Showing posts with label Silicon Valley Bank. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Silicon Valley Bank. Show all posts

Friday 21 April 2023

Silicon Valley Bank became the second-largest bank to fail in US history

For a quick recap, Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) became the second-largest bank to fail in US history, the biggest being Washington Mutual Bank in 2008, following a run on the bank. 

What happened? 

SVB had an abnormally high percentage of bond holdings (56% of total assets) on its balance sheet and as unrealised losses mounted, worried depositors — mostly Silicon Valley start-ups and venture-capital firms with large, uninsured deposits (of more than US$250,000 per account) — rushed to withdraw their money. 

The sudden huge outflow of deposits forced SVB to liquidate its bonds at current market values (losses), which then tipped it into insolvency (where the values of liabilities exceeded assets). 

The bank had to be taken over by FDIC on March 10 to stem contagion fears. 

Another regional bank, Signature Bank, suffered the same fate and went into FDIC receivership just days later. 

Despite the quick actions, worries continued to spread to other smaller banks, all of which continue to suffer substantially higher-than-normal deposit withdrawals.


https://www.theedgemarkets.com/node/662043


The issues for SVB are, to a certain extent, idiosyncratic — 

  • an exceptionally narrow customer base and 
  • high uninsured deposits (according to various reports, they ranged from 88% to 96% of total deposits), 
  • abnormally high long-dated bond holdings relative to traditional loans and, 
  • critically, failure to hedge interest rate risks.

The overall US banking system is, no doubt, suffering from withdrawal symptoms — from excessive government stimulus, near-zero interest rates and massive quantitative easing over the past few years. At the outset of the pandemic, banks were inundated with large deposit inflows — excess savings surged from generous government handout, coupled with little avenue to spend during lockdowns.

Bank deposits increased by nearly US$5 trillion, or 35%, from about US$13.4 trillion in March 2020 to US$18.1 trillion in March 2022 (see Chart 1). Meanwhile, loans to businesses were limited during the pandemic. Banks had to put all these excess cash to work, and many ended up buying Treasuries and especially MBS (new mortgages and refinancing activities saw a huge jump as the housing sector boomed). Then the Fed started hiking interest rates aggressively.


Situation in Malaysia is quite different

Clearly, the situation is quite different in Malaysia. 

For starters, pandemic cash handouts were far smaller and, while deposits also rose during the pandemic — owing to loan moratoriums and lower spending — it was nowhere near the scale of that in the US. 

Total deposits increased from RM1.968 trillion to RM2.186 trillion between March 2020 and March 2022, or equivalent to just about 11% growth (see Chart 2).


https://www.theedgemarkets.com/node/662043

Saturday 18 March 2023

The economist who won the Nobel for his work on bank runs breaks down SVB’s collapse—and his fears over what’s next

Shawn Tully

Small wonder that most Americans are stunned and confused by the sudden fall of Silicon Valley Bank. How did a cornerstone of the dynamic venture capital community, the nation’s 16th-largest lending institution that until recently enjoyed the growth worthy of the tech startups it served, fall so hard, so fast? Is its failure the legacy of poor practices specific to SVB, or is the Fed’s policy of drastically hiking rates that hammers the value of banks’ investments endangering fellow midsize lenders? Even if bad management destroyed SVB, why didn’t its top regulators, the Fed and the California banking authorities, see this runaway train wobbling on the tracks, and force the drivers to throttle back before it derailed?

I thought of just the expert to skirt the usual dense jargon and provide easy-to-grasp answers. He’s Douglas Diamond, professor at the University of Chicago’s Booth School of Business who shared the 2022 Nobel Prize for Economics with his research partner, Philip Dybig of Washington University in St. Louis, and former Fed chairman Ben Bernanke. The Diamond-Dybig research that captured the Nobel stressed that banks are inherently fragile and vulnerable to “runs,” because if customers exit en masse, the lenders may need to sell their bonds or loans, which would have fully paid off on maturity, at fire-sale prices. Hence, a panic can unnecessarily ruin an otherwise healthy bank. Diamond and Dybig emphasize that both sound regulation and prudent management that broadly diversifies the risk in both the loan and investment portfolios, and makeup of customers, are essential to instilling client confidence required to keep America’s banks out of harm’s way.

In October, just after receiving the prize, Diamond warned in a Fortune interview that the Fed’s policies of raising rates at a brutal, virtually unprecedented pace would trigger dangerously big losses in the bond portfolios of companies and banks that believed inflation-adjusted yields sitting at near-zero for years would stay there for years to come.

But in our hour-long interview on the SVB debacle, Diamond stated that though Fed policy hurt, it wasn’t the main reason for the implosion. Nor did SVB suffer the classic “sound bank wrecked by a stampede” scenario. Instead, SVB deployed just about every bad policy on both the assets and liabilities sides of its balance sheet. For Diamond, SVB is a case study in how setting a rickety structure to enable breakneck expansion created daunting risks that prudently run banks, despite the Fed’s huge run-up in rates, have avoided.

What make banks work, and how SVB broke the mold

Diamond described the template for how banks secure their customers’ trust, and protect themselves from a wave of withdrawals. “The papers that the Nobel Committee recognized explained how banks should be structured,” he explains. “On the asset side, banks make loans to lots of different types of people and businesses. Ideally, banks create safe assets out of risky ones by diversifying. They have diversified funding sources so that since depositors all don’t need their money on the same date, that diversification allows the bank to economize on what they hold in cash and liquid assets.As for liabilities, he adds, it’s key that banks serve a wide, varied range of depositors. Having loads of retail customers is a boon. When rates on Treasuries jump, they’re less likely to empty their savings or money market accounts to get some extra yield than are corporate clients.

As Diamond notes, it’s crucial to understand the role of the two classes of investments on SVB’s balance sheet. The first grouping is called Available for Sale, or AFS. It consists of securities in the trading account banks are free to sell at any time. All bonds in the AFS designation must be “marked to market” at the end of each quarter. If a bank is holding Treasuries it bought early last year at extremely low yields, and rates jump, the prices of those bonds fall sharply, hitting the bank’s capital. The second investment category is Held to Maturity, or HTM. It comprises the fixed income securities that the bank intends to keep on its balance sheet until they’re redeemed at their full par value. Once each quarter, banks can shift securities between AFS and HTM—if they need to replenish their equity, they’ll transfer bonds from the long-term hold to the trading account. But if a bank transfers HTM securities that have an unrealized loss, that would raise liquidity but hit their book equity even harder. This is a quandary SVB faced before the deluge.

At the close of 2022, SVB counted $26 billion in AFS, virtually all in Treasuries and “agency” mortgaged backed securities issued mainly by GSE’s Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. As Diamond points out, those AFS bonds were all highly liquid; they’d easily sell at full market price, and stood no danger of suffering a haircut if dumped fast. SVB’s balance sheet also contained $91 billion in HTM bonds, of which over 90% sat in agency-issued mortgage securities that also benefit from a deep, active market. Its $74 billion credit portfolio was highly concentrated, consisting primarily of loans to tech startups, as well as their founders and managers. Those companies and Silicon Valley bigwigs also were also their main depositors. It’s been reported, in fact, that SVB often placed covenants in its loan agreements requiring that a borrower keep its deposits at the bank.

SVB mismatched its investments to the deposits funding them

The bonds in AFS, the ones SVB would need to sell in an emergency, were generating a puny yield of just 1.79% as of mid-March. Clearly, it had purchased most of those securities well before rates started spiking big-time in the spring of 2022. The average maturity on the AFS portfolio was a substantial 3.6 years. At the end of 2022, nearly 90% of the HTM loans carried maturities of over 10 years, and the return on that bedrock portfolio was just 1.63%—once again, SVB had bought almost all those bonds way before rates exploded. Its loan portfolio was also garnering low returns of well under 4% after provisions for credit losses.

“Their investments were pretty long-term, and they were generating very low yields,” says Diamond. “They must have figured that scenario would work fine if every depositor stayed forever, and they kept accepting zero rates on checking accounts and sub-1% rates on money market funds. In that case, they could hold their bonds to maturity and get full value.” It’s clear that SVB’s strategy to “go out on the yield curve” to garner an extra 0.5%, say, on a five-year versus a one-year Treasury, was a mistake. The crunch came in 2022, when yields on five-year Treasuries competing with the ones they bought a just a year before jumped from under 1% at the start of the year to the mid-4% range by fall. Suddenly, SVB was forced to pay 4.5% on savings accounts, a multiple of what it offered a year before.

It appears that before mid-2022, SVB’s deposit base was extremely stable. Not only did it keep adding new customers at a rapid clip, but its existing clients kept their deposits in place. But when rates surged, depositors who’d parked billions in SVB’s checking and money markets pulled their cash in pursuit of the sumptuous yields on Treasuries. In 2022, SVB lost 8% of its deposits, and the exodus accelerated in January and February. On March 8, it issued an 8K stating that it had sold all of its AFS bonds to raise money and pay fleeing customers, and sought to refill its coffers via a $1.25 billion stock offering. The AFS sale raised $21 billion, causing a pre-tax loss of around $2.4 billion, or 11%.

For Diamond, SVB faced two fundamental problems of its own making. The first was the fall in the value of its bonds, which had long maturities compared with a deposit base potentially far less stable than those at a JPMorgan Chase or Bank of America. “The rise in rates hit their bonds and cut their capital down,” says Diamond. “They had to write down the AFS bonds whether they sold them or not. The management claimed it was a fire sale, but it wasn’t a fire sale. Those bonds were highly liquid. SVB didn’t take any discount for selling in a hurry.” Hence, he says, SVB was far from the traditional disaster case where a flight of deposits forces a bank to jettison hard-to-sell assets at distress prices.

Diamond posits that even before the 8K announcement ignited the run, SVB was close to insolvent, and rapidly heading for failure. “As their cost of ‘funding,’ meaning the interest they had to pay on deposits, kept rising to 4% and higher, they’re forced to pay that higher interest needed to keep their customers. But their bond portfolio, where the money comes from, is paying them less than 2%,” he says. “Put simply, you’re getting less than 2% on your assets and paying out, say, 5% on your liabilities.” That deficit of interest coming in and out meant that SVB was destined for big operating losses.

To cover those losses, SVB would need to raise cash by shifting its longer-maturity HTM securities to the trading account. But doing so would have pounded its capital even harder. And in a footnote to the 8K, SVB noted that if it marked its HTM securities to market, the adjustment would wipe out all of its book capital. “The downward adjustment on long-term bonds carrying low rates would be even steeper than on the three-to-five-year bonds in AFS,” says Diamond. Even if they were able to hold the HTM portfolio to maturity, the operating losses would eventually render the bank insolvent. “It appears that they were already dead or dying before the meltdown,” says Diamond.

It also astounds Diamond that although SVB was highly vulnerable to a rise in rates, it did little hedging to offset the obvious risk that yields would eventually jump from their historic lows. Rate hedging is practiced extensively by well-run institutions such as JPMorgan.

SVB’s failure to diversify the deposit base increased risks of a run

For Diamond, besides failing to match its investments’ maturities to its depositors’ quicksilver demands, SVB also violated the second tenet of sound banking: attracting a broad mix of customers. He points out that SVB had an extremely small proportion of retail clients to balance all the Silicon Valley startups and their wealthy founders. “SVB reportedly looked for companies that were getting new VC funding, and offered them large loans,” says Vivian Fang, an accounting professor at the University of Minnesota. “That’s how they grew their business so rapidly.” Adds Diamond, “Keep in mind that money had been flowing out for six months. These weren’t programmers or teachers leaving. They were CFOs. Almost all of their deposits were wholesale.” Once again, the CFOs were much quicker to pull cash from checking accounts and grab those big Treasury yields than regular folks would have been.

An incredible $48 billion in deposits departed in a single day. “It was the fastest bank run in history,” marvels Diamond. “The customers in the Silicon Valley community all talk to one another. When Peter Thiel and Y-Combinator, the startup hub, say to get your money out, when that happens, the run will be fast and complete.”

On contagion, Diamond is concerned about lax regulation and the Fed’s super-tough policies

Of course, most midsize banks aren’t risking the funding mismatch and all-in-on-a-single-client approach that sank SVB. Still, Diamond worries that the Fed’s oversight of regional banks, in itself, is far too light to prevent further blowups. In the early years following the passage of the Dodd-Frank legislation in 2010, the central bank imposed the same tough annual tests on midsize lenders as the likes of Wells Fargo or Citigroup. But in 2018, the Trump administration successfully championed a regulatory relief bill that greatly reduced the frequency and severity of the stress exams for regionals. “I looked at the latest stress test, and the Fed was assessing how the banks would perform at rates from 0% to 2%, as if 2% was as high as they’d ever go. So almost any bank would pass. The standard should have been 0% to 7%.” (SVB was exempt from what would have been its last stress test in 2021 because its assets were still below the required level. It was not scheduled for testing in 2022 when its assets passed the threshold.) In SVB's case, Diamond is surprised that the Fed and California Department of Financial Protection and Innovation didn’t see the red flags raised by SVB’s slender, restless clientele and holdings of low-yielding, long-duration bonds.

Obviously, the Fed will need to predict the midsize banks’ outlook using much higher rate assumptions in the future, a shift that could require lenders to hold far more capital. Since marking their AFS securities to market is already denting their equity, it’s conceivable that regionals will need to float equity to restore their capital. In turn, announcing you need to sell stock could send depositors for the exits. Of course, it’s the super-tough Fed policy that’s put banks in this difficult position. “When the Fed takes rates from 1% to 5% in a year, it shouldn’t be surprising if that causes trouble in the system,” says Diamond. “When we spoke after I received the Nobel, I talked mainly about how fast-rising rates would hurt companies. But the incredible speed of the hikes hurts banks a lot too.” Diamond believes that the Fed should be “much more slow and deliberate” in raising rates, in part to forestall more SVB-like shocks to the system.

Doug Diamond won his Nobel for, in the words of the National Bureau of Economic Research, providing “insights [that] form the basis of modern bank regulation.” For Diamond, the sound management practices and regulation that he extolled in his research, that make banks safe, was sorely lacking in the SVB catastrophe. Banks get in trouble when they veer from the Diamond model. We can only hope that SVB was a lone case, and that the Fed’s relentless march and weak regulation won’t produce a flurry of renegades that roil America’s credit markets just as our economy teeters on the brink of recession.

This story was originally featured on Fortune.com

https://finance.yahoo.com/news/economist-won-nobel-bank-runs-160025143.html


Sunday 12 March 2023

Silicon Valley Bank receivership. WHO WILL GET PAID FIRST?

We encourage clients with SVB accounts in excess of the FDIC insured limit to contact the FDIC toll-free number at +1.866.799.0959, or as otherwise indicated here.

WHO WILL GET PAID FIRST?

The Federal Deposit Insurance Act specifies the order in which claims will be paid under the receivership as follows:

  1. Secured claims
  2. Administrative expenses of the FDIC as receiver
  3. Insured deposits (the standard insurance amount is $250,000 per depositor, for each account ownership category)
  4. Uninsured deposits
  5. General/senior liabilities
  6. Subordinated debt and similar liabilities
  7. Shareholders of SVB and its parent, SVB Financial

SVB has been cited as having relied more heavily on large—and therefore uninsured—deposits than have other banks. This means that the amount of funds allocated for satisfying insured deposit claims in the tier immediately above uninsured deposits should be much smaller than at most banks with more traditional deposit bases. Assuming that the amount of secured claims and administrative expenses will also be relatively modest, this should mean that more funds will be available to satisfy the claims of uninsured depositors. Recoveries for uninsured depositors and creditors junior to them are not guaranteed by the FDIC and will more heavily depend on proceeds available from liquidation of SVB’s assets.

For now, the FDIC has advised that insured depositors should have access to their accounts and insured funds on Monday, March 13, 2023. The FDIC has also announced it will pay uninsured depositors an advance dividend the week of March 13 and will issue receivership certificates for remaining amounts. Depositors will not have to file a claim for their advanced dividend. It is not known what percentage of uninsured deposits will be paid through next week’s advance; the closure order reports that at the close of business on March 9, 2023, due to a “run on the bank,” SVB had a negative cash balance of $958 million. Subsequent dividends are likely, although the amounts and timing of such distributions will be determined by the FDIC in its discretion.


WHAT ARE MY DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS AS A PUBLIC COMPANY?

Public companies should consider whether disclosure is required based on their specific facts and circumstances in coordination with their boards and trusted advisers. Any disclosure relating to the possible impact should be limited to the facts known at the time that the disclosure is made, and companies should exercise caution in drawing any definitive conclusions as to the materiality of impact given the evolving nature of the situation. Careful consideration should also be made to Regulation FD compliance, and any forward-looking statements should be identified as such and accompanied by meaningful cautionary language.


https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/2023/03/silicon-valley-bank-collapse-initial-issues-raised

Saturday 11 March 2023

Silicon Valley Bank Fails After Run on Deposits

 Silicon Valley Bank Fails After Run on Deposits

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation took control of the bank’s assets on Friday. The failure raised concerns that other banks could face problems, too.

Silicon Valley Bank’s headquarters in Santa Clara, Calif., on Friday. Founded in 1983, Silicon Valley Bank was a big lender to tech start-ups.


By Emily Flitter and Rob Copeland

Emily Flitter and Rob Copeland cover Wall Street and finance.


March 10, 2023

Updated 9:42 p.m. ET

One of the most prominent lenders in the world of technology start-ups, struggling under the weight of ill-fated decisions and panicked customers, collapsed on Friday, forcing the federal government to step in.

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation said on Friday that it would take over Silicon Valley Bank, a 40-year-old institution based in Santa Clara, Calif. The bank’s failure is the second-largest in U.S. history, and the largest since the financial crisis of 2008.

The move put nearly $175 billion in customer deposits under the regulator’s control. While the swift downfall of the nation’s 16th largest bank evoked memories of the global financial panic of a decade and a half ago, it did not immediately touch off fears of widespread destruction in the financial industry or the global economy.

Silicon Valley Bank’s failure came two days after its emergency moves to handle withdrawal requests and a precipitous decline in the value of its investment holdings shocked Wall Street and depositors, sending its stock careening. The bank, which had $209 billion in assets at the end of 2022, had been working with financial advisers until Friday morning to find a buyer, a person with knowledge of the negotiations said.

While the woes facing Silicon Valley Bank are unique to it, a financial contagion appeared to spread through parts of the banking sector, prompting Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen to publicly reassure investors that the banking system was resilient.

Investors dumped stocks of peers of Silicon Valley Bank, including First Republic, Signature Bank and Western Alliance, many of which cater to start-up clients and have similar investment portfolios.

Trading in shares of at least five banks was halted repeatedly throughout the day as their steep declines triggered stock exchange volatility limits.

By comparison, some of the nation’s largest banks appeared more insulated from the fallout. After a slump on Thursday, shares of JPMorgan, Wells Fargo and Citigroup all were generally flat on Friday.

That’s because the biggest banks operate in a vastly different world. Their capital requirements are more stringent and they also have far broader deposit bases than banks like Silicon Valley, which do not attract masses of retail customers. Regulators have also tried to keep the big banks from focusing too heavily in a single area of business, and they have largely stayed away from riskier assets like cryptocurrencies.

Greg Becker, the president and chief executive of Silicon Valley Bank, last year. The bank’s downward spiral accelerated this week.

“I don’t think that this is an issue for the big banks — that’s the good news, they’re diversified,” said Sheila Bair, former chair of the F.D.I.C. Ms. Bair added that since the largest banks were required to hold cash equivalents even against the safest forms of government debt, they should be expected to have plenty of liquidity.

On Friday, Ms. Yellen discussed the issues surrounding Silicon Valley Bank with banking regulators, according to a statement from the Treasury Department.

Representatives from the Federal Reserve and the F.D.I.C. also held a bipartisan briefing for members of Congress organized by Maxine Waters, a Democrat from California and the ranking member of the House Financial Services Committee, according to a person familiar with the matter.

Silicon Valley Bank’s downward spiral accelerated with incredible speed this week, but its troubles have been brewing for more than a year. Founded in 1983, the bank had long been a go-to lender for start-ups and their executives.

Though the bank advertised itself as a “partner for the innovation economy,” some decidedly old-fashioned decisions led to this moment.

Flush with cash from high-flying start-ups that had raised a lot of money from venture capitalists, Silicon Valley Bank did what all banks do: It kept a fraction of the deposits on hand and invested the rest with the hope of earning a return. In particular, the bank put a large share of customer deposits into long-dated Treasury bonds and mortgage bonds which promised modest, steady returns when interest rates were low.

That had worked well for years. The bank’s deposits doubled to $102 billion at the end of 2020 from $49 billion in 2018. One year later, in 2021, it had $189.2 billion in its coffers as start-ups and technology companies enjoyed heady profits during the pandemic.

But it bought huge amounts of bonds just before the Federal Reserve began to raise interest rates a little more than a year ago, then failed to make provisions for the possibility that interest rates would rise very quickly. As rates rose, those holdings became less attractive because newer government bonds paid more in interest.

That might not have mattered so long as the bank’s clients didn’t ask for their money back. But because the gusher of start-up funding slowed at the same time as interest rates were rising, the bank’s clients began to withdraw more of their money.

To pay those redemption requests, Silicon Valley Bank sold off some of its investments. In its surprise disclosure on Wednesday, the bank admitted that it had lost nearly $2 billion when it was all but forced sell some of its holdings.

“It’s the classic Jimmy Stewart problem,” said Ms. Bair, referring to the actor who played a banker trying to stave off a bank run in the film “It’s a Wonderful Life.” “If everybody starts withdrawing money all at once, the bank has to start selling some of its assets to give money back to depositors.”

Those fears set off investor worries about some of the regional banks. Like Silicon Valley Bank, Signature Bank is also a lender that caters to the start-up community. It’s perhaps best known for its connections to former President Donald J. Trump and his family.

First Republic Bank, a San Francisco-based lender focused on wealth management and private banking services for high net worth clients in the tech industry, warned recently that its ability to earn profits is being hampered by rising interest rates. Its Phoenix-based peer in the wealth management industry, Western Alliance Bank, is facing similar pressures.

Separately, another bank, Silvergate, said on Wednesday that it was shutting down its operations and liquidating after suffering heavy losses from its exposure to the cryptocurrency industry.

A First Republic spokesman responded to a request for comment by sharing a filing the bank made to the Securities and Exchange Commission on Friday stating that its deposit base was “strong and very-well diversified” and that its “liquidity position remains very strong.”

A Western Alliance spokeswoman pointed to a news release by the bank on Friday describing the condition of its balance sheet. “Deposits remain strong,” the statement said. “Asset quality remains excellent.”

Representatives of Signature and Silicon Valley Bank had no comment. Representatives for the Federal Reserve and F.D.I.C. declined to comment.

Some banking experts on Friday pointed out that a bank as large as Silicon Valley Bank might have managed its interest rate risks better had parts of the Dodd-Frank financial-regulatory package, put in place after the 2008 crisis, not been rolled back under President Trump.

In 2018, Mr. Trump signed a bill that lessened regulatory scrutiny for many regional banks. Silicon Valley Bank’s chief executive, Greg Becker, was a strong supporter of the change, which reduced how frequently banks with assets between $100 billion and $250 billion had to submit to stress tests by the Fed.

At the end of 2016, Silicon Valley Bank’s asset size was $45 billion. It had jumped to more than $115 billion by the end of 2020.

Friday’s upheaval raised uncomfortable parallels to the 2008 financial crisis. Although it’s not uncommon for small banks to fail, the last time a bank of this magnitude unraveled was in 2008, when the F.D.I.C. took over Washington Mutual.

The F.D.I.C. rarely takes over banks when the markets are open, preferring to put a failing institution into receivership on a Friday after business has closed for the weekend. But the banking regulator put out a news release in the first few hours of trading on Friday, saying that it created a new bank, the National Bank of Santa Clara, to hold the deposits and other assets of the failed one.

The regulator said that the new entity would be operating by Monday and that checks issued by the old bank would continue to clear. While customers with deposits of up to $250,000 — the maximum covered by F.D.I.C. insurance — will be made whole, there’s no guarantee that depositors with larger amounts in their accounts will get all of their money back.

Those customers will be given certificates for their uninsured funds, meaning they would be among the first in line to be paid back with funds recovered while the F.D.I.C. holds Silicon Valley Bank in receivership — although they might not get all of their money back.

When the California bank IndyMac failed in July 2008, it, like Silicon Valley Bank, did not have an immediate buyer. The F.D.I.C. held IndyMac in receivership until March 2009, and large depositors eventually only received 50 percent of their uninsured funds back. When Washington Mutual was bought by JPMorgan Chase, account holders were made whole.


Emily Flitter covers finance. She is the author of “The White Wall: How Big Finance Bankrupts Black America.” @FlitterOnFraud


Rob Copeland covers Wall Street and banking. @realrobcopeland


https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/10/business/silicon-valley-bank-stock.html