Why did Buffett buy Apple Inc. ( AAPL)? - A Cash Cow that turned 24.8% of its Revenues into Free Cash Flow for its Owners.

At the price of US 139.84 per share and with 5,500 million shares outstanding, Apple is priced by the market at a whopping US 769.12 Billion.

It is the company with the highest market capitalisation in a stock market in the world today.

Apple continues to innovate in its products and it is expected to deliver some new surprises in the future.

Despite some negative news in recent years, it has proven its critics wrong in growing its revenues, profit before tax and EPS share over the last 5 years.

The revenue growth showed consistency, however, the profit before tax and EPS were more volatile and less consistent, being affected by efficiency and costs leading to profit margins that were variable over the period.

Though its revenues had grown from US 156 billion in its FY 2012 to US 214 billion in its FY 2016, its net income grew from US 41.7 billion to US 45.7 billion over the same period.

Its profit before tax margins continued to be maintained at high levels of 28.6% and its latest ROE was 38.3%.

Apple started its share buybacks over the years and had reduced the number of shares outstanding from 6,617 million shares in 2012 to 5,500 million shares in 2016.

Due to its huge free cash flow generated yearly and its huge cash reserves, this share buyback should benefit the shareholders who are still holding to its shares.

Apple distributed little dividend in the past.  In 2012, its dividends were US 2.5 billion.  Since 2013, Apple had distributed dividends of US 10.6 billion, US 11.1 billion, US 11.6 billion and US 12.2 billion yearly to 2016.

Over these 5 years from 2013 to 2016, its dividend payout was a total of 22.1% of its earnings.

Apple still retains a lot of its earnings, some being used to buyback its own shares.

This company is a true cash cow.  Its FCF for the year ending Sept 2016 was US 53.1 billion on a revenue of US 214 billion.  This gave a FCF/Revenue of 24.8%.  A remarkably high and cash generating company.

At today's market capitalisation of US 769.12 billion (US 139.84 per share), its FCF to market cap yield is 6.89%.

At today's price of US 139.84 per share, and using the EPS of FY 2016 of US 8.31 per share, Apple is trading at a PE of 16.8x.

When Warren Buffett bought into Apple at the end of 2016, its share price was around US 110 per share.

At US 100 per share then, Warren Buffett bought into Apple which is a great company at a fair price.  At that price, the upside and downside were about even.  The dividend yield was 2.4% and the potential total upside return around 11.1% per year (2.4% from dividends and 8.7% from capital appreciation) for the next 5 years.

At US 139.84 today,  the upside is much less compared to the downside.  The dividend yield is 1.9% and the total projected potential return around 4,5 %per year (2.6% from dividends and 1.9% from capital appreciation) over the next 5 years.

Aeon Credit (22.3.2017)

The revenue, profit before tax and EPS continue to grow.

In its latest quarter, it grew its quarterly revenue 14% and its quarterly EPS 27.4% when compared to the previous year same quarter.

Its share price peaked at RM 18.86 per share in 2013.

Since then its share prices have been range bound between RM 10 to RM 15 per share.

Its EPS continued to grow at a good rate during the same period from 93.1 sen per share to 158.5 sen per share.

The rising EPS and the flat share prices over the last 3 years, resulted in Aeon Credit trading at very low PE of below 10.

At today's closing price of RM 16.60 per share, it is trading at a PE of 10.5.

This stock pays dividend over the years.  Its dividend payout ratio has been around 38%.

It has increased its dividends yearly over the years from 25 sen per share in 2012 to 59.5 sen per share in 2016 (more than double over this period).

At its present price of RM 16.60 per share, its dividend yield is 3.58%.

This dividend yield should appeal to those who are investing for income too.

Projecting into the future, Aeon Credit should continue to grow its revenues, profit before tax and EPS.

Those who own Aeon Credit for the long term should enjoy a satisfactory total return from its capital appreciation and its growing dividends.

Benjamin Graham's teachings on Market Fluctuations and your investing

Market Fluctuations

            Fluctuations of Common Stock Prices

Since common stocks are subject to wide price swings, the investor should seek to profit from these opportunities.  However, attempting to time the market usually ends in unsatisfactory results.  Graham believes that market timing is pure speculation and is not an investing activity.  The best an investor can do is the change the bond and stock proportions in his portfolio after major market swings. 

Formulas do not work, although they have been in vogue since the 1950s.  When the market reached new highs in the mid-1950s, many formula investors sold their equities according to formula only to witness the market grow increasingly higher.  Any approach to the market that is easily described is sure to fail (except for Graham’s method). 

The investor also can focus on the price of a security. Graham recommends this practice.  Short-term fluctuations should not matter.  Over a period of 5 years, the investor should not be surprised if the average value of his portfolio increases more than 50% from its low point or decreases 1/3 from its high point.

Market advances and declines tempt investors to make foolish decisions.  Varying the proportion of stocks and bonds between the 25%-75% ratio occupies an investor’s time during turbulent markets and prevents him from making gross errors in judgement.  The true investor takes comfort that his actions are opposite from the actions of the crowd.

The better a firm’s record and its prospects, the less relationship that its price will have to its book value.  The more successful the company, the more likely its share price is to fluctuate.  More often than not, a fast growing firm’s market price will exceed its intrinsic value.  So, the better the quality of the stock, the more speculative it will be.  This explains the erratic price behavior of some of the most successful and impressive enterprises, such as IBM and Xerox.

The investor should purchase issues close to their tangible asset values and at no more than 33% above that figure.  These purchases logically are related to a company’s balance sheet and not to its earnings.  Any premium over book value may be thought of as a fee for liquidity that accompanies any publicly traded stock.   

            Just because a stock sells at or below its net asset value does not warrant that it is a sound purchase.  In addition to below market values, the investor also must demand a strong financial position, a satisfactory p/e ratio, and an assurance that the firm’s earnings will be sustained over the years.  This is not an entirely difficult bill to fill except under dangerously high market conditions.  At the end of 1970 more than half of the DJIA met these investment criteria.  However, the investor will forgo the most brilliant, high growth prospects.

            With a portfolio purchased at close to book value, the investor can take a more detached view of market fluctuations.  In fact, so long as the earning power of the portfolio remains satisfactory, the investor can use these market vagaries to buy low and sell high.

As seen with the stock fluctuations of A & P over many years, the market often goes wrong.  Although the stock market may fall, a true investor is rarely forced to sell his shares.  Rather, the investor is free to disregard the market quotes.  Thus, the investor who allows himself to be unduly worried about the market transforms his basic advantage into a disadvantage.  In fact, the investor who owns common stock owns a piece of these companies as a private owner would, and a private owner would not sell his business when it is undervalued by the market.  A quoted stock provides an option for the investor to sell at a given price and nothing more.  The investor with a diversified portfolio of good stocks should neither worry about sizeable declines nor become excited about sizeable advances.   An investor never should sell a stock just because it has gone down or purchase it because it has gone up.

Graham provides the parable of “Mr. Market”, who like the stock market, quotes you a price for your shares each and every day.  Mr. Market will either buy your shares or sell you his.  The price will depend upon Mr. Market’s mood.  You can ignore his efforts, or you can take advantage of him when he quotes you a price that you believe is priced advantageously.  Finally, one should not forget the effect of management on a firm’s results.  Good management produces acceptable results and bad management does not.

Fluctuation of Bond Prices

            Short-term bonds, defined as those with a duration of less than 7 years, are not significantly affected by changes in the market.  This applies to US Savings Bonds, which can be redeemed at anytime.  Long term bonds, however, may experience wide price swings as a result of fluctuations in the interest rate.  Thus, long term bonds may seem attractive when discounted, but this practice often leads to speculation and losses.

Low yields correspond with high bond prices and vice versa; prices and yields are inversely related.  The period from 1960 to 1975 is marked by reversing swings in the price of bonds so much so that it reminded Graham of Newton’s law: “every action has an opposite and equal reaction.”  Of course, nothing on Wall Street actually occurs the same way twice. 

Graham acknowledges the impossibility of attempting to predict bond prices, even if common stock prices were predictable.  Therefore, the investor must choose between long- term and short-term bonds chiefly on the basis of personal preference.  If the investor wishes to ensure that his market values will not decrease, then the investor is best served by US Savings Bonds.  With higher yield long term bonds, the investor must be prepared to see their market values fluctuate. 

Convertible issues should be avoided.  Their prices fluctuate widely and unpredictably based upon the price of the underlying common stock, the credit standing of the firm, and the market interest rate.  Because convertible issues experience huge swings in market value, they are largely speculative investments.

Warren Buffett teaches on Share Repurchases

Share Repurchases

In the investment world, discussions about share repurchases often become heated. But I'd suggest that participants in this debate take a deep breath: Assessing the desirability of repurchases isn't that complicated.

From the standpoint of exiting shareholders, repurchases are always a plus. Though the day-to-day impact of these purchases is usually minuscule, it's always better for a seller to have an additional buyer in the market.

For continuing shareholders, however, repurchases only make sense if the shares are bought at a price below intrinsic value. When that rule is followed, the remaining shares experience an immediate gain in intrinsic value. Consider a simple analogy: If there are three equal partners in a business worth $3,000 and one is bought out by the partnership for $900, each of the remaining partners realizes an immediate gain of $50. If the exiting partner is paid $1,100, however, the continuing partners each suffer a loss of $50. The same math applies with corporations and their shareholders. Ergo, the question of whether a repurchase action is value-enhancing or value-destroying for continuing shareholders is entirely purchase-price dependent.

It is puzzling, therefore, that corporate repurchase announcements almost never refer to a price above which repurchases will be eschewed. That certainly wouldn't be the case if a management was buying an outside business. There, price would always factor into a buy-or-pass decision.

When CEOs or boards are buying a small part of their own company, though, they all too often seem oblivious to price. Would they behave similarly if they were managing a private company with just a few owners and were evaluating the wisdom of buying out one of them? Of course not.

It is important to remember that there are two occasions in which repurchases should not take place, even if the company's shares are underpriced. One is when a business both needs all its available money to protect or expand its own operations and is also uncomfortable adding further debt. Here, the internal need for funds should take priority. This exception assumes, of course, that the business has a decent future awaiting it after the needed expenditures are made.

The second exception, less common, materializes when a business acquisition (or some other investment opportunity) offers far greater value than do the undervalued shares of the potential repurchaser. Long ago, Berkshire itself often had to choose between these alternatives. At our present size, the issue is far less likely to arise.

My suggestion: Before even discussing repurchases, a CEO and his or her Board should stand, join hands and in unison declare, 'What is smart at one price is stupid at another.'

* * * * * * * * * * * *

To recap Berkshire's own repurchase policy: I am authorized to buy large amounts of Berkshire shares at 120% or less of book value because our Board has concluded that purchases at that level clearly bring an instant and material benefit to continuing shareholders. By our estimate, a 120%-of-book price is a significant discount to Berkshire's intrinsic value, a spread that is appropriate because calculations of intrinsic value can't be precise.

The authorization given me does not mean that we will 'prop' our stock's price at the 120% ratio. If that level is reached, we will instead attempt to blend a desire to make meaningful purchases at a value-creating price with a related goal of not over-influencing the market.

To date, repurchasing our shares has proved hard to do. That may well be because we have been clear in describing our repurchase policy and thereby have signaled our view that Berkshire's intrinsic value is significantly higher than 120% of book value. If so, that's fine. Charlie and I prefer to see Berkshire shares sell in a fairly narrow range around intrinsic value, neither wishing them to sell at an unwarranted high price ' it's no fun having owners who are disappointed with their purchases ' nor one too low. Furthermore, our buying out 'partners' at a discount is not a particularly gratifying way of making money. Still, market circumstances could create a situation in which repurchases would benefit both continuing and exiting shareholders. If so, we will be ready to act.

One final observation for this section: As the subject of repurchases has come to a boil, some people have come close to calling them un-American ' characterizing them as corporate misdeeds that divert funds needed for productive endeavors. That simply isn't the case: Both American corporations and private investors are today awash in funds looking to be sensibly deployed. I'm not aware of any enticing project that in recent years has died for lack of capital. (Call us if you have a candidate.)

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-02-25/lessons-from-the-oracle-warren-buffett-s-shareholder-letter-annotated?cmpid=socialflow-facebook-business&utm_content=business&utm_campaign=socialflow-organic&utm_source=facebook&utm_medium=social

Why anyone would buy a 30-year bond 'absolutely baffles me,' Warren Buffett says

Billionaire investor Warren Buffett told CNBC he can't see any reason for investors to buy 30-year bonds right now.

"It absolutely baffles me who buys a 30-year bond, the chairman and CEO of Berkshire Hathaway said on "Squawk Box" on Monday. "I just don't understand it."

"The idea of committing your money at roughly 3 percent for 30 years ... doesn't make any sense to me," he added.

Buffett said he wants his money in companies, not Treasurys — making the case throughout CNBC's three-hour interview that he sees stocks outperforming fixed income.

Click here for the video

http://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/27/buffett-doesnt-understand-30-year-bond-appeal.html

Buffett: Measured against interest rates, stocks are actually on the cheap side compared to historic valuations.

BUFFETT ON BONDS

WHEN RATES HAVE BEEN WHERE THEY HAVE BEEN THE LAST FIVE OR SIX YEARS OR EVEN LONGER, SELLING VERY LONG BONDS MAKES SENSE FOR THE SAME REASON I THINK IT'S DUMB TO BUY THEM. I WOULDN'T BUY 50 YEAR BOND IN A MILLION YEARS AT THESE RATES IF IT'S THAT DUMB FOR ME TO BUY IT, ITS PROBABLY PRETTY SMART FOR THE ENTITY TO SELL THEM. IF I AM RIGHT. SO I WOULD SAY THE TREASURY – THERE'S A LOT OF CONSIDERATIONS THEY HAVE, BUT I WOULD BE SHOVING OUT LONG BONDS.

BUFFETT ON BUYING CONSISTENTLY

THE BEST THING WITH STOCKS ACTUALLY IS TO BUY THEM CONSISTENTLY OVER TIME. YOU WANT TO SPREAD THE RISK AS FAR AS THE SPECIFIC COMPANIES YOU'RE IN BY OWNING A DIVERSIFIED GROUP AND YOU DIVERSIFY OVER TIME. BY BUYING THIS MONTH, NEXT MONTH, THE YEAR AFTER, THE YEAR AFTER, THE YEAR AFTER. YOU'RE MAKING A TERRIBLE MISTAKE IF YOU STAY OUT OF A GAME YOU THINK IS GOING TO BE VERY GOOD OVER TIME BECAUSE YOU THINK YOU CAN PICK A BETTER TIME TO ENTER IT.

BUFFETT ON NO BUBBLE

AND WE ARE NOT IN A BUBBLE TERRITORY. OR ANYTHING OF THE SORT. IF INTEREST RATES WERE 7 OR 8%, THEN THESE PRICES WOULD LOOK EXCEPTIONALLY HIGH. BUT YOU HAVE TO MEASURE – YOU MEASURE EVERYTHING AGAINST INTEREST RATES BASICALLY. AND INTEREST RATES ACT LIKE GRAVITY ON VALUATION.

BUFFETT ON STOCKS CHEAP

MEASURED AGAINST INTEREST RATES, STOCKS ACTUALLY ARE ON THE CHEAP SIDE COMPARED TO HISTORIC VALUATIONS. BUT THE RISK ALWAYS IS THAT INTEREST RATES GO UP A LOT AND THAT BRINGS STOCKS DOWN. BUT I WOULD SAY THIS, IF THE TEN YEAR STAYS AT 230 AND WOULD STAY THERE FOR 10 YEARS, YOU WOULD REGRET VERY MUCH NOT HAVING BOUGHT STOCKS NOW.

http://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/27/cnbc-excerpts-billionaire-investor-warren-buffett-speaks-with-cnbcs-becky-quick-on-squawk-box-today.html

Warren Buffett is a closet dividend investor.

How Warren Buffett earns $1,140 in dividend income per minute

On April 3rd, 2017, Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway (BRK.B) will receive $148 million dollars in dividend income from their 400 million shares of Coca-Cola (KO). This comes out to roughly $1.644 million in dividend income per day, $68,500 dollars in dividend income per hour, $1142 dollars in dividend income for Berkshire Hathaway every minute, or almost $19.03 every single second. Those shares have a cost basis of $1.29 billion dollars, and were acquired between 1988 – 1994. This comes out to $3.25/share. The annual dividend payment produces an yield on cost of over 45.60%. This doesn’t assume dividend reinvestment and is 4 – 5 times higher than what investors in 30 year US Treasuries would be earning today. This is why I believe that Warren Buffett is a closet dividend investor.



This is a testament to the power of long-term dividend investing, where time in market is the investors best ally, not timing the market. If you can select a business which is run by able and honest management, which has solid competitive advantages, and which is available at a good price today, one needs to only sit and let the power of compounding do the heavy lifting for them. As Buffett likes to say, time is a great ally for the good business. In the case of Coca-Cola, the past 29 years have been a great time to buy and hold the stock. The company has been able to tap emerging markets in Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America like never before. As a result, it has been able to receive a higher share of the worldwide drinks market, which has also been expanding as well. If you add in strategic acquisitions, new product development, cost containment initiatives and streamlining of operations, you have a very powerful force for delivering solid shareholder returns. With dividend investing your are rewarded for smart decisions you have made years before.



If they closed the stock market for a period of 10 years, Coca-Cola would be one of the companies I would be willing to hold on to. This is because ten years from now, the company would likely be earning double what it is earning today, and would likely be distributing twice as much in dividend income than it is paying to shareholders today. Check my analysis of Coca-Cola for more information.

At the end of the day, if you identify a solid business, that has lasting power for the next 20 – 30 years, the job of the investor is to purchase shares at attractive values, and hold on to it. This slow and steady approach might seem unexciting initially, but just like with the story of the slow-moving tortoise beating the fast moving hare, the power of compounding would work miracles for the patient dividend investor.

In the case of Warren Buffett's investment in Coca-Cola, he is able to recover his original purchase price in dividends alone, every two years. Even if Coca-Cola goes to zero tomorrow, he has generates a substantial returns from dividends alone, which have flown to Berkshire's coffers, and have been invested in a variety of businesses that will benefit Berkshire Hathaway's shareholders for generations to come.

Currently, Coca-Cola is selling for 21.10 times forward earnings and yields 3.60%. This dividend king has managed to increase dividends for 55 years in a row. There are only twenty companies in the entire world which have gained membership into the exclusive list of dividend kings. Over the past decade, Coca-Cola has managed to increase dividends by 8.50%/year, equivalent to dividend payments doubling every eight and a half years. This is much better than the raises I have received at work over the past decade, despite the fact that I have routinely spent 55 - 60 hour weeks at the office.


http://www.valuewalk.com/2017/03/warren-buffett-earns-1140-dividend-income-per-minute/