Bullbear Buffett : RORC

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Thursday, 30 August 2012

KAF - Return on Retained Earnings

KAF

Year		DPS		EPS		Retained EPS
2002		4.5		5.4	a	0.9
2003		5.4		7.9		2.5
2004		6.3		12.6		6.3
2005		5.4		13.7		8.3
2006		5.4		9.9		4.5
2007		30.1		15.8		-14.3
2008		5.6		12.5		6.9
2009		5.6		-2.5		-8.1
2010		5.6		17.3		11.7
2011		11.3		16.2	b	4.9
2012

Total		85.2	c	108.8	d	23.6	e


From	2002	to	2011
EPS increase (sen)			b-a	10.8
DPO			c/d	78%
Return on retained earnings			(b-a)/e	46%

(Figures are in sens)

CIMB - Return on Retained Earnings

CIMB

Year		DPS		EPS		Retained EPS
2002		1.1		10.8	a	9.7
2003		1.9		14.9		13
2004		3.6		14		10.4
2005		7.2		15		7.8
2006		5.4		23.6		18.2
2007		14.6		30.9		16.3
2008		9.3		27.7		18.4
2009		9.9		38.3		28.4
2010		27.3		47		19.7
2011		20		50.9	b(P)	30.9
2012

Total		100.3	c	273.1	d	172.8	e


From	2002	to	2011
EPS increase (sen)			b-a	40.1
DPO			c/d	37%
Return on retained earnings			(b-a)/e	23%

(Figures are in sens)

PIE - Return on Retained Earnings

PIE

Year		DPS		EPS		Retained EPS
2002		10		12.4	a	2.4
2003		10		12.2		2.2
2004		12		18.1		6.1
2005		12		27.2		15.2
2006		14.6		41.4		26.8
2007		22		55.6		33.6
2008		28.7		53		24.3
2009		26.3		39.5		13.2
2010		26.3		40.1		13.8
2011		26.3		59.5	b(P)	33.2
2012

Total		188.2	c	359	d	170.8	e


From	2002	to	2011
EPS increase (sen)			b-a	47.1
DPO			c/d	52%
Return on retained earnings			(b-a)/e	28%

(Figures are in sens)

Sime Darby - Return on Retained Earnings

Sime Darby

Year		DPS		EPS		Retained EPS
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007		0		31.4	a	31.4
2008		38.2		56.6		18.4
2009		19.1		39.1		20
2010		10		14.4		4.4
2011		30		61.9	b	31.9
2012

Total		97.3	c	203.4	d	106.1	e


From	2007	to	2011
EPS increase (sen)			b-a	30.5
DPO			c/d	48%
Return on retained earnings			(b-a)/e	29%

(Figures are in sens)

Ajinomoto - Return on Retained Earnings

Ajinomoto

Year		DPS		EPS		Retained EPS
2002		5.3		17	a	11.7
2003		6.5		19.9		13.4
2004		7.9		21.6		13.7
2005		7.9		14.6		6.7
2006		7.9		9.9		2
2007		8.9		24.7		15.8
2008		12.9		34.4		21.5
2009		15		31.2		16.2
2010		15.8		36.6		20.8
2011		17.3		42.6	b	25.3
2012

Total		105.4	c	252.5	d	147.1	e


From	2002	to	2011
EPS increase (sen)			b-a	25.6
DPO			c/d	42%
Return on retained earnings			(b-a)/e	17%

(Figures are in sens)

BAT - Return on Retained Earnings

BAT

Year		DPS		EPS		Retained EPS
2002		201		232	a	31
2003		298		266		-32
2004		247		283		36
2005		216		208		-8
2006		275		252		-23
2007		329		256		-73
2008		263		284		21
2009		250		262		12
2010		239		256		17
2011		276		252	b (P)	-24
2012

Total		2594	c	2551	d	-43e


From	2002	to	2011
EPS increase (sen)			b-a	20.0
DPO			c/d	102%
Return on retained earnings			(b-a)/e	-47%

(Figures are in sens)

Fraser & Neave - Return on Retained Earnings

Fraser & Neave

Year		DPS		EPS		Retained EPS
2002		12		24.6	a	12.6
2003		10		29.1		19.1
2004		18		32.7		14.7
2005		27.4		37		9.6
2006		31.7		40.1		8.4
2007		33.2		42.9		9.7
2008		39.8		46.8		7
2009		35.3		68.2		32.9
2010		45.5		86.3		40.8
2011		183		88.7	b	-94.3
2012

Total		435.9	c	496.4	d	60.5	e


From	2002	to	2011
EPS increase (sen)			b-a	64.1
DPO			c/d	88%
Return on retained earnings			(b-a)/e	106%

(Figures are in sens)

Coastal - Return on Retained Earnings

Coastal

Year		DPS		EPS		Retained EPS
2002
2003		0		3	a	3
2004		0.9		3.1		2.2
2005		0.6		3.5		2.9
2006		0.7		7.5		6.8
2007		1.4		14.6		13.2
2008		2.6		20.3		17.7
2009		2.2		33.2		31
2010		3.7		41		37.3
2011		8.3		39.5	b(P)	31.2
2012

Total		20.4	c	165.7	d	145.3e


From	2003	to	2011
EPS increase (sen)			b-a	36.5
DPO			c/d	12%
Return on retained earnings			(b-a)/e	25%

(Figures are in sens)

Tower Reit - Return on Retained Earnings

Tower Reit

Year		DPS		EPS		Retained EPS
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006		0		7.5	a	7.5
2007		9.3		8.5		-0.8
2008		9.5		9.9		0.4
2009		9.4		10.7		1.3
2010		9.5		10.6		1.1
2011		10.7		11.9	b	1.2
2012

Total		48.4	c	59.1	d	10.7	e


From	2006	to	2011
EPS increase (sen)			b-a	4.4
DPO			c/d	82%
Return on retained earnings			(b-a)/e	41%

(All figures are in sens)

Starhill Reit - Return on Retained Earnings

Starhill Reit

Year		DPS		EPS		Retained EPS
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006		2.5		5.6a		3.1
2007		6.7		6.9		0.2
2008		6.9		6.9		0
2009		6.9		6.9		0
2010		6.5		6		-0.5
2011		6.5		4.9	b	-1.6
2012

Total		36	c	37.2	d	1.2	e


From	2006	to	2011
EPS increase (sen)			b-a	-0.7
DPO			c/d	97%
Return on retained earnings			(b-a)/e	-58%

(All figures are in sens)

Axis Reit - Return on Retained Earnings

Axis Reit

Year		DPS		EPS		Retained EPS
2002
2003
2004
2005		0		13		13
2006		10.9		12.8		1.9
2007		12.9		13.6	a	0.7
2008		14.9		15.2		0.3
2009		17.9		14		-3.9
2010		14.7		14		-0.7
2011		19		14.4	b (P)	-4.6
2012

Total		90.3	c	97	d	6.7


From	2005	to	2011
EPS increase (sen)			b-a	1.4
DPO			c/d	93%
Return on retained earnings			(b-a)/e	21%

(All figures are in sens)

AL-'AQAR Healthcare Reit - Return on Retained Earnings

AL-'AQAR Healthcare Reit

Year		DPS		EPS		Retained EPS
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006		0		7.3	a	7.3
2007		6.4		7.5		1.1
2008		7.7		7.4		-0.3
2009		8.4		7.1		-1.3
2010		8.2		7.3		-0.9
2011		8.5		7.3	b (E)	-1.2
2012

Total		39.2	c	43.9	d	4.7


From	2006	to	2011
EPS increase (sen)			b-a	0.0
DPO			c/d	89%
Return on retained earnings			(b-a)/e	0%

(All figures are in sens)

Latexx - Return on Retained Earnings

Latexx

Year		DPS		EPS		Retained EPS
2002		0		-29.7	a	-29.7
2003		0		-16.9		-16.9
2004		0		-12		-12
2005		0		5.2		5.2
2006		0		4.8		4.8
2007		0		2.7		2.7
2008		0		8.4		8.4
2009		2		27		25
2010		5		29.9		24.9
2011		5		19.7	b (P)	14.7
2012

Total		12	c	39.1	d	27.1e


From	2002	to	2011
EPS increase (sen)			b-a	49.4
DPO			c/d	31%
Return on retained earnings			(b-a)/e	182%

(All figures are in sens)

Aeon - Return on Retained Earnings

Aeon

Year		DPS		EPS		Retained EPS
2002		3.6		17.2		13.6
2003		3.6		18.1		14.5
2004		4.3		18.3		14
2005		5.4		20.9		15.5
2006		5.4		23.7		18.3
2007		5.8		30		24.2
2008		8.3		34.4		26.1
2009		9		38		29
2010		9		48.6		39.6
2011		12		52.8	P	40.8
2012

Total		66.4		302		235.6


From	2002	to	2011
EPS increase (sen)				35.6
DPO				22%
Return on retained earnings				15%

(All figures are in sens)

Scientex - Return on Retained Earnings

Scientex

Year		DPS		EPS	Retained EPS
2002		1.4		2.9	1.5
2003		1.4		1.9	0.5
2004		1.4		8.8	7.4
2005		4.2		12.2	8
2006		5.2		14.5	9.3
2007		2.2		17.2	15
2008		5.2		16.9	11.7
2009		5.2		16.8	11.6
2010		8		26.2	18.2
2011		12		33.6	21.6
2012

Total		46.2		151	104.8


From	2002	to	2011
EPS increase (sen)				30.7
DPO				31%
Return on retained earnings				29%

(All figures are in sens)

Aeon Credit - Return on Retained Earnings

Aeon Credit

Year		DPS		EPS	Retained EPS
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007		2.8		16.4	13.6
2008		9.5		27.8	18.3
2009		15.1		40.6	25.5
2010		16.9		45.2	28.3
2011		19.9		52.9	33
2012

Total		64.2		182.9	118.7


From	2007	to	2011
EPS increase (sen)				36.5
DPO				35%
Return on retained earnings				31%

(Figures are in sens)

Green Packet - Return on Retained Earnings

Green Packet

Year		DPS		EPS		Retained EPS
2002
2003
2004
2005		0		8.9		8.9
2006		2		11.5		9.5
2007		5.1		7		1.9
2008		0		-10.6		-10.6
2009		0		-27.8		-27.8
2010		0		-21.8		-21.8
2011		0		-13.5	P	-13.5
2012

Total		7.1		-46.3		-53.4


From	2005	to	2011
EPS increase (sen)				-22.4
DPO				-15%
Return on retained earnings				42% (NM)

(Figures are in sens)

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My 18 points guide to Successfully compounding your money in Stocks

Be a good stock picker.
Think as a business owner.
Always look at value rather than the price. Do the homework.
Buy and hold is alright for selected stocks.
Compounding is your friend, get this to work its magic.
Mr. Market is there to be taken advantage of. Do not be the sucker instead. BFS;STS.
Always buy a lot when the price is low.
Never buy when the stock is overpriced.
It is alright to buy when the selected stock is at a fair price.
Phasing in or dollar cost averaging is safe for such stocks during a downtrend, unless the price is still obviously too high.
Do not time the market for such or any stocks.
By keeping to the above strategy, the returns will be delivered through the growth of the company's business.
So, when do you sell the stock? Almost never, as long as the fundamentals remain sound and the future prospects intact.
The downside risk is protected through only buying when the price is low or fairly priced.
Tactical dynamic asset allocation or rebalancing based on valuation can be employed but this sounds easier than is practical, except in extreme market situations.
Sell urgently when the company business fundamental has deteriorated irreversibly.
You may also wish to sell should the growth of the company has obviously slowed and you can reinvest into another company with greater growth potential of similar quality. However, unlike point 16, you can do so leisurely.
In conclusion, a critical key to successful investing is in your stock picking ability.

http://myinvestingnotes.blogspot.com/2012/07/my-18-points-guide-to-successfully.html

11 Lessons From Peter Lynch

Peter Lynch taught me:

1. Behind every stock is a company. Find out what it’s doing.
2. Never invest in any idea you can’t illustrate with a crayon.
3. Over the short term, there may be no correlation between the success of a company’s operations and the success of its stock. Over the long term, there’s a 100% correlation.
4. Buying stocks without studying the companies is the same as playing poker – and never looking at your cards.
5. Time is on your side when you own shares of superior companies.
6. Owning stock is like having children. Don’t get involved with more than you can handle.
7. When the insiders are buying, it’s a good sign.
8. Unless you’re a short seller, it never pays to be pessimistic.
9. A stock market decline is as predictable as a January blizzard in Colorado. If you’re prepared, it can’t hurt you.
10. Everyone has the brainpower to make money in stocks. Not everyone has the stomach.
11. Nobody can predict interest rates, the future direction of the economy, or the stock market. Dismiss all such forecasts and concentrate on what’s actually happening to the companies in which you’ve invested.

Lynch’s advice had a profound effect on my stock market approach. He taught me that investment success isn’t the result of developing the right macro-economic view or deciding when to jump in or out of the market. Success is about researching companies to identify those that are likely to report positive surprises.

Capital Expenditure

A great company with a Durable Competitive Advantage will have a ratio of Capital Expenditures to Net Income of less than 25%. Less is better.

Capital Expenditures are expenses on:
- fixed assets such as equipment, property, or industrial buildings
- fixing problems with an asset
- preparing an asset to be used in business
- restoring property
- starting new businesses

A good company will have a ratio of Capital Expenditures to Net Income of less than 50%.

A great company with a Durable Competitive Advantage will have a ratio of less than 25%.

Less is better.

Benjamin Graham's 113 Wise Words

The true investor scarcely ever is forced to sell his shares, and at all times he is free to disregard the current price quotation. He need pay attention to it and act upon it only to the extent that it suits his book, and no more. Thus the investor who permits himself to be stampeded or unduly worried by unjustified market declines in his holdings is perversely transforming his basic advantage into a basic disadvantage. That man would be better off if his stocks had no market quotation at all, for he would then be spared the mental anguish caused him by other persons' mistakes of judgement."

Philip Fisher's Wise Words

"The refusal to sell at a loss, while completely natural and normal, is probably one of the most dangerous in which we can indulge ourselves in the entire investment process.

More money has probably been lost by investors holding a stock they really did not want until they could 'at least come out even' than from any other single reason. If to these actual losses are added the profits that might have been made through the proper reinvestment of these funds if such reinvestment had been made when the mistake was first realized, the cost of self-indulgence becomes truly tremendous."

(Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits)

The Ultimate Hold-versus-Sell Test

Here is the overriding primary test, followed by observations on why it is so critically important:

Knowing all that you now know and expect about the company and its stock (not what you originally believed or hoped at time of purchase), and assuming that you had available capital, and assuming that it would not cause a portfolio imbalance to do so, would you buy this stock today, at today's price?

No equivocation. Yes or no?

Answers such as maybe or probably are not acceptable since they are ways of dodging the issue. No investor probably buys a stock; they either place an order or do not.

Here is the implication of your answer to that critical test: if you did not answer with a clear affirmative, you should sell; only if you said a strong yes, are you justified to hold.

Some thoughts on Analysing Stocks (KISS)

Ideally a stock you plan to purchase should have all of the following charateristics:

• A rising trend of earnings dividends and book value per share.
• A balance sheet with less debt than other companies in its particular industry.
• A P/E ratio no higher than average.
• A dividend yield that suits your particular needs.
• A below-average dividend pay-out ratio.
• A history of earnings and dividends not pockmarked by erratic ups and downs.
• Companies whose ROE is 15 or better.
• A ratio of price to cash flow (P/CF) that is not too high when compared to other stocks in the same industry.

Margin of Safety Concept: Stocks should be bought like groceries, not like perfume

The high CAGR in the early years of the investing period, due to buying at a discount, tended to decline and approach that of the intrinsic EPS GR of the companies over a longer investment time-frame.

Chapter 20 - “Margin of Safety” as the Central Concept of Investment

A single quote by Graham on page 516 struck me:

Observation over many years has taught us that the chief losses to investors come from the purchase of low-quality securities at times of favorable business conditions.

Basically, Graham is saying that most stock investors lose money because they invest in companies that seem good at a particular point in time, but are lacking the fundamentals of a long-lasting stable company.

This seems obvious on the surface, but it’s actually a great argument for thinking more carefully about your individual stock investments. If most of your losses come from buying companies that seem healthy but really aren’t, isn’t that a profound argument for carefully studying any company you might invest in?

Bullbear Buffett