Showing posts with label business valuations. Show all posts
Showing posts with label business valuations. Show all posts

Saturday, 20 December 2025

Valuation: What's it worth?

 

Valuation: What's it worth?


Business Valuation: A Practical Guide for Investors

When assessing a business's worth, understand there is no single "right" answer. Valuation is a blend of art and science. Use multiple methods to triangulate a fair value, and always seek independent professional advice. Here are the four core techniques you need to know.

1. Asset Valuation (The Floor Price)

  • What it is: The business's liquidation value.

  • How it works: Assets – Liabilities = Net Asset Value.

  • Investor Insight: This sets the absolute minimum price. It tells you what you could recover if the business closed today. It ignores future profit potential and intangibles like brand reputation (goodwill). Useful for asset-heavy or underperforming businesses, but will understate the value of any profitable, going concern.

2. Capitalised Future Earnings (The Income Standard)

  • What it is: The most common method for small businesses. It values the stream of future profits.

  • How it works: (Adjusted Average Net Profit ÷ Desired Rate of Return) x 100.

  • Investor Insight: This method answers a key question: "What price gives me my target return?" The critical input is your required rate of return, which must reflect the business's risk. A higher risk demands a higher return, which lowers the price you should pay. Compare this return to other investments (e.g., stocks, bonds) to gauge attractiveness.

3. Earnings Multiple (The Market Shortcut)

  • What it is: A quick, market-driven method based on a profitability metric.

  • How it works: Earnings Before Interest & Tax (EBIT) x Industry Multiple.

  • Investor Insight: Its power is simplicity, but the multiple is everything. Multiples range widely (often 1x to 6x for private companies) based on industry, growth potential, and profit stability. Action: Consult brokers to find the current multiple for similar businesses. This method is excellent for cross-checking against the Capitalised Earnings result.

4. Comparable Sales (The Reality Check)

  • What it is: The market-based benchmark—what are similar businesses actually selling for?

  • How it works: Research recent, arms-length sales of comparable businesses in your sector.

  • Investor Insight: This grounds your valuation in market reality. Just like real estate, recent "comps" are the ultimate price determinant. Speak to multiple brokers and scan industry listings. If your calculated value is far from market prices, re-examine your assumptions.


Investor Action Plan

  1. Calculate All Four: Run the numbers using each method to establish a value range.

  2. Weight the Methods: For a profitable service business, emphasize Earnings methods. For a struggling capital-intensive firm, the Asset value may be key.

  3. Stress-Test Key Inputs: Vary your required rate of return and earnings multiple. How sensitive is the valuation?

  4. Quantify Goodwill: If paying above asset value, identify what you're paying for (customer base, location, brand). Is it transferable?

  5. Get the Data: Use Comparable Sales to anchor your offer in the real market.

  6. Engage a Professional: A business valuer or broker provides critical, objective analysis and market intelligence.

Final Warning: Valuation is the starting point for negotiation, not the final price. The true "worth" is what a informed buyer is willing to pay and a motivated seller is willing to accept, based on a disciplined analysis of these fundamentals.

Tuesday, 16 December 2025

How is a P/E multiple used? The Price/Earnings Multiple Enigma

 

How is a P/E multiple used?  The Price/Earnings Multiple Enigma


Summary

The article from November 2009 explains the Price-to-Earnings (P/E) ratio and its variants as fundamental tools for stock valuation. Key points include:

  1. Definition and Calculation:

    • The P/E ratio is calculated as the market price per share divided by earnings per share (EPS).

    • The trailing P/E uses historical (past year or last four quarters) EPS.

    • The forward P/E uses projected future EPS, which incorporates growth expectations.

  2. Usage and Interpretation:

    • P/E reflects the premium investors are willing to pay based on a company’s future growth prospects.

    • It helps assess whether a stock is overvalued or undervalued, but must be compared within context (industry, growth rates, management quality).

    • A higher P/E may indicate higher expected growth or superior company fundamentals, not necessarily overvaluation.

  3. Limitations of Historical P/E:

    • Trailing P/E fails to capture recent events (e.g., mergers) or future expectations, making forward P/E more relevant for investment decisions.

  4. Introduction to PEG (Price/Earnings-to-Growth) Ratio:

    • PEG refines P/E analysis by dividing the P/E ratio by the expected earnings growth rate (e.g., over the next 2–3 years).

    • A lower PEG suggests a more attractive investment. A rule of thumb:

      • PEG < 0.5: Undervalued

      • PEG = 1: Fairly valued

      • PEG > 2: Overvalued

  5. Important Caveats:

    • P/E cannot be used for loss-making companies (no earnings).

    • Qualitative factors (transparency, management quality) influence P/E multiples.

    • Comparisons should account for industry differences (e.g., utilities vs. tech).


Discussion and Commentary

The article remains largely relevant today, as P/E and PEG are still widely used in equity analysis. However, some nuances and modern contexts can be added:

Strengths of the Article:

  • Clarity on Forward vs. Trailing P/E: It correctly emphasizes that forward P/E is more meaningful for investment decisions, as markets are forward-looking.

  • Context Matters: It highlights that P/E cannot be viewed in isolation—industry dynamics, growth rates, and qualitative factors must be considered.

  • PEG as a Refinement: Introducing PEG helps adjust for growth, addressing a key limitation of P/E.

Limitations and Additional Considerations:

  1. Earnings Manipulation: Both trailing and forward P/E rely on reported or projected EPS, which can be distorted by accounting practices or one-time items. Analysts often use adjusted EPS to mitigate this.

  2. Interest Rate Environment: The article briefly mentions macroeconomic factors but does not deeply explore how interest rates affect P/E multiples. In low-rate eras, higher P/Es are more common (and vice versa).

  3. Sector Exceptions: While P/E works for most sectors, it is less useful for capital-intensive, cyclical, or high-growth companies (e.g., early-stage tech) where earnings may be volatile or negative. Alternatives like P/S (Price-to-Sales) or EV/EBITDA may be preferred.

  4. PEG’s Shortcomings: PEG assumes a linear relationship between P/E and growth, which may not hold for very high or low growth rates. It also depends on the accuracy of growth projections, which are often unreliable.

Modern Context:

  • With the rise of FAANG-style tech stocks and unicorns, many investors now tolerate high P/Es (or negative earnings) based on disruptive potential, network effects, or scalability, challenging traditional P/E frameworks.

  • Quantitative easing (post-2008) and low-interest-rate regimes have pushed P/E multiples higher globally, making historical averages less reliable benchmarks.

  • ESG (Environmental, Social, Governance) factors are increasingly priced into multiples, affecting investor perception beyond pure earnings growth.


Conclusion

The article provides a solid foundational understanding of P/E and PEG ratios, emphasizing their utility and limitations. While its core principles endure, investors today must also consider macroeconomic conditions, sector-specific nuances, and alternative metrics—especially in markets dominated by growth and innovation. P/E remains a starting point for valuation, but a holistic approach combining quantitative metrics with qualitative judgment is essential.

Tuesday, 1 October 2013

Business Buyers and Sellers

A business buyer's task can be stated simply:  to buy a good company at a good price.

Buyers usually have many alternatives, and time is often on their side.

The job of the buyer is to make sure that a company is "as good as it looks" by analyzing financial statements and the competitive landscape of the industry.

The buyer should also question whether a company can successfully navigate a change in ownership, as companies sometimes lose key employees or customers in time of transition.


A business seller's task can be stated simply as well:  to position his company to receive the best possible price in the marketplace.

Sellers need to anticipate the sale of their company well before it actually happens so that they have enough time to sell unused assets or make other necessary changes.

Early consideration of important issues will allow sellers to capitalize on favourable conditions in their industry or in the capital markets.


Both buyers and sellers need to think carefully about the extent to which a company has created an economic moat - a sustainable competitive advantage -within its industry.  Business with wide moats tend to be more valuable.

Tuesday, 13 March 2012

Business Valuation




Day One
Session One: 
• The Discounted Cash Flow Model
• Setting up the Model

Session Two : 
• The Big Picture of DCF Valuation
• Valuation Examples
• The Discount Rate Question

Session Three : 
• Open Q&A

Session Four : 
• Risk premiums and Betas
• The Cost of Debt
• Estimating Cash Flows

Session Five : 
• Estimating Growth Rates
• Estimating Growth Patterns
• The Terminal Value
• Closing Thoughts on DCF valuation

Session Six : 
• Open Q&A

Day Two
Session Seven : 
• Loose Ends in Valuation
-Cash, Cross holdings and other assets
-The Value of Control, Synergy and Transparency
-The Liquidity Discount
-Employee Stock Options

Session Eight : 
• The Allure of Relative Valuation
• Categorizing Multiples
• The Four Steps in Analyzing Multiples

Session Nine : 
• Open Q&A

Session Ten :
• Applying Multiples in Valuation
• Finding Comparable firms
• Controlling for differences
• Picking the Right Multiple

Session Elven :
• The Real Options Story
• The Option to Delay (and valuing patents and natural resource companies)
• The Option to Abandon
• The Option to Expand
• Equity in Troubled firms as options

Session Twelve : 
• Open Q&A


Thursday, 1 March 2012

Buffett: What students should be learning is how to value a business.


John Kenneth Galbraith once slyly observed that economists were most economical with ideas: They made the ones learned in graduate school last a lifetime. University finance departments often behave similarly. Witness the tenacity with which almost all clung to the theory of efficient markets throughout the 1970s and 1980s, dismissively calling powerful facts that refuted it “anomalies.” (I always love explanations of that kind: The Flat Earth Society probably views a ship’s circling of the globe as an annoying, but inconsequential, anomaly.)

Academics’ current practice of teaching Black-Scholes as revealed truth needs re-examination. For that matter, so does the academic’s inclination to dwell on the valuation of options. You can be highly successful as an investor without having the slightest ability to value an option. What students should be learning is how to value a business. That’s what investing is all about.



http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2010ltr.pdf

Wednesday, 7 December 2011

Characteristics of Growth Companies and their Value Drivers


Characteristics of growth companies

            Growth companies are diverse in size, growth prospects and can be spread out over very different businesses but they share some common characteristics that make an impact on how we value them. In this section, we will look at some of these shared features:
  1. Dynamic financials: Much of the information that we use to value companies comes from their financial statements (income statements, balance sheets and statements of cash flows). One feature shared by growth companies is that the numbers in these statements are in a state of flux. Not only can the numbers for the latest year be very different from numbers in the prior year, but can change dramatically even over shorter time periods. For many smaller, high growth firms, for instance, the revenues and earnings from the most recent four quarters can be dramatically different from the revenues and earnings in the most recent fiscal year (which may have ended only a few months ago).
  2. Private and Public Equity: It is accepted as conventional wisdom that the natural path for a young company that succeeds at the earliest stages is to go public and tap capital markets for new funds. There are three reasons why this transition is neither as orderly nor as predictable in practice. The first is that the private to public transition will vary across different economies, depending upon both institutional considerations and the development of capital markets. Historically, growth companies in the United States have entered public markets earlier in the life cycle than growth companies in Europe, partly because this is the preferred exit path for many venture capitalists in the US. The second is that even within any given market, access to capital markets for new companies can vary across time, as markets ebb and flow. In the United States, for instance, initial public offerings increase in buoyant markets and drop in depressed markets; during the market collapse in the last quarter of 2008, initial public offerings came to a standstill. The third is that the pathway to going public varies across sectors, with companies in some sectors like technology and biotechnology getting access to public markets much earlier in the life cycle than firms in other sectors such as manufacturing or retailing. The net effect is that the growth companies that we cover in chapter will draw on a mix of private equity (venture capital) and public equity for their equity capital. Put another way, some growth companies will be private businesses and some will be publicly traded; many of the latter group will still have venture capitalists and founders as large holders of equity.
  3. Size disconnect: The contrast we drew in chapter 1 between accounting and financial balance sheets, with the former focused primarily on existing investments and the latter incorporating growth assets into the mix is stark in growth companies. The market values of these companies, if they are publicly traded, are often much higher than the accounting (or book) values, since the former incorporate the value of growth assets and the latter often do not. In addition, the market values can seem discordant with the operating numbers for the firm – revenues and earnings. Many growth firms that have market values in the hundreds of millions or even in the billions can have small revenues and negative earnings. Again, the reason lies in the fact that the operating numbers reflect the existing investments of the firm and these investments may represent a very small portion of the overall value of the firm.
  4. Use of debt: While the usage of debt can vary across sectors, the growth firms in any business will tend to carry less debt, relative to their value (intrinsic or market), than more stable firms in the same business, simply because they do not have the cash flows from existing assets to support more debt. In some sectors, such as technology, even more mature growth firms with large positive earnings and cash flows are reluctant to borrow money. In other sectors, such as telecommunications, where debt is a preferred financing mode, growth companies will generally have lower debt ratios than mature companies.
  5. Market history is short and shifting: We are dependent upon market price inputs for several key components of valuation and especially so for estimating risk parameters (such as betas). Even if growth companies are publicly traded, they tend to have short and shifting histories. For example, an analyst looking at Google in early 2009 would have been able to draw on about 4 years of market history (a short period) but even those 4 years of data may not be particularly useful or relevant because the company changed dramatically over that period – from revenues in millions to revenues in billions, operating losses to operating profits and from a small market capitalization to a large one. 
While the degree to which these factors affect growth firms can vary across firms, they are prevalent in almost every growth firm.


Growth companies- Value Drivers

Scalable growth

The question of how quickly revenue growth rates will decline at a given company can generally be addressed by looking at the company's specifics – the size of the overall market for its products and services, the strength of the competition and quality of both its products and management.  Companies in larger markets with less aggressive competition (or protection from competition) and better management can maintain high revenue growth rates for longer periods.
            There are a few tools that we can use to assess whether the assumptions we are making about revenue growth rates in the future, for an individual company, are reasonable:
1.     Absolute revenue changes: One simple test is to compute the absolute change in revenues each period, rather than to trust the percentage growth rate. Even experienced analysts often under estimate the compounding effect of growth and how much revenues can balloon out over time with high growth rates. Computing the absolute change in revenues, given a growth rate in revenues, can be a sobering antidote to irrational exuberance when it comes to growth.
2.     Past history: Looking at past revenue growth rates for the firm in question should give us a sense of how growth rates have changed as the company size changed in the past. To those who are mathematically inclined, there are clues in the relationship that can be used for forecasting future growth.
3.     Sector data: The final tool is to look at revenue growth rates of more mature firms in the business, to get a sense of what a reasonable growth rate will be as the firm becomes larger.
In summary, expected revenue growth rates will tend to drop over time for all growth companies but the pace of the drop off will vary across companies.

Sustainable margins

To get from revenues to operating income, we need operating margins over time. The easiest and most convenient scenario is the one where the current margins of the firm being valued are sustainable and can be used as the expected margins over time. In fact, if this is the case, we can dispense with forecasting revenue growth and instead focus on operating income growth, since the two will be the equivalent. In most growth firms, though, it is more likely that the current margin is likely to change over time.
            Let us start with the most likely case first, which is that the current margin is either negative or too low, relative to the sustainable long-term margin. There are three reasons why this can happen. One is that the firm has up-front fixed costs that have to be incurred in the initial phases of growth, with the payoff in terms of revenue and growth in later periods. This is often the case with infrastructure companies such as energy, telecommunications and cable firms. The second is the mingling of expenses incurred to generate growth with operating expenses; we noted earlier that selling expenses at growth firms are often directed towards future growth rather than current sales but are included with other operating expenses. As the firm matures, this problem will get smaller, leading to higher margins and profits. The third is that there might be a lag between expenses being incurred and revenues being generated; if the expenses incurred this year are directed towards much higher revenues in 3 years, earnings and margins will be low today.
            The other possibility, where the current margin is too high and will decrease over time, is less likely but can occur, especially with growth companies that have a niche product in a small market. In fact, the market may be too small to attract the attention of larger, better-capitalized competitors, thus allowing the firms to operate under the radar for the moment, charging high prices to a captive market. As the firm grows, this will change and margins will decrease. In other cases, the high margins may come from owning a patent or other legal protection against competitors, and as this protection lapses, margins will decrease. 
            In both of the latter two scenarios – low margins converging to a higher value or high margins dropping back to more sustainable levels – we have to make judgment calls on what the target margin should be and how the current margin will change over time towards this target. The answer to the first question can be usually be found by looking at both the average operating margin for the industry in which the firm operates and the margins commanded by larger, more stable firms in that industry. The answer to the second will depend upon the reason for the divergence between the current and the target margin. With infrastructure companies, for instance, it will reflect how long it will take for the investment to be operational and capacity to be fully utilized.

Quality Growth

A constant theme in valuation is the insistence that growth is not free and that firms will have to reinvest to grow. To estimate reinvestment for a growth firm, we will follow one of three paths, depending largely upon the characteristics of the firm in question:
1.     For growth firms earlier in the life cycle, we will adopt the same roadmap we used for young growth companies, where we estimated reinvestment based upon the change in revenues and the sales to capital ratio.
Reinvestmentt = Change in revenuest/ (Sales/Capital)
The sales to capital ratio can be estimated using the company's data (and it will be more stable than the net capital expenditure or working capital numbers) and the sector averages. Thus, assuming a sales to capital ratio of 2.5, in conjunction with a revenue increase of $ 250 million will result in reinvestment of $ 100 million.  We can build in lags between the reinvestment and revenue change into the computation, by using revenues in a future period to estimate reinvestment in the current one.
2.     With a growth firm that has a more established track record of earnings and reinvestment, we can use the relationship between fundamentals and growth rates that we laid out in chapter 2:
Expected growth rate in operating income = Return on Capital * Reinvestment Rate + Efficiency growth (as a result of changing return on capital)
In the unusual case where margins and returns and capital have settled into sustainable levels, the second term will drop out of the equation.
3.     Growth firms that have already invested in capacity for future years are in the unusual position of being able to grow with little or no reinvestment for the near term. For these firms, we can forecast capacity usage to determine how long the investment holiday will last and when the firm will have to reinvest again. During the investment holiday, reinvestment can be minimal or even zero, accompanied by healthy growth in revenues and operating income.
With all three classes of firms, though, the leeway that we have in estimating reinvestment needs during the high growth phase should disappear, once the firm has reached its mature phase. The reinvestment in the mature phase should hew strictly to fundamentals:
Reinvestment rate in mature phase = 
In fact, even in cases where reinvestment is estimated independently of the operating income during the growth period, and without recourse to the return on capital, we should keep track of the imputed return on capital (based on our forecasts of operating income and capital invested) to ensure that it stays within reasonable bounds.

The Little Book of Valuation
Aswath Damodaran

Sunday, 4 September 2011

Intrinsic Value Basics: Valuing a Business - Seth Klarman's 3 Methods

Valuing a Business - Seth Klarman's 3 Methods

"Price is what you pay. Value is what you get." says Buffett. Valuing a business is, therefore, a fundamental skill that every value investor must master to be able to discern the intrinsic value of a business from publicly available information.

The truth is all of us can recognize a discount when we see one. When I shop for organic fuji apples, I know they are at a discount at $2.39/lb if they normally sell for $3.99/lb. Keeping an eye on the price tags is the key. But when it comes to recognizing a business selling on a discount, the share price does not always reflect the value of a business. This is because a business is made up of people. Hence, businesses evolve for better or for worse. When a business evolve into a more valuable business, the share price must at some point reflect this change.

The trouble is no one perceives the value of a business the same way. This is why even Ian Cumming and Joseph Steinberg couldn't agree on the same intrinsic value for Leucadia. So when you throw the entire population of investors and speculators in the mix, you get a variable share price that changes by the second.

Business valuation is as much an art as a science. There is no one value that is the absolute right value for a company. Because of the imperfect knowledge of the future, we can only come up with a range of values for a company. Below are the three methods of business valuation that Seth Klarman postulates every value investor should have in his warchest.


1. Discounted Cash Flow / Net Present Value

In Theory of Investment Value, John Burr Williams was among the first to introduce the discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis. Seth Klarman categorizes this under the net present value (NPV) method. With a properly chosen discount rate and reasonably predictable future cash flows, the NPV method yields the closest to precise valuation of a profitable business.

DCF basically calculates the present value of all future cash flows by applying a discount rate. The discount rate is the interest that you would like to be compensated for incurring the opportunity cost of giving up alternative, less risky investments. The riskier the investment the higher the discount rate should be. Generally, the short term US Treasury securities are considered risk-free alternatives. In other words, if you are accepting a higher risk for an equity investment, you should expect to earn an interest higher than the current US Treasury yield. Don't just apply a 10% discount rate on all analysis. A smaller, less liquid company probably deserves a higher discount rate, say 12% - 15%, than its blue chip counterpart.

Despite its proximity to accuracy, DCF has a flaw: it depends on predictable future cash flows which no one can reliably estimate given the massive number of variables. Unlike a bond, the earnings of a business are not fixed every year. A one percent difference in your growth assumption can have a huge impact on the NPV. Unfortunately, most investors are overly optimistic when it comes to estimating growth. The best defense here is to err on the side of caution and always pick the more conservative estimate.


2. Liquidation

The net present value analysis works great for determining the value of a profitable business with predictable future cash flows. But when it comes to valuing an unprofitable business, the NPV analysis falls apart. Since there is no future cash flow, you can't calculate the NPV. Thus, most investors, unwilling to part with NPV, would simply pass on investing in unprofitable businesses. But this is precisely why investors who are willing to spend the time scouring the floors for cigar butts could find some wonderful bargains.

To value an unprofitable business, an investor needs to be extra conservative since many of these businesses are already troubled businesses headed for the dead pool. Typically, only tangible assets are considered. Intangibles such as brand names are assumed to be worthless. A good shortcut to evaluate the liquidation value of a business is to calculate the net-net working capital. Net-net working capital is calculated by subtracting current and long term liabilities from current assets. If the company trades below its net-net working capital and it is not depleting its net-net working capital nor does it have any off-balance sheet liabilities, the failing company could be a very successful investment.

However, there is a shortcoming with the net-net working capital analysis. Most of the time, in a liquidation, a company sells pieces of standalone operating entities too. These operating entities could very well be profitable going concerns despite its parent's fallout. The net-net working capital analysis would have underestimated the worth of these subsidiaries. Often, in this situation, investors resort to a breakup analysis to evaluate the worth of the subsidiaries. Basically, you treat the subsidiaries just like you would any company when valuing a business; applying the proper analysis. Once you have the values of each of its subsidiaries you sum them up to arrive at the total value of the parent. This is also known as the sum-of-parts analysis.


3. Market Value

The market value analysis is the best and only sensible valuation method for closed-end funds. Closed-end funds are funds that are closed to new capital after launch and their shares can be traded at any time in open market. Unlike a mutual fund, a closed-end fund usually trades at a premium or a discount to its net asset value (NAV). The NAV of a closed-end fund is the sum of all its securities. Since the value of the securities are realized when sold to the market, only a market value analysis of the securities makes sense.

Some investors make the mistake of extending the market value analysis to valuing companies. The reasoning behind this is simple, but irrational; if a similar company in the same industry trades at 12 times pretax cash flow, this company should trade at the same multiple. This is what Seth Klarman calls "circular reasoning". What if all the companies in the industry are overvalued?

A more appropriate relative valuation method for companies is the private market value analysis. The assumption here is that in a private transaction where sophisticated businessmen are involved, businesses are often bought at fair prices or at reasonable premiums. Often times, this is true. But when considering a leveraged buyout transaction for comparison, an investor has to be cautious about whether the buyer overpaid.


Conclusion

All three valuation methods are not without flaws. Therefore, it is sometimes necessary to use several methods simultaneously to arrive at a more comfortable estimate. It is important to pick the right tool for the right job lest you contract the man-with-a-hammer syndrome. As Munger would say, "To a man with a hammer, every problem looks like a nail."