Lessons from Malaysia: Why Singapore needs a strong and stable government
June 2nd, 2010 | Author: Your Correspondent
OPINION
When Law Minister Shanmugam spoke about the need for Singapore to have a “strong and stable” government which makes “quick and effective” decisions a few months ago in Parliament, he was greeted with a dose of cynicism and derision by some netizens who saw it as another lame attempt to justify the PAP’s dominant position in Singapore politics.
The latest developments in neighboring Malaysia have provided us ample lessons on why it is important for Singapore to have a strong government and a weak opposition in order not to hamper the decision-making process for the greater good of the nation.
For over 50 years, Malaysia is governed by the ruling Barisan Nasional coalition (formerly known as the Alliance) which enjoyed two-thirds majority in the Dewan Rakyat (Malaysia’s Parliament) till the 2008 elections when the opposition won an unprecedented 82 out of 222 seats in Parliament and lost control of 5 states including the two richest states of Penang and Selangor. (the number is now reduced to 72 after a spate of defections and resignations of MPs from Parti Keadilan Rakyat)
Malaysia used to be an attractive investment destination for MNCs, but the political uncertainty has made a dent on foreign investment with net portfolio and direct investment outflows reaching US$61 billion in 2008 and 2009. Little money has also flowed into equities, according to central bank statistics.
Investments into the opposition-controlled states have slowed down too as investors are unsure if the state governments will survive till the next election after the Perak fiasco which saw Barisan wrestling control of the state back from the Pakatan Rakyat following the “defection” of three lawmakers.
The recent spate of resignations of PKR MPs from the states of Kedah and Selangor have spooked potential investors who are left wondering if business deals signed with the present state governments will be honored in the event that there is a change in government.
At the Federal level, the resurgent opposition has kept the Malaysian government on its toes, preventing it from implementing much needed reforms to liberalize the economy.
Malaysia spent 15.3 per cent of total federal government operating spending on subsidies in its 2009 budget when its deficit surged to a 20-year high of 7 per cent of GDP.
A Minister warned recently that unless Malaysia cut back on the subsidies, it will become bankrupt in 2019.
Prime Minister Najib Razak, an economist by training, has proposed the New Economic Model (NEM) to replace a four-decades old Malay affirmative policy known as the New Economic Policy (NEP) which gave a wide array of economic benefits to the “bumiputras” or ethnic Malays sometimes at the expense of other races.
Investors have long complained that abuse of the policy spawned a patronage-ridden economy, promoted corrupted practices, retarded Malaysia’s competition and causing foreign investors to favour Indonesia and Thailand.
Najib’s moves to roll back the NEP have met with stiff opposition from Malay rights group Perkasa which rejected the NEM outright and called on the NEP to be preserved.
Though cutting back on subsidies will have an immediate impact on low-income Malaysians, it will benefit the country in the long run leading to increased competitiveness and foreign direct investment.
Unfortunately, many analysts believe that the proposed reforms will be delayed, watered down or even abandoned altogether to avoid losing votes.
With the ethnic Chinese firmly behind the opposition Pakatan Rakyat, Barisan needs the votes of the Malays to shore up its flagging support base.
Rolling back the NEP at such a crucial juncture will definitely cause Barisan to lose the support of the Malays which may cause it to be voted out of office in the next general election due to be called by 2013.
Najib’s hands are tied out of political considerations to the detriment of the entire nation.
Malaysia will not be in such a conundrum if it had a strong and stable government like Singapore as well as a weak and non-existent opposition to create trouble for the ruling party.
Unpopular policies which are beneficial to the nation can be implemented swiftly on the ground without the lingering fear of losing votes in the next election.
Singapore’s economy took off between the years 1968 – 1980 when the PAP controlled all the seats in Parliament without a single opposition member.
Critical and sometimes painful decisions are made and policies implemented quickly and efficiently with no opposition from other parties.
For example, the Chinese language and vernacular schools were closed down and replaced by national schools during this period of time.
In Malaysia, this archaic system of education divided by language has remained because no Malaysian Prime Minister has the courage or determination to deal with the expected outcry from Malay rights groups and Chinese clans.
As such, Malaysia’s standard of education continues to lag behind Singapore to this very day.
Singapore does not have any natural resources like Malaysia to fall back on. That is why we need a strong and stable government to make quick and effective decisions for the good of the nation.
The present system has served us well for the last fifty years and has delivered unprecedented economic success and prosperity to our nation. Let us not go down the slippery slope of multi-party partisan politics which have ruined our neighbors like Thailand, Philipines and Malaysia.
http://www.temasekreview.com/2010/06/02/lessons-from-malaysia-why-singapore-needs-a-strong-and-stable-government/
Sunday 6 June 2010
Saturday 5 June 2010
Kenmark stock an easy buy after force-selling
Saturday June 5, 2010
Stock an easy buy after force-selling
By IZWAN IDRIS
izwan@thestar.com.my
MORE than half of Kenmark Industrial Co (M) Bhd’s entire paid up share capital were pledged as collateral at various financial institutions by the main shareholders of the company, based on information from the company’s latest annual report.
It is believed that large blocks of these shares were force-sold into the market in recent days, which had paved the way for a shrewd former shareholder to gain control of the troubled furniture maker.
The force-selling on Kenmark shares gained momentum on Monday after some clients failed to top up their margin accounts in the aftermath of the stock’s sudden price collapse the week before, according to several stockbrokers contacted by StarBizWeek.
Kenmark’s annual report 2009 showed that as at Aug 6 last year, about 55% of the company’s total 181.75 million shares were pledged as collateral for the margin financing facilities. That works out to about 100 million shares held in custody by several banks and stockbrokers.
A chunk of these shares belonged to managing director James Hwang, director Chen Wen-Ling @ Dolly Chen, as well as several privately held companies. Executives from two stockbroking firms confirmed that they no longer hold any Kenmark shares as they had dumped the shares in the market.
Another broker confirmed that his firm had to force sell shares in Kenmark earlier this week after a client failed to top up his margin account. An industry observer said that it is highly likely that these institutions would have to bear significant losses as the stock price had plunged considerably.
Kenmark made headlines last week after its key management went missing and bankers demanded the company pay back it loans. Its failure to submit its latest quarterly financial account fuelled speculation the company was deep in a financial quagmire.
Kenmark’s counter has been on a wild roller coaster ride since then. Shares in Kenmark were suspended from trading by the exchange on Monday after just over an hour of trade on extended sell-down to a paltry 10.5 sen which led to a massive surge in trading volume to 71.9 million shares.
Trading resumed on Tuesday and the stock closed at a record low of 6 sen on 191.1 million shares transacted. However, it rebounded on Wednesday to close at 11.5 sen with 138 million shares changing hands.
The stock was suspended for the second time this week on Thursday, and resumed trading yesterday; it shot up 14.5 sen to close at 26 sen on trading volume of 101 million shares.
On Thursday, the market was in for another shock when it was revealed that Datuk Ishak Ismail had acquired a huge block of shares in Kenmark, a company he had helped list back in 1997. He had mopped up some 57.7 million shares in the open market at near rock bottom prices.
Based on press statement issued on Thursday by managing director James Hwang, Ishak had bought the shares on Tuesday and Wednesday. Recent filings to Bursa Malaysia did not offer any indication about Ishak’s purchase cost, but the stock’s average price over the two-day period was well below 10 sen a piece.
The week before Ishak had resurfaced, Kenmark’s share price was trading at 83 sen on May 25 with a mere 55,000 shares transacted. The stock had kept within a tight trading range of RM1 and 80 sen for the past four years right, up until late May this year.
It is however unclear at this stage, whether Hwang’s stakes in Kenmark has been reduced following the recent sell-off.
Based on the latest availaible information on Kenmark’s shareholding structure, Hwang owned 49.48 million shares, or 27.61% stake in Kenmark as at Aug 6 last year.
It was estimated that Hwang had pledged about 13% of his interest in Kenmark as collateral to several financial institutions including Kenanga Investment Bank, Alliance Group, Maybank and SJ Securities. Company director Chen owned 33.5 million shares, or 18.7% stake in Kenmark, with about 10% of her total stake pledged as collateral.
The annual report showed stockbroker A.A. Anthony held 12 million Kenmark shares that was pledged by Paduan Gangsa Sdn Bhd, while TA Enterprise held 8.34 million shares put up by Rancak Bernas Sdn Bhd and 7.28 million shares pledged by a shareholder Mohd Noh Ibrahim.
http://biz.thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2010/6/5/business/6406163&sec=business
Stock an easy buy after force-selling
By IZWAN IDRIS
izwan@thestar.com.my
MORE than half of Kenmark Industrial Co (M) Bhd’s entire paid up share capital were pledged as collateral at various financial institutions by the main shareholders of the company, based on information from the company’s latest annual report.
It is believed that large blocks of these shares were force-sold into the market in recent days, which had paved the way for a shrewd former shareholder to gain control of the troubled furniture maker.
The force-selling on Kenmark shares gained momentum on Monday after some clients failed to top up their margin accounts in the aftermath of the stock’s sudden price collapse the week before, according to several stockbrokers contacted by StarBizWeek.
Kenmark’s annual report 2009 showed that as at Aug 6 last year, about 55% of the company’s total 181.75 million shares were pledged as collateral for the margin financing facilities. That works out to about 100 million shares held in custody by several banks and stockbrokers.
A chunk of these shares belonged to managing director James Hwang, director Chen Wen-Ling @ Dolly Chen, as well as several privately held companies. Executives from two stockbroking firms confirmed that they no longer hold any Kenmark shares as they had dumped the shares in the market.
Another broker confirmed that his firm had to force sell shares in Kenmark earlier this week after a client failed to top up his margin account. An industry observer said that it is highly likely that these institutions would have to bear significant losses as the stock price had plunged considerably.
Kenmark made headlines last week after its key management went missing and bankers demanded the company pay back it loans. Its failure to submit its latest quarterly financial account fuelled speculation the company was deep in a financial quagmire.
Kenmark’s counter has been on a wild roller coaster ride since then. Shares in Kenmark were suspended from trading by the exchange on Monday after just over an hour of trade on extended sell-down to a paltry 10.5 sen which led to a massive surge in trading volume to 71.9 million shares.
Trading resumed on Tuesday and the stock closed at a record low of 6 sen on 191.1 million shares transacted. However, it rebounded on Wednesday to close at 11.5 sen with 138 million shares changing hands.
The stock was suspended for the second time this week on Thursday, and resumed trading yesterday; it shot up 14.5 sen to close at 26 sen on trading volume of 101 million shares.
On Thursday, the market was in for another shock when it was revealed that Datuk Ishak Ismail had acquired a huge block of shares in Kenmark, a company he had helped list back in 1997. He had mopped up some 57.7 million shares in the open market at near rock bottom prices.
Based on press statement issued on Thursday by managing director James Hwang, Ishak had bought the shares on Tuesday and Wednesday. Recent filings to Bursa Malaysia did not offer any indication about Ishak’s purchase cost, but the stock’s average price over the two-day period was well below 10 sen a piece.
The week before Ishak had resurfaced, Kenmark’s share price was trading at 83 sen on May 25 with a mere 55,000 shares transacted. The stock had kept within a tight trading range of RM1 and 80 sen for the past four years right, up until late May this year.
It is however unclear at this stage, whether Hwang’s stakes in Kenmark has been reduced following the recent sell-off.
Based on the latest availaible information on Kenmark’s shareholding structure, Hwang owned 49.48 million shares, or 27.61% stake in Kenmark as at Aug 6 last year.
It was estimated that Hwang had pledged about 13% of his interest in Kenmark as collateral to several financial institutions including Kenanga Investment Bank, Alliance Group, Maybank and SJ Securities. Company director Chen owned 33.5 million shares, or 18.7% stake in Kenmark, with about 10% of her total stake pledged as collateral.
The annual report showed stockbroker A.A. Anthony held 12 million Kenmark shares that was pledged by Paduan Gangsa Sdn Bhd, while TA Enterprise held 8.34 million shares put up by Rancak Bernas Sdn Bhd and 7.28 million shares pledged by a shareholder Mohd Noh Ibrahim.
http://biz.thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2010/6/5/business/6406163&sec=business
Kenmark - A bizarre run of events
Saturday June 5, 2010
A bizarre run of events
An implausible series of happenings at Kenmark requires that the authorities take note and do the needful
ANYONE following the strange sequence unfolding at furniture manufacturer Kenmark Industrial Co (M) Bhd can be forgiven for thinking that there is more – much more – than meets the eye.
A disappearing managing director and senior management saw its share price collapsing and in its aftermath, a new controlling shareholder emerged, along with the re-emergence of the MD made known via a press release.
First indications of trouble came when the share price collapsed on the eve of Wesak day, on Thursday May 27 and again on Monday, May 31, there being no trading on Friday because of the public holiday. From nearly 80 sen a share, it had collapsed to about 10 sen, in just over a day, wiping out nearly nine tenths of its value.
On Monday morning – 10.10am – after one hour and 10 minutes of trading, Bursa Malaysia suspended the shares and shot a query to the company on the unusual market activity.
Back came the shocking reply on the same day: Kenmark said its independent directors, Zainabon @ Zainab Abu Bakar and Yeunh Wee Tiong, were the only ones present at an audit committee meeting that was to be held at 10.30am on May 27, incidentally, the day the share prices collapsed.
Neither managing director James Hwang nor another executive and non-executive director, all from Taiwan, could be contacted. The deputy general manager and the finance and administration manager had resigned. There was no management representation at the meeting and therefore the meeting could not proceed.
The independent directors visited the company’s premises in Port Klang on May 29 and found it sealed and the premises secured by a guard. In a further announcement the same day, the independent directors revealed that there were letters of demand for borrowings which totalled over RM60mil and that they were unable to ascertain the financial position of the company or offer any other opinion.
And the independent directors said the company would enter PN17 status requiring its operations to be regularised. They also said that the company would be unable to release its quarterly report in time and that the shares would be suspended five trading days later on June 8. This was confirmed by Bursa Malaysia. All these announcements were made on May 31.
In short, it was utter chaos and no one knew what was happening with key board members and senior management having resigned or disappeared or otherwise unable to be located. That must have been a sort of record even for the Kuala Lumpur stock exchange where strange things have sometimes been known to happen and set the stage for a sell-off.
Incredibly, with such a state of uncertainty surrounding the company, the suspension of the shares was lifted the following day, June 1. Prudence should have dictated that the suspension be maintained until more information was forthcoming so that all shareholders could act from a position of equal information.
That would have discouraged needless speculation and ensured that insiders did not have a trading advantage. If syndicates were in the market, they could have been flushed out as more information about the company came into the public domain.
On May 31 when trading was shortened by the suspension, turnover of the company’s shares had already ballooned to an incredible 72 million shares from 1.5 million shares the previous trading day, May 27 and just 55,000 shares on May 26. That 72 million represented nearly 40% of Kenmark’s issued shares, enough to tell anyone that activity was not just unusual but terribly, terribly unusual, considering the shares changed hands in just one hour and ten minutes of trading. .
If you thought turnover was high on May 31, wait for the next day when the suspension was lifted. It shot up to a massive 190 million plus, more than the entire paid-up capital of Kenmark, implying the same shares were changing hands several times. The following day it was still an incredible 138 million shares.
And then came the next shocking announcement on June 2, when the shares were suspended from trading at the awkward time of 4.43pm and remained suspended until yesterday, June 4
Suddenly, managing director Hwang was contactable. He even issued a press release. He had been sick and unconscious, he said, and his family had barred all calls. But he did not explain why his other directors could not be contacted as well. He apologised for the confusion caused.
“I have spoken with a friendly party who has already acquired a substantial stake in the company and there will be new appointments of directors, including two executive directors to manage the situation there,” he said.
He did not say when he spoke to the friendly party.
His letter to the independent directors said that four new directors should be immediately appointed to the board. They were Ho Soo Woon, Ahmed Azhar Abdullah, Woon Wai En and Datuk Abd Gani Yusuf. The last was appointed executive chairman. The independent directors then resigned.
It transpired that the friendly party and new major shareholder was Datuk Ishak Ismail, who managed to pick up some 32% from the market on June 1 and June 2. Ishak, at his own admission, was the bumiputra partner when Kenmark was listed in 1997.
Yesterday, trading continued to be active and the share closed at 29.5 sen, more than double the previous close of 11.5 sen, on a turnover of 100.8 million shares but still well below its recent price of around 80 sen.
The series of events can only be termed incredible and highly volatile. Any reasonable person who follows the case closely will have serious questions to ask at each juncture of the transactions.
It is now up to the authorities, Bursa Malaysia and the Securities Commission to investigate and establish what happened and bring those responsible to book.
At the very least, there was gross negligence in terms of corporate governance and the proper running of a company.
But things could be a lot worse than that.
l Managing editor P Gunasegaram says that smoke usually indicates fire.
http://biz.thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2010/6/5/business/6407063&sec=business
A bizarre run of events
An implausible series of happenings at Kenmark requires that the authorities take note and do the needful
ANYONE following the strange sequence unfolding at furniture manufacturer Kenmark Industrial Co (M) Bhd can be forgiven for thinking that there is more – much more – than meets the eye.
A disappearing managing director and senior management saw its share price collapsing and in its aftermath, a new controlling shareholder emerged, along with the re-emergence of the MD made known via a press release.
First indications of trouble came when the share price collapsed on the eve of Wesak day, on Thursday May 27 and again on Monday, May 31, there being no trading on Friday because of the public holiday. From nearly 80 sen a share, it had collapsed to about 10 sen, in just over a day, wiping out nearly nine tenths of its value.
On Monday morning – 10.10am – after one hour and 10 minutes of trading, Bursa Malaysia suspended the shares and shot a query to the company on the unusual market activity.
Back came the shocking reply on the same day: Kenmark said its independent directors, Zainabon @ Zainab Abu Bakar and Yeunh Wee Tiong, were the only ones present at an audit committee meeting that was to be held at 10.30am on May 27, incidentally, the day the share prices collapsed.
Neither managing director James Hwang nor another executive and non-executive director, all from Taiwan, could be contacted. The deputy general manager and the finance and administration manager had resigned. There was no management representation at the meeting and therefore the meeting could not proceed.
The independent directors visited the company’s premises in Port Klang on May 29 and found it sealed and the premises secured by a guard. In a further announcement the same day, the independent directors revealed that there were letters of demand for borrowings which totalled over RM60mil and that they were unable to ascertain the financial position of the company or offer any other opinion.
And the independent directors said the company would enter PN17 status requiring its operations to be regularised. They also said that the company would be unable to release its quarterly report in time and that the shares would be suspended five trading days later on June 8. This was confirmed by Bursa Malaysia. All these announcements were made on May 31.
In short, it was utter chaos and no one knew what was happening with key board members and senior management having resigned or disappeared or otherwise unable to be located. That must have been a sort of record even for the Kuala Lumpur stock exchange where strange things have sometimes been known to happen and set the stage for a sell-off.
Incredibly, with such a state of uncertainty surrounding the company, the suspension of the shares was lifted the following day, June 1. Prudence should have dictated that the suspension be maintained until more information was forthcoming so that all shareholders could act from a position of equal information.
That would have discouraged needless speculation and ensured that insiders did not have a trading advantage. If syndicates were in the market, they could have been flushed out as more information about the company came into the public domain.
On May 31 when trading was shortened by the suspension, turnover of the company’s shares had already ballooned to an incredible 72 million shares from 1.5 million shares the previous trading day, May 27 and just 55,000 shares on May 26. That 72 million represented nearly 40% of Kenmark’s issued shares, enough to tell anyone that activity was not just unusual but terribly, terribly unusual, considering the shares changed hands in just one hour and ten minutes of trading. .
If you thought turnover was high on May 31, wait for the next day when the suspension was lifted. It shot up to a massive 190 million plus, more than the entire paid-up capital of Kenmark, implying the same shares were changing hands several times. The following day it was still an incredible 138 million shares.
And then came the next shocking announcement on June 2, when the shares were suspended from trading at the awkward time of 4.43pm and remained suspended until yesterday, June 4
Suddenly, managing director Hwang was contactable. He even issued a press release. He had been sick and unconscious, he said, and his family had barred all calls. But he did not explain why his other directors could not be contacted as well. He apologised for the confusion caused.
“I have spoken with a friendly party who has already acquired a substantial stake in the company and there will be new appointments of directors, including two executive directors to manage the situation there,” he said.
He did not say when he spoke to the friendly party.
His letter to the independent directors said that four new directors should be immediately appointed to the board. They were Ho Soo Woon, Ahmed Azhar Abdullah, Woon Wai En and Datuk Abd Gani Yusuf. The last was appointed executive chairman. The independent directors then resigned.
It transpired that the friendly party and new major shareholder was Datuk Ishak Ismail, who managed to pick up some 32% from the market on June 1 and June 2. Ishak, at his own admission, was the bumiputra partner when Kenmark was listed in 1997.
Yesterday, trading continued to be active and the share closed at 29.5 sen, more than double the previous close of 11.5 sen, on a turnover of 100.8 million shares but still well below its recent price of around 80 sen.
The series of events can only be termed incredible and highly volatile. Any reasonable person who follows the case closely will have serious questions to ask at each juncture of the transactions.
It is now up to the authorities, Bursa Malaysia and the Securities Commission to investigate and establish what happened and bring those responsible to book.
At the very least, there was gross negligence in terms of corporate governance and the proper running of a company.
But things could be a lot worse than that.
l Managing editor P Gunasegaram says that smoke usually indicates fire.
http://biz.thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2010/6/5/business/6407063&sec=business
Institutional and retail investors in the GCC have short time horizons compared to global benchmarks
Friday 4th, June 2010 -- 23:20 GMT
Invesco Middle East Asset Management Study finds a consistently high demand for emerging markets across the region
Posted: 26-05-2010 , 09:35 GMT
Invesco Asset Management Limited today unveiled the findings of its inaugural Invesco Middle East Asset Management Study. This regional study is the first of its kind and reveals a fascinating insight into the complex and sophisticated investment habits of this continually evolving region. The company, who opened its Dubai office in 2005, has been working with Middle East clients for decades, offering financial institutions and investment professionals access to global investment expertise.
Surveying the attitudes and behaviours of both institutional and retail markets across the six Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) countries, the study revealed a number of key findings:
• There is currently a consistently high demand for emerging markets across all companies and territories
• Institutional and retail investors in the GCC have short time horizons compared to global benchmarks
• Investor location within the GCC has a strong influence on exposure to investment sectors
Interestingly, the study also indicated that both the institutional and retail market are becoming increasingly risk averse.
Nick Tolchard, Head of Invesco Middle East commented: “The Middle East is often portrayed as a homogenous region; this report clearly shows this is not the case, though there are some surprising similarities. The influence of investor location over asset allocation makes it quite clear that the Middle East is a highly diverse investment region.”
He continued: “We believe that this diversity is explained by access to investment products, which varies across the region. Certain markets, such as Saudi Arabia, have restricted access to international investments whereas others, such as the UAE, are dominated by offshore life wrappers with large international fund ranges.”
Investor type also plays a key role in asset allocation, according to the study. In the growing retail market, preferences vary according to distributer. Private client portfolio managers favour global equities and alternative assets, while retail banks prefer local equities and cash and IFAs opt for global equities and cash.
On the institutional side, preferences are even more diverse:
o Sovereign Wealth Funds prefer alternative investments (private equity and hedge funds)
o Institutional investors tend to invest in mainstream asset classes (equities, bonds and cash)
o Corporates (commercial banks and diversified financial services) prefer local over international assets.
o Asset managers prefer property
Commenting on these asset allocation preferences, Nick Tolchard said: “Sovereign Wealth Funds’ preference for private equity and hedge funds may align to opportunistic investment strategies to exploit any short-term market volatility and below average allocations to local securities and commodities is expected given that the source of funding for Sovereign Wealth Funds (government revenue) is heavily dependent on commodity prices and the performance of the local economy.”
In addition, one of the most striking findings is the universal preference for emerging market assets. Across all participants 82% of respondents forecast exposure to emerging markets over the next 3-5 years compared to 30% for North America, 14% for Europe and 8% for Japan. The key driver for this appears to be simply that GCC investors expect returns to exceed those in developed markets.
The Retail and institutional respondents in the GCC are also unified by their perceptions of change in risk appetite – they have indicated that 79% of institutional and 70% of retail investors have changed their attitude to risk in the last six to twelve months and in both cases, more investors have become increasingly risk averse.
In addition, the study indicated that the respondents also share similar very short-term investment time horizons, 38% of retail respondents have a time horizon of less than a year compared to 33% in the institutional market. Of those surveyed, only 12% of institutional respondents have an investment horizon beyond 5 years, significantly below global comparatives for institutional markets.* Invesco believes that the short retail time horizons in the retail market can be explained by the transient nature of retail expatriate clients, investment losses during the global financial crisis and the coverage on Dubai’s debt restructuring. Looking forward it expects retail time horizons to lengthen as markets stabilise, but to remain shorter than global retail benchmarks.
Nick Tolchard explained: “Perhaps the most surprising finding was the short term and highly volatile investment attitudes in the institutional sector. However, this could be explained by nimble and fast moving investment behaviour of Sovereign Wealth Funds in the GCC region, in contrast to other institutional markets which are typically dominated by large insurance and pension funds managing a high proportion of their assets against long-term liabilities.”
He concluded: “The Middle East is a growing investor force in the world and we see this research as part of our strategic commitment to understanding the perspective of investors, as well as the investment and savings culture of the Middle East. We intend to carry out this research on a regular basis, monitoring the retail investment market as it continues to grow, and learning even more about the behaviour and preferences of the highly sophisticated institutions operating in the GCC.”
© 2010 Mena Report (www.menareport.com)
http://www.menareport.com/en/business/316494
Summary:
This research studied the investment and savings culture of the Middle East. It highlights the growing retail investment market and the behaviour and preferences of the highly sophisticated institutions operating in the GCC.
Invesco Middle East Asset Management Study finds a consistently high demand for emerging markets across the region
Posted: 26-05-2010 , 09:35 GMT
Invesco Asset Management Limited today unveiled the findings of its inaugural Invesco Middle East Asset Management Study. This regional study is the first of its kind and reveals a fascinating insight into the complex and sophisticated investment habits of this continually evolving region. The company, who opened its Dubai office in 2005, has been working with Middle East clients for decades, offering financial institutions and investment professionals access to global investment expertise.
Surveying the attitudes and behaviours of both institutional and retail markets across the six Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) countries, the study revealed a number of key findings:
• There is currently a consistently high demand for emerging markets across all companies and territories
• Institutional and retail investors in the GCC have short time horizons compared to global benchmarks
• Investor location within the GCC has a strong influence on exposure to investment sectors
Interestingly, the study also indicated that both the institutional and retail market are becoming increasingly risk averse.
Nick Tolchard, Head of Invesco Middle East commented: “The Middle East is often portrayed as a homogenous region; this report clearly shows this is not the case, though there are some surprising similarities. The influence of investor location over asset allocation makes it quite clear that the Middle East is a highly diverse investment region.”
He continued: “We believe that this diversity is explained by access to investment products, which varies across the region. Certain markets, such as Saudi Arabia, have restricted access to international investments whereas others, such as the UAE, are dominated by offshore life wrappers with large international fund ranges.”
Investor type also plays a key role in asset allocation, according to the study. In the growing retail market, preferences vary according to distributer. Private client portfolio managers favour global equities and alternative assets, while retail banks prefer local equities and cash and IFAs opt for global equities and cash.
On the institutional side, preferences are even more diverse:
o Sovereign Wealth Funds prefer alternative investments (private equity and hedge funds)
o Institutional investors tend to invest in mainstream asset classes (equities, bonds and cash)
o Corporates (commercial banks and diversified financial services) prefer local over international assets.
o Asset managers prefer property
Commenting on these asset allocation preferences, Nick Tolchard said: “Sovereign Wealth Funds’ preference for private equity and hedge funds may align to opportunistic investment strategies to exploit any short-term market volatility and below average allocations to local securities and commodities is expected given that the source of funding for Sovereign Wealth Funds (government revenue) is heavily dependent on commodity prices and the performance of the local economy.”
In addition, one of the most striking findings is the universal preference for emerging market assets. Across all participants 82% of respondents forecast exposure to emerging markets over the next 3-5 years compared to 30% for North America, 14% for Europe and 8% for Japan. The key driver for this appears to be simply that GCC investors expect returns to exceed those in developed markets.
The Retail and institutional respondents in the GCC are also unified by their perceptions of change in risk appetite – they have indicated that 79% of institutional and 70% of retail investors have changed their attitude to risk in the last six to twelve months and in both cases, more investors have become increasingly risk averse.
In addition, the study indicated that the respondents also share similar very short-term investment time horizons, 38% of retail respondents have a time horizon of less than a year compared to 33% in the institutional market. Of those surveyed, only 12% of institutional respondents have an investment horizon beyond 5 years, significantly below global comparatives for institutional markets.* Invesco believes that the short retail time horizons in the retail market can be explained by the transient nature of retail expatriate clients, investment losses during the global financial crisis and the coverage on Dubai’s debt restructuring. Looking forward it expects retail time horizons to lengthen as markets stabilise, but to remain shorter than global retail benchmarks.
Nick Tolchard explained: “Perhaps the most surprising finding was the short term and highly volatile investment attitudes in the institutional sector. However, this could be explained by nimble and fast moving investment behaviour of Sovereign Wealth Funds in the GCC region, in contrast to other institutional markets which are typically dominated by large insurance and pension funds managing a high proportion of their assets against long-term liabilities.”
He concluded: “The Middle East is a growing investor force in the world and we see this research as part of our strategic commitment to understanding the perspective of investors, as well as the investment and savings culture of the Middle East. We intend to carry out this research on a regular basis, monitoring the retail investment market as it continues to grow, and learning even more about the behaviour and preferences of the highly sophisticated institutions operating in the GCC.”
© 2010 Mena Report (www.menareport.com)
http://www.menareport.com/en/business/316494
Summary:
This research studied the investment and savings culture of the Middle East. It highlights the growing retail investment market and the behaviour and preferences of the highly sophisticated institutions operating in the GCC.
The study indicated that the respondents share similar very short-term investment time horizons,
- 38% of retail respondents have a time horizon of less than a year compared to 33% in the institutional market.
- Of those surveyed, only 12% of institutional respondents have an investment horizon beyond 5 years, significantly below global comparatives for institutional markets.
- the transient nature of retail expatriate clients,
- investment losses during the global financial crisis and
- the coverage on Dubai’s debt restructuring.
Perhaps the most surprising finding was the short term and highly volatile investment attitudes in the institutional sector.
- However, this could be explained by nimble and fast moving investment behaviour of Sovereign Wealth Funds in the GCC region, in contrast to other institutional markets which are typically dominated by large insurance and pension funds managing a high proportion of their assets against long-term liabilities.”
Market in Turmoil Again
Is this a healthy correction?
Is this another bear market?
Will you be seeking for shelter?
Will you be seizing this as an opportunity to buy?
Is this another bear market?
Will you be seeking for shelter?
Will you be seizing this as an opportunity to buy?
Friday 4 June 2010
Who were the sellers of Kenmark shares?
Before the recent crisis, Kenmark was trading at 83 sen per share (market capitalization of RM 148.63 million).
On 2.6.2010, Kenmark was trading at 6 sen per share (market capitalization of RM10.74 million)
Mr. Ishak bought 57.6919 million shares on 1.6.2010 and 2.6.2010 (32.36% of total market shares).
Surely this buying is based on unequal information which he possesses.
Who were the sellers of these shares?
Pity the shareholders whose shares were pledged as securities for loans which were forced sold.
How can this market be better regulated?
Here is an attempt at estimating the liquidation value of Kenmark:
http://spreadsheets.google.com/pub?key=tZ7l9at-gaLGGpM4h5RaOsw&output=html
Ref:
http://announcements.bursamalaysia.com/EDMS/edmsweb.
nsf/LsvAllByID/337D2BBAB10029B248257737003B6066?OpenDocument
Also read:
http://whereiszemoola.blogspot.com/2010/06/
more-incredible-news-flow-from-kenmark.html
----
Business Times
Ishak now a major investor in Kenmark
By Azlan Abu Bakar
alan@nstp.com.my
2010/06/04
Datuk Ishak Ismail, former KFC deputy executive chairman bought 32.36 per cent of Kenmark, a furniture maker, on June 1 and 2
DATUK Ishak Ismail, KFC Holdings (Malaysia) Bhd's former deputy executive chairman, is now a major shareholder of financially-troubled Kenmark Industrial Co (M) Bhd (7030) as he bought while others were busy dumping the stock.
He bought 32.36 per cent of Kenmark, a furniture maker, on June 1 and 2, as the stock hit record lows of between 3.5 sen and 4.5 sen. The group did not say who were the sellers.
Kenmark also did not say how much he paid for the stake but based on the closing and last traded prices of the two days, Ishak could have spent about RM6 million. He may have even paid much less, or probably half of that, if he had bought the stake at the days' lows.
Kenmark, a PN17 company, has yet to report its fourth quarter numbers for the period to March 31 2010 as its managing director and major shareholder James Hwang, a Taiwanese, went missing since last week.
From then on, the group went into a tailspin as two banks said it defaulted on loans, named a receiver to a subsidiary while all operations ground to a halt and some 400 of its workers were uncertain of their future.
The group has hired Messrs UHY Diong as its special auditor.
A former politician, he was once involved in a battle with the Lau brothers for control of KFC. Ishak was firmly in control of KFC until the Asian financial crisis hit Malaysia in 1997.
Kenmark also named new directors yesterday. They are executive chairman Datuk Abd Gani Yusof, executive director Ho Soo Woon, and independent non-executive directors Ahmed Azhar Abdullah and Woon Wai En.
Kenmark's independent directors Zainabon @ Zainab Abu Bakar and Yeunh Wee Tiong have tendered their resignations yesterday.
"The new directors are currently assessing the current situation of the Kenmark Group and are in discussion with the receivers of Kenmark Paper Sdn Bhd to allow the re-activation of business operations at the business and corporate office at Port Klang soonest possible and restore market confidence," Kenmark said in a statement to Bursa Malaysia.
The new directors also stressed that all employees have been paid salaries up to May 2010 and all payments to statutory bodies have also been made.
On June 2, Kenmark said Hwang fell ill in China from May 24 and he could not be reached as his family barred all calls. The group's new directors hope that he could return by next month.
As for the other two Taiwanese directors, Chang Chin-Chuan and Chen Wen-Ling who were also said to be missing, they have made contact with Kenmark.
Shares of Kenmark have been suspended since June 2 and its last traded price was 11.5 sen.
http://www.btimes.com.my/Current_News/BTIMES/articles/kenshak/Article/index_html
On 2.6.2010, Kenmark was trading at 6 sen per share (market capitalization of RM10.74 million)
Mr. Ishak bought 57.6919 million shares on 1.6.2010 and 2.6.2010 (32.36% of total market shares).
Surely this buying is based on unequal information which he possesses.
Who were the sellers of these shares?
Pity the shareholders whose shares were pledged as securities for loans which were forced sold.
How can this market be better regulated?
Here is an attempt at estimating the liquidation value of Kenmark:
http://spreadsheets.google.com/pub?key=tZ7l9at-gaLGGpM4h5RaOsw&output=html
Ref:
http://announcements.bursamalaysia.com/EDMS/edmsweb.
nsf/LsvAllByID/337D2BBAB10029B248257737003B6066?OpenDocument
Announcement Details :
Name
Date Acquired ... No. of shares ... %
BHLB Trustee Berhad for a discretionary trust
for the family of Ishak Bin Ismail
1.6.2010 ... 10,000,000 ... 5.61%
2.6.2010 ... 20,000,000 ... 11.22%
Unioncity Enterprises Ltd
2.6.2010 ... 27,691,900 ... 15.53%
Also read:
http://whereiszemoola.blogspot.com/2010/06/
more-incredible-news-flow-from-kenmark.html
----
Business Times
Ishak now a major investor in Kenmark
By Azlan Abu Bakar
alan@nstp.com.my
2010/06/04
Datuk Ishak Ismail, former KFC deputy executive chairman bought 32.36 per cent of Kenmark, a furniture maker, on June 1 and 2
DATUK Ishak Ismail, KFC Holdings (Malaysia) Bhd's former deputy executive chairman, is now a major shareholder of financially-troubled Kenmark Industrial Co (M) Bhd (7030) as he bought while others were busy dumping the stock.
He bought 32.36 per cent of Kenmark, a furniture maker, on June 1 and 2, as the stock hit record lows of between 3.5 sen and 4.5 sen. The group did not say who were the sellers.
Kenmark also did not say how much he paid for the stake but based on the closing and last traded prices of the two days, Ishak could have spent about RM6 million. He may have even paid much less, or probably half of that, if he had bought the stake at the days' lows.
Kenmark, a PN17 company, has yet to report its fourth quarter numbers for the period to March 31 2010 as its managing director and major shareholder James Hwang, a Taiwanese, went missing since last week.
From then on, the group went into a tailspin as two banks said it defaulted on loans, named a receiver to a subsidiary while all operations ground to a halt and some 400 of its workers were uncertain of their future.
Kenmark is now the subject of Securities Commission (SC) probe while Bursa Malaysia has ordered it to appoint a special auditor to ascertain if there are any irregularities.
The group has hired Messrs UHY Diong as its special auditor.
In 2001, Ishak was fined RM400,000 by the Sessions Court for giving false information to the SC.
A former politician, he was once involved in a battle with the Lau brothers for control of KFC. Ishak was firmly in control of KFC until the Asian financial crisis hit Malaysia in 1997.
Kenmark also named new directors yesterday. They are executive chairman Datuk Abd Gani Yusof, executive director Ho Soo Woon, and independent non-executive directors Ahmed Azhar Abdullah and Woon Wai En.
Kenmark's independent directors Zainabon @ Zainab Abu Bakar and Yeunh Wee Tiong have tendered their resignations yesterday.
"The new directors are currently assessing the current situation of the Kenmark Group and are in discussion with the receivers of Kenmark Paper Sdn Bhd to allow the re-activation of business operations at the business and corporate office at Port Klang soonest possible and restore market confidence," Kenmark said in a statement to Bursa Malaysia.
The new directors also stressed that all employees have been paid salaries up to May 2010 and all payments to statutory bodies have also been made.
On June 2, Kenmark said Hwang fell ill in China from May 24 and he could not be reached as his family barred all calls. The group's new directors hope that he could return by next month.
As for the other two Taiwanese directors, Chang Chin-Chuan and Chen Wen-Ling who were also said to be missing, they have made contact with Kenmark.
Shares of Kenmark have been suspended since June 2 and its last traded price was 11.5 sen.
http://www.btimes.com.my/Current_News/BTIMES/articles/kenshak/Article/index_html
The Coming Bubble of 2010, and How to Avoid It
The Coming Bubble of 2010, and How to Avoid It
Adam J. Wiederman
May 30, 2010
Even though it has been barely two years since the latest investing bubble burst, sending the stocks of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to their knees, there's yet another bubble forming. And I believe it will burst this year.
Don't just take my word for it; even world-renowned investor George Soros agrees.
Just ahead, I'll tell you how to completely avoid it, and I'll present an alternative strategy you can adopt instead of following the crowd into this bubble.
But first, let's take a look at this bubble and how it formed.
All that glitters
Congress has spent billions of dollars in stimulus funds to jump-start the economy. This influx of dollars was funded almost entirely with debt. As the national debt level rises, the dollar becomes weaker, because currency investors shy away from high-debt countries. This causes higher inflation, which most everyone agrees is coming.
But the consensus right now is that the best way to counteract inflation is by investing in gold.
And the consensus is dead wrong!
Alas, gold is a luxury commodity. It has no coupon rate or growth prospects, and it can rise in price only as much as demand for it grows.
It's also difficult to value. Some believe the price of gold per ounce should match the Dow Jones Industrial Average. Others believe it must reflect the price of a top-tier man's suit. Still others believe it must account for global supply and demand.
In spite of this inherent confusion, many prominent investors -- John Hathaway of the Tocqueville Gold Fund, Jim Rogers of Quantum Fund fame, and even top hedge fund managers like David Einhorn and John Paulson, to name a few -- believe gold can do well right now.
Even more shockingly, a recent Value Investors Congress was full of lectures on how to profit in precious metals.
Even the best can be fooled
The average investor is blindly following these noteworthy financial wizards. That's why more than $12 billion of new money was invested in the SPDR Gold Trust in 2009 alone. I'm the first to admit that falling prey to other investors' moves is an easy pitfall, but it can set you up for disaster.
So what exactly are all these investors -- and their followers -- overlooking? These two key facts:
1. When gold demand rises, supply does, too, which brings gold prices back down.
Fortune magazine reports that gold miners invested more than $40 billion into new projects since 2001, and they "are now bearing fruit." Bullion dealer Kitco "predicts that these new mining projects will add 450 tons annually -- or 5% -- "to the gold supply through 2014, enough to move prices lower." The demand also brings out sellers of scrap gold, which adds even more to the supply.
All this while demand for gold (other than as an investment) dropped 20% in 2009.
2. Gold is historically a poor investment.
Perhaps the most damning fact is that, from 1833 through 2005, gold and inflation had nearly perfect correlation, according to Forbes. This means that, after taxes, you would have actually lost money in gold.
Warren Buffett once quipped:
It gets dug out of the ground. ... Then we melt it down, dig another hole, bury it again and pay people to stand around guarding it. It has no utility. Anyone watching from Mars would be scratching their head.
Truth be told, the only way to get the price of gold to rise is to get other investors to buy into the idea -- like a giant Ponzi scheme. And as we know from watching the unraveling of Bernie Madoff's empire, that can't last forever.
No wonder the vice governor of the Chinese central bank recently announced that the bank is holding off on purchasing gold.
All of this explains why buying gold today is a horrible decision -- and why investors would be better off looking elsewhere.
The absolute best place to look
The best way to invest for inflation is to invest in high-yield dividend companies. Unlike gold, which has no coupon rate and no growth potential, you should be sending your investing dollars to companies that pay a dividend (which often rises) and also have both stable growth potential (which also often rises) and strong assets (in inflationary periods, assets are more valuable since they cost more to replace).
Here are six solid candidates that fit that bill, all of which have a long history of dividends -- through periods of inflation and deflation alike:
Company
Market Cap
Dividend Yield
5-Year Compounded Annual Growth Rate of Dividends
Liabilities-to-Assets Ratio
Dividends Paid Since
United Technologies (NYSE: UTX)
$64 billion
2.5%
16.2%
66%
1936
McDonald’s (NYSE: MCD)
$72 billion
3.3%
30.7%
53%
1976
Abbott Laboratories (NYSE: ABT)
$74 billion
3.7%
9.2%
61%
1926
Coca-Cola (NYSE: KO)
$118 billion
3.4%
10.1%
48%
1893
Chevron (NYSE: CVX)
$149 billion
3.9%
11.4%
44%
1912
Johnson & Johnson (NYSE: JNJ)
$163 billion
3.7%
11.4%
43%
1944
Data from Capital IQ and DividendInvestor.com.
These are exactly the sorts of dividend-paying stocks that former hedge-fund analyst and current Motley Fool Income Investor advisor James Early looks for in his market-beating service.
In his newsletter, James has put together a "core portfolio" of top dividend stocks, consisting of six dividend stocks he believes every investor should use as a platform to profitable dividend investing.
This article was originally published Nov. 6, 2009. It has been updated.
http://www.fool.com/investing/dividends-income/2010/05/30/the-coming-bubble-of-2010-and-how.aspx
Take home message:
The best way to invest for inflation is to invest in high-yield dividend companies. Unlike gold, which has no coupon rate and no growth potential, you should be sending your investing dollars to companies that pay a dividend (which often rises) and also have both stable growth potential (which also often rises) and strong assets (in inflationary periods, assets are more valuable since they cost more to replace).
Adam J. Wiederman
May 30, 2010
Even though it has been barely two years since the latest investing bubble burst, sending the stocks of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to their knees, there's yet another bubble forming. And I believe it will burst this year.
Don't just take my word for it; even world-renowned investor George Soros agrees.
Just ahead, I'll tell you how to completely avoid it, and I'll present an alternative strategy you can adopt instead of following the crowd into this bubble.
But first, let's take a look at this bubble and how it formed.
All that glitters
Congress has spent billions of dollars in stimulus funds to jump-start the economy. This influx of dollars was funded almost entirely with debt. As the national debt level rises, the dollar becomes weaker, because currency investors shy away from high-debt countries. This causes higher inflation, which most everyone agrees is coming.
But the consensus right now is that the best way to counteract inflation is by investing in gold.
And the consensus is dead wrong!
Alas, gold is a luxury commodity. It has no coupon rate or growth prospects, and it can rise in price only as much as demand for it grows.
It's also difficult to value. Some believe the price of gold per ounce should match the Dow Jones Industrial Average. Others believe it must reflect the price of a top-tier man's suit. Still others believe it must account for global supply and demand.
In spite of this inherent confusion, many prominent investors -- John Hathaway of the Tocqueville Gold Fund, Jim Rogers of Quantum Fund fame, and even top hedge fund managers like David Einhorn and John Paulson, to name a few -- believe gold can do well right now.
Even more shockingly, a recent Value Investors Congress was full of lectures on how to profit in precious metals.
Even the best can be fooled
The average investor is blindly following these noteworthy financial wizards. That's why more than $12 billion of new money was invested in the SPDR Gold Trust in 2009 alone. I'm the first to admit that falling prey to other investors' moves is an easy pitfall, but it can set you up for disaster.
So what exactly are all these investors -- and their followers -- overlooking? These two key facts:
1. When gold demand rises, supply does, too, which brings gold prices back down.
Fortune magazine reports that gold miners invested more than $40 billion into new projects since 2001, and they "are now bearing fruit." Bullion dealer Kitco "predicts that these new mining projects will add 450 tons annually -- or 5% -- "to the gold supply through 2014, enough to move prices lower." The demand also brings out sellers of scrap gold, which adds even more to the supply.
All this while demand for gold (other than as an investment) dropped 20% in 2009.
2. Gold is historically a poor investment.
Perhaps the most damning fact is that, from 1833 through 2005, gold and inflation had nearly perfect correlation, according to Forbes. This means that, after taxes, you would have actually lost money in gold.
Warren Buffett once quipped:
It gets dug out of the ground. ... Then we melt it down, dig another hole, bury it again and pay people to stand around guarding it. It has no utility. Anyone watching from Mars would be scratching their head.
Truth be told, the only way to get the price of gold to rise is to get other investors to buy into the idea -- like a giant Ponzi scheme. And as we know from watching the unraveling of Bernie Madoff's empire, that can't last forever.
No wonder the vice governor of the Chinese central bank recently announced that the bank is holding off on purchasing gold.
All of this explains why buying gold today is a horrible decision -- and why investors would be better off looking elsewhere.
The absolute best place to look
The best way to invest for inflation is to invest in high-yield dividend companies. Unlike gold, which has no coupon rate and no growth potential, you should be sending your investing dollars to companies that pay a dividend (which often rises) and also have both stable growth potential (which also often rises) and strong assets (in inflationary periods, assets are more valuable since they cost more to replace).
Here are six solid candidates that fit that bill, all of which have a long history of dividends -- through periods of inflation and deflation alike:
Company
Market Cap
Dividend Yield
5-Year Compounded Annual Growth Rate of Dividends
Liabilities-to-Assets Ratio
Dividends Paid Since
United Technologies (NYSE: UTX)
$64 billion
2.5%
16.2%
66%
1936
McDonald’s (NYSE: MCD)
$72 billion
3.3%
30.7%
53%
1976
Abbott Laboratories (NYSE: ABT)
$74 billion
3.7%
9.2%
61%
1926
Coca-Cola (NYSE: KO)
$118 billion
3.4%
10.1%
48%
1893
Chevron (NYSE: CVX)
$149 billion
3.9%
11.4%
44%
1912
Johnson & Johnson (NYSE: JNJ)
$163 billion
3.7%
11.4%
43%
1944
Data from Capital IQ and DividendInvestor.com.
These are exactly the sorts of dividend-paying stocks that former hedge-fund analyst and current Motley Fool Income Investor advisor James Early looks for in his market-beating service.
In his newsletter, James has put together a "core portfolio" of top dividend stocks, consisting of six dividend stocks he believes every investor should use as a platform to profitable dividend investing.
This article was originally published Nov. 6, 2009. It has been updated.
http://www.fool.com/investing/dividends-income/2010/05/30/the-coming-bubble-of-2010-and-how.aspx
Take home message:
The best way to invest for inflation is to invest in high-yield dividend companies. Unlike gold, which has no coupon rate and no growth potential, you should be sending your investing dollars to companies that pay a dividend (which often rises) and also have both stable growth potential (which also often rises) and strong assets (in inflationary periods, assets are more valuable since they cost more to replace).
Buffett's a Dividend Investor, Why Aren't You?
Buffett's a Dividend Investor, Why Aren't You?
http://www.fool.com/investing/dividends-income/2010/05/27/buffetts-a-dividend-investor-why-arent-you.aspx
Jim Royal, Ph.D.
May 27, 2010
One of the worst misconceptions about dividend investing is that it's boring. If you mean regularly increasing gobs of cash delivered to your brokerage account, then OK, it's boring. Heck, some even think dividends are dumb.
But for those of us who love it when someone deposits money into our accounts, it's the most powerful and low-risk form of investing around, I would argue. And I have.
In fact, dividend investing is so powerful that the world's greatest investor, Warren Buffett, has made it a staple of his portfolio, a good reason that you should too.
Buffett, a dividend investor?!
Sure, Buffett is known primarily as a value investor, but the Oracle of Omaha has made a career of finding businesses that pump out cash like oil from a well, a trait that makes them primed to be outstanding income stocks. Such cash-flow companies include high-quality insurers like GEICO or other well-run financials such as Wells Fargo and American Express.
One of Buffett's finest picks has been a dividend monster. The stock? Coca-Cola (NYSE: KO). Buffett first started acquiring Coca-Cola shares in 1988 and has built a position of 200 million shares as of March 2010, meaning he owns nearly 9% of the soda king. Coca-Cola forms 21% of Berkshire's investment portfolio, followed by Wells Fargo at 18%.
But in 1988 Coca-Cola wasn't the clear slam-dunk choice it appears today. Buffett was one of the first investors to see its enviable Coke brand as a serious competitive advantage. The superinvestor has now held shares for over 20 years and has repeatedly praised the efficiency of its capital-light business model, which spits out tons of free cash.
That free cash has allowed the company to consistently raise its dividend, making a small fortune for a long-term holder like Buffett.
Because Coca-Cola has raised its dividend by 12% on average over the last 21 years, Buffett now manages to get back about one-third of his original investment every year. If the company continues to increase its dividend at this historical rate, in about nine years Buffett will manage to get back his original investment in dividends every year!
Given Coca-Cola's steady economic performance and solid record of increasing dividends, there's every indication that it will continue those growing payouts. That's the power and excitement of income investing with a rock-solid company: increasing payouts for life.
And that's not all ...
As Buffett did with Coca-Cola, when screening for dividend stocks you should look for strong fundamentals such as steady profitability and increasing growth over time.
Generally, you should avoid cyclical companies, since they may be unable to maintain consistent profitability, which could endanger their ability to pay a dividend. Instead, focus on businesses whose products will be in demand regardless of the financial climate, helping to ensure a steady payout.
Here are a few that fit my criteria.
Company
Trailing Dividend Yield
5-Year Dividend Growth Rate
5-Year Earnings Growth
Procter & Gamble (NYSE: PG)
3.2%
11.9%
13.5%
McDonald's (NYSE: MCD)
3.2%
30.7%
13.3%
Microsoft (Nasdaq: MSFT)
2%
16.7%
9%
Johnson & Johnson (NYSE: JNJ)
3.6%
11.4%
8.5%
General Mills (NYSE: GIS)
2.7%
9.1%
9.7%
Nike (NYSE: NKE)
1.5%
18.2%
8.1%
Source: Capital IQ, as of May 27, 2010.
Each of these companies has a remarkably strong franchise for consumer products that we use day in and day out, as you can see in their consistent earnings growth.
While Procter & Gamble offers the detergents and shaving products we use on a daily basis, McDonald's offers the most known fast-food brand along with its famous fries. It's hard to operate a computer without using Microsoft software somewhere, and Johnson & Johnson's health products cover a wide swath, from mundane goods such as Band-Aids and Tylenol to ultra-high-tech medical devices. General Mills profitably serves up its cereals, as well as yogurt and pizzas -- in short, some of the popular foods in the grocery. And Nike is so ubiquitous that it's hard to imagine sports without this brand.
The indispensability of their products ensures that payouts from such blue chips can grow for decades, turning even a small initial investment into a dividend dynamo, just like Buffett did with Coke.
Follow these dividend stars
Like Buffett, the experts at Motley Fool Income Investor are focused on "boring" companies that mint money -- including Coca-Cola. Advisor James Early and the whole Income Investor team look for companies offering a yield of 3% or better and that are primed to increase their payouts for the long term.
Jim Royal, Ph.D. owns shares in Procter & Gamble and Microsoft. American Express, Coca-Cola, and Microsoft are Inside Value selections. Johnson & Johnson, Coca-Cola, and Procter & Gamble are Income Investor recommendations. Motley Fool Options has recommended a buy calls position on Johnson & Johnson and a diagonal call position on Microsoft. The Fool owns shares of Coca-Cola and Procter & Gamble. The Fool has a disclosure policy.
http://www.fool.com/investing/dividends-income/2010/05/27/buffetts-a-dividend-investor-why-arent-you.aspx
Jim Royal, Ph.D.
May 27, 2010
One of the worst misconceptions about dividend investing is that it's boring. If you mean regularly increasing gobs of cash delivered to your brokerage account, then OK, it's boring. Heck, some even think dividends are dumb.
But for those of us who love it when someone deposits money into our accounts, it's the most powerful and low-risk form of investing around, I would argue. And I have.
In fact, dividend investing is so powerful that the world's greatest investor, Warren Buffett, has made it a staple of his portfolio, a good reason that you should too.
Buffett, a dividend investor?!
Sure, Buffett is known primarily as a value investor, but the Oracle of Omaha has made a career of finding businesses that pump out cash like oil from a well, a trait that makes them primed to be outstanding income stocks. Such cash-flow companies include high-quality insurers like GEICO or other well-run financials such as Wells Fargo and American Express.
One of Buffett's finest picks has been a dividend monster. The stock? Coca-Cola (NYSE: KO). Buffett first started acquiring Coca-Cola shares in 1988 and has built a position of 200 million shares as of March 2010, meaning he owns nearly 9% of the soda king. Coca-Cola forms 21% of Berkshire's investment portfolio, followed by Wells Fargo at 18%.
But in 1988 Coca-Cola wasn't the clear slam-dunk choice it appears today. Buffett was one of the first investors to see its enviable Coke brand as a serious competitive advantage. The superinvestor has now held shares for over 20 years and has repeatedly praised the efficiency of its capital-light business model, which spits out tons of free cash.
That free cash has allowed the company to consistently raise its dividend, making a small fortune for a long-term holder like Buffett.
Because Coca-Cola has raised its dividend by 12% on average over the last 21 years, Buffett now manages to get back about one-third of his original investment every year. If the company continues to increase its dividend at this historical rate, in about nine years Buffett will manage to get back his original investment in dividends every year!
Given Coca-Cola's steady economic performance and solid record of increasing dividends, there's every indication that it will continue those growing payouts. That's the power and excitement of income investing with a rock-solid company: increasing payouts for life.
And that's not all ...
As Buffett did with Coca-Cola, when screening for dividend stocks you should look for strong fundamentals such as steady profitability and increasing growth over time.
Generally, you should avoid cyclical companies, since they may be unable to maintain consistent profitability, which could endanger their ability to pay a dividend. Instead, focus on businesses whose products will be in demand regardless of the financial climate, helping to ensure a steady payout.
Here are a few that fit my criteria.
Company
Trailing Dividend Yield
5-Year Dividend Growth Rate
5-Year Earnings Growth
Procter & Gamble (NYSE: PG)
3.2%
11.9%
13.5%
McDonald's (NYSE: MCD)
3.2%
30.7%
13.3%
Microsoft (Nasdaq: MSFT)
2%
16.7%
9%
Johnson & Johnson (NYSE: JNJ)
3.6%
11.4%
8.5%
General Mills (NYSE: GIS)
2.7%
9.1%
9.7%
Nike (NYSE: NKE)
1.5%
18.2%
8.1%
Source: Capital IQ, as of May 27, 2010.
Each of these companies has a remarkably strong franchise for consumer products that we use day in and day out, as you can see in their consistent earnings growth.
While Procter & Gamble offers the detergents and shaving products we use on a daily basis, McDonald's offers the most known fast-food brand along with its famous fries. It's hard to operate a computer without using Microsoft software somewhere, and Johnson & Johnson's health products cover a wide swath, from mundane goods such as Band-Aids and Tylenol to ultra-high-tech medical devices. General Mills profitably serves up its cereals, as well as yogurt and pizzas -- in short, some of the popular foods in the grocery. And Nike is so ubiquitous that it's hard to imagine sports without this brand.
The indispensability of their products ensures that payouts from such blue chips can grow for decades, turning even a small initial investment into a dividend dynamo, just like Buffett did with Coke.
Follow these dividend stars
Like Buffett, the experts at Motley Fool Income Investor are focused on "boring" companies that mint money -- including Coca-Cola. Advisor James Early and the whole Income Investor team look for companies offering a yield of 3% or better and that are primed to increase their payouts for the long term.
Jim Royal, Ph.D. owns shares in Procter & Gamble and Microsoft. American Express, Coca-Cola, and Microsoft are Inside Value selections. Johnson & Johnson, Coca-Cola, and Procter & Gamble are Income Investor recommendations. Motley Fool Options has recommended a buy calls position on Johnson & Johnson and a diagonal call position on Microsoft. The Fool owns shares of Coca-Cola and Procter & Gamble. The Fool has a disclosure policy.
Absolute Return Investing
At the other extreme, there are funds that are not benchmarked. Instead, their objective is to target a particular return with a given risk level and a strong focus on capital preservation. This strategy is called "absolute return investing" and is largely adopted by hedged funds.
Absolute return managers can invest in any asset class anywhere in the world. Therefore, if the S&P 500 is falling significantly, absolute return managers can choose to allocate their money to a more favourable market like Europe and Asia, or even raise cash, to invest in another asset classes or invest short.
In a bull market, absolute return portfolios can under-perform against relative return portfolios. However, in the longer term when markets go through the cycle of boom and bust, absolute return portfolios tend to outperform as big losses are avoided during the bear periods.
Absolute return managers can invest in any asset class anywhere in the world. Therefore, if the S&P 500 is falling significantly, absolute return managers can choose to allocate their money to a more favourable market like Europe and Asia, or even raise cash, to invest in another asset classes or invest short.
In a bull market, absolute return portfolios can under-perform against relative return portfolios. However, in the longer term when markets go through the cycle of boom and bust, absolute return portfolios tend to outperform as big losses are avoided during the bear periods.
Benchmark Investing: Relative Return Investment Strategy
Fund managers who track a benchmark closely have a relative return investment strategy.
Their asset allocation strategy and stocks picked are close to their chosen benchmarks. They then value-add by overweighting or underweighting stocks that they feel would help the fund outperform.
Investors who question the existence of fund managers, who consistently underperform their benchmark, have been advised to invest via index funds instead as they charge lower on management fees.
There are also managers who vary quite significantly from their benchmark. With a larger tracking error, they can outperform it by quite a wide margin especially in volatile times.
However, when a broad based market heads south significantly, a fund that is benchmarked, like the S&P 500, will usually find it difficult to avoid losses.
Their asset allocation strategy and stocks picked are close to their chosen benchmarks. They then value-add by overweighting or underweighting stocks that they feel would help the fund outperform.
Investors who question the existence of fund managers, who consistently underperform their benchmark, have been advised to invest via index funds instead as they charge lower on management fees.
There are also managers who vary quite significantly from their benchmark. With a larger tracking error, they can outperform it by quite a wide margin especially in volatile times.
However, when a broad based market heads south significantly, a fund that is benchmarked, like the S&P 500, will usually find it difficult to avoid losses.
- Firstly, this is because the fund is mandated to stay invested in stock under the index.
- Secondly, the fund manager cannot stay invested in only a few profitable stocks, as they typically do not invest more than 5 percent of their portfolio in a stock or a group of related companies.
Thursday 3 June 2010
Stocks That Buffett Is Unloading
Stocks That Buffett Is Unloading
Posted: June 2, 2010 9:59AM by Mark Riddix
The investing decisions of Warren Buffett are mimicked by investors worldwide. Many value investors and market experts often look to Buffett for help in navigating the murky waters of investing. Buffett has built a fortune by taking advantage of opportunities when others have been fearful and a lot can be learned by paying attention to his moves. So what exactly has the Oracle of Omaha been up to? Shockingly enough, the famed buy-and-hold investor has been dumping shares of some long-term holdings over the past few quarters.
Buffett's Stock Sales
Buffett has eliminated his 2.3 million share stake in the banking firm Sun Trust Bank (NYSE: STI). He completely sold off investment positions in insurance companies Travelers Insurance (NYSE: TRV), UnitedHealth Group (NYSE: UNH) and Wellpoint Inc. (NYSE: WLP) Buffett also reduced his holdings in defensive stocks Procter & Gamble (NYSE: PG) by 9% and Johnson & Johnson (NYSE: JNJ) by 26% earlier in the year. He also trimmed his stake in ratings agency Moody's (NYSE: MCO) and banking giant M&T Bank (NYSE: MTB). Buffett sold off shares of auto retailer Carmax (NYSE: KMX), oil and gas conglomerate ConocoPhillips (NYSE: COP) and struggling newspaper firm Gannett (NYSE: GCI).
The big sale, however, was Buffett's disposal of Kraft's (NYSE: KFT) shares. He sold over 31 million shares of Kraft Food, which had a market value of approximately $1 billion dollars. He still owns a 6.3% stake in Kraft with over 106 million shares. Many of these sales came as a shock to investors. Market spectators began to wonder if Buffett was turning negative on U.S. equities. Why is the man, who was once quoted as saying his favorite long-term holding period for stocks is forever, selling stocks? (Learn more about how Buffett operates in What Is Warren Buffett's Investing Style?)
Why Buffett Is Selling
Investors shouldn't read too much into Buffett's recent sales. The answer is pretty simple: Buffett is reducing his stake in many stocks to increase the capital position at Buffett's holding company, Berkshire Hathaway (NYSE: BRK.A) (NYSE: BRK.B). Berkshire Hathaway has put a lot of its cash to work over the past two years. Buffett deployed substantial amounts of cash buying stock and warrants in Goldman Sachs (NYSE: GS) and General Electric (NYSE: GE). Recently, Berkshire spent a lot of cash financing its $27 billion dollar acquisition of railroad company Burlington Northern Santa Fe (NYSE: BNI). All of these purchases have caused Buffett to dispose of many stocks to replenish the coffers at Berkshire Hathaway.
The sale of Kraft, however, is a completely different animal. This move was anticipated as Buffett has continuously voiced his displeasure with Kraft management, including voicing disapproval of Kraft's $19.6 billion dollar acquisition of rival Cadbury. Buffett voted against the proposed merger, which eventually gained shareholder approval. After the merger, Buffett showed his disapproval by trimming his $4 billion dollar stake substantially. (Find out how Buffett got to where he is today. Read Warren Buffett: The Road to Riches.)
Buffett's Rationale
It should also not be overlooked that Buffett may be selling shares because he has found a better opportunity elsewhere. Buffett may be turning his attention to other sectors or looking to invest in international markets. He is famous for selling off one cheap investment in order to buy a cheaper investment.
The Bottom Line
Investors should know that if Warren Buffett is building up his cash stockpile that the legendary investor must see a better opportunity on the horizon.
Buffett's making news this week as well. Read more in this week's financial news highlights: Water Cooler Finance: Crying Over Spilled Oil, And Buffett Goes To Court.
http://financialedge.investopedia.com/financial-edge/0610/Stocks-That-Buffett-Is-Unloading.aspx?partner=ntu6
Posted: June 2, 2010 9:59AM by Mark Riddix
The investing decisions of Warren Buffett are mimicked by investors worldwide. Many value investors and market experts often look to Buffett for help in navigating the murky waters of investing. Buffett has built a fortune by taking advantage of opportunities when others have been fearful and a lot can be learned by paying attention to his moves. So what exactly has the Oracle of Omaha been up to? Shockingly enough, the famed buy-and-hold investor has been dumping shares of some long-term holdings over the past few quarters.
Buffett's Stock Sales
Buffett has eliminated his 2.3 million share stake in the banking firm Sun Trust Bank (NYSE: STI). He completely sold off investment positions in insurance companies Travelers Insurance (NYSE: TRV), UnitedHealth Group (NYSE: UNH) and Wellpoint Inc. (NYSE: WLP) Buffett also reduced his holdings in defensive stocks Procter & Gamble (NYSE: PG) by 9% and Johnson & Johnson (NYSE: JNJ) by 26% earlier in the year. He also trimmed his stake in ratings agency Moody's (NYSE: MCO) and banking giant M&T Bank (NYSE: MTB). Buffett sold off shares of auto retailer Carmax (NYSE: KMX), oil and gas conglomerate ConocoPhillips (NYSE: COP) and struggling newspaper firm Gannett (NYSE: GCI).
The big sale, however, was Buffett's disposal of Kraft's (NYSE: KFT) shares. He sold over 31 million shares of Kraft Food, which had a market value of approximately $1 billion dollars. He still owns a 6.3% stake in Kraft with over 106 million shares. Many of these sales came as a shock to investors. Market spectators began to wonder if Buffett was turning negative on U.S. equities. Why is the man, who was once quoted as saying his favorite long-term holding period for stocks is forever, selling stocks? (Learn more about how Buffett operates in What Is Warren Buffett's Investing Style?)
Why Buffett Is Selling
Investors shouldn't read too much into Buffett's recent sales. The answer is pretty simple: Buffett is reducing his stake in many stocks to increase the capital position at Buffett's holding company, Berkshire Hathaway (NYSE: BRK.A) (NYSE: BRK.B). Berkshire Hathaway has put a lot of its cash to work over the past two years. Buffett deployed substantial amounts of cash buying stock and warrants in Goldman Sachs (NYSE: GS) and General Electric (NYSE: GE). Recently, Berkshire spent a lot of cash financing its $27 billion dollar acquisition of railroad company Burlington Northern Santa Fe (NYSE: BNI). All of these purchases have caused Buffett to dispose of many stocks to replenish the coffers at Berkshire Hathaway.
The sale of Kraft, however, is a completely different animal. This move was anticipated as Buffett has continuously voiced his displeasure with Kraft management, including voicing disapproval of Kraft's $19.6 billion dollar acquisition of rival Cadbury. Buffett voted against the proposed merger, which eventually gained shareholder approval. After the merger, Buffett showed his disapproval by trimming his $4 billion dollar stake substantially. (Find out how Buffett got to where he is today. Read Warren Buffett: The Road to Riches.)
Buffett's Rationale
It should also not be overlooked that Buffett may be selling shares because he has found a better opportunity elsewhere. Buffett may be turning his attention to other sectors or looking to invest in international markets. He is famous for selling off one cheap investment in order to buy a cheaper investment.
The Bottom Line
Investors should know that if Warren Buffett is building up his cash stockpile that the legendary investor must see a better opportunity on the horizon.
Buffett's making news this week as well. Read more in this week's financial news highlights: Water Cooler Finance: Crying Over Spilled Oil, And Buffett Goes To Court.
http://financialedge.investopedia.com/financial-edge/0610/Stocks-That-Buffett-Is-Unloading.aspx?partner=ntu6
5 Steps Of A Bubble
5 Steps Of A Bubble
by Investopedia Staff, (Investopedia.com)
The term "bubble," in the financial context, generally refers to a situation where the price for an asset exceeds its fundamental value by a large margin. During a bubble, prices for a financial asset or asset class are highly inflated, bearing little relation to the intrinsic value of the asset. The terms "asset price bubble," "financial bubble" or "speculative bubble" are interchangeable and are often shortened simply to "bubble." (For a review on the South Sea Bubble, check out Crashes: The South Sea Bubble.)
Bubble Characteristics
A basic characteristic of bubbles is the suspension of disbelief by most participants during the "bubble phase." There is a failure to recognize that regular market participants and other forms of traders are engaged in a speculative exercise which is not supported by previous valuation techniques. Also, bubbles are usually identified only in retrospect, after the bubble has burst.
In most cases, an asset price bubble is followed by a spectacular crash in the price of the securities in question. In addition, the damage caused by the bursting of a bubble depends on the economic sector/s involved, and also whether the extent of participation is widespread or localized. For example, the bursting of the 1980s bubble in Japan led to a prolonged period of stagnation for the Japanese economy. But since the speculation was largely confined to Japan, the damage wrought by the bursting of the bubble did not spread much beyond its shores. On the other hand, the bursting of the U.S. housing bubble triggered record wealth destruction on a global basis in 2008, because most banks and financial institutions in the U.S. and Europe held hundreds of billions of dollars worth of toxic subprime mortgage-backed securities. By the first week of January, 2009, the 12 largest financial institutions in the world had lost half of their value. The economic downturn had caused many other businesses in various industries to either go bankrupt or seek financial assistance. (To learn more about housing bubbles, read Why Housing Market Bubbles Pop.)
The Dutch Tulip Mania
To this day, the Dutch tulip mania remains the yardstick by which speculative bubbles are measured, because of the total disconnect between the fundamental value of a tulip and the price that a prized specimen could fetch in Holland in the 1630s.
The vivid colors of tulips and the seven years it takes to grow them led to their increasing popularity among the Dutch in the 1600s. As demand for them grew, tulip prices rose, and professional growers became willing to pay increasingly higher prices for them. Tulip mania peaked in 1636-37, and tulip contracts were selling for more than 10-times the annual income of skilled craftsmen.
The tulip bubble collapsed from February 1637. Within months, tulips were selling for 1/100th of their peak prices.
1. Displacement: A displacement occurs when investors get enamored by a new paradigm, such as an innovative new technology or interest rates that are historically low. A classic example of displacement is the decline in the federal funds rate from 6.5% in May, 2000, to 1% in June, 2003. Over this three-year period, the interest rate on 30-year fixed-rate mortgages fell by 2.5 percentage points to a historic lows of 5.21%, sowing the seeds for the housing bubble.
2. Boom: Prices rise slowly at first, following a displacement, but then gain momentum as more and more participants enter the market, setting the stage for the boom phase. During this phase, the asset in question attracts widespread media coverage. Fear of missing out on what could be an once-in-a-lifetime opportunity spurs more speculation, drawing an increasing number of participants into the fold.
3. Euphoria: During this phase,caution is thrown to the wind, as asset prices skyrocket. The "greater fool" theory plays out everywhere.
Valuations reach extreme levels during this phase. For example, at the peak of the Japanese real estate bubble in 1989, land in Tokyo sold for as much as $139,000 per square foot, or more than 350-times the value of Manhattan property. After the bubble burst, real estate lost approximately 80% of its inflated value, while stock prices declined by 70%. Similarly, at the height of the internet bubble in March, 2000, the combined value of all technology stocks on the Nasdaq was higher than the GDP of most nations.
4. Profit Taking: By this time, the smart money – heeding the warning signs – is generally selling out positions and taking profits. But estimating the exact time when a bubble is due to collapse can be a difficult exercise and extremely hazardous to one's financial health, because, as John Maynard Keynes put it, "the markets can stay irrational longer than you can stay solvent."
Note that it only takes a relatively minor event to prick a bubble, but once it is pricked, the bubble cannot "inflate" again. In August, 2007, for example, French bank BNP Paribas halted withdrawals from three investment funds with substantial exposure to U.S. subprime mortgages because it could not value their holdings. While this development initially rattled financial markets, it was brushed aside over the next couple months, as global equity markets reached new highs. In retrospect, this relatively minor event was indeed a warning sign of the turbulent times to come.
5. Panic: In the panic stage, asset prices reverse course and descend as rapidly as they had ascended. Investors and speculators, faced with margin calls and plunging values of their holdings, now want to liquidate them at any price. As supply overwhelms demand, asset prices slide sharply.
One of the most vivid examples of global panic in financial markets occurred in October 2008, weeks after Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy and Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and AIG almost collapsed. The S&P 500 plunged almost 17% that month, its ninth-worst monthly performance. In that single month, global equity markets lost a staggering $9.3 trillion of 22% of their combined market capitalization.
Anatomy of a Stock Bubble
Numerous internet-related companies made their public debut in spectacular fashion in the last 1990s before disappearing into oblivion by 2002. We use the example of eToys to illustrate how a stock bubble typically plays out.
In May, 1999, with the internet revolution in full swing, eToys had a very successful initial public offering, where shares at $20 each escalated to $78 on their first trading day. The company was less than three years old at that point, and had grown sales to $30 million for the year ended March 31, 1999, from $0.7 million in the preceding year. Investors were very enthusiastic about the stock's prospects, with the general thinking being that most toy buyers would buy toys online rather than at retail stores such as Toys "R" Us. This was the displacement phase of the bubble.
As the 8.3 million shares soared in its first day of trading on the Nasdaq, giving it a market value of $6.5 billion, investors were eager to buy the stock. While eToys had posted a net loss of $28.6 million on revenues of $30 million in its most recent fiscal year, investors were expecting for the financial situation of the firm to take a turn for the best. By the time markets closed on May 20, eToys sported a price/sales valuation that was largely exceeding that of rival Toys "R" Us, which had a stronger balance sheet. This marked the boom / euphoria stages of the bubble.
Shortly afterwards, eToys fell 9% on concern that potential sales by company insiders could drag down the stock price, following the expiry of lockup agreements that placed restrictions on insider sales. Trading volume was exceptionally heavy that day, at nine-times the three-month daily average. The day's drop brought the stock's decline from its record high of $86 to 40%, identifying this as the profit-taking phase of the bubble.
By March, 2000, eToys had tumbled 81% from its October peak to about $16 on concerns about its spending. The company was spending an extraordinary $2.27 on advertising costs for every dollar of revenue generated. Although the investors were saying that this was the new economy of the future, such a business model simply is not sustainable.
In July 2000, eToys reported its fiscal first-quarter loss widened to $59.5 million from $20.8 million a year earlier, even as sales tripled over this period to $24.9 million. It added 219,000 new customers during the quarter, but the company was not able to show bottom-line profits. By this time, with the ongoing correction in technology shares, the stock was trading around $5.
Towards the end of the year, with losses continuing to mount, eToys would not meet its fiscal third-quarter sales forecast and had just four months of cash left. The stock, which had already been caught up in the panic selling of internet-related stocks since March and was trading around at slightly over $1, fell 73% to 28 cents by February, 2001. Since the company failed to retain a stable stock price of at least $1, it was delisted from the Nasdaq.
A month after it had reduced its workforce by 70%, eToys let go its remaining 300 workers and was forced to declare bankruptcy. By this time, eToys had lost $493 million over the previous three years, and had $274 million in outstanding debt.
Conclusion
As Minsky and a number of other experts opine, speculative bubbles in some asset or the other are inevitable in a free-market economy. However, becoming familiar with the steps involved in bubble formation may help you to spot the next one and avoid becoming an unwitting participant in it. (Learn how to avoid stocks that deviate from the fundamentals. Read Sorting Out Cult Stocks.)
by Investopedia Staff (Contact Author | Biography)
Investopedia.com believes that individuals can excel at managing their financial affairs. As such, we strive to provide free educational content and tools to empower individual investors, including thousands of original and objective articles and tutorials on a wide variety of financial topics.
Filed Under: Economy, Stocks
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/stocks/10/5-steps-of-a-bubble.asp?partner=ntu6
by Investopedia Staff, (Investopedia.com)
The term "bubble," in the financial context, generally refers to a situation where the price for an asset exceeds its fundamental value by a large margin. During a bubble, prices for a financial asset or asset class are highly inflated, bearing little relation to the intrinsic value of the asset. The terms "asset price bubble," "financial bubble" or "speculative bubble" are interchangeable and are often shortened simply to "bubble." (For a review on the South Sea Bubble, check out Crashes: The South Sea Bubble.)
Bubble Characteristics
A basic characteristic of bubbles is the suspension of disbelief by most participants during the "bubble phase." There is a failure to recognize that regular market participants and other forms of traders are engaged in a speculative exercise which is not supported by previous valuation techniques. Also, bubbles are usually identified only in retrospect, after the bubble has burst.
In most cases, an asset price bubble is followed by a spectacular crash in the price of the securities in question. In addition, the damage caused by the bursting of a bubble depends on the economic sector/s involved, and also whether the extent of participation is widespread or localized. For example, the bursting of the 1980s bubble in Japan led to a prolonged period of stagnation for the Japanese economy. But since the speculation was largely confined to Japan, the damage wrought by the bursting of the bubble did not spread much beyond its shores. On the other hand, the bursting of the U.S. housing bubble triggered record wealth destruction on a global basis in 2008, because most banks and financial institutions in the U.S. and Europe held hundreds of billions of dollars worth of toxic subprime mortgage-backed securities. By the first week of January, 2009, the 12 largest financial institutions in the world had lost half of their value. The economic downturn had caused many other businesses in various industries to either go bankrupt or seek financial assistance. (To learn more about housing bubbles, read Why Housing Market Bubbles Pop.)
The Dutch Tulip Mania
To this day, the Dutch tulip mania remains the yardstick by which speculative bubbles are measured, because of the total disconnect between the fundamental value of a tulip and the price that a prized specimen could fetch in Holland in the 1630s.
The vivid colors of tulips and the seven years it takes to grow them led to their increasing popularity among the Dutch in the 1600s. As demand for them grew, tulip prices rose, and professional growers became willing to pay increasingly higher prices for them. Tulip mania peaked in 1636-37, and tulip contracts were selling for more than 10-times the annual income of skilled craftsmen.
The tulip bubble collapsed from February 1637. Within months, tulips were selling for 1/100th of their peak prices.
Minsky's Theory of Financial Instability
The economist Hyman P. Minsky is certainly no household name. However, thanks to the credit crisis and recession of 2008-09, Minsky's theory of financial instability attracted a great deal of attention and gathered an increasing number of adherents more than a decade after his passing in 1996. Minsky was one of the first economist to explain the development of financial instability and its interaction with the economy. His book, "Stabilizing an Unstable Economy" (1986) was considered a pioneering work on this subject. (To learn more, refer to Riding The Market Bubble: Don't Try This At Home.)Five Steps of a Bubble
Minsky identified five stages in a typical credit cycle – displacement, boom, euphoria, profit taking and panic. Although there are various interpretations of the cycle, the general pattern of bubble activity remains fairly consistent. 1. Displacement: A displacement occurs when investors get enamored by a new paradigm, such as an innovative new technology or interest rates that are historically low. A classic example of displacement is the decline in the federal funds rate from 6.5% in May, 2000, to 1% in June, 2003. Over this three-year period, the interest rate on 30-year fixed-rate mortgages fell by 2.5 percentage points to a historic lows of 5.21%, sowing the seeds for the housing bubble.
2. Boom: Prices rise slowly at first, following a displacement, but then gain momentum as more and more participants enter the market, setting the stage for the boom phase. During this phase, the asset in question attracts widespread media coverage. Fear of missing out on what could be an once-in-a-lifetime opportunity spurs more speculation, drawing an increasing number of participants into the fold.
3. Euphoria: During this phase,caution is thrown to the wind, as asset prices skyrocket. The "greater fool" theory plays out everywhere.
Valuations reach extreme levels during this phase. For example, at the peak of the Japanese real estate bubble in 1989, land in Tokyo sold for as much as $139,000 per square foot, or more than 350-times the value of Manhattan property. After the bubble burst, real estate lost approximately 80% of its inflated value, while stock prices declined by 70%. Similarly, at the height of the internet bubble in March, 2000, the combined value of all technology stocks on the Nasdaq was higher than the GDP of most nations.
During the euphoric phase, new valuation measures and metrics are touted to justify the relentless rise in asset prices.
4. Profit Taking: By this time, the smart money – heeding the warning signs – is generally selling out positions and taking profits. But estimating the exact time when a bubble is due to collapse can be a difficult exercise and extremely hazardous to one's financial health, because, as John Maynard Keynes put it, "the markets can stay irrational longer than you can stay solvent."
Note that it only takes a relatively minor event to prick a bubble, but once it is pricked, the bubble cannot "inflate" again. In August, 2007, for example, French bank BNP Paribas halted withdrawals from three investment funds with substantial exposure to U.S. subprime mortgages because it could not value their holdings. While this development initially rattled financial markets, it was brushed aside over the next couple months, as global equity markets reached new highs. In retrospect, this relatively minor event was indeed a warning sign of the turbulent times to come.
5. Panic: In the panic stage, asset prices reverse course and descend as rapidly as they had ascended. Investors and speculators, faced with margin calls and plunging values of their holdings, now want to liquidate them at any price. As supply overwhelms demand, asset prices slide sharply.
One of the most vivid examples of global panic in financial markets occurred in October 2008, weeks after Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy and Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and AIG almost collapsed. The S&P 500 plunged almost 17% that month, its ninth-worst monthly performance. In that single month, global equity markets lost a staggering $9.3 trillion of 22% of their combined market capitalization.
Anatomy of a Stock Bubble
Numerous internet-related companies made their public debut in spectacular fashion in the last 1990s before disappearing into oblivion by 2002. We use the example of eToys to illustrate how a stock bubble typically plays out.
In May, 1999, with the internet revolution in full swing, eToys had a very successful initial public offering, where shares at $20 each escalated to $78 on their first trading day. The company was less than three years old at that point, and had grown sales to $30 million for the year ended March 31, 1999, from $0.7 million in the preceding year. Investors were very enthusiastic about the stock's prospects, with the general thinking being that most toy buyers would buy toys online rather than at retail stores such as Toys "R" Us. This was the displacement phase of the bubble.
As the 8.3 million shares soared in its first day of trading on the Nasdaq, giving it a market value of $6.5 billion, investors were eager to buy the stock. While eToys had posted a net loss of $28.6 million on revenues of $30 million in its most recent fiscal year, investors were expecting for the financial situation of the firm to take a turn for the best. By the time markets closed on May 20, eToys sported a price/sales valuation that was largely exceeding that of rival Toys "R" Us, which had a stronger balance sheet. This marked the boom / euphoria stages of the bubble.
Shortly afterwards, eToys fell 9% on concern that potential sales by company insiders could drag down the stock price, following the expiry of lockup agreements that placed restrictions on insider sales. Trading volume was exceptionally heavy that day, at nine-times the three-month daily average. The day's drop brought the stock's decline from its record high of $86 to 40%, identifying this as the profit-taking phase of the bubble.
By March, 2000, eToys had tumbled 81% from its October peak to about $16 on concerns about its spending. The company was spending an extraordinary $2.27 on advertising costs for every dollar of revenue generated. Although the investors were saying that this was the new economy of the future, such a business model simply is not sustainable.
In July 2000, eToys reported its fiscal first-quarter loss widened to $59.5 million from $20.8 million a year earlier, even as sales tripled over this period to $24.9 million. It added 219,000 new customers during the quarter, but the company was not able to show bottom-line profits. By this time, with the ongoing correction in technology shares, the stock was trading around $5.
Towards the end of the year, with losses continuing to mount, eToys would not meet its fiscal third-quarter sales forecast and had just four months of cash left. The stock, which had already been caught up in the panic selling of internet-related stocks since March and was trading around at slightly over $1, fell 73% to 28 cents by February, 2001. Since the company failed to retain a stable stock price of at least $1, it was delisted from the Nasdaq.
A month after it had reduced its workforce by 70%, eToys let go its remaining 300 workers and was forced to declare bankruptcy. By this time, eToys had lost $493 million over the previous three years, and had $274 million in outstanding debt.
Conclusion
As Minsky and a number of other experts opine, speculative bubbles in some asset or the other are inevitable in a free-market economy. However, becoming familiar with the steps involved in bubble formation may help you to spot the next one and avoid becoming an unwitting participant in it. (Learn how to avoid stocks that deviate from the fundamentals. Read Sorting Out Cult Stocks.)
by Investopedia Staff (Contact Author | Biography)
Investopedia.com believes that individuals can excel at managing their financial affairs. As such, we strive to provide free educational content and tools to empower individual investors, including thousands of original and objective articles and tutorials on a wide variety of financial topics.
Filed Under: Economy, Stocks
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/stocks/10/5-steps-of-a-bubble.asp?partner=ntu6
Investment Strategies and Theories You Must Know for Greater Investment Success!
Warren Buffett once said, "To invest successfully over a lifetime does not require a stratospheric I.Q., unusual business insight or inside information. What is needed is a sound intellectual framework for making decisions and the ability to keep emotions from corroding that framework."
Posted here are some basic foundations to help you develop your own investment strategy and to help you make better investment decisions. These are also the investment strategies and theories you must know for greater investment success!
Investment Styles
"Your 'Basic Advantage' is to be able to think for yourself." Wisdom from Benjamin Graham.
Different Investment Styles
Value Investing
Growth Investing
Core/Blend/Market-oriented
Stock Pickers
Market Capitalisations
Value and Small Cap Stocks
Top-down Approach
Bottom-up Approach
Benchmark Investing vs Absolute Return Investing
Methods of Securities Selection
Fundamental Analysis
Technical Analysis
Techno-fundamental Analysis
Limitations of Fundamental and Technical Analysis
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Investment Strategies and Theories
"You need a strategy and sound approach before you invest." Anonymous
Short-term Strategies
Short Selling
Margin Investing
Momentum Investing - "Buy High, Sell Higher"
Sideway Trends
Long-term Strategies
Buy and Hold
Dollar-cost Averaging
Ladder Investing
Managing Risk
Diversification
Danger of Owning Too Many Stocks
Modern Portfolio Theory
Limitations of the Modern Portfolio Theory
Asset Allocation
Criticism of the Asset Allocation Strategy
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Portfolio Management Strategies
"Successful investing is more than buy, hold and forget." Anonymous
Static Asset Allocation
(i) Buy-and-Hold
(ii) Strategic Asset Allocation
Flexible Allocations
(i) Tactical Asset Allocation
(ii) Dynamic Asset Allocation
Core-satellite Portfolio Management
Alternative Strategy - A Trader's Approach
Short Term Trading
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Limit Your Losses
"Survive first and make money afterwards." George Soros
The Evolution of Buy-and-Hold Advice
Efficient Market Hypothesis
Random Walk Theory
Merits of the Buy-and-Hold Method
Weaknesses of the Buy-and-Hold Method
Forgotten History of a Sideways Market
Futile Asset Allocation Strategies
The Easy Way Out?
Transaction Costs
Limitation of Traditional Investment Funds
Market Anomalies
Value Investing
Neglected Stocks
Low-priced Stocks
Small Cap Stocks
Investors' Irrationality
How to Prevent Big Losses
Rule No. 1 - Set and Apply Stop-Loss Rules
Rule No. 2 - Do Your Homework
Rule No. 3 - Look for Margin of Safety
Rule No. 4 - Do Not Bet Too Much at One Go
Rule No. 5 - Do Not Over Diversify
Rule No. 6 - The Trend is Your Friend, Until It Bends
Rule No. 7 - Avoid Deadly "Price Bubbles" When They Pop
Ref: How to Be a Successful Investor by William Cai
Posted here are some basic foundations to help you develop your own investment strategy and to help you make better investment decisions. These are also the investment strategies and theories you must know for greater investment success!
Investment Styles
"Your 'Basic Advantage' is to be able to think for yourself." Wisdom from Benjamin Graham.
Different Investment Styles
Value Investing
Growth Investing
Core/Blend/Market-oriented
Stock Pickers
Market Capitalisations
Value and Small Cap Stocks
Top-down Approach
Bottom-up Approach
Benchmark Investing vs Absolute Return Investing
Methods of Securities Selection
Fundamental Analysis
Technical Analysis
Techno-fundamental Analysis
Limitations of Fundamental and Technical Analysis
----
Investment Strategies and Theories
"You need a strategy and sound approach before you invest." Anonymous
Short-term Strategies
Short Selling
Margin Investing
Momentum Investing - "Buy High, Sell Higher"
Sideway Trends
Long-term Strategies
Buy and Hold
Dollar-cost Averaging
Ladder Investing
Managing Risk
Diversification
Danger of Owning Too Many Stocks
Modern Portfolio Theory
Limitations of the Modern Portfolio Theory
Asset Allocation
Criticism of the Asset Allocation Strategy
-----
Portfolio Management Strategies
"Successful investing is more than buy, hold and forget." Anonymous
Static Asset Allocation
(i) Buy-and-Hold
(ii) Strategic Asset Allocation
Flexible Allocations
(i) Tactical Asset Allocation
(ii) Dynamic Asset Allocation
Core-satellite Portfolio Management
Alternative Strategy - A Trader's Approach
Short Term Trading
----
Limit Your Losses
"Survive first and make money afterwards." George Soros
The Evolution of Buy-and-Hold Advice
Efficient Market Hypothesis
Random Walk Theory
Merits of the Buy-and-Hold Method
Weaknesses of the Buy-and-Hold Method
Forgotten History of a Sideways Market
Futile Asset Allocation Strategies
The Easy Way Out?
Transaction Costs
Limitation of Traditional Investment Funds
Market Anomalies
Value Investing
Neglected Stocks
Low-priced Stocks
Small Cap Stocks
Investors' Irrationality
How to Prevent Big Losses
Rule No. 1 - Set and Apply Stop-Loss Rules
Rule No. 2 - Do Your Homework
Rule No. 3 - Look for Margin of Safety
Rule No. 4 - Do Not Bet Too Much at One Go
Rule No. 5 - Do Not Over Diversify
Rule No. 6 - The Trend is Your Friend, Until It Bends
Rule No. 7 - Avoid Deadly "Price Bubbles" When They Pop
Ref: How to Be a Successful Investor by William Cai
The New Millionaires - When a million is not enough
When a million is not enough
GEORGINA ROBINSON
May 28, 2010
In a time when a television network can afford to run a game show called Who Wants To Be a Millionaire but the average Sydney house costs $600,000, it's time to re-assess the value of $1 million dollars.
Can it still guarantee you financial freedom when whole residential blocks in Sydney are lined with homes carrying million-dollar plus price tags?
“You were generally considered to be rich if you had $1 million in the 1950s and now nobody would say you were seriously rich unless you had $10 million,” author and sociologist Michael Pusey says.
“But if you're talking about a sum of money that leaves you without economic insecurity then probably no sum will do it because expectations have risen and the multimillionaires themselves are at risk of going bankrupt and they want more and more … in order to feel safe.”
The professor of Public Ethics at Charles Sturt University, Clive Hamilton, agrees that the noughties' equivalent of a 1950s millionaire is someone with between $10 million and $20 million to burn.
And Eddie Maguire's television show is his proof.
“We now have a television program called Who Wants To Be A Millionaire, that would have been impossible 30 years ago because no television company would have been willing to stump up prize money of a million dollars, it would have sent them broke if anybody had won,” Professor Hamilton said.
The magic million may not have the same cache it once did but that will be little comfort to the many Australians who found themselves kicked out of the club during the GFC.
A study compiled by financial research company CoreData found nearly a quarter of the 1700 Australians with investment assets of more than $1 million were pushed out of the $1 million-plus bracket by the global financial crisis.
Another survey in the Boston Consulting Group's latest global wealth report, reported a 40 per cent drop in the numbers of millionaire households in Australia.
“It's about money that you could use, money is hard to use if it's tied up in your house,” wealth researcher Simon Kelly says.
Professor Kelly, working at the University of Canberra's National Centre for Social and Economic Modelling, says international benchmarks have declared US$2 million to be “the new $1 million dollars”.
“And that's excluding houses … because particularly in places like Sydney, there'd be whole suburbs where the value of each house is worth $1 million dollars and they take that out.”
A Sydney-based funds management specialist, who wanted to remain anonymous, says $10 million – split just about evenly between property and income-generating assets – would have him sleeping soundly at night.
“Enough to form a stash to generate comfortable annuity for a period of 30 years,” he says.
But Professor Pusey says it is impossible in today's economic, political and social climate to confidently predict what “enough” might look like.
“In the baby boomer times
“Today you would need vastly more than $1 million to achieve those ends for yourself.”
Professor Pusey says incomes are much more volatile these days, people enter the full-time labour market later and are often forced out earlier but live for much longer.
“The good news is you're going to live until you're 82-and-a-half, the bad news is you get pushed out of the labour market in your 50s if you can make it that long,” he says.
http://www.smh.com.au/executive-style/luxury/when-a-million-is-not-enough-20100528-wkkp.html
GEORGINA ROBINSON
May 28, 2010
In a time when a television network can afford to run a game show called Who Wants To Be a Millionaire but the average Sydney house costs $600,000, it's time to re-assess the value of $1 million dollars.
Can it still guarantee you financial freedom when whole residential blocks in Sydney are lined with homes carrying million-dollar plus price tags?
Do you need something closer to $10 million or $20 million to attain the symbolic separation from the masses a million once bought?
“You were generally considered to be rich if you had $1 million in the 1950s and now nobody would say you were seriously rich unless you had $10 million,” author and sociologist Michael Pusey says.
“But if you're talking about a sum of money that leaves you without economic insecurity then probably no sum will do it because expectations have risen and the multimillionaires themselves are at risk of going bankrupt and they want more and more … in order to feel safe.”
The professor of Public Ethics at Charles Sturt University, Clive Hamilton, agrees that the noughties' equivalent of a 1950s millionaire is someone with between $10 million and $20 million to burn.
And Eddie Maguire's television show is his proof.
“We now have a television program called Who Wants To Be A Millionaire, that would have been impossible 30 years ago because no television company would have been willing to stump up prize money of a million dollars, it would have sent them broke if anybody had won,” Professor Hamilton said.
“So now $1 million dollars is perhaps not chicken feed … but it just doesn't have the punch that it used to have.”
The magic million may not have the same cache it once did but that will be little comfort to the many Australians who found themselves kicked out of the club during the GFC.
A study compiled by financial research company CoreData found nearly a quarter of the 1700 Australians with investment assets of more than $1 million were pushed out of the $1 million-plus bracket by the global financial crisis.
Another survey in the Boston Consulting Group's latest global wealth report, reported a 40 per cent drop in the numbers of millionaire households in Australia.
The survey excluded individuals' businesses, homes and luxury goods, a key differentiator in the wealth race.
“It's about money that you could use, money is hard to use if it's tied up in your house,” wealth researcher Simon Kelly says.
“If you talk about people having $2 million to spend that's quite a different sort of person to one that's just worth $2 million.”
Professor Kelly, working at the University of Canberra's National Centre for Social and Economic Modelling, says international benchmarks have declared US$2 million to be “the new $1 million dollars”.
“And that's excluding houses … because particularly in places like Sydney, there'd be whole suburbs where the value of each house is worth $1 million dollars and they take that out.”
A Sydney-based funds management specialist, who wanted to remain anonymous, says $10 million – split just about evenly between property and income-generating assets – would have him sleeping soundly at night.
“Enough to form a stash to generate comfortable annuity for a period of 30 years,” he says.
But Professor Pusey says it is impossible in today's economic, political and social climate to confidently predict what “enough” might look like.
“In the baby boomer times
- we assumed that we would be able to buy a house on one income;
- we assumed that we would have quality health care for nothing;
- we assumed we'd have enough education as we wanted or needed for nothing;
- we assumed that the pension with our own savings would support us in our retirement and
- we assumed that we would have the resources to set up our children with those things,” he says.
“Today you would need vastly more than $1 million to achieve those ends for yourself.”
Professor Pusey says incomes are much more volatile these days, people enter the full-time labour market later and are often forced out earlier but live for much longer.
“The good news is you're going to live until you're 82-and-a-half, the bad news is you get pushed out of the labour market in your 50s if you can make it that long,” he says.
"There is no economic security and [people] need vastly more money to get it because their incomes are insecure and because debt levels are much higher than they were."
http://www.smh.com.au/executive-style/luxury/when-a-million-is-not-enough-20100528-wkkp.html
US probe takes aim at ratings agencies - and Buffett
US probe takes aim at ratings agencies - and Buffett
June 3, 2010 - 7:13AM
Credit rating agencies came under fire for their role in the global financial crisis on Wednesday, as senior industry figures -- including mega-investor Warren Buffett -- were grilled by US investigators.
Answering allegations that rating firms helped propel the sale of risky investments that poisoned the global financial system, senior officials from Moody's admitted mistakes were made, but denied any wrongdoing.
"Financial institutions that have failed and have required the assistance of the federal government... the CEOs should basically go away broke, and I have said I think his spouse should go away broke," he said.
The powerful "big three" raters -- Moody's, Standard & Poor's and Fitch -- have been accused of blithely awarding mortgage-backed securities their lucrative "AAA" investment ratings simply to net more business.
These top ratings are often seen as a seal of approval by investors and a sign that a company, country or debtor will pay back borrowed cash on time and in full.
"The picture is not pretty," said Phil Angelides, the chairman of the Congress-appointed panel.
"From 2000 through 2007, Moody's slapped its coveted triple-A rating on 42,625 residential mortgage backed securities," he added. "Moody's was a Triple-A factory."
Raymond McDaniel, Moody's chief executive, told the commission it was "deeply disappointing" that the firm misjudged how risky mortgage-backed investments were, but said steps had been taken to improve the system.
"Moody's is certainly not satisfied with the performance of these ratings," he said, facing questions about why he had not resigned.
"There has been an intense level of self evaluation within our organisation," he said.
The rating agencies have come under fire from US lawmakers who are putting the final touches to financial reforms that would see stiffer curbs on how the firms do business.
Eric Kolchinsky, a whistleblower who once worked for Moody's, said the industry was largely unregulated and "given a blank check" to pursue profits over sound assessments.
"Rating agencies faced the age-old and pedestrian conflict between long-term product quality and short-term profits. They chose the latter," Kolchinsky said in prepared testimony.
He accused Moody's of lying about the influence that banks -- which packaged and sold the securities -- had over the ratings process.
"Banker requests to keep certain analysts off of their deals were granted," he said.
He also accused banks of concealing the worst-performing parts of bonds that banded together mortgage debt.
"I have had cases where bankers were, I believe, lying to me about where those were being placed and there's nothing that I could do about it. You know, there's no penalty for lying to a rating agency analyst," he said.
Moody's CEO McDaniel denied that "misleading or manipulative" information was used in ratings.
He also said that some proposals to regulate the market would "likely have a positive impact," but that other measures were "contradictory."
Rating agencies have returned to the spotlight in recent weeks as a string of European countries have seen their credit ratings downgraded, pushing the cost of borrowing ever-higher.
European Union officials on Wednesday called for a centralised monitoring of rating agencies, accusing them of sparking "attacks" by speculators.
Standard & Poor's and Fitch were not asked to testify, according to a panel spokesperson.
AFP
http://www.smh.com.au/business/world-business/us-probe-takes-aim-at-ratings-agencies--and-buffett-20100603-x05j.html
June 3, 2010 - 7:13AM
Credit rating agencies came under fire for their role in the global financial crisis on Wednesday, as senior industry figures -- including mega-investor Warren Buffett -- were grilled by US investigators.
Answering allegations that rating firms helped propel the sale of risky investments that poisoned the global financial system, senior officials from Moody's admitted mistakes were made, but denied any wrongdoing.
Buffett, who holds a major stake in Moody's, said the agency had "made the wrong call" in assessing some complex financial products but firms that failed after buying dodgy products should shoulder most blame.
"Financial institutions that have failed and have required the assistance of the federal government... the CEOs should basically go away broke, and I have said I think his spouse should go away broke," he said.
The powerful "big three" raters -- Moody's, Standard & Poor's and Fitch -- have been accused of blithely awarding mortgage-backed securities their lucrative "AAA" investment ratings simply to net more business.
These top ratings are often seen as a seal of approval by investors and a sign that a company, country or debtor will pay back borrowed cash on time and in full.
"The picture is not pretty," said Phil Angelides, the chairman of the Congress-appointed panel.
"From 2000 through 2007, Moody's slapped its coveted triple-A rating on 42,625 residential mortgage backed securities," he added. "Moody's was a Triple-A factory."
Raymond McDaniel, Moody's chief executive, told the commission it was "deeply disappointing" that the firm misjudged how risky mortgage-backed investments were, but said steps had been taken to improve the system.
"Moody's is certainly not satisfied with the performance of these ratings," he said, facing questions about why he had not resigned.
"There has been an intense level of self evaluation within our organisation," he said.
The rating agencies have come under fire from US lawmakers who are putting the final touches to financial reforms that would see stiffer curbs on how the firms do business.
Criticism has focused on the fact that agencies are paid by the same firms they rate.
Eric Kolchinsky, a whistleblower who once worked for Moody's, said the industry was largely unregulated and "given a blank check" to pursue profits over sound assessments.
"Rating agencies faced the age-old and pedestrian conflict between long-term product quality and short-term profits. They chose the latter," Kolchinsky said in prepared testimony.
He accused Moody's of lying about the influence that banks -- which packaged and sold the securities -- had over the ratings process.
"Banker requests to keep certain analysts off of their deals were granted," he said.
He also accused banks of concealing the worst-performing parts of bonds that banded together mortgage debt.
"I have had cases where bankers were, I believe, lying to me about where those were being placed and there's nothing that I could do about it. You know, there's no penalty for lying to a rating agency analyst," he said.
Moody's CEO McDaniel denied that "misleading or manipulative" information was used in ratings.
He also said that some proposals to regulate the market would "likely have a positive impact," but that other measures were "contradictory."
Rating agencies have returned to the spotlight in recent weeks as a string of European countries have seen their credit ratings downgraded, pushing the cost of borrowing ever-higher.
European Union officials on Wednesday called for a centralised monitoring of rating agencies, accusing them of sparking "attacks" by speculators.
Standard & Poor's and Fitch were not asked to testify, according to a panel spokesperson.
AFP
http://www.smh.com.au/business/world-business/us-probe-takes-aim-at-ratings-agencies--and-buffett-20100603-x05j.html
Wednesday 2 June 2010
A quick look at Kenmark (2.6.2010)
A quick look at Kenmark (2.6.2010)
http://spreadsheets.google.com/pub?key=tyT8o3UdiCxgyUhc6ph3flg&output=html
Securities Commission probes Kenmark
Could I have predicted what would happen to Kenmark from its accounts?
Definitely NO
However, it is most unlikely that Kenmark will be a stock I would have in my portfolio based on my investment criterias. Therein, lies my protection against buying such a stock.
Interestingly, here are the comments in the latest SPG (Dynaquest) in its recently released latest edition of March 2010 on Kenmark:
Kenmark is engaged in the manufacturing of wooden furniture which are mainly exported to the West. In FY 08, it expanded from the LCD TV trading and distribution into the assembly of LCD TV. Its 9M 10 results exceeded our expectations with earnings soared by 129.6% yoy. We saw significant improvement in the Wood-based manufacturing segment although Trading segment is not doing so well. Looking forward, improving business environment and better margin are going to fuel Kenmark's profit growth.
It was obvious that those in Dynaquest did not and could not forsee what was coming in Kenmark then. ;-(
Padini versus Hing Yiap
From the above chart:
The EPS has grown from less than 10 sen to 40 sen since 2005. (3x)
Its dividend has increased from less than 5 sen to above 10 sen since 2005. (2x)
It share price has increased from about RM 1 to just below RM 4 since 2005. (3x)
Financial strength: Excellent
Its PE is about 10.
Share price is RM 3.49 per share.
Its annualised EPS is 49.59 sen (est.)
Its dividend yield is 3.44%.
Its P/B is 1.9
----
From the above chart:
The EPS has grown from negative 5 sen to just below 25 sen since 2005. (5x)
Its dividend has increased from just above 0 sen to about 5 sen since 2005. (2x)
It share price has increased from just above RM 0.50 to RM 1 since 2005. (2x)
Financial strength: Good
Financial strength: Good
Its PE is about 4.
Share price is MR 1.09 per share.
Its annualised EPS is 37.29 sen (est.)
Its dividend yield is 7.64%.
Its P/B is 0.49
----
The growth in EPS of Padini is due to its increasing revenue over the years.
The growth in EPS of Hing Yiap is due to its better profit margins with little increase in its top line revenue.
Padini is trading at higher P/E and higher P/B ratio compared with Hing Yiap.
Which company will grow its EPS at a faster rate in the future?
Which company will give a higher total shareholder return in the next 2 to 5 years?
Which company will you choose to invest into?
Would you invest into these companies today or wait for a more opportune time?
My subjective assessment:
Quality: Padini > Hing Yiap
Management: Padini (Great) > Hing Yiap (Good)
Value: Padini is anticipated to grow its EPS at faster rate, therefore, it is not a surprise that its P/E is higher. Hing Yiap may surprise on the upside, but it will need to be monitored.
My subjective assessment:
Quality: Padini > Hing Yiap
Management: Padini (Great) > Hing Yiap (Good)
Value: Padini is anticipated to grow its EPS at faster rate, therefore, it is not a surprise that its P/E is higher. Hing Yiap may surprise on the upside, but it will need to be monitored.
20 Questions to Focus the Hold versus Sell Decision
Key to Investment Success
20 Questions to focus the hold versus sell decision
http://spreadsheets.google.com/pub?key=txuLCrK4TZX_7uR7KDlLE7A&output=html
20 Questions to focus the hold versus sell decision
http://spreadsheets.google.com/pub?key=txuLCrK4TZX_7uR7KDlLE7A&output=html
Tuesday 1 June 2010
Panic-Resilient Stocks
There are several groups of stocks that tend to act well in a post panic environment, especially if the crash itself drives prices to incredible levels. Of course, the more unusual the values created, the quicker is the upside correction. Some of the groups most likely to snap back are:
It is important to make hold/sell calls in the light of prevailing market expectation and not personal judgement of what may happen. If the (correct) bet is no recession, the reward is smaller and slower than if the (correct) bet is market expectation of a recession (whether it comes or not). The investor must subject his ego to the realities of the emotional climate. It is better to be rich than to be vindicated slowly.
- Recession-resistant industries (foods, drugs, utilities).
- Noncyclical blue chips driven well down (oils).
- Big names with corporate staying power (AT&T, Exxon, General Electric and
General Motors). - Fortune 100 and similar companies with good yields.
- Trade-down concepts like low-cost restaurants and discount retailers (recession "beneficiaries").
- Companies with low P/Es or low price/cash flow ratios not in the first list here.
- Companies selling below book value and with positive earnings estimates for the coming year (implying credibly sustainable book values).
- Companies with low debt/equity ratios.
- Unleveraged closed-end, non-junk bond funds.
- Panic-trigger beneficiaries (e.g., oil-service and insulation stocks after OPEC raised oil prices in 1973).
It is important to make hold/sell calls in the light of prevailing market expectation and not personal judgement of what may happen. If the (correct) bet is no recession, the reward is smaller and slower than if the (correct) bet is market expectation of a recession (whether it comes or not). The investor must subject his ego to the realities of the emotional climate. It is better to be rich than to be vindicated slowly.
Stocks that don't fare well in a post-crash environment
Stocks that don't fare well in a post-crash environment
Stocks that tend to be sub-par performers in a post-crash environment are:
Because of fear, nervousness and lack of speculative appetite after a crash or panic, the first five groups (some of which overlap) lack sponsorship.
In addition, because market panics generate immediate scare headlines in the media, there is talk of recession and parallels drawn with 1929. So recession-sensitive stocks by industry do not bounce back much for a period of time.
There may, in fact, be no recession following the market's downmove (as in 1988), but perception and expectation drive prices near-term more than facts do. So cyclicals like steels, chemicals, paper and capital-good producers are not solid choices for participating in the bounce. Similarly, vacation and luxury stocks fare poorly.
The discredited groups vary from one market period to another. Their identity depends on what was in the headlines in recent months.
Again in a longer-term perspective, the facts may prove that the fear about leading companies in discredited groups was unfounded. But in the short term after a crash there are few who have the courage to sponsor tarnished-image stocks with either money or written advice. Such issues are early recovery laggards.
The final category should be off the hold list for similar reasons. Sometimes there is an industry or category of stocks related to the news that triggers the panic selling.
- OTC issues
- Low-priced stocks
- Small total-capitalization issues
- Thinly-traded, under- or non-covered stocks
- Industry laggards
- Recession-sensitive by industry
- Discredited groups
- Panic-trigger related groups
Because of fear, nervousness and lack of speculative appetite after a crash or panic, the first five groups (some of which overlap) lack sponsorship.
In addition, because market panics generate immediate scare headlines in the media, there is talk of recession and parallels drawn with 1929. So recession-sensitive stocks by industry do not bounce back much for a period of time.
There may, in fact, be no recession following the market's downmove (as in 1988), but perception and expectation drive prices near-term more than facts do. So cyclicals like steels, chemicals, paper and capital-good producers are not solid choices for participating in the bounce. Similarly, vacation and luxury stocks fare poorly.
The discredited groups vary from one market period to another. Their identity depends on what was in the headlines in recent months.
- Basic industry stocks were taboo in the early 1980s, known as the 'rust-belt' period.
- High-tech stocks suffered through a private, one-industry recession in the mid-1980s.
- Banks were whipping boys in the early era of bad third-world loans.
- Most recently, savings and loans have been in the doghouse due to bailout legislation and highly visible failures and scandals.
Again in a longer-term perspective, the facts may prove that the fear about leading companies in discredited groups was unfounded. But in the short term after a crash there are few who have the courage to sponsor tarnished-image stocks with either money or written advice. Such issues are early recovery laggards.
The final category should be off the hold list for similar reasons. Sometimes there is an industry or category of stocks related to the news that triggers the panic selling.
- In 1962, it was steel stocks sensitive to pricing confrontation with the Kennedy administration.
- Brokerage stocks would have been poor choices to hold after the 1987 crash because of all the controversy surrounding program trading.
- The 1989 crash was triggered by the collapse of the propose buyout of UAL, Inc., so airlines and other proposed leveraged buyout candidates were identifiable as the trigger-related group at that time.
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