If some degree of mis-pricing exists in the stock market, it does not persist for long.

Market valuations rest on both logical and psychological factors.

The theory of valuation depends on the projection of a long-term stream of dividends whose growth rate is extraordinarily difficult to estimate.  Thus, fundamental value is never a definite number.  It is a fuzzy band of possible values, and prices can move sharply within this band whenever there is increased uncertainty or confusion.  Moreover, the appropriate risk premiums for common equities are changeable and far from obvious either to investors or to financial economists.  Thus, there is room for the hopes, fears, and favorite fashions of market participants to play a role in the valuation process.  

History provides extraordinary examples of markets in which psychology seemed to dominate the pricing process, as in the tulip-bulb mania in seventeenth century Holland and the Internet bubble at the turn of the twenty-first century.  It is doubtful that the current array of market prices ALWAYS represents the best estimate available of appropriate discounted value.

Nevertheless, the evidence suggest that stock prices display a remarkable degree of efficiency.  Prices adjust so well to important information.  Information contained in past prices or any publicly available fundamental information is rapidly assimilated into market prices.  If some degree of mis-pricing exists, it does not persist for long.

"True value will always out" in the stock market.  To paraphrase Benjamin Graham, ultimately the market is a weighing mechanism, not a voting mechanism.  

A Great Metaphor - The Stock Market can be likened to the Sea.

The stock market is indeed similar to the ocean because, just as a cork floating upon its surface is, the price of a stock is affected by many different influences at once.  And each of those forces can either add to or subtract from the effects of the others.

The broadest influence is, of course, the tide that ebbs and flows regularly and in some places rises 50 feet or more above its low point.

Upon the tide are the broad, rolling waves caused by the various disturbances at the sea bottom.  Then there are the large waves caused by storms and major changes in the atmosphere, and there are the various ripples and patterns caused by the whim of the local breeze that blows this way and that over a few square yards of the surface.

That cork is buoyed by a combination of all of these influences, some rising and some falling, all at the same time.   If you were to try to predict where that cork would be in relation to sea level in the next moment, you'd have a tough time of it.  You can't predict what a storm or even an underground earthquake will do to the cork at any given moment.  And if you add to that the effects of the winds and the little breezes, it's hopeless!

However, you would be able to forecast, in general, where your cork would be over the course of the day, instead of at a particular moment.  This is because the tides are influenced by the position of the moon, by gravity, and by a variety of other factors that are all scientifically predictable - so predictable, in fact, that almanacs are published that forecast the tides for years ahead, right to the minute.

The stock market is also governed by a diverse set of influences.  And just as the sea is, it is predictable over the long term but not over the short term.

Investing: As Easy as Taking a Shower?

By Brian Stoffel 
November 9, 2011 

For the beginning investor, entering the stock market can be a confusing experience. Too often, a newbie dips his or her toe into the water, gets burned, and lets the "pros" take care of money matters from there on out.

It doesn't have to be this way; but first, we need to examine why investing can be such a difficult task.

Peter Senge in his best-seller The Fifth Discipline offers us a simple framework to explain the pitfalls of investing.

It's all about a feedback delayLet's pretend it's the morning, and you've jumped in the shower. Of course, the water temperature isn't going to be perfect right away; you need to adjust the knob. In the most basic sense, your feedback loop would look like this.

Now let's change things up: You have a defective shower. Instead of the water temperature adjusting almost immediately to a turn in the knob, it takes 10 seconds after turning the knob for any noticeable change to occur.

Now the feedback loop looks like this.

That delay is a pretty big deal, especially if you aren't used to dealing with it. Your first time in the shower might go like this: turn the knob to make it mildly hot, not feel a change, and turn the knob to scalding hot. Ten seconds later, while you're burning your skin off, you turn it to mildly cold. Not feeling a change, you adjust it to frigid cold, and then...

Well, you get the idea.

Applied to investingThe inclusion of a delay causes many a self-inflicted wound, and this explains why some beginners run into trouble.

Enticed into the stock market by opportunities for riches, investors may become frustrated when they don't see immediately results from their decisions. This leads them to constantly move money in and out of certain stocks, never allowing time for their thesis to play out.

In reality, an investor's feedback loop looks like this:

How long of a delay are we talking here?Fool founders Tom and David Gardner have always espoused the view that when investing, the average person should have a three-year time limit, minimum. That doesn't mean that you can't sell a stock before the three-year minimum. If it's crystal clear that your original thesis for investing in a company no longer holds true, then it's best to part ways sooner rather than later.

Being "crystal clear," however, isn't as easy as it sounds. Separating a company's performance as a business from its performance as a stock is essential. As Warren Buffett attributed to mentor Ben Graham in a letter to shareholders, "In the short run, the stock market is a voting machine, but in the long run, it's a weighing machine."

A few choice examples...To illustrate the importance of understanding this delay, I went back and looked at some well-known companies and how they've performed since three years ago, in November 2008. Here's a look:

Company	3-Year Return	Change at Lowest Close vs. Starting Price
Whole Foods (Nasdaq: WFM  )	612%	(15%)
Sirius XM (Nasdaq: SIRI  )	530%	(78%)
Green Mountain Coffee (Nasdaq:GMCR  )	1,200%	0%
Rosetta Stone (NYSE: RST  )	(72%)*	(72%)

Source: Yahoo! Finance. *Since going public in April 2009.

All four of these examples reveal a slightly different lesson for investors in how they should approach the market with a long-term time horizon.

When the Great Recession hit, investors behaved as if the organic food movement were dead. Adding to the negative sentiment, competition was coming from all sides: Even Wal-Mart (NYSE: WMT  ) began offering some organic food. Investors with a three-year horizon, however, realized that eventually, our economy would recover. And if they were following the broader move toward organic food, they knew the trend was undeniable.

Sirius XM, on the other hand, seemed to be on the brink of bankruptcy in early 2009. Believers in the company, however, were confident that the company wasn't going to be going anywhere, anytime soon. When they were bailed out by Liberty Media (Nasdaq: LCAPA  ) , life (and cash) was injected back into the company.

I included Green Mountain (maker of the ubiquitous Keurig coffeemakers) to show that there's really no telling how long a delay will be. Sometimes it will be a year, sometimes just one day. In this case, Green Mountain climbed immediately. The bigger point is that three years isgenerally long enough for any delay to work its way out of a system.

Finally, Rosetta Stone is an excellent example of the fact that it is OK to sell a stock before three years if your investment thesis changes dramatically. Just last month, I sold my sharesin this company because of the constant turnover in the executive suite.  

http://www.fool.com/investing/beginning/2011/11/09/investing-as-easy-as-taking-a-shower.aspx

Key Points about Risks

Risk unequivocally exist in investing in any stock  ...

... but important to distinguish between volatility in stock price and business risk ...

... and my point is that none are large or imminent enough to explain why shares are so cheap.

Market price fluctuations have only one significant meaning for the true investor.

Basically, price fluctuations have only one significant meaning for the true investor. They provide him with an opportunity 

• to buy wisely when prices fall sharply and 
• to sell wisely when they advance a great deal. 

At other times he will do better if he forgets about the stock market and pays attention to his dividend returns and to the operating results of his companies.

Explanations for the Erratic Price Behaviour of some of the Most Successful and Impressive Enterprises

Growth Stock Paradox: The more successful the company, the greater are likely to be the fluctuations in the price of its shares.

The argument made above should explain the often erratic price behavior of our most successful and impressive enterprises. 

• Our favorite example is the monarch of them all—International Business Machines. The price of its shares fell from 607 to 300 in seven months in 1962–63; after two splits its price fell from 387 to 219 in 1970. 
• Similarly, Xerox—an even more impressive earnings gainer in recent decades—fell from 171 to 87 in 1962–63, and from 116 to 65 in 1970. 

These striking losses 

• did not indicate any doubt about the future long-term growth of IBM or Xerox; 
• they reflected instead a lack of confidence in the premium valuation that the stock market itself had placed on these excellent prospects.

Every investor who owns common stocks must expect to see them fluctuate in value over the years.

Market Fluctuations of the Investor’s Portfolio

Every investor who owns common stocks must expect to see them fluctuate in value over the years. 

The behavior of the DJIA since our last edition was written in 1964 probably reflects pretty well what has happened to the stock portfolio of a conservative investor who limited his stock holdings to those of large, prominent, and conservatively financed corporations.

• The overall value advanced from an average level of about 890 to a high of 995 in 1966 (and 985 again in 1968), fell to 631 in 1970, and made an almost full recovery to 940 in early 1971. 
• (Since the individual issues set their high and low marks at different times, the fluctuations in the Dow Jones group as a whole are less severe than those in the separate components.) 
• We have traced through the price fluctuations of other types of diversified and conservative common-stock portfolios and we find that the overall results are not likely to be markedly different from the above. 
• In general, the shares of second-line companies* fluctuate more widely than the major ones, but this does not necessarily mean that a group of well established but smaller companies will make a poorer showing over a fairly long period. 

In any case the investor may as well resign himself in advance to the probability rather than the mere possibility that most of his holdings will advance, say, 50% or more from their low point and decline the equivalent one-third or more from their high point at various periods in the next five years.†




* Today’s equivalent of what Graham calls “second-line companies” would be any of the thousands of stocks not included in the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index. A regularly revised list of the 500 stocks in the S & P index is available at www.standardandpoors.com.

† Note carefully what Graham is saying here. It is not just possible, but probable, that most of the stocks you own will gain at least 50% from their lowest price and lose at least 33% from their highest price—regardless of which stocks you own or whether the market as a whole goes up or down. 

• If you can’t live with that—or you think your portfolio is somehow magically exempt from it—then you are not yet entitled to call yourself an investor. 
• (Graham refers to a 33% decline as the “equivalent one-third” because a 50% gain takes a $10 stock to $15. From $15, a 33% loss [or $5 drop] takes it right back to $10, where it started.

Ref:  Intelligent Investor by Benjamin Graham

Investors will frequently not know why security prices fluctuate. Must look beyond security prices to underlying business value.

Security prices sometimes fluctuate, not based on any apparent changes in reality, but on changes in investor perception.

• The shares of many biotechnology companies doubled and tripled in the first months of 1991, for example despite a lack of change in company or industry fundamentals that could possibly have explained that magnitude of increase. 
• The only explanation for the price rise was that investors were suddenly willing to pay much more than before to buy the same thing.

In the short run supply and demand alone determine market prices. 

• If there are many large sellers and few buyers, prices fall, sometimes beyond reason. 
• Supply-and-demand imbalances can result from year-end tax selling, an institutional stampede out of a stock that just reported disappointing earnings, or an unpleasant rumor. 

Most day-to-day market price fluctuations result from supply- and-demand variations rather than from fundamental developments.


Investors will frequently not know why security prices fluctuate. 

• They may change because of, in the absence of, or in complete indifference to changes in underlying value. 
• In the short run investor perception may be as important as reality itself in determining security prices. 
• It is never clear which future events are anticipated by investors and thus already reflected in today's security prices. 

Because security prices can change for any number of reasons and because it is impossible to know what expectations are reflected in any given price level,  investors must look beyond security prices to underlying business value, always comparing the two as part of the investment process.


Main Point: 
Investors will frequently not know why security prices fluctuate and must look beyond security prices to underlying business value, always comparing the two as part of the investment process

If you are buying sound value at a discount, do short-term price fluctuations matter?

In the long run, they do not matter much; value will ultimately be reflected in the price of a security.  

• Indeed, ironically, the long-term investment implication of price fluctuations is in the opposite direction from the near-term market impact.  
• For example, short-term price declines actually enhance the returns of long-term investors.  

There are, however several eventualities in which near-term price fluctuations do matter to investors. 

1.  Security holders who need to sell in a hurry are at the mercy of market prices.  The trick of successful investors is to sell when they want to, not when they have to.  Investors who may need to sell should not own marketable securities other than U.S. Treasury bills.

2.  Near-term security prices also matter to investors in a troubled company.  If a business must raise additional capital in the near term to survive, investors in its securities may have their fate determined, at least in part, by the prevailing market price of the company's stock and bonds.

3.  The third reason long-term-oriented investors are interested in short-term price fluctuations is that Mr. Market can create very attractive opportunities to buy and sell.

• If you hold cash, you are able to take advantage of such opportunities.  If you are fully invested when the market declines, your portfolio will likely drop in value, depriving you of the benefits arising from the opportunity to buy in at lower levels.  This creates an opportunity cost, the necessity to forego future opportunities that arise.  
• If what you hold is illiquid or unmarketable, the opportunity cost increases further; the illiquidity precludes your switching to better bargains.

Investors should expect prices to fluctuate

The Relevance of Temporary Price Fluctuations

In addition to the probability of permanent loss attached to investment, there is also the possibility of interim price fluctuations that are unrelated to underlying value.

Many investors consider price fluctuations to be a significant risk:  if the price goes down, the investment is seen as risky regardless of the fundamentals.

But are temporary price fluctuations really a risk?

• Not in the way that permanent value impairments are and 
• then only for certain investors in specific situations.

It is, of course, not always easy for investors to distinguish temporary price volatility, related to the short-term forces of supply and demand, from price movements related to business fundamentals.  The reality may only become apparent after the fact.

While investors should obviously try to avoid overpaying for investments or buying into businesses that subsequently decline in value due to deteriorating results, it is not possible to avoid random short-term market volatility.  

Indeed, investors should expect prices to fluctuate and should not invest in securities if they cannot tolerate some volatility.

Comparing equity yields with term deposits is lazy

Marcus Padley
December 3, 2011

I have been getting a little bit irritated by the constant comparisons between the yield on equities and the yield on a bond or term deposit.

The argument goes that equity yields are now higher than bond yields and also higher than term deposits, so you should switch.

But the truth is that a comparison of the returns on term deposits or bonds with equity yields is simply lazy and ridiculous and reckless, because it misses the point about why people are in term deposits in the first place.

Let me explain by taking a well-known income stock - the National Australia Bank, one of the highest-yielding and safest blue-chip stocks in the market. The yield on the NAB is 7.5 per cent - 10.7 per cent including franking. That, everyone will tell you, is cheap and the argument is that all you mugs holding term deposits earning just 5.5 per cent are idiots because you get a whole extra 2.2 per cent in the NAB or 5.2 per cent including franking.

Fair enough, until you consider this exercise.



Get a chart up of the NAB over the last year (one year will do). Now mark off the peaks and troughs since January and calculate how many and how big the variations have been. You will find that the NAB has had 10 fluctuations. Five rallies and five falls.

The size of the rallies has been +12.8 per cent, +17.8 per cent, +8.3 per cent, +23.2 per cent and +26.9 per cent. The falls have been -9.8 per cent, -15.3 per cent, -23.9 per cent, -13.5 per cent and -18.7 per cent and if we picked a smaller-income stock or took NAB out over a longer period, it would be even more dramatic.



Now tell me after 10 moves of more than 7.5 per cent in just a year that I should be worrying about the 7.5 per cent yield on the NAB. Now tell me, amid that volatility and instability, that I should mention the yield on the NAB and the yield on a risk-free term deposit or bond in the same breath. Now tell me the prudence behind selling my term deposit and buying the NAB.


The NAB and almost all other income stocks in the current market, are not stable low-risk investments; they are volatile trading stocks and the message is clear and let's make it clearer, once and for all. You cannot compare the yield on an equity to the yield on a bond because one includes no risk of a capital loss (no risk of a gain either) and the other contains a currently huge perceived risk of a capital loss (or gain).

Promoting income stocks because they yield more than a bond is ignoring that extra risk and misunderstanding why people are now in bonds and term deposits. They are there because they don't want to lose any more money. Because they don't want volatility.

The only way to compare equities to bonds or equities to term deposits is if the equities came with a price guarantee, which they don't, or if you compare risk-free yields with the expected total return from equities, which includes the extra volatility and risk and not just the dividends.

In the current market, equities are nothing like a bond or term deposit because share-price risk is dominating the investment decision not the yield. Do you really think people are in term deposits to make 5.5 per cent? No, they are in term deposits to avoid losing money. The focus is on the risk not the return. Risk rules.

But it's not all gloom. The good news is that this is not a normal state of affairs. The sharemarket is supposed to be about opportunity not risk and the fact that risk is so in focus means the opportunity side of the equation is being ignored.

Also, risk can change very quickly. Ahead of the last European Union summit the market jumped 11 per cent in four days on lower perceived equity risk. The banks jumped 19.2 per cent. If the GFC doesn't reignite, the focus is going to very rapidly swing back to yields and price-to-earnings (PE) ratios. If the GFC is behind us, how long do you think the NAB is going to trade on a 10.7 per cent yield and the market on a PE of 10.7 times against a long-term average of 14 times?

Not long. In which case the game now is not debating the marginal merits of term deposits versus equities but waiting for a chink of light in the outlook for risk, because that is all that matters and because when it appears, the herd is going to smash down the door to get to those yields and PEs.

At the moment they don't believe in them. Your job is to be on the ball on the day they do.

Marcus Padley is a stockbroker with Patersons Securities and the author of sharemarket newsletter Marcus Today. His views do not necessarily reflect those of Patersons.



Read more: http://www.smh.com.au/money/investing/comparing-equity-yields-with-term-deposits-is-lazy-20111202-1oakh.html#ixzz1jkzaigzd

Redefining Risk. Realistic definition of Risk.

Redefining Risk

Risk was the chance that you might not meet your long-term investment goals. 

And the greatest enemy of reaching those goals:  inflation. 

Nothing is safe from inflation. 

It's major victims are savings accounts, T-bills, bonds, and other types of fixed-income investments.

Investors usually use Treasury bills as their benchmark for risk. These are considered risk-free because their nominal value can't go down. However, T-bills and bonds are in fact highly risky because of their susceptibility to inflation.




Realistic definition of Risk

A realistic definition of risk recognizes the potential loss of capital through inflation and taxes, and includes:

1. The probability your investment will preserve your capital over your investment time horizon.

2. The probability your investments will outperform alternative investments during the period.

Short-term stock price volatility is not risk. Avoid investment advice based on volatility.

So if volatility is not risk, what is your major risk?

The major risk is not the short-term stock price volatility that many thousands of academic articles have been written about. 

Rather it is the possibility of not reaching your long-term investment goal through the growth of your funds in real terms. 

To measure monthly or quarterly volatility and call it risk - for investors who have time horizons 5, 10, 15 or even 30 years away - is a completely inappropriate definition. (David Dreman)


Take Home Lesson

Using Dreman's definition of risk, stocks are actually the safest investment out there over the long term. 

Investors who put some or most of their money into bonds and other investments on the assumption they are lowering their risk are, in fact, deluding themselves.

"Indeed, it goes against the principle we were taught from childhood - that the safest way to save was putting our money in the bank." 

Buy-and-Hold: Golden Strategy That Takes an Iron Will

Buy-and-Hold: Golden Strategy That Takes an Iron Will

August 10, 1997|TOM PETRUNO

http://articles.latimes.com/1997/aug/10/business/fi-21077/2

Anne Scheiber's life was no happy tale. Embittered after the federal government failed to promote her from her IRS auditing job at the end of 1944, she retired and spent the next 51 years mostly alone, living on the Westside of Manhattan.

Her only hobby was investing. She apparently put every penny she had into stocks, rarely selling, her broker would later explain.

By the time she died in 1995, Scheiber had amassed a $22-million fortune in about 100 stocks--all of which she left to a stunned, but grateful, Yeshiva University.

If Scheiber's story is something of a cliche--"aged, frugal recluse buys and holds stocks, leaves millions to charity"--it's too bad we all can't be beneficiaries of such cliches.

But then, many investors have in fact benefited handsomely in the 1990s from the same basic investment philosophy: Just buy stocks and don't sell them. Period.

The proven long-term success of buy-and-hold is the basis for the retirement savings plan boom of the past decade, of course. Americans are encouraged to invest regularly in the market, avoid the temptation to sell when stocks suddenly sink, and trust that when retirement happens in 10, 20 or 30 years, a hefty nest egg will be there to fund it.

And why doubt that? Since Dec. 31, 1989, the Dow Jones industrial average has risen 192%, from 2,753.20 to 8,031.22 at Friday's close.

Even better: Measured from the start of the 1980s bull market on Aug. 13, 1982, the Dow has increased a spectacular tenfold.

What's more, if buy-and-hold still is good enough for Warren Buffett--perhaps the greatest living spokesmodel for that investment style--it still should be good enough for the rest of us, right?

Yet as stock prices have zoomed this year, adding to the huge gains of 1995 and 1996, many investors have understandably grown uneasy. The nagging worry is that stocks might have reached such historically high levels that buying and holding at these prices may never pay off.

On days like Friday--when the Dow sank 156.78 points, or 1.9%, as bond yields surged on concerns about the economy's growth rate--investors' darkest concerns about the market's future can surface.

*

Is there a danger in trusting buy-and-hold at this point?


Certainly not if you have 51 years, like Anne Scheiber did. Academic studies show that the longer your time horizon, the lower the possibility of losing money in stocks.

That's not terribly surprising: Over time, the economy's natural tendency is to grow, because humankind's tendency is to strive to achieve more. If you own stocks, you own a piece of the economy--so you participate in its growth.

But over shorter periods--and that includes periods as long as a decade--it is indeed possible to lose money in stocks. Consider: The Dow index was at 890 on Dec. 31, 1971. Ten years later, on Dec. 31, 1981, the Dow was at 875. Your return after a decade of buy-and-hold was a negative 1.7%.

True, the 1970s were a miserable time for financial assets overall, as inflation soared with rocketing oil prices, sending interest rates soaring as well. But we don't even have to look back that far to discover just how difficult it can be to stick with a buy-and-hold strategy.

From the late 1980s through 1991, major drug stocks such as Merck & Co. and Pfizer Inc. were among Wall Street's favorites. They were well-run businesses, and the long-term demand for their products seemed assured.

By December 1991, Merck was trading at $56 a share, or a lofty 31 times its earnings per share that year.

Then came the Clinton administration's push for national health care. Suddenly, the drug companies found their pricing policies under attack. The stellar long-term earnings growth that Wall Street anticipated seemed very much in doubt. And the stocks fell into a decline that lasted more than two years and which shaved 40% to 50% from their peak 1991 prices.

Merck, for example, bottomed at $28.13 in 1994, which meant a paper loss of 50% for someone who bought at the peak in 1991.

If that had been you, could you have held through that horrendous decline? You should have: Today, Merck is at $98.81 a share, or 76% above its 1991 year-end level. After restructuring its business, Merck's earnings began to surge again in 1995 and 1996.

And this year, the drug stocks have once again become market darlings. But therein lies the problem: Merck is again trading for a high price-to-earnings ratio--26 times estimated 1997 results.

*

That doesn't necessarily mean that Merck is primed to drop 50%, as it did in 1992-94. But it does mean that if you own that stock--any stock, for that matter--you must allow for the possibility of a deep decline from these current high levels, something much worse than the just-short-of-10% pullbacks the market has experienced twice in the last 14 months.

Anne Scheiber, angry recluse that she was said to be, somehow managed to show no emotion at all about the stock market's many ups and downs in her 51 years of investing. A cynic might say she had nothing on which to spend her money, anyway. But the point is, she managed to remain true to buy-and-hold, when many other investors were probably selling out at the market's lows.

Mark Hulbert, editor of the Hulbert Financial Digest newsletter in Alexandria, Va., and a student of market history, worries that too few investors will have Scheiber's iron stomach when the tide eventually turns for the market overall, as it did for the drug stocks in 1992.

"I am cynical about all of these people genuflecting at the altar of buy-and-hold," Hulbert says. "They're not buy-and-hold--that's just what is working now," so investors are happy to go with the flow, he says.

Most investors, Hulbert maintains, are too new to the market to imagine how psychologically painful a major and sustained loss in their portfolio would be.

What is key to judging how much of your assets should be in stocks is your tolerance for risk, your tolerance for loss and, of course, your time horizon. But as a simple rule of thumb, many Warren Buffett disciples like to use this line: If, for whatever reason, you can't take a temporary, 50% loss in your portfolio, then you don't belong in the stock market.

For the relative handful of pros who really invest like Buffett, what the market does on a short-term basis isn't important. Their faith in buying and holding stocks derives from their long-term faith in the underlying businesses.

George Mairs, the 69-year-old manager of the $324-million Mairs & Power growth stock fund in St. Paul, Minn., owns just 33 stocks in the fund. He is among the least active traders in the fund business--he almost never sells. And his results speak for themselves: Mairs & Power Growth has beaten the Standard & Poor's 500 index every year in this decade.

Does Mairs fear that buy-and-hold isn't a great idea at these market levels? Hardly. High-quality stocks aren't cheap, he says, but neither does he find them to be drastically overpriced. "It's the long-term earnings stream that we look at," he says. "If the earnings are going to be there, we don't worry too much.

"What we want to do is own businesses," Mairs says. "If we like a business for the long term, we don't worry about what the stock value is on a week-to-week basis."

(BEGIN TEXT OF INFOBOX / INFOGRAPHIC)


How Patient Can You Be?

"Buy and hold" sounds great on paper, but it can require enormous patience. Major drug stocks, for example, soared 94% between March, 1990 and December, 1991, as measured by the Standard & Poor's index of five major drug companies. But when the threat of federalized health care surfaced in 1992, drug stocks began a sustained decline that lasted more than two years--and slashed the S&P drug index by 42%. With the stocks again rocketing this year, 1992-1994 stands as a sobering reminder of how bad things can get. S&P drug stock index, quarterly closes and latest



Source: Bloomberg News

Tips on how to invest during turbulent times

Tuesday October 25, 2011

Singular Vision - By Teoh Kok Lin

STOCK markets around the world lately gave investors that sinking feeling again, weighed down by deepening woes of Europe's sovereign debts, an anemic US economy and new fears of a sharp economic slowdown in China.

Many investors sold shares to hold more cash, despite cash earning very little interest. In Singapore for example, six months USD fixed deposits of less than US$1mil earns zero interest in some banks.

In the United States, 10-year Treasury bonds are yielding 2.1% per annum; despite misery returns, many investors prefer the safety of US Treasuries during crisis times, while waiting for policymakers to act boldly and markets to stabilise.

At the same time, we see many economists and other pundits offer a whole host of predictions about today's global financial predicaments. The many predictions range from the slightly hopeful to the pessimistic, right down to the disastrous and absurd.

Does it sound familiar? Did we not hear many such predictions during the 2008/2009 global financial crisis? Who should we listen to? What should one do?

No doubt in hindsight, a few forecasts will be correct; and as the dust settles, many extreme predictions will also likely be forgotten. Yet for investors today, separating much of the “noise” from facts is one of the more tricky parts of steering through these very challenging times.

Fundamentals and valuation takes a back seat during a crisis

Volatile stock markets today are driven by latest positive or negative news flow affecting sentiment. Uncertainties during a crisis causes investment risks to spike, stock investors tend to sell first and ask questions later; fundamentals and stock valuation typically takes a back seat in the short term.

No doubt many investors worry about negative impact to a company's fundamentals in difficult times. For example, a manufacturing company's stock with a present price earning (PE) multiple of six times can change drastically to 60 times PE if earnings were to collapse 90% because of a global financial crisis.

Similarly, a property company's price to book value discount of 60% can easily drop to 30% if asset value is marked down by half in troubled times. Monitoring, reassessments and analysis of a company's financial progress is obviously important during tumultuous times.

Share prices of companies (even those with good fundamentals) may continue to fall indiscriminately, due to many reasons such as panic selling, fund redemption and repatriation. Investors should tread cautiously, even if stock prices may appear to be at very attractive levels.

I relate a challenging experience from the last global stock market plunge. In 2008, I invested in the largest luxury watch distributor and retailer in China (at that time 210 stores and sales amounting to 5.5 billion yuan a year or about 30% market share).

This Hong Kong listed Chinese company sells luxury watches (such as Omega, Longines, Bvlgari) from global brand owners Swatch group of Switzerland and LVMH of France (both by the way are also 9.1% and 6.3% shareholders of this Chinese company respectively).

As the US sub-prime mortgage crisis deepens by end-July 2008, many stocks around the world plunged. This company's shares similarly dropped from HK$2 to HK$1.50 in a matter of weeks.

We vigorously reassessed the company's fundamentals, including visits to retail outlets in China and Hong Kong. The result was an affirmation of our conviction to invest in the company for the long-term, despite short-term price weakness.

By late September 2008, we decided to purchase more shares when valuation proved so attractive at HK$1.15 per share (at a PE multiple of eight times).

Unfortunately, as the global financial crisis worsened, the company's shares continued to plunge and bottomed to a low of HK$0.51 by Nov 26, 2008.

This stock eventually recovered back to HK$2 per share (by June 1, 2009) and went on to exceed HK$5 per share by late 2010. The company's share prices recovered partly because Asian equities rebounded quickly in 2009, but also reached new highs because the company's fundamentals continue to improve with strong sales (+49%), profitability (+26%) and expansions (+140 stores to 350 stores) from 2008 to 2010.

A lesson if you will that during a crisis, one should be prepared for short-term (weeks and months) stock market volatility.

It is essential for bargain hunters to have long-term holding power, good understanding of company fundamentals and strong conviction on a company's prospect. In the long-term, we know fundamentals and valuation does matter.

How does one invest during a time of crisis?

My approaches to investing in turbulent times are:

Search for and invest (when valuations are attractive) in well managed companies that will not only survive but emerge stronger from crisis times;

Be prepared to stomach stock market volatility in the months ahead;

Have a longer term investment horizon (perhaps two to three years); once this crisis dissipates, reap the rewards as stock markets recover.

In Asia, macroeconomic fundamentals likely will remain resilient as many Asian economies have strong foreign currency reserves, coupled with more fiscal and monetary policy options to support growth.

China is also likely to withstand any fallout from Europe better than most would think. China's economy is still growing at a strong 9.1% gross domestic product growth for the third quarter of 2011; speculations about China's economy crashing may be somewhat premature at this stage.

Similarly, I think many established Asian companies have sufficient resources be it cash, borrowing powers or human capital, to emerge out of these turbulent times faster and stronger than before.

I believe with increasingly attractive valuation, the investing risk-reward equation (potential downside risk versus long term return prospects) favors Asian equities in the long run. I have confidence investing in Asia's fundamentals and Asian companies for many more years ahead.

Teoh Kok Lin is the founder and chief investment officer of Singular Asset Management Sdn Bhd