Showing posts with label Healthcare sector. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Healthcare sector. Show all posts

Saturday, 14 February 2026

Health Economics

 




Here is a summary of the video from the 0:00 to 15:00 minute mark:

0:00 - 0:50 Introduction
Professor Gruber introduces the final lecture as a different kind of class. He will apply the economic tools learned throughout the semester to the real-world topic of health care policy, drawing on his 25 years of experience in the field.

0:51 - 3:46 Background: The US Health Care Problem

  • High Spending: The US spends far more on health care than any other developed nation—about 17.5% of its GDP (nearly $10,000 per person). This is roughly double what many European countries spend.

  • Mixed Outcomes: Despite this spending, health outcomes are unequal. The "haves" (well-insured) get the best care in the world, evidenced by a million people coming to the US for treatment. The "have-nots" get some of the worst care. For example, a Black baby is twice as likely to die in its first year as a white baby, a rate worse than Barbados.

  • The Two Fundamental Problems: The US faces two core issues: spending is too high, and access to care is too unequal. The lecture will focus on these two aspects.

3:47 - 12:27 The Access Problem

  • The Uninsured: Before 2014, about 50 million Americans were uninsured.

  • Market Failure, Not Just Choice: The fact people are uninsured is a policy concern due to market failure (adverse selection) and redistribution (the uninsured are poorer).

  • How Insurance Worked (Pre-ACA):

    • Employer-Sponsored Insurance (60%): Most Americans get insurance through their employer. Insurers prefer large groups because risk is predictable.

    • Individual Market (6%): This market functioned poorly due to adverse selection. Insurers feared only sick people would buy insurance, so they protected themselves through "pre-existing conditions exclusions" (refusing to cover costs related to past illnesses) or "medical underwriting" (denying coverage or charging exorbitant prices to sick individuals). This meant if you were sick, you often couldn't get insurance.

    • Government Insurance (20%): Two main programs: Medicare (for the elderly) and Medicaid (for the poor). These programs offered full coverage without discrimination.

    • The Uninsured (15%): These were typically the "working poor"—people with jobs that don't offer insurance but who earn too much to qualify for Medicaid.

12:28 - 15:00 Historical Reform Attempts and Two Extreme Solutions
For 100 years, efforts to reform health care failed because they were caught between two extreme solutions:

  • Solution 1: Subsidization: Giving money to help people buy insurance. The problem is that it doesn't fix insurers' incentive to avoid sick people and is politically difficult.

  • Solution 2: Single-Payer: A government-run system for everyone (like in Canada). The lecture outlines three major political barriers to this:

    1. Paying for it: It requires a massive, visible tax increase, even though it would replace the "hidden tax" of employer-sponsored insurance (where employers pay lower wages in exchange for providing insurance). People don't believe employers would pass the savings back to them in wages.

    2. Status Quo Bias: People with employer-sponsored insurance are reluctant to give up what they know for an unknown new system, due to loss aversion.

    3. Powerful Lobbying: Health insurance is a massive industry that would fight aggressively to protect its business.


Here is a summary of the video from the 15:00 to 30:00 minute mark:

15:00 - 21:00 The "Three-Legged Stool" Solution
Stuck between the extremes of subsidization and single-payer, economists (including Professor Gruber) developed a new approach, first pioneered in Massachusetts and later becoming the basis for the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare). This "three-legged stool" consists of:

  1. Ban Insurer Discrimination: Insurers are no longer allowed to deny coverage or charge higher prices based on pre-existing conditions. They must offer insurance to everyone at a standard community rate.

  2. The Individual Mandate: If insurers are forced to accept everyone, they will only get sick buyers and go bankrupt. To fix this, everyone is required to purchase insurance. This ensures a balanced pool of both healthy and sick people, allowing insurers to function like a bookie setting odds to guarantee a profit.

  3. Subsidies: A mandate is unfair if people cannot afford insurance. Therefore, the government provides income-related subsidies to make coverage affordable for low-income individuals.

21:00 - 30:30 The Impact and Ongoing Debate on Access

  • Did it work? Yes, it was the largest insurance expansion in American history, covering about 45% of the uninsured nationally (and 2/3 in Massachusetts).

  • Why are people still uninsured? Three main reasons:

    1. The law doesn't apply to undocumented immigrants (about a quarter of the uninsured).

    2. The mandate has exemptions (e.g., for those below the poverty line or for whom insurance is still unaffordable).

    3. The penalty is a tax, and some people prefer to pay it rather than buy insurance.

  • Political Challenge: This three-part solution is more complicated to explain than simple alternatives like "single-payer." While it was a major step forward, it hasn't solved the access problem entirely, leaving an ongoing debate, particularly within the Democratic party, about whether to push for single-payer.

30:30 - 45:00 The Cost Problem

  • Two Contradictory Facts:

    1. It's been worth it: Health care spending has quadrupled since 1950, but the improvements in health outcomes (e.g., lower infant mortality, better heart attack and knee surgery treatments) have been economically worth the cost.

    2. It's incredibly wasteful: An estimated one-third of all health care spending does nothing to improve health.

  • The Core Challenge: The productive 2/3 of spending is so valuable that it makes the overall rise in costs seem worthwhile, but the unproductive 1/3 represents massive waste. The problem is that while we can identify waste in hindsight, it is extremely difficult to prospectively know which treatments will be effective and which will be wasteful.

  • Two Potential Solutions to Control Costs:

    1. The Regulatory Path (European Model): Direct government control over the health care system through:

      • Technological Regulation: Rationing certain procedures (e.g., denying kidney transplants to people over 75).

      • Supply Regulation: Limiting the number of doctors, hospitals, and machines (e.g., Canada has far fewer MRI machines).

      • Price Regulation: The government sets the prices for medical services. This is the most important method. The US is unique in letting the free market set most prices, which fails due to market imperfections like lack of information (you can't shop for a heart attack) and imperfect competition (monopoly hospitals or prestigious hospitals charging far more).

    2. The Incentives Route (ACOs): This approach, a key part of Obamacare, creates "Accountable Care Organizations" (ACOs)—groups of doctors and hospitals that work together. Instead of paying for each service, the government pays them a flat fee per patient to manage all of that person's care. The idea is to give them an incentive to be efficient. However, this approach has not worked well in practice, as providers struggle to figure out how to effectively manage care and costs within this system.

Here is a summary of the video from the 30:00 minute mark to the end (46:00):

30:30 - 41:00 The Cost Problem (Continued)

  • Two Potential Solutions (Continued):

    • The Regulatory Path (European Model): This involves direct government control through:

      • Technological Regulation: Rationing certain procedures (e.g., denying kidney transplants based on age).

      • Supply Regulation: Limiting the number of doctors, hospitals, and machines (e.g., Canada has far fewer MRI machines, leading to long waits).

      • Price Regulation: The government sets the prices for medical services. This is the most important method. The US is unique in letting the free market set most private insurance prices, which fails due to market imperfections like lack of information (you can't shop for a heart attack) and imperfect competition (monopoly hospitals or prestigious hospitals like MGH charging far more due to a "reputational monopoly"). While Medicare successfully uses price regulation, applying it universally is politically difficult and has failed in the past (e.g., state-level attempts in the 1970s).

    • The Incentives Route (ACOs): This approach, a key part of Obamacare, creates "Accountable Care Organizations" (ACOs)—groups of doctors and hospitals that work together to provide all of a patient's care. Instead of paying for each service, the government pays them a flat fee per patient to manage all of that person's care. The goal is to give them an incentive to be efficient and control costs. However, this approach has not worked well in practice, as providers struggle to figure out how to effectively manage care and costs within this system.

  • Why This Matters: Health care costs are the single most important government fiscal problem. The US faces a long-term deficit of roughly $75 trillion, and $70 trillion of that is driven by health care costs. Controlling costs is as critical an issue for the future as climate change.

41:00 - 46:00 Course Conclusion

  • The Goal of the Course: Professor Gruber explains that the purpose of 14.01 is not to memorize formulas, but to:

    1. Spark an interest in economics.

    2. Make students more educated consumers of news and policy, especially in an era where facts and the scientific method are under attack.

  • The Economist's Job: He concludes with a joke about a doctor, a priest, and an economist who are rude to a slow, blind golfer. While the doctor and priest pledge charitable acts to atone, the economist asks, "If he's blind, why doesn't he just play at night?" The point is that the economist's job is to be "annoying"—to question basic assumptions, find logical flaws in arguments, and think critically about problems to find responsible solutions.

Thursday, 24 August 2017

CCMDBIO 24.8.2017

CCMDBIO 24.8.2017
5 Years Quarterly Report History
Qtr Financial Revenue PBT  PAT PBT 
No Quarter (RM,000) (RM,000) (RM,000) Margin
1 31-Mar-17 123,306 12,122 9,564 9.8%
4 31-Dec-16 74,033 6,299 9,926 8.5%
3 30-Sep-16 80,302 7,516 6,341 9.4%
2 30-Jun-16 79,135 7,723 4,503 9.8%
1 31-Mar-16 79,470 9,941 7,843 12.5%
4 31-Dec-15 89,401 17,529 15,335 19.6%
3 30-Sep-15 79,372 11,621 8,623 14.6%
2 30-Jun-15 56,308 8,407 5,848 14.9%
1 31-Mar-15 45,599 12,198 8,969 26.8%
4 31-Dec-14 51,024 13,921 11,119 27.3%
3 30-Sep-14 44,819 11,287 8,682 25.2%
2 30-Jun-14 40,623 10,107 7,513 24.9%
1 31-Mar-14 40,495 11,175 8,365 27.6%
4 31-Dec-13 45,734 9,160 9,313 20.0%
3 30-Sep-13 40,845 9,054 6,786 22.2%
2 30-Jun-13 37,988 13,007 10,689 34.2%
1 31-Mar-13 37,837 8,956 6,699 23.7%
4 31-Dec-12 35,378 9,000 5,997 25.4%
3 30-Sep-12 29,521 8,392 6,442 28.4%
2 30-Jun-12 34,355 9,037 6,867 26.3%
5 Years Trailing 4 Quarters
No. Financial ttm-Rev ttm-PBT  ttm-PAT ttm-PBT 
Qtr. Quarter (RM,000) (RM,000) (RM,000) Margin
1 31-Dec-17 356,776 33,660 30,334 9.4%
4 31-Dec-16 312,940 31,479 28,613 10.1%
3 31-Dec-16 328,308 42,709 34,022 13.0%
2 31-Dec-16 327,378 46,814 36,304 14.3%
1 31-Dec-16 304,551 47,498 37,649 15.6%
4 31-Dec-15 270,680 49,755 38,775 18.4%
3 31-Dec-15 232,303 46,147 34,559 19.9%
2 31-Dec-15 197,750 45,813 34,618 23.2%
1 31-Dec-15 182,065 47,513 36,283 26.1%
4 31-Dec-14 176,961 46,490 35,679 26.3%
3 31-Dec-14 171,671 41,729 33,873 24.3%
2 31-Dec-14 167,697 39,496 31,977 23.6%
1 31-Dec-14 165,062 42,396 35,153 25.7%
4 31-Dec-13 162,404 40,177 33,487 24.7%
3 31-Dec-13 152,048 40,017 30,171 26.3%
2 31-Dec-13 140,724 39,355 29,827 28.0%
1 31-Dec-13 137,091 35,385 26,005 25.8%
4 31-Dec-12 135,311 35,298 26,014 26.1%
3 31-Dec-12 132,969 34,134 26,346 25.7%
2 31-Dec-12 140,215 35,468 27,425 25.3%  
   
   
   
5 Years Adjusted EPS, DPS, NTA and ttm-EPS for capital changes    
No of shares (m) 278.8
adj adj adj adj adj
Qtr Financial EPS  DPS NTA ttm-EPS ttm-DPS
No Quarter (Cent) (Cent) (RM) (Cent) (Cent)
1 31-Mar-17 3.43 0.0 1.66 10.88 2.91
4 31-Dec-16 3.56 0.0 1.70 10.26 2.91
3 30-Sep-16 2.27 0.0 1.65 12.20 6.15
2 30-Jun-16 1.61 2.9 1.83 13.02 6.15
1 31-Mar-16 2.81 0.0 1.64 13.50 5.29
4 31-Dec-15 5.50 3.3 0.97 13.91 5.29
3 30-Sep-15 3.09 0.0 0.96 12.39 9.22
2 30-Jun-15 2.10 2.0 0.68 12.42 9.22
1 31-Mar-15 3.22 0.0 0.74 13.01 9.21
4 31-Dec-14 3.99 7.2 0.69 12.80 9.21
3 30-Sep-14 3.11 0.0 0.67 12.15 8.71
2 30-Jun-14 2.69 2.0 0.64 11.47 8.71
1 31-Mar-14 3.00 0.0 0.68 12.61 8.71
4 31-Dec-13 3.34 6.7 0.65 12.01 8.71
3 30-Sep-13 2.43 0.0 0.64 10.82 7.22
2 30-Jun-13 3.83 2.0 0.67 10.70 7.22
1 31-Mar-13 2.40 0.0 0.63 9.33 6.97
4 31-Dec-12 2.15 5.2 0.61 9.33 6.97
3 30-Sep-12 2.31 0.0 0.60 9.45 8.96
2 30-Jun-12 2.46 1.7 0.58 9.84 8.96
Capital changes
No. Financial No of
Qtr. Quarter Shrs (m)
1 31-Mar-17 278.8
4 31-Dec-16 291.1
3 30-Sep-16 284.3
2 30-Jun-16 319.4
1 31-Mar-16 279.1
4 31-Dec-15 166.9
3 30-Sep-15 166.8
2 30-Jun-15 139.6
1 31-Mar-15 139.5
4 31-Dec-14 138.8
3 30-Sep-14 138.9
2 30-Jun-14 138.9
1 31-Mar-14 138.7
4 31-Dec-13 138.8
3 30-Sep-13 138.8
2 30-Jun-13 138.8
1 31-Mar-13 138.7
4 31-Dec-12 138.8
3 30-Sep-12 138.8
2 30-Jun-12 138.7
1 31-Mar-12 138.9
4 31-Dec-11 138.8
3 30-Sep-11 138.8
2 30-Jun-11 138.9