
Published: December 19, 2008

The revelation that Bernard Madoff — brilliant investor (or so almost everyone thought), philanthropist, pillar of the community — was a phony has shocked the world, and understandably so. The scale of his alleged $50 billion Ponzi scheme is hard to comprehend.

Yet surely I’m not the only person to ask the obvious question: How different, really, is Mr. Madoff’s tale from the story of the investment industry as a whole?
The financial services industry has claimed an ever-growing share of the nation’s income over the past generation, making the people who run the industry incredibly rich. Yet, at this point, it looks as if much of the industry has been destroying value, not creating it. And it’s not just a matter of money: the vast riches achieved by those who managed other people’s money have had a corrupting effect on our society as a whole.
Let’s start with those paychecks. Last year, the average salary of employees in “securities, commodity contracts, and investments” was more than four times the average salary in the rest of the economy. Earning a million dollars was nothing special, and even incomes of $20 million or more were fairly common. The incomes of the richest Americans have exploded over the past generation, even as wages of ordinary workers have stagnated; high pay on Wall Street was a major cause of that divergence.
But surely those financial superstars must have been earning their millions, right? No, not necessarily. The pay system on Wall Street lavishly rewards the appearance of profit, even if that appearance later turns out to have been an illusion.
Consider the hypothetical example of a money manager who leverages up his clients’ money with lots of debt, then invests the bulked-up total in high-yielding but risky assets, such as dubious mortgage-backed securities. For a while — say, as long as a housing bubble continues to inflate — he (it’s almost always a he) will make big profits and receive big bonuses. Then, when the bubble bursts and his investments turn into toxic waste, his investors will lose big — but he’ll keep those bonuses.
O.K., maybe my example wasn’t hypothetical after all.
So, how different is what Wall Street in general did from the Madoff affair? Well, Mr. Madoff allegedly skipped a few steps, simply stealing his clients’ money rather than collecting big fees while exposing investors to risks they didn’t understand. And while Mr. Madoff was apparently a self-conscious fraud, many people on Wall Street believed their own hype. Still, the end result was the same (except for the house arrest): the money managers got rich; the investors saw their money disappear.
We’re talking about a lot of money here. In recent years the finance sector accounted for 8 percent of America’s G.D.P., up from less than 5 percent a generation earlier. If that extra 3 percent was money for nothing — and it probably was — we’re talking about $400 billion a year in waste, fraud and abuse.
But the costs of America’s Ponzi era surely went beyond the direct waste of dollars and cents.
At the crudest level, Wall Street’s ill-gotten gains corrupted and continue to corrupt politics, in a nicely bipartisan way. From Bush administration officials like Christopher Cox, chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, who looked the other way as evidence of financial fraud mounted, to Democrats who still haven’t closed the outrageous tax loophole that benefits executives at hedge funds and private equity firms (hello, Senator Schumer), politicians have walked when money talked.
Meanwhile, how much has our nation’s future been damaged by the magnetic pull of quick personal wealth, which for years has drawn many of our best and brightest young people into investment banking, at the expense of science, public service and just about everything else?
Most of all, the vast riches being earned — or maybe that should be “earned” — in our bloated financial industry undermined our sense of reality and degraded our judgment.
Think of the way almost everyone important missed the warning signs of an impending crisis. How was that possible? How, for example, could Alan Greenspan have declared, just a few years ago, that “the financial system as a whole has become more resilient” — thanks to derivatives, no less? The answer, I believe, is that there’s an innate tendency on the part of even the elite to idolize men who are making a lot of money, and assume that they know what they’re doing.
After all, that’s why so many people trusted Mr. Madoff.
Now, as we survey the wreckage and try to understand how things can have gone so wrong, so fast, the answer is actually quite simple: What we’re looking at now are the consequences of a world gone Madoff.


http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/19/opinion/19krugman.html?em







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