Wednesday, 3 December 2025

The different types of bulk ship carriers in the world

The world of bulk carriers is fascinating and crucial to global trade, moving the raw materials that build and power our world. Here is an enlightening breakdown of the different types, categorized primarily by size, cargo, and capability.

The Core Classification: By Size and Cargo Type

Bulk carriers are most commonly grouped by their size, measured in Deadweight Tonnage (DWT—the total weight a ship can carry). This size directly correlates with the trade routes they serve and the cargoes they carry.


1. Handysize (10,000 - 39,999 DWT)

  • The "Workhorses" or "Trucks of the Sea."

  • Characteristics: Small, versatile, and nimble. They are often geared (equipped with their own cranes), allowing them to serve remote ports with limited infrastructure.

  • Primary Cargoes: Minor bulks like grain, fertilizers, sugar, wood products, steel, and cement.

  • Trade Routes: Global and flexible, operating in coastal regions, small ports, and inland seas.

2. Handymax/Supramax (40,000 - 64,999 DWT)

  • The "Versatile Middleweights." (The term "Handymax" is older, with "Supramax" now more common).

  • Characteristics: A larger, more efficient evolution of the Handysize. Almost always geared. They offer a sweet spot between flexibility and cargo volume.

  • Primary Cargoes: Similar to Handysize but in larger volumes, also including coal, minerals, and aggregates.

  • Trade Routes: Serve a wide range of global ports, including many that cannot accommodate larger vessels.

3. Panamax (65,000 - 99,999 DWT)

  • The "Canal Crossers." Originally defined by the maximum dimensions capable of transiting the old Panama Canal locks (pre-2016 expansion).

  • Characteristics: Designed to maximize the canal's dimensions. Can be geared or gearless.

  • Primary Cargoes: Major bulks like coal, grain, and bauxite/alumina, as well as minor bulks.

  • Trade Routes: Historically dominated the trans-Americas coal and grain trades. Still vital on routes using the Panama Canal.

4. Post-Panamax / Kamsarmax (100,000+ DWT)

  • The "Optimized Designs."

    • Post-Panamax: Wider and longer than the old Panama Canal limits.

    • Kamsarmax: A subset (~82,000 DWT) designed to the maximum dimensions for the port of Kamsar (Guinea), a major bauxite loading hub.

  • Characteristics: These are design-maximized vessels for specific trades or newer canals (like the expanded Panama Canal).

5. Capesize (100,000+ DWT, typically 180,000 DWT)

  • The "Ocean Giants."

  • Characteristics: The largest dry bulk carriers. They are always gearless (rely on shore equipment) due to their size. Their name comes from the fact they are too large to transit the Suez or (old) Panama Canals and must sail via the Cape of Good Hope or Cape Horn.

  • Primary Cargoes: Iron ore and coal—the raw materials for steelmaking and power generation.

  • Trade Routes: Long-haul routes between major export hubs (Brazil, Australia, South Africa) and import regions (China, Japan, Europe).

6. Very Large Ore Carrier (VLOC) & Valemax (300,000+ DWT)

  • The "Specialized Behemoths."

  • Characteristics: These are a subset of Capesize, specifically designed and often dedicated to the iron ore trade between Brazil and China. Valemax ships are the world's largest bulk carriers, built for the Brazilian mining giant Vale.

  • Primary Cargoes: Iron ore exclusively.

  • Trade Routes: Dedicated shuttle services (e.g., Brazil to China).


Classification by Other Features

By Loading/Unloading Gear:

  • Gearless: Depend entirely on port equipment. Cheaper to build and maintain, but limited to well-equipped ports. (All Capesize, many Panamax).

  • Geared: Equipped with onboard cranes (derricks/gantries). More versatile and independent. (All Handysize/Supramax, some Panamax).

By Cargo Specialization:

  • Standard Bulk Carrier: Carries dry bulk in holds.

  • Self-Discharger: Has a built-in conveyor system (e.g., continuous ship unloader) for rapid discharge of specific cargoes like grain or alumina.

  • Lakers: Specifically designed for the Great Lakes of North America, with a unique silhouette to fit locks.

  • BIBO (Bulk-In, Bags-Out): Can load bulk cargo but unload it into bags, adding value for certain markets.

  • Cement Carrier: Highly specialized with pneumatic systems to handle powdered cement.

  • Log Carrier: Fitted with reinforced holds and tween-decks to carry timber.

How This Relates to Your Document:

The Baltic Exchange report you shared uses these exact classifications to report market rates. Each segment (Capesize, Panamax, Ultramax/Supramax, Handysize) has its own freight rate index (like the 5TC for Capesize) because their supply, demand, and trading patterns are fundamentally different. For example, a boom in Brazilian iron ore exports will spike Capesize rates, while a U.S. grain harvest will primarily affect Panamax and Handysize rates.

In essence, the bulk carrier fleet forms a pyramid:

  • Base: Many small, versatile Handysize/Supramax vessels serving countless ports and cargoes.

  • Middle: The efficient Panamax/Post-Panamax workhorses on key commodity routes.

  • Peak: A smaller number of massive, specialized Capesize/VLOC ships moving the foundational commodities of the global economy on trunk routes.

This ecosystem ensures the cost-effective transport of everything from the grain in your bread to the steel in your car and the coal that powers electricity.

Tuesday, 2 December 2025

****Buffett (1992): Do not categorise stocks into growth and value types, the two approaches are joined at the hip

 

****Buffett (1992): Do not categorise stocks into growth and value types, the two approaches are joined at the hip


====


Here is a summary of Warren Buffett's key points from his 1992 shareholder letter:

Core Argument: The traditional division between "value" and "growth" investing is a false and unhelpful dichotomy. True investing is always about seeking value.

Key Takeaways:

  1. Growth and Value Are Inseparable: Growth is a critical component in calculating a business's intrinsic value. Its impact can be positive, negative, or negligible, but it is always a variable in the valuation equation.

  2. "Value Investing" is Redundant: All legitimate investing is the pursuit of value. Paying more for a stock than its calculated intrinsic value is speculation, not investing.

  3. Surface Metrics Are Misleading: Traditional "value" indicators (low P/E, low P/B, high yield) or "growth" indicators (high P/E, high P/B) are not definitive. A stock with a high P/E can still be a "value" purchase if its intrinsic value is even higher.

  4. Growth Alone Does Not Create Value: Growth only benefits investors when the business can generate returns on its incremental capital that exceed its cost of capital. Profitable growth that consumes vast amounts of capital can destroy shareholder value (e.g., the airline industry).

  5. The Crucial Metric is Return on Capital: The primary determinant of value is not profit growth itself, but the amount of capital required to achieve that growth. The lower the capital consumed for a given level of growth, the higher the intrinsic value.

Practical Investor Lesson: Investors should avoid companies and sectors where fast profit growth is accompanied by low returns on capital employed (below the cost of capital). The focus must be on the relationship between growth, capital required, and the resulting returns.



Why Return on Assets (ROA) is a critical and preferred metric for evaluating banks, investment banks, and financial companies (as opposed to Return on Total Capital, or ROTC).


ROA of Banks, Investment Banks and Financial Companies


Banks, investment banks and financial companies rely on borrowing large amounts of money that they hope to loan out at higher interest rates to businesses and consumers.

A company like Freddie Mac, which deals in residential mortgages, carries $175 billion in short-term debt and $185 billion in long-term debt. If your business is borrowing money at 6% and loaning it out at 7%, there is no way your return on total capital ROTC is going to even approach 12%.

In these instances, Warren Buffett likes to look at what the bank or finance company earned in relation to the total assets under its control. The rule here is, the higher the betterAnything over 1% is good and anything over 1.5% is fantastic.


Learning Point

With banks, investment banks, and financial companies, look for a consistent return on assets ROA in excess of 1% and a consistent return on shareholders' equity ROE in excess of 12%.




=====

Why Return on Assets (ROA) is a critical and preferred metric for evaluating banks, investment banks, and financial companies (as opposed to Return on Total Capital, or ROTC). Here is a discussion and summary of the key points:

Core Discussion Points:

  1. Unique Business Model: These institutions are fundamentally in the "business of money." Their core activity is financial intermediation: borrowing at lower rates (e.g., from deposits or debt markets) and lending/investing at higher rates. This makes them highly leveraged (carry massive debt) by design.

  2. Why ROA (not ROTC) is Key:

    • Their balance sheets are dominated by interest-bearing liabilities (debt). Using Return on Total Capital (ROTC), which includes this debt, would be misleading.

    • As the Freddie Mac example illustrates: borrowing at 6% and lending at 7% yields a slim net interest margin. When this slim profit is measured against the enormous total capital (equity + massive debt), the ROTC will always appear very low—even if the bank is run efficiently.

    • ROA cuts through this. By measuring Net Income / Total Assets, it assesses how effectively management is using the assets it controls (primarily loans and investments) to generate profits, regardless of how those assets were financed (with debt or equity).

  3. Buffett's Benchmark Rules of Thumb:

    • ROA > 1% = Good. Indicates solid asset utilization and prudent risk management.

    • ROA > 1.5% = Fantastic. Suggests exceptional operational efficiency and/or a valuable, low-cost funding base (like a strong deposit franchise).

  4. The Dual Mandate (ROA & ROE): The final learning point introduces the complete picture for evaluating these firms:

    • ROA (>1%): Measures operational efficiency and asset quality. A consistent ROA shows the core lending/investing business is sound.

    • ROE (>12%): Measures returns to shareholders. Because these firms use high leverage (debt), a solid ROA can be magnified into a high ROE. A consistent ROE above 12% indicates the firm is not only efficient but also generating attractive returns on its equity capital.

Summary:

For banks and financial companies, the standard return metrics used for industrial firms are distorted by their inherent, massive leverage. Therefore:

  • Focus on Return on Assets (ROA) to judge the efficiency and profitability of their core lending/investment operations. Warren Buffett considers a consistent ROA above 1% good and above 1.5% excellent.

  • Also consider Return on Equity (ROE) in conjunction with ROA. A strong, consistent ROE (exceeding 12%) indicates that the firm's operational efficiency (high ROA) is successfully being translated into strong returns for shareholders through prudent use of leverage.

In essence: For financial institutions, ROA tells you if they are good bankers, while ROE tells you if they are good investments for shareholders. A well-run bank should excel at both.

Buffett (1980): The true value is determined by the intrinsic value of the company and not the dividends.


Wednesday, 31 March 2010

Buffett (1980): The true value is determined by the intrinsic value of the company and not the dividends.


Warren Buffett in his 1980 letter to the shareholders of Berks
hire Hathaway:

"The value to Berkshire Hathaway of retained earnings is not determined by whether we own 100%, 50%, 20% or 1% of the businesses in which they reside. Rather, the value of those retained earnings is determined by the use to which they are put and the subsequent level of earnings produced by that usage."



======

Buffett’s thinking from that 1980 letter.

Let’s break down and expand upon the key ideas you’ve highlighted:


1. Intrinsic Value vs. Dividends in Accounting

Buffett was criticizing the accounting convention that focused on dividends received from partially owned companies as the measure of value for the owning company.
He argued that the real worth to Berkshire wasn’t the dividend payout, but the proportionate share of the underlying business’s intrinsic value — regardless of whether those earnings were paid out or retained.

Your Indian example — valuing M&M based only on dividends from Tech Mahindra, rather than 20% of Tech Mahindra’s intrinsic value — perfectly illustrates the flawed accounting viewpoint.
If Tech Mahindra reinvests its earnings profitably, the retained earnings compound and increase the intrinsic value of M&M’s stake far beyond the dividends received.
Accounting rules at the time (and to a large extent still today) fail to capture this unless ownership exceeds a certain threshold (e.g., consolidation or equity method with impairment tests, but still not intrinsic-value based).


2. Retained Earnings: Value Depends on Use

Buffett’s core point:

“The value of retained earnings is determined by the use to which they are put and the subsequent level of earnings produced.”

This means it’s not retention itself that creates value, but the return on reinvested capital. If a business can reinvest earnings at high rates of return, retaining earnings adds more value than paying dividends.
If it can’t find good reinvestment opportunities, returning capital to shareholders (via dividends or buybacks) is better.

For partial ownership, even if you don’t control the capital allocation decisions, if the investee company reinvests earnings well, your share of its value grows without you receiving cash dividends.
That’s why Berkshire’s holdings in companies like Coca-Cola or See’s Candies were worth far more than the dividends indicated — because retained earnings were deployed into high-return operations.


3. Buybacks at a Discount to Intrinsic Value

The second quote contrasts corporate acquisitions (often full-price or overpay in competitive bidding) with stock buybacks in the open market (where shares can sometimes be bought far below intrinsic value).

Key takeaways:

Buffett loves buybacks when:

  1. The stock trades below intrinsic value.

  2. The company has excess cash and no better investment opportunities.

Buybacks increase per-share intrinsic value by reducing shares outstanding, effectively giving remaining shareholders a larger claim on future earnings at a bargain price.


4. Relevance Today

These principles remain central to value investing:

  • Look-through earnings: When evaluating holdings, include your share of undistributed earnings of subsidiaries/associates if they are reinvested well.

  • Capital allocation priority:

    1. Reinvest in high-return projects.

    2. Acquire other businesses at fair prices.

    3. Buy back stock when cheap.

    4. Pay dividends if no better use.

The accounting standards (e.g., IFRS 9, ASC 323) still don’t fully reflect “look-through” intrinsic value for minority holdings — they focus on dividends, fair value changes, or equity-accounted earnings, but not necessarily the full economic value of retained earnings compounding inside the investee.


5. Buffett’s Broader Philosophy

The 1980 letter segment you’re discussing fits into Buffett’s larger framework:

  • Own businesses, not stocks → value comes from underlying business performance.

  • Mr. Market offers opportunities to buy/sell pieces of businesses at irrational prices.

  • Management’s job is to increase per-share intrinsic value over time, not to cater to short-term stock prices.

By ignoring dividends as the sole measure of value from investments and focusing on the growth in intrinsic value, Buffett built Berkshire’s worth far beyond what dividend-based accounting would suggest.



=====


SUMMARY


Here is a summary of the article's key points:

Core Argument

Warren Buffett, in his 1980 letter, argues that the true economic value of a company's stake in another business is not determined by the dividends it receives, but by its share of the intrinsic value of the underlying business. Accounting standards that focus on dividend income are misleading.

Main Points

  1. Intrinsic Value Over Dividends:

    • If Company A owns 20% of Company B, the stake should be valued as 20% of Company B's intrinsic value, not just 20% of the dividends paid out. This is because retained earnings reinvested into the business can create far more long-term value.

    • Example: Valuing M&M based only on the dividends from its stake in Tech Mahindra would be incorrect; one must value its 20% ownership of Tech Mahindra itself.

  2. Value of Retained Earnings:

    • The worth of retained earnings depends entirely on how effectively they are reinvested. If a business can reinvest earnings at a high rate of return, retaining them creates more value than paying them out as dividends.

  3. Buybacks vs. Acquisitions:

    • Acquisitions often occur in a competitive auction, forcing acquirers to pay a "full" or inflated price.

    • Stock Buybacks, however, allow a company to buy parts of its own business in the open market, often at a significant discount to intrinsic value, especially during market panics.

    • Buffett strongly advocates for buybacks when a company's stock is trading below its intrinsic value, as it is the most efficient use of capital to increase per-share value for remaining shareholders.

Conclusion

Buffett’s philosophy centers on economic reality over accounting convention. A value investor should focus on the growth of intrinsic value from reinvested earnings and take advantage of market irrationality to buy ownership stakes at a discount.



ROA of Banks, Investment Banks and Financial Companies

ROA of Banks, Investment Banks and Financial Companies

Banks, investment banks and financial companies rely on borrowing large amounts of money that they hope to loan out at higher interest rates to businesses and consumers.

A company like Freddie Mac, which deals in residential mortgages, carries $175 billion in short-term debt and $185 billion in long-term debt. If your business is borrowing money at 6% and loaning it out at 7%, there is no way your return on total capital ROTC is going to even approach 12%.

In these instances, Warren Buffett likes to look at what the bank or finance company earned in relation to the total assets under its control. The rule here is, the higher the betterAnything over 1% is good and anything over 1.5% is fantastic.



Learning Point

With banks, investment banks, and financial companies, look for a consistent return on assets ROA in excess of 1% and a consistent return on shareholders' equity ROE in excess of 12%.


 

=====


Also read:

https://myinvestingnotes.blogspot.com/2025/12/why-return-on-assets-roa-is-critical.html

Why Return on Assets (ROA) is a critical and preferred metric for evaluating banks, investment banks, and financial companies (as opposed to Return on Total Capital, or ROTC).

Monday, 1 December 2025

ROTC, ROA, ROE and Buffett's Durable Competitive Advantage


ROTC, ROA, ROE and Buffett's Durable Competitive Advantage

https://myinvestingnotes.blogspot.com/2009/06/relating-rotc-and-roa-to-durable.html


1. Warren Buffett has learned that a consistently high return on total capital is indicative of a durable competitive advantage. He is looking for a consistent ROTC of 12% or better.

2. With banks and finance companies he looks at the return of total assets ROA to determine if the company is benefitting from some kind of durable competitive advantage. Warren Buffett looks for a consistent return on assets ROA in excess of 1% (anything over 1% is good, anything over 1.5% is fantastic) and a consistent ROE in excess of 12%.

3. In situations where the entire net worth of the company is paid out, creating a negative net worth, Warren Buffett has only made investments in those companies that show a consistent ROTC of 20% or more. The high ROTC is indicative of a durable competitive advantage.


=====

Here is a detailed elaboration, discussion, and summary of Warren Buffett's use of ROA, ROE, and ROTC as indicators of a durable competitive advantage (often called an "economic moat").

Elaboration: The Three Metrics and Their Buffett Context

1. ROTC (Return on Total Capital)

  • What it is: Measures how efficiently a company uses all its permanent capital (both equity and long-term debt) to generate profits. Formula: Earnings Before Interest & Taxes (EBIT) / (Shareholders' Equity + Long-Term Debt).

  • Buffett's Threshold: A consistent 12% or better. He looks for consistency over time, not just a single high year. This indicates the company can deploy large amounts of capital at high rates of return—a key sign of a moat.

  • Key Insight: Because it uses pre-interest earnings (EBIT) and includes debt, ROTC neutralizes the effects of different capital structures (how much debt vs. equity a company uses). It focuses purely on the operating efficiency of the core business.

2. ROA (Return on Assets) & ROE (Return on Equity) for Financials

  • Why separate for banks/financials? For these companies, debt is the raw material of the business (e.g., deposits for banks, premiums for insurers). Their assets are predominantly financial (loans, securities). Therefore, standard ROTC is less meaningful.

  • ROA (Return on Assets): Net Income / Total Assets. Buffett looks for consistently over 1% (excellent if over 1.5%). A consistently high ROA for a bank indicates it is skilled at underwriting (lending) and investing without taking excessive risk. It suggests pricing power, operational efficiency, and a valuable, low-cost deposit base—all forms of a competitive advantage.

  • ROE (Return on Equity): Net Income / Shareholders' Equity. Even for financials, Buffett seeks consistently over 12%. This ensures the company is not just efficient with assets but also generates a superb return for its owners.

3. The "Negative Equity" Exception & High ROTC Bar

  • The Scenario: Some exceptional companies generate so much cash that they can pay out all their cumulative earnings as dividends or share buybacks, effectively reducing their retained earnings (and thus shareholder equity) to zero or negative. Think of powerful brands like Moody's or See's Candies.

  • Buffett's Adjusted Metric: In these cases, ROE becomes distorted or infinite. Therefore, he reverts to ROTC, but raises the bar significantly to 20% or more. This extreme profitability with minimal capital reinvestment is the ultimate sign of a durable competitive advantage—a "toll-bridge" or "franchise" business that prints money.

Discussion: The Underlying Philosophy and Connections

1. Consistency is the True Signal: Buffett is not looking for a single year's spike. He looks for a decade or more of consistently high metrics. This consistency proves the advantage is durable and can withstand economic cycles, competition, and management changes. Volatility in these returns suggests a cyclical commodity business, not a moat.

2. The Hierarchy of Metrics Reflects Business Model:

  • For most businesses (Coca-Cola, Apple): ROTC is the primary gauge because it isolates business quality from financing decisions.

  • For financial businesses (Bank of America, American Express): ROA is the key operational metric, supplemented by ROE.

  • For capital-light franchise businesses: An extremely high ROTC (20%+) is the tell-tale sign, even trumping ROE.

3. The "Why" Behind the Numbers: These metrics are the output, not the cause. A high and consistent ROTC/ROA/ROE is the result of the durable competitive advantage, which can stem from:

4. The Avoidance of "Look-Through" Debt: By focusing on ROTC (using EBIT) for industrials, Buffett avoids being fooled by a high ROE achieved through excessive leverage (debt). A highly leveraged company can have a high ROE but be very risky. Buffett prefers profits from business strength, not financial engineering.

Summary: The Buffett Framework for Identifying a Moat











In essence, Warren Buffett uses these profitability ratios as a forensic tool to identify a business's underlying economic reality. He seeks consistent excellence in these metrics as evidence that a company possesses a durable competitive advantage (moat). The specific metric he emphasizes depends on the business model, but the ultimate goal is the same: to find a business so fundamentally strong that it can generate high returns on capital for many years into the future, with minimal need for additional investment. This is the engine behind Berkshire Hathaway's compounding value.