Tuesday, 29 August 2017

Loss arising from demerger drags UMW Holdings deeper into the red in 2Q


Tan Xue Ying/theedgemarkets.com
August 28, 2017 21:24 pm MYT

KUALA LUMPUR (Aug 28): UMW Holdings Bhd's quarterly net loss widened to RM209.3 million from RM12.13 million, dragged down by one-off losses arising from its demerger exercise of associate UMW Oil & Gas Corp Bhd (UMW-OG).

For the second quarter ended June 30, 2017 (2QFY17), the Group posted 2.54% growth in revenue, from RM2.72 billion to RM2.79 billion, mainly attributed to higher top line contribution from its automotive business segment.

Losses per share expanded to 17.92 sen from 1.04 sen in 2QFY16, according to the filing with Bursa Malaysia this evening.

UMW Holdings noted that for the first six-month period ended June 30 (1HFY17), UMW Holdings posted net loss of RM189.14 million, compared with a net profit of RM4.45 million in the previous corresponding period.

This is despite a 14.2% year-on-year revenue growth for the cumulative period, from RM4.83 billion to RM5.51 billion.

For the quarter under review, the group said in its bourse filing that while its automotive business segment enjoyed higher revenue due to the surge in demand for Toyota Innova and Fortuner models, margins were crimped by the higher cost of imports with the strengthening of the US dollar.

Its equipment segment delivered consistent revenue in the quarter, however with lower earnings seen amid squeezed margins.

The group's manufacturing and engineering segment was loss-making in 2QFY17, due to pre-operating expenses incurred for its aerospace business.

Losses at its unlisted oil & gas segment widened in 2QFY17 due to the lower revenue and redundancy expenses incurred on the cessation of drilling operations in Oman.

“As per our strategy, we have successfully completed the demerger within the said timeframe and the exit will provide the platform for the group to emerge as a stronger, more competitive industrial conglomerate with increased capacity for expansion.

“The demerger has resulted in reduced exposure to debt and a strengthened balance sheet, thus improving our financial position to enable new and accretive investments which will spur the growth of our core business segments moving forward”, said UMW Holdings' president and group chief executive officer, Badrul Feisal Abdul Rahim, in a statement.

He added that UMW Holdings’ overall performance will continue to be impacted by headwinds in the oil & gas sector until full completion of the exit plan, and gave assurance that there may be considerable milestones achieved by the end of the year.

On a more positive note, it said that UMW Toyota Motor is on track to achieve its full-year sales target of 70,000 units for 2017, and that its fan case project is progressing as per schedule and delivery is expected to commence in the final quarter of this year.

UMW Holdings’ share price has climbed 36% year to date, rising from the low of RM4.22 end-2016 to RM5.75 today with market capitalisation of RM6.65 billion.


Monday, 28 August 2017

Aeon Credit ICULS

Some notes extracted from a blog.


my understanding of iculs is a kind of loan. after the expired, it will automatically convert to common share, by the fixed convertion rate. 
1st time subcrip of right 2000LA with cost RM2000, it is equal to 181.98 shares 3yrs later. 
After 3yrs, 181.98shares will credit to your account. No need to pay rm10.99 for convertion


you can buy the ICULS because it is 2 for 1 share, mean if you have 100 units share you can buy 200 units ICULS, and it is round number lot. After that you have 3 years time to sell the ICULS at anytime if you don't convert them to share. If you convert to share, you may have odd lot.


For those who dont understand why share price drop from 12.80 to 12.52, I will show you the calculation 

for example if you have 
109900 units of AEONCR you will be entitled 219800 units of AEONCR-LR,219800 units of AEONCR-LR can be converted to 20000 units of AEONCR 

so today open price=(109900*12.8+109900*2)/(109900+20000)=12.52


To subscribe the Iculs is a form of hedging on future price increase; much the same as airline's forward purchase of their fuel requirement. Of course the outcome can go either way. One pays RM 10.99 + RM 1.00 to lock in the mother share's price 3 years down the road. In view of the potential of Aeoncr, it is a portfolio worth locking in.


We get LR (right) now. We can then buy LA (ICULS) with RM1 each. After we have LA, we have option to convert this LA to mother share (no cash involved) anytime from day 1 to 3 years time. After 3 years, all remaining LA will auto convert to mother share. 

LR or later LA most probably will have premium (over price) because these financial derivatives have gearing ratio to their mother share. For instance you can now see the Aeoncr rose from RM12.44 to RM12.60 (+1.2%), but the Aeoncr-LR has risen from RM0.13 to RM0.20 (+53.8%). So over price is acceptable in this case.


You don't pay rm10.99+rm1 for the share. You subscribe to the ICULS at rm1 and you can convert 10.99 of your ICULS to the mother share when you like from issued date to 3 years time.


Aeoncr-LR is not the same as aeoncr-LA(loan stock) , a lot of ppl kind of confused here. The aeoncr-LR is a right for you to exercise to buy aeoncr-LA and will expiring on 28-8-17, the Aeoncr-LR of what existing aeoncr shareholder received will become worthless after 28-8-17. For those who exercise their right and pay to buy Aeoncr-LA. You will receive Aeoncr-La after ceasation of the right and you have another right to convert your loan stock to the mother shares at 10.99 anytime within 3 years (or mandatory conversion on the end of 3rd year) with no conversion fee as you already pay to exercise your right before.


Learning from Philip Fisher and Walter Schloss

A Dozen Things I’ve Learned from Philip Fisher and Walter Schloss About Investing By Tren Griffin

1. “I had made what I believe was one of the more valuable decisions of my business life. This was to confine all efforts solely to making major gains in the long-run…. There are two fundamental approaches to  investment.  There’s the approach Ben Graham pioneered, which is to find  something intrinsically so cheap that there is little chance of it having a big  decline. He’s got financial safeguards to that. It isn’t going to go down much,  and sooner or later value will come into it.  Then there is my approach, which is to find  something so good–if you don’t pay too much for it–that it will have very,  very large growth. The advantage is that a bigger percentage of my stocks is apt  to perform in a smaller period of time–although it has taken several years for  some of these to even start, and you’re bound to make some mistakes at it. [But]  when a stock is really unusual, it makes the bulk of its moves in a relatively  short period of time.”  Phil Fisher understood (1) trying to predict the direction  of a market or stock in the short-term is not a game where one can have an advantage versus the house (especially after fees); and (2) his approach was different from Ben Graham.
2. “I don’t want a lot of good investments; I want a few outstanding ones…. I believe that the greatest long-range investment profits are never obtained by investing in marginal companies.”  Warren Buffett once said: “I’m 15%  Fisher and 85% Benjamin Graham.”  Warren Buffett is much more like Fisher in 2013 than the 15% he once specified, but only he knows how much. It was the influence of Charlie Munger which moved Buffet away from a Benjamin Graham approach and their investment in See’s Candy  was an early example in which Berkshire paid up for a “quality” company.  Part of the reason this shift happened is that the sorts of companies that Benjamin Graham liked no longer existed the further way the time period was from the depression.
3. “The wise investor can profit if he can think independently of the crowd and reach the rich answer when the majority of financial opinion is leaning the other way. This matter of training oneself not to go with the crowd but to  be able to zig when the crowd zags, in my opinion, is one of the most important fundamentals of investment success.”The inevitable math is that you can’t beat the crowd if you are the crowd, especially after fees are deducted.
4. “Usually a very long list of securities is not a sign of the brilliant investor, but of one who is unsure of himself. … Investors have been so oversold on diversification that fear of having too many eggs in one basket has caused  them to put far too little into companies they thoroughly know and far too much in others which they know nothing about.” For the “know-something” active investor like Phil Fisher, wide diversification is a form of closet indexing.  A “know-something”  active investor must focus on a relatively small number of stocks if he or she expects to outperform a market.  By contrast, “know-nothing” investors (i.e., muppets) should buy a low fee index fund.
5. “If the job has been correctly done when a common stock is purchased, the time to sell it is almost never.” Phil Fisher preferred a holding period of almost forever (e.g., Fisher bought Motorola in 1955 and held it until 2004). The word “almost” is important since every company is in danger of losing its moat.
6. “Great stocks are extremely hard to find. If they weren’t, then everyone would own them.  The record is crystal clear that fortune – producing growth stocks can be found. However, they cannot be found without hard work and they  cannot be found every day.”  Fisher believed that the “fat pitch” investment opportunity is delivered rarely and only to those investors who are willing to patiently work to find them.
7. “Focus on buying these companies when they are out of favor, that is when, either because of general market conditions or because the financial community at the moment has misconceptions of its true worth, the stock is selling  at prices well under what it will be when it’s true merit is better understood.” Like Howard Marks, Fisher believed that (1) business cycles and (2) changes in Mr. Market’s attitude are inevitable.  By focusing on the value of individual stocks (rather than just price) the  investor can best profit from these inevitable swings.
8. “The successful investor is usually an individual who is inherently interested in business problems.” A stock is a part ownership of a business. If you do not understand the business you do not understand that stock.  If you  do not understand the business you are investing in you are a speculator, not an investor.
9. “The stock market is filled with individuals who know the price of everything, but the value of nothing.” Price is what you pay and value is what you get.  By focusing on value Fisher was able to outperform as an investor even  though he did not look for cigar butts.
10. “It is not the profit margins of the past but those of the future that are basically important to the investor.” Too often people believe that the best prediction about the future is that it is an extension of the recent past.
11. “There is a complicating factor that makes the handling of investment mistakes more difficult. This is the ego in each of us. None of us likes to admit to himself that he has been wrong. If we have made a mistake in buying a stock  but can sell the stock at a small profit, we have somehow lost any sense of having been foolish. On the other hand, if we sell at a small loss we are quite unhappy about the whole matter. This reaction, while completely natural and normal, is probably one  of the most dangerous in which we can indulge ourselves in the entire investment process. More money has probably been lost by investors holding a stock they really did not want until they could ‘at least come out even’ than from any other single reason. If  to these actual losses are added the profits that might have been made through the proper reinvestment of these funds if such reinvestment had been made when the mistake was first realized, the cost of self-indulgence becomes truly tremendous.”  Fisher  was very aware of the problems that loss aversion bias can cause.
12. “Conservative investors sleep well.”  If you are having trouble sleeping due to worrying about your portfolio, reducing risk is wise. Life is too short to not sleep well, but also fear can result in mistakes.
Walter Schloss
1. “I think investing is an art, and we tried to be as logical and unemotional as possible. Because we understood that investors are usually affected by the market, we could take advantage of the market by being rational. As [Benjamin]  Graham said, ‘The market is there to serve you, not to guide you!’.”  Walter Schloss was the closest possible match to the investing style of Benjamin Graham.  No one else more closely followed the “cigar butt” style of investing of Benjamin Graham.  In  other words, if being like Benjamin Graham was a game of golf, Walter Schloss was “closest to the pin.”  He was a man of his times and those times included the depression which had a profound impact on him.  While his exact style of investing is not possible  today, today’s investor’s still can learn from Walter Schloss.  It is by combining the best of investors like Phil Fisher and Walter Schloss and matching it to their unique skills and personality that investors will find the best results.  Warren  Buffet once wrote in a letter:  “Walter outperforms managers who work in temples filled with paintings, staff and computers… by rummaging among the cigar butts on the floor of capitalism.”   When Walter’s son told him no such cigar butt companies existed any  longer Walter told his son it was time to close the firm.  The other focus of Walter Schloos was low fees and costs. When it came to keeping overhead and investing expenses low, Walter Schloss was a zealot.
2. “I try to establish the value of the company.  Remember that a share of stock represents a part of a business and is not just a piece of paper. … Price is the most important factor to use in relation to value…. I believe stocks  should be evaluated based on intrinsic worth, NOT on whether they are under or over priced in relationship with each other…. The key to the purchase of an undervalued stock is its price COMPARED to its intrinsic worth.”
3.”I like Ben’s analogy that one should buy stocks the way you buy groceries not the way you buy perfume… keep it simple and try not to use higher mathematics in you analysis.” Keeping emotion out of the picture was a key part of  the Schloss style. Like Ben Graham he as first and foremost rational.
4. “If a stock is cheap, I start buying. I never put a stop loss on my holdings because if I like a stock in the first place, I like it more if it goes down. Somehow I find it difficult to buy a stock that has gone up.” 
5. “I don’t like stress and prefer to avoid it, I never focus too much on market news and economic data. They always worry investors!” Like all great investors in this series, the focus of Schloss was on individual companies not  the macro economy.  Simpler systems are orders of magnitude easier to understand for an investor.
6. “The key to successful investing is to relate value to price today.” Not only did Schloss not try to forecast the macro market, he did not really focus forecasting the future prospects of the company.  This was very different  than the Phil Fisher approach which was focused on future earnings.
7. “I like the idea of owning a number of stocks. Warren Buffet is happy owning a few stocks, and he is right if he is Warren….” Schloss was a value investor who also practiced diversification.  Because of his focus on obscure  companies and the period in which he was investing, Walter was able to avoid closet indexing.
8. “We don’t own stocks that we’d never sell.  I guess we are a kind of store that buys goods for inventory (stocks) and we’d like to sell them at a profit within 4 years if possible.”  This is very different from a Phil Fisher  approach where his favorite holding period is almost forever. Schloss once said in a Colombia Business school talk that he owned “some 60-75 stocks”.
9.  “Remember the word compounding.  For example, if you can make 12% a year and reinvest the money back, you will double your money in 6 years, taxes excluded.  Remember the rule of 72.  Your rate of return into 72 will tell you  the number of years to double your money.” Schloss felt that “compounding could offset [any advantage created by] the fellow who was running around visiting managements.”
10.  “The ability to think clearly in the investment field without the emotions that are attached to it is not an easy undertaking. Fear and greed tend to affect one’s judgment.” Schloss was very self-aware and matched his investment  style to his personality. He said once” We try to do what is comfortable for us.”
11. “Don’t buy on tips or for a quick move.”
12.  “In thinking about how one should invest, it is important to look at you strengths and weaknesses. …I’m not very good at judging people. So I found that it was much better to look at the figures rather than people.” Schloss knew  that Warren Buffett was a better judge of people than he was so Walter’s approach was almost completely quantitative.  Schloss knew to stay within his “circle of competence”.  Schloss said once: “Ben Graham didn’t visit management because he thought figure told  the story.”


  1. http://klse.i3investor.com/blogs/www.eaglevisioninvest.com/130959.jsp

Saturday, 26 August 2017

PNB Investments in Bursa Malaysia (10.3% of the market cap of Bursa Malaysia.)

Market cap of Bursa Malaysia is RM 1,814.59 billion.

PNB owns 10.3% or RM 186.2 billion of Bursa Malaysia.


Putting the Bursa Malaysia in Perspective

The market cap of Berkshire Hathaway is 1.55x  that of the market cap of Bursa Malaysia.

Berkshire Hathaway is listed in NYSE

1 U.S. = RM 4.26

Its equity is US 286.4 billion or RM 1,220.1 billion.

Its market cap based on its share price of US 267,377 per share on 19.8.2017 is US 659.4 billion or RM 2,809.0 billion.

How Warren Buffett built his fortune

How Warren Buffett built his fortune

The more you learn, the more you earn.
- Warren Buffett

Sometimes success is the product of being in the right place at the right time, being born into the right conditions, getting the right piece of advice, or perhaps even having that one-in-a-million moment of perfect insight. Other times, it is the product of seeming inevitability.

This last one is the case of the man we are looking at today. To be clear, this is not a born into wealth kind of story. Quite the contrary, Warren Buffett was born into a working class family in 1930.

So what is the secret of his success? How did this seemingly ordinary guy accomplish what we are all trying to accomplish? Most importantly, if he really was like any of us, how can we say that his rise was essentially inevitable?

There is almost certainly something that has to be original and unborn when we speak about someone as being inevitable. Case and point, Buffett was 7 years old when he read the book One Thousand Ways to Make $1000.

He made his first transactions at that age, buying and selling Coca-cola (bottles not stock) for extra cash. This is of course deliciously ironic because today Buffett is one of the major stockholders of Coca-cola. At an age when most kids are watching television and spending time in the playground, Buffett was already wheeling and dealing. Ask him about it, "I like numbers," he would reply.

Despite his obvious natural inclination, perhaps what really made Buffett the man he is today were the early defeats and the perseverance he had to cultivate, as well as his pioneering spirit.

As a young man, he loved learning and competition but faltered academically. He ended up at the unimpressive University of Nebraska. After completing his degree he interviewed for Harvard Business School but was turned down. Many would have given up but he tried again.

At Columbia, Buffett found what every success story needs, mentors. Ben Graham and David Dodd would become his guides in his early forays into the investing world. Graham gave him the "two rules of investing":

Rule #1: "Never lose money."
Rule #2: "Never forget Rule #1."

Too often, when one finds a way that works, a path to follow, then that becomes enough. Ben Graham, in particular, provided Buffett with a formula for investing wisely, investing safely and profitably.

Had Buffett taken this formula as his own, and merely followed the path, would he be a household name today? We will never know the answer to that. What we do know however is that Buffett followed his mentor to a point and then blazed his own path according to his own original understanding.

There was a fundamental choice that Buffett had to make in parting ways with his mentor and it is a philosophical divide that made Buffett who he is today.

At the heart of the Buffett philosophy is the idea of compounding wealth. Where some would be content taking $100 and safely making 15%, Buffett was about, eschewing safety, taking that same amount and turning it into $2700. In other words, growing rich was always the end goal.

The Magic of Compounding Interest.
Warren Buffett Net Worth
source: dadaviz.com

What is fascinating about Buffett's approach is that he would often buy the exact same stocks as other investors - as his own mentors - but somehow get better results. How is this possible?! Buffett says about himself, that it is not that he had better ideas than other investors, but that he simply had less bad ones. In other words, where some would diversify for safety, he would "focus" on his best ideas and invest as much money as possible in them.

Despite the clarity of his vision, there were some significant setbacks. Out of Columbia, he wanted to go to work for the investment firm of Benjamin Graham, his mentor.

He offered to work for free and was rejected. He went back to Omaha, bought a gas station and it too faltered. Again, Buffett persevered and while still in his early twenties, in buying up the stock of a then little-known company called Geico, he applied that "no-holds-barred" approach that would become his trademark.

First came trying to figure out if Geico was indeed a good company to invest in. Buffett did his research. How? He got on a train from New York to Washington D.C., to the company's headquarters and literally knocked on Geico’s front door.

The man who answered was Lorimer Davidson the future CEO of Geico. Buffett pelted Davidson with in-depth questions for hours and once he was convinced that the company had a bright future, Buffett got back on the train and headed back to New York where he promptly proceeded to invest two-thirds of his total net worth on the fledgling company. He believed Geico’s stock was bound to double within 5 years.

He believed in The Geico agentless business model, and went where few investors dared to go. He over-committed to a single company. In doing so he was directly contradicting his mentor’s approach. He did so, simply put, because his goal was different.

Buffett did not value safe diversification (where one invests in a great idea but also buys other safe, but mediocre stocks for safety). Buffett wanted to get rich and repeating this approach is how he did it.

After Geico, Buffett didn’t need to put 75% of his net worth on the table again, but he continued to buy the most shares possible in his best ideas.

Warren Buffett’s early career is marked by countless investments, all very different, with varied levels of success. There was Greif Brothers Cooperage, Cleveland Worsted Mills, Western Insurance, and National American Fire Insurance, among many.

What, if anything, linked all of these investments? What is the one thing that we can say Buffett looked for in a company. We know he brought an aggressive commitment to the table, so what is the unifying quality he expected his investment prospects to have? Many of Buffett’s early investments had a strong management team.

This means that Buffett thought capital was going to be used more wisely by the right management team. This idea might seem simple and commonplace at first, but it really isn’t. Too often a good investment is seen as one that goes to some sort of incredible idea, or to a wunderkind CEO, but this was not what drew his attention.

In Buffett's mind "management quality" was not a flashy, elusive concept but rather something synonymous with smart capital allocation. In other words, to this day he is not after the one-of-a-kind genius with the precious but fragile idea that will change the world. He's looking for someone who thinks like he does on issues of compounding wealth and getting that return on capital.

That's what he wants in a CEO; someone who is an investor at heart, someone who has and is aware of their competitive advantage in the marketplace; someone who has their eyes fixed on the plausibility of a substantial return on investment. The numbers, just as he is obsessed with them, he wants to see the obsession mirrored in management.

It is an interesting paradox that plays out in the investment style that made Warren Buffett who he is today. At a glance, he appears to be a risk taker, someone who deliberately avoids safety and puts himself out on a limb for a chance at the big money. Logic, however, tells us this can’t be so. Otherwise, he'd be a gambler and a half century of success would have to be attributed to luck.

That would be the wrong lesson to take away from Mr. Buffett. He is no gambler. The way a gambler rests his faith on luck, he rests his on a method, on thorough and deep research, on scrutiny. The supreme confidence he has in his investments is the product of research not just in the numbers but in the people and philosophies behind them.


Thursday, 24 August 2017

Pantech 24.8.2017

Pantech 24.8.2017
5 Years Quarterly Report History
Qtr Financial Revenue PBT  PAT PBT 
No Quarter (RM,000) (RM,000) (RM,000) Margin
1 31-May-17 151,496 17,042 13,963 11.2%
4 28-Feb-17 152,580 15,842 11,270 10.4%
3 30-Nov-16 99,080 7,930 6,385 8.0%
2 31-Aug-16 103,809 6,581 5,136 6.3%
1 31-May-16 123,943 10,325 8,089 8.3%
4 29-Feb-16 109,094 11,158 7,427 10.2%
3 30-Nov-15 144,010 14,616 11,096 10.1%
2 31-Aug-15 121,409 13,774 10,429 11.3%
1 31-May-15 138,635 13,529 9,124 9.8%
4 28-Feb-15 129,645 11,288 7,683 8.7%
3 30-Nov-14 124,049 11,572 9,081 9.3%
2 31-Aug-14 141,370 18,218 13,394 12.9%
1 31-May-14 130,678 18,097 13,584 13.8%
4 28-Feb-14 127,764 19,134 14,618 15.0%
3 30-Nov-13 131,089 16,339 12,093 12.5%
2 31-Aug-13 153,826 21,917 15,302 14.2%
1 31-May-13 162,263 18,522 13,763 11.4%
4 28-Feb-13 156,296 18,761 12,622 12.0%
3 30-Nov-12 171,520 20,878 15,613 12.2%
2 31-Aug-12 164,114 22,671 14,307 13.8%
5 Years Trailing 4 Quarters
No. Financial ttm-Rev ttm-PBT  ttm-PAT ttm-PBT 
Qtr. Quarter (RM,000) (RM,000) (RM,000) Margin
1 28-Feb-18 506,965 47,395 36,754 9.3%
4 28-Feb-17 479,412 40,678 30,880 8.5%
3 28-Feb-17 435,926 35,994 27,037 8.3%
2 28-Feb-17 480,856 42,680 31,748 8.9%
1 28-Feb-17 498,456 49,873 37,041 10.0%
4 29-Feb-16 513,148 53,077 38,076 10.3%
3 29-Feb-16 533,699 53,207 38,332 10.0%
2 29-Feb-16 513,738 50,163 36,317 9.8%
1 29-Feb-16 533,699 54,607 39,282 10.2%
4 28-Feb-15 525,742 59,175 43,742 11.3%
3 28-Feb-15 523,861 67,021 50,677 12.8%
2 28-Feb-15 530,901 71,788 53,689 13.5%
1 28-Feb-15 543,357 75,487 55,597 13.9%
4 28-Feb-14 574,942 75,912 55,776 13.2%
3 28-Feb-14 603,474 75,539 53,780 12.5%
2 28-Feb-14 643,905 80,078 57,300 12.4%
1 28-Feb-14 654,193 80,832 56,305 12.4%
4 28-Feb-13 637,160 80,221 55,003 12.6%
3 28-Feb-13 609,316 75,189 53,061 12.3%
2 28-Feb-13 550,448 68,723 47,790 12.5%  
5 Years Adjusted EPS, DPS, NTA and ttm-EPS for capital changes    
No of shares (m) 738.8
adj adj adj adj adj
Qtr Financial EPS  DPS NTA ttm-EPS ttm-DPS
No Quarter (Cent) (Cent) (RM) (Cent) (Cent)
1 31-May-17 1.89 1.0 0.73 4.97 2.16
4 28-Feb-17 1.53 0.5 0.71 4.18 1.58
3 30-Nov-16 0.86 0.2 0.69 3.66 1.49
2 31-Aug-16 0.70 0.4 0.68 4.30 1.65
1 31-May-16 1.09 0.4 0.70 5.01 1.73
4 29-Feb-16 1.01 0.4 0.68 5.15 1.72
3 30-Nov-15 1.50 0.4 0.68 5.19 2.23
2 31-Aug-15 1.41 0.5 0.65 4.92 2.29
1 31-May-15 1.24 0.4 0.63 5.32 2.58
4 28-Feb-15 1.04 0.9 0.61 5.92 2.94
3 30-Nov-14 1.23 0.5 0.61 6.86 2.76
2 31-Aug-14 1.81 0.8 0.60 7.27 3.02
1 31-May-14 1.84 0.8 0.60 7.53 3.09
4 28-Feb-14 1.98 0.7 0.56 7.55 3.15
3 30-Nov-13 1.64 0.7 0.54 7.28 3.19
2 31-Aug-13 2.07 0.9 0.52 7.76 3.22
1 31-May-13 1.86 0.8 0.53 7.62 3.11
4 28-Feb-13 1.71 0.8 0.48 7.45 2.89
3 30-Nov-12 2.11 0.8 0.47 7.18 2.91
2 31-Aug-12 1.94 0.7 0.45 6.47 2.88
Capital changes
No. Financial No of
Qtr. Quarter Shrs (m)
1 31-May-17 738.8
4 28-Feb-17 736.6
3 30-Nov-16 613.9
2 31-Aug-16 611.4
1 31-May-16 612.8
4 29-Feb-16 608.8
3 30-Nov-15 609.7
2 31-Aug-15 606.3
1 31-May-15 600.3
4 28-Feb-15 586.5
3 30-Nov-14 582.1
2 31-Aug-14 574.8
1 31-May-14 568.4
4 28-Feb-14 545.4
3 30-Nov-13 539.9
2 31-Aug-13 525.8
1 31-May-13 509.7
4 28-Feb-13 478.1
3 30-Nov-12 468.9
2 31-Aug-12 457.1
1 31-May-12 449.9
4 29-Feb-12 450.6
3 30-Nov-11 451.6
2 31-Aug-11 452.3