Showing posts with label wall street fund managers. Show all posts
Showing posts with label wall street fund managers. Show all posts

Friday 2 December 2011

Hedge fund legend Paulson has lost out heavily by backing a booming economic recovery which has not materialised.

Recovery hopes painful for hedge fund legend Paulson
John Paulson, the hedge fund manager who made billions betting on a collapse in US house prices, has lost out heavily by backing a booming economic recovery which has not materialised.


President Obama with his wife Michelle
President Obama has been accused of not doing enough for the US economy 
Wagers that the US economy and housing market would bounce back strongly have helped leave one of his flagship funds almost 50pc down for the year so far, which will fuel talk that he has lost his "magic touch".
Paulson & Co, his New York-based hedge fund with $30bn (£19bn) under management, has informed clients its Advantage Plus fund dropped almost 20pc in September, leaving it off 46.73pc for the year, sources told Reuters.
In comparison, the average hedge fund lost 2.81pc last month leaving it down 4.74pc for the year, according to data from Hedge Fund Research.
Paulson, who reports the performance of his funds to investors on a monthly basis, will make a conference call to clients on Tuesday to explain his career's biggest loss.
"I don't think I need to listen to his excuses, it would be like rubbing salt in the wounds," one said.
Paulson's famous bet on a US housing crash helped him generate a personal fortune that the Forbes Rich List puts at $15.5bn (£10bn).
But after well-placed bets on a downturn, his optimism about the US and the wider economic recovery has proved expensive. He invested heavily in America's banking sector, where share prices have slumped in recent months.
Earlier this year he suffered heavy losses over a stake in Sino-Forest, a Chinese timber company, when fraud allegations caused its share price to collapse.
Some suggest Paulson's problem is partly one of size.
Industry watchers say large hedge funds can be unwieldy to manage, with one study looking at thousands of funds finding younger, more nimble funds offered better returns.

Tuesday 1 November 2011

MF Global collapses under euro-zone bets


November 1, 2011 - 10:18AM

Jon Corzine's bid to revive his Wall Street career crashed and burned overnight when his futures brokerage MF Global Holdings Ltd filed for bankruptcy protection following bad bets on euro zone debt.
Corzine, 64, who once ran Goldman Sachs before becoming a U.S. senator and then governor of New Jersey, had been trying to turn the more than 200-year-old MF Global into a mini Goldman by taking on more risky trades.

But once regulators forced it to fully disclose the bets on debt issued by countries including Italy, Portugal and Spain, it rapidly unraveled with no buyers willing to step in.

MF Global's meltdown in less than a week made it the biggest U.S. casualty of Europe's debt crisis, and the seventh-largest bankruptcy by assets in U.S. history.

The company's shares plunged last week as its credit ratings were cut to junk. The Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing came after talks to sell a variety of assets to Interactive Brokers Group Inc broke down earlier on Monday, a person familiar with the matter said.

Regulators had expressed "grave concerns" about the viability of MF Global, which filed for bankruptcy only after "no viable alternative was available in the limited time leading up to the regulators' deadline," the company's chief operating officer, Bradley Abelow, said in a court filing.

One of the regulators that pressed MF Global, the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, was unhappy with the brokerage's failure to give it the required data and records. "(T)o date we don't have the information that we should have," a source close to the CFTC told Reuters.

In the end, regulators and markets reacted swiftly to MF Global's troubles, which may have been exacerbated by Corzine's affinity for risk-taking over the course of a career that took him to the top echelons of Wall Street and then into politics.

"They went for what would be a very profitable trade with European sovereign debt that obviously has blown up in their face, and brought the company down," said Dave Westhouse, vice president of Chicago retail broker PTI Securities and Futures.

RIPPLE EFFECTS

The bankruptcy is reminiscent of the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 at the height of the financial crisis. But market participants said the impact from this collapse, far smaller, would likely be contained.

Still, MF Global's 2,870 employees, as well as trading counterparties, were left scrambling and confused on Monday, as MF Global halted its shares but did not file for bankruptcy until well after U.S. markets had opened.

Trading activity in U.S. gold, crude oil and grain futures slowed to a crawl as the bankruptcy forced a chaotic scramble to untangle trading positions.

"Ultimately it will have lost all confidence of its investor base," Michael Epstein, a restructuring adviser with CRG Partners, said of MF Global. "I'm not sure what restructuring it actually does. In some respects, it's a baby Lehman, in effect."

There was also uncertainty over Wall Street's exposure.

JPMorgan Chase & Co's exposure for a $1.2 billion syndicated loan to MF Global is less than $100 million, a source at the bank said. Deutsche Bank is listed in the court filing as a trustee for bondholders with $1 billion of claims. The banks declined to comment.

The impact on the markets should be smaller and nothing like when Lehman failed and hedge funds had money locked up with the firm for months, said Jeff Carter, an independent futures trader in Chicago.

At the Chicago Board of Trade, three traders wearing MF Global jackets were seen leaving prior to the opening of pit trading, and floor sources told Reuters they had been turned away after their security access cards were denied.

Back outside the Manhattan office, one MF Global employee said all he knew about the bankruptcy was what has been on TV. The company's HR department, meanwhile, was busy making calls withdrawing job offers it made in the past few weeks, according to a person familiar with the situation.

"A sale here is potentially the best outcome for employees because the company will continue to operate as opposed to slowly winding down," said Dan McElhinney, the managing director of corporate restructuring for Epiq Systems.

"I think there will be a lot of effort to tee up the sale pretty quickly here."

The New York Federal Reserve terminated MF Global as one of its primary dealers. CME Group Inc, IntercontinentalExchange Inc, Singapore Exchange Ltd and Singapore's central bank, among others, halted the broker's operations in some form except for liquidations.

European clearinghouse LCH.Clearnet declared MF Global in default.

THE ROAD TO BANKRUPTCY

Corzine was trying to transform MF Global from a brokerage that mainly places customers' trades on exchanges into an investment bank that bets with its own capital.

In the past week, the company posted a quarterly loss and its shares fell by two-thirds as investors focused on the euro zone bets and the effect of low interest rates, which hurt profits from its core brokerage operations.

MF Global scrambled through the weekend and into Monday to find buyers for all or parts of the company, while at the same time hiring restructuring and bankruptcy advisers in case nothing could be done.

In the court filing explaining what went wrong, MF Global pointed a finger at regulators. The bankruptcy was hastened by pressure from the CFTC, the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, wrote Abelow, the COO.

FINRA ordered that its U.S. broker-dealer unit, called MFGI, boost net capital, and then reveal a $6.3 billion stake in short-term debt from European sovereigns with "troubled economies," he wrote.

Market concerns over such exposures led to MF Global being downgraded to "junk" status by various credit rating agencies, sparking margin calls that threatened liquidity, he added.

"Concerned about the events of the past week, some of MFGI's principal regulators -- the CFTC and the SEC -- expressed their grave concerns about MFGI's viability."

MF Global in the filing did not elaborate on the regulators' concerns or the reasons behind them. The SEC, CFTC and FINRA each declined to comment.

According to a July proxy filing, Corzine would be entitled to $12.1 million in severance, prorated bonus and other benefits upon being terminated without cause. Two other executives would be entitled to more: retail operations chief Randy MacDonald could get $17.9 million, and Abelow could get $13.7 million.

However, federal bankruptcy law may limit any possible severance payouts.

First-day hearings in the case were scheduled for Tuesday at 3 p.m. in U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Manhattan. Among other things, MF Global is expected to seek permission from Judge Martin Glenn to use cash collateral to keep operating its business, court papers show.

CLOCK TICKING

By filing for bankruptcy, MF Global freezes the value of its free-falling notes and gives potential suitors a clearer picture of the losses they would be taking on, said Bill Brandt, CEO of Chicago-based turnaround firm Development Specialists Inc.

If a sale is in the offing, he added, the buyer may be a European bank or sovereign government, as such entities would be particularly keen on stopping the slide and maximizing the value of the notes.

"The real question is how many assets will be left to transfer," said Niamh Alexander, an analyst at Keefe, Bruyette & Woods. "Customers might move very quickly and it may be that every hour that passes shrinks the portfolio of assets that could be transferred" to a buyer, she said.

The bankruptcy is the latest flop for finance-focused private equity fund J.C. Flowers, whose other recent investments include nationalized German bank Hypo Real Estate.

After dividends the private equity firm has received for its preferred shares, J.C. Flowers' net exposure to MF Global is $47.8 million, according to a source familiar with the matter. The firm declined to comment.

MF Global hired boutique investment bank Evercore Partners to help find a buyer, separate sources said last week.

The broker's deeply distressed 6.25 percent notes maturing in 2016 fell 4 cents to 46 on the dollar, according to the Trace, which reports bond trades. The price had earlier fallen as low as 15 cents.

MF Global shares remained halted in New York
Reuters


Read more: http://www.smh.com.au/business/world-business/mf-global-collapses-under-eurozone-bets-20111101-1msqp.html#ixzz1cPA8MyYV


Comments:
How can things go so wrong for the professionals managing Other People's Money?



Consequences must dominate Probabilities

In making decisions under conditions of uncertainty, the consequences must dominate the probabilities. We never know the future.

The intelligent investor must focus not just on getting the analysis right. You must also ensure against loss if your analysis turns out to be wrong - as even the best analyses will be at least some of the time. 

The probability of making at least one mistake at some point in your investing lifetime is virtually 100%, and those odds are entirely out of your control. However, you do have control over the consequences of being wrong.

http://myinvestingnotes.blogspot.com/2008/10/consequences-must-dominate.html

Wednesday 26 October 2011

No guru is too big to fail

HOWARD R. GOLD
MoneyShow.com
Published Thursday, Oct. 20, 2011

The market has been pretty rough these days for all of us. But some big-name investors are probably doing worse than you are.


William H. Gross, the head of Pimco Total Return Fund and the most illustrious bond investor of our time, is reeling from a big move out of U.S. Treasuries early in the year.


John Paulson, he of the “Greatest Trade Ever,” is anxiously awaiting the end of the month, when he’ll see how many of his investors cash out of his Advantage hedge funds after heavy losses this year.
Both Mr. Gross and Mr. Paulson are big names who’ve had rough patches, and their experience shows how tough it is for even the best to beat the market consistently over long periods - especially if managers make big macro bets on the economy or stray beyond their areas of expertise. (Mr. Paulson’s spokesperson declined my request for comment, and Pimco didn’t respond by deadline.)
Mr. Gross has presided over Pimco Total Return for nearly 25 years. During that time, he built it into the U.S.’s biggest bond fund, with $242.2-billion (U.S.) in assets as of Sept. 30. Forbes estimates his net worth at $2.2-billion.
Mr. Gross has fame as well as fortune, appearing regularly on CNBC, where he is lionized, as well as in the venerable Barron’s Roundtable. He’s also well known for his clever commentaries, which are posted monthly on Pimco’s website.
In his March missive, Mr. Gross explained his big call for this year: He was dumping Treasuries, because of what could happen once the Federal Reserve ended its latest round of quantitative easing.
“Who will buy Treasuries when the Fed doesn’t?” he wrote. “Yields may have to go higher, maybe even much higher, to attract buying interest.”
It seemed plausible at the time. But when the economy weakened and the European debt crisis flared up again, investors did what they did in 2008 - they rushed for the safety of U.S. Treasuries. Amazingly, that occurred even after Standard & Poor’s cut the U.S.’s AAA rating in August.
The flight-to-safety rally drove the yield on the 10-year Treasury note down to a 65-year low of 1.72 per cent on Oct. 4, from around 3.5 per cent in early March - a humongous move, which Pimco shareholders missed. Pimco Total Return, which has beaten its benchmark over every time period since its inception, has been near the bottom of its peer group over the past year.
Mr. Gross admitted to losing sleep over it, and finally, predictably, he threw in the towel. In a piece entitled “Mea Culpa,” Mr. Gross wrote: “This year is a stinker. PIMCO’s centrefielder has lost a few fly balls in the sun.”
“As Europe’s crisis and the U.S. debt-ceiling debacle turned developed economies towards a potential recession, the Total Return Fund had too little risk off and too much risk on,” he continued.
But now, having been too optimistic about the economy, Mr. Gross seems to be going to the other extreme. Pimco started loading up on long-duration Treasuries late this summer, anticipating that the Fed’s Operation Twist would gobble up 30-year T-bonds.
We’ll see if he’s right, but I wonder whether this kind of all-or-nothing bet is really beneficial to investors. Actually I don’t wonder, but I’ll get to that later.
And while we’re talking about macro bets, consider John Paulson. Having started Paulson & Co. with $2-million in 1994, he was little-known until he scored big by shorting subprime mortgages as the housing market crashed.
His funds were up $15-billion in 2007, and he made more than $3-billion personally that year - “believed to be the largest one-year payday in Wall Street history,” The Wall Street Journal wrote.
Paulson & Co., you may recall, was the firm for which Goldman Sachs set up its notorious ABACUS collateralized debt obligation, which allowed him to short handpicked subprime mortgages. Mr. Paulson was never accused of wrongdoing by either the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Senate committee that investigated the deals.
But in the past year, Mr. Paulson has stumbled badly. Though he’s done well until recently with his big investment in gold, through the SPDR Gold Shares ETF (GLD, in which I own a much smaller position than he does), he also loaded up on shares in banks like Citigroup and Bank of America. Bank stocks, of course, have been a disaster as the economy weakened.
He also lost $750-million on Sino-Forest, a Toronto-listed Chinese timber company caught up in an accounting scandal.
He even lost money on Hewlett-Packard stock, which he bought earlier this year. Does he own Netflix Inc. or Research in Motion Ltd., too? Just kidding.
Result: His Advantage Plus fund was down 47 per cent as of this month, and his Advantage funds have lost a third of their value, or $6-billion, since the beginning of the year, according to The New York Times’ Deal Book. Mr. Paulson is bracing for big redemptions at the end of the month.
“We made a mistake,” he reportedly told investors on a conference call. And he is moving to reduce leverage - another swing in the opposite direction.
Well, at least both billionaires have admitted their errors, which is refreshingly candid on Wall Street ... though Mr. Paulson also took the opportunity to lecture the Occupy Wall Street protesters, who don’t have enough money to lose half of it in the market in a year.
But both men went all in on huge macro bets on the economy. It speaks to overconfidence, even hubris - not surprising when everybody around you calls you a genius all the time.
“People who are entrepreneurs and money managers ... tend to be overconfident in their abilities. When they fail ... you generally don’t know about it,” said Meir Statman, a finance professor at Santa Clara University and one of the leading lights of behavioral finance.
He has written a book, What Investors Really Want, which explains behavioral finance’s key concepts clearly, with down-to-earth examples.
Mr. Statman believes even fund managers with great track records are living on borrowed time. “They have skill and they have luck,” he told me. “There are some periods when luck combines with skill and they wind up looking infallible.” That’s usually around when they crash and burn.
But Mr. Statman actually believes most of their performance is due to luck. “I find myself amazed that those people, knowing what they should know - that most of it is luck - can go on TV and say the market is going to go up or go down. It is supreme overconfidence,” he told me.
I think skill plays a bigger role in it than Mr. Statman does, but anybody - no matter how good their track record - who tries to outguess the markets in a shaky economy like this one is asking for trouble.
Those unhedged macro bets, which both Mr. Gross and Mr. Paulson made, produce plenty of alpha - excess return - when they’re right, and plenty of pain when they’re wrong. That’s why for us mere mortals, diversification is the only way to go, and we should make our “bets” with only what we can afford to lose.
“People expect that gurus are going to be right all the time,” said Mr. Statman. “They jump from guru to guru, but there are no gurus.”
No, there aren’t, and even the gurus themselves are beginning to find that out.
Howard R. Gold is editor at large for MoneyShow.com and a columnist for MarketWatch. You can follow him on Twitter @howardrgold, read more commentary on www.howardrgold.com, and check out his political blog at www.independentagenda.com.


Monday 16 May 2011

Taking a bet on analysts' stock tips



John Collett
April 30, 2011
    Track records ... investor newsletters are a difficult game.
    Track records ... investor newsletters are a difficult game. Photo: Nicolas Walker
    Many self-directed investors rely on the stock tips and advice offered by investor newsletters. But there is no real way to gauge which one has the best strike rate, writes John Collett.
    Investor appetite for share tips is growing strongly, spurred by the flight to DIY super. Many self-directed investors rely on the stock tips and advice offered by investor newsletters.
    But how good are their recommendations?
    While the performance of fund managers is easily established by looking at independently audited performance data, the same is not true for these analysts.
    Only a few have their performance audited. And to complicate things further, all use different methods to measure their success rates. Of the leading players, only Fat Prophets has its numbers independently audited by an accountant.
    ''Nothing hums like a paper portfolio,'' says Ben Griffiths, co-founder of Eley Griffiths Group, a small-companies manager. ''When the dollar is alive, it's not as easy.''
    Demand is growing for these services, particularly from the swelling ranks of DIY super fund trustees looking for advice on how to make money in the sharemarket.
    Whereas 10 years ago the newsletters offered a printed publication with recommendations of stocks once or twice a week, these days, the subscribers can access the advice any time as they are updated almost daily.
    Investors pay up to $900 a year for their flagship, web-based reports; more when the newsletter is bundled with specialist reports such as mining and small companies.
    Fat Prophets has 20,000 subscribers. More than 13,000 of those are based in Australia, with the rest in Britain, where it has a London office, and a small number in the US. In 2005, Fat Prophets had about 7000 subscribers in Australia.
    Angus Geddes, who co-founded Fat Prophets in 2000, says a big part of the growth in his business has been the rise of DIY super funds.
    ''We also attract a lot of people who are disgruntled with the big broking houses,'' he says.
    In recent years, Fat Prophets has added a share brokering service and a funds management arm to its stock-tipping services.
    Huntley's Your Money Weekly, started by Ian Huntley in 1973, has a loyal following, many of whom are DIY fund trustees and small-business owners. Morningstar bought Huntley's business in 2006.
    The head of retail at Morningstar, Paul Easton, says: ''Subscribers are high-net-worth individuals who like to take control of their finances.''
    Strike rate
    When it comes to the tipsters' track records, it is difficult to make meaningful comparisons - some account for a portion of the costs of investing and others do not.
    The Rivkin Report says its recommendations have produced an average annual return of 13.2 per cent against a total return (including dividends) from Australian shares of 9 per cent between mid-1998 and the end of 2010. While the cost of brokerage is deducted from the ''estimated'' return, the performance is not independently audited.
    Intelligent Investor's stated return between May 2001 and December 31 last year - a total of 521 recommendations - is 8.9 per cent, compared with the market's return of 8.4 per cent.
    Huntley's main model portfolio for the 20 years to the end of last year produced an average annual return of 11.9 per cent, compared with the market return of 11.2 per cent.
    Fat Prophets says its recommendations have produced an average annual return of 24.6 per cent, compared with the All Ordinaries Accumulation Index of 8.2 per cent between October 2000 and the end of last year. The numbers for last year have not yet been audited - but they will be.
    ''It [auditing] is expensive to do but you have to do it, particularly if you use it in advertising,'' Geddes says.
    Fat Prophets was pulled up by the regulator in 2002 after using potentially misleading performance figures in its advertising and was required to engage an independent expert to devise a methodology for measuring performance.
    Whether the numbers are audited or not, the performance of the tipsters on all their recommendations may not mean that much, since investors could not possibly trade on every one of the tipsters' choices.
    Model portfolios
    To help subscribers replicate their recommendations in their own portfolios, the tipsters have ''model'' portfolios.
    The model portfolio contains a limited number of the newsletter's best stock ideas and is constructed to be balanced between the various industry sectors of the sharemarket.
    Each stock holding will be ''weighted''. Stocks they favour most will make up more of the portfolio. The performance of the model portfolio is published to the tipsters' subscribers.
    The performance of the Rivkin model portfolio, for example, accounts for the cost of brokerage, interest on the cash balance and franking credits.
    ''Model portfolios provide a transparent method of reporting our performance and provide valuable advice as to capital allocation,'' says the chief executive of the Rivkin Report, Kristian Dibble.
    Tipsters say their services are as much about giving their subscribers advice on what to do when shares they own are the subject of a takeover offer or a buyback from the company as they are about giving tips on stocks.
    Dibble says the Rivkin Report's advice to buy BHP Billiton shares in the expectation of a buyback would have made about 26 per cent on the trade. ''It's an example of an event-driven trade,'' Dibble says.
    Despite not having a single standard on measuring their performance, Griffiths says the tipsters generally do a good job.
    They provide investor education and go into the smaller stocks that normally don't get much attention. However, their market timing on when you should be buying stocks is often less than ideal, he says.
    ''But the private investor could do far worse than have a copy of the tip sheet like Huntley's at the ready,'' Griffiths says.
    Best calls
    Fat Prophets' Angus Geddes says their best call was on gold in 2001, when it was at $US258 an ounce. It is now about $US1500. Their view on gold led to a number of gold stock recommendations.
    One was Red Back Mining, which Fat Profits recommended in 2003 at between 30¢ to 40¢ a share. The Perth-based miner floated in late 1996 as a junior explorer. The share price of the company rose and the company was taken over last year by a Canadian-listed miner.
    Other good calls include Oil Search and uranium miner Extract Resources.
    One of Huntley's best calls was its "speculative buy" recommendation on Australian-listed copper miner Equinox Minerals in 2005 at about $1 a share. Huntley analysts recognised the risks facing the company in developing its copper interests in Zambia but liked the fundamentals.
    Since Huntley's initial call, the company has been the subject of merger proposals, which helped lift its share price. Equinox is currently under a takeover offer, with its shares trading at more than $8.
    Intelligent Investor's two best calls were Cochlear, which makes hearing implants, and ARB Corporation, which makes four-wheel-drive accessories.
    The tipster first recommended Cochlear at $6.30 in 1998. Intelligent Investor stuck to its positive view on Cochlear even when its share price dipped in 2004, recommending the dip as a buying opportunity. Cochlear shares are now trading at more than $80.
    Intelligent Investor first put a long-term buy recommendation on ARB Corporation in 2004 at about $3.50. It again recommended subscribers buy in 2006. The shares are now trading at more than $8.
    Both companies have paid good dividends over that time.


     http://www.smh.com.au/money/investing/taking-a-bet-on-analysts-stock-tips-20110429-1e13s.html#ixzz1MT82Vxq4