Saturday, 6 December 2025

Bursa fines and suspends dealer for manipulative trading.

 


The manipulative trading activities described in this case represent a direct breach of market integrity and cause several forms of harm to average investors in Hap Seng Consolidated Bhd (or any affected stock), even if they are not directly targeted. Here’s a breakdown of the harm caused:


1. Artificial Price Inflation

Hazni’s repeated entry of buy orders above prevailing market prices—especially during the final trading hour and pre-closing phase—artificially inflated Hap Seng’s share price.

  • Impact on Retail Investors: Average investors relying on market prices for buying/selling decisions may have purchased shares at an artificially high price, believing the price reflected genuine supply and demand. When the manipulation stops or is uncovered, the price often corrects downward, causing immediate paper or real losses for those holding the stock.


2. Misleading Market Signals

By narrowing spreads and inflating the buy side of the order book, Hazni created a false impression of strong buying interest and price strength.

  • Impact: Retail investors and traders using technical analysis or order book data could have been misled into thinking there was genuine bullish sentiment, prompting them to buy or hold positions based on distorted information.


3. Manipulation of Closing Price

Placing buy orders above the last traded price during the pre-closing phase to influence the Theoretical Closing Price (TCP) is particularly harmful.

  • Impact: The closing price is a key reference point for end-of-day valuations, derivatives pricing, and benchmark calculations. An artificially high close can affect decisions related to margin calls, fund NAV calculations, and trigger automated trading systems, harming investors who rely on accurate closing prices.


4. Erosion of Trust in Market Fairness

When registered dealers engage in or facilitate manipulation, it undermines confidence in the fairness and transparency of the market.

  • Impact: Average investors may become hesitant to participate in the market, fearing that prices do not reflect true value. This reduces market liquidity and efficiency, ultimately harming all participants.


5. Unfair Advantage to the Manipulating Client

The corporate client on whose behalf Hazni executed trades gained an unfair advantage—likely to exit positions at inflated prices or to meet certain portfolio valuation targets.

  • Impact: Other investors, especially retail traders, are effectively disadvantaged because they are trading in a rigged market environment without access to the same manipulative tactics.


6. Regulatory and Reputational Risk to the Market

Such incidents can lead to broader regulatory scrutiny, tighter trading restrictions, or loss of foreign and institutional investor confidence in Bursa Malaysia.

  • Impact: A tainted market reputation can lead to reduced capital inflow, lower liquidity, and higher cost of capital for all listed companies, indirectly affecting shareholder value.


7. Hazni’s Failure as a Professional Gatekeeper

Bursa’s statement emphasizes that Hazni failed to exercise due diligence and acted as a “mere order-taker.”

  • Impact: This negligence allowed manipulative activities to persist even after surveillance warnings. If dealers do not act as frontline safeguards, market integrity relies solely on retrospective enforcement, leaving investors exposed to ongoing manipulation.


Conclusion:

While the direct financial penalty and suspension are imposed on Hazni, the real victims are the average investors who traded under false pretenses. Their losses may never be recovered, and their trust in the market may be permanently damaged. This case highlights the critical role of licensed professionals in maintaining market integrity and the need for continuous surveillance, stringent enforcement, and investor education to protect the investing public.


The case reveals a dynamic where both the dealer and his client benefited, but in different ways, and the client (the "master") was the primary beneficiary and likely the instigator.

Let's break down the "why" and "who."

1. Why Did the Dealer Behave This Way?

The dealer's actions can be attributed to a combination of pressure, misaligned incentives, and rationalization:

  • Client Pressure & Fear of Losing Business: The dealer, was acting for a corporate client. Large clients generate significant commission revenue for both the dealer and his firm. There is immense pressure to retain such clients and keep them happy. Pushing back on their orders, even suspicious ones, risks the client taking their business elsewhere.

  • The "Order-Taker" Mentality: Bursa's reprimand crucially states it was "unacceptable for a dealer to act as a mere order-taker." This is the core of the issue. Instead of exercising professional skepticism and duty to the market, he chose to follow instructions blindly, prioritizing client service over market integrity. He likely rationalized it as "just doing my job for the client."

  • Possible Direct or Indirect Incentives: While not stated, it's plausible that:

    • The dealer earned commissions on the high volume of trades executed.

    • His performance or bonuses might have been linked to client satisfaction or trading volume from key accounts.

    • There might have been an implicit promise of future business or rewards from the pleased client.

2. Who Benefitted?

A. The Corporate Client (The "Master") – PRIMARY BENEFICIARY
The client, whose account was used, received the most direct and substantial financial benefit. The manipulative trading aimed to:

  • Artificially Inflate the Share Price: This could help the client in several ways:

    1. Improve Portfolio Valuation: If the client held a large position in Hap Seng, a higher closing price would make their portfolio/balance sheet look stronger at reporting periods (e.g., quarter-end or year-end).

    2. Facilitate an Exit: They could sell their own shares into the artificially created strength at a higher price.

    3. Support a Related Transaction: The price could be propped up to aid a secondary offering, a collateralized loan based on share value, or to meet certain covenant requirements.

    4. Influence Derivative Positions: If the client had options or other derivatives tied to Hap Seng's closing price, manipulating the TCP could lead to direct profits on those contracts.

  • Benefit: Direct financial gain, improved financial metrics, or successful execution of a related financial strategy.

B. The Dealer – SECONDARY BENEFICIARY
His benefits were more indirect and career-oriented, but real:

  • Retaining a Lucrative Client: By being compliant, he secured ongoing business and commissions from a major client.

  • Avoiding Conflict: He avoided a difficult confrontation with a powerful client.

  • Career & Commissions: Meeting the client's demands likely translated to steady income and possibly positive performance reviews in the short term, before the manipulation was discovered.

3. How Did They Benefit Specifically?

  • Client's Gain: Financial profit and strategic advantage. They used the dealer as a tool to manipulate the market for their own ends, turning market mechanics (order book, closing price) into a lever for private gain.

  • Dealer's Gain: Job security, steady commissions, and short-term professional ease. He traded his regulatory duty for client appeasement, opting for the path of least resistance in his daily work.

The Critical Imbalance

The key point is the asymmetry of risk and reward:

  • The Client reaped most of the financial rewards while the dealer bore the execution risk.

  • The Dealer took on immense legal, regulatory, and career risk (fines, suspension, reputational ruin) for what were, in comparison, modest professional benefits (keeping a client happy).

Conclusion: This was not a case of a rogue dealer acting alone for personal speculative gain. It was a case of a dealer failing in his duty as a market gatekeeper, succumbing to client pressure, and becoming an essential tool for a client's market manipulation scheme. The client was the architect and primary beneficiary; the dealer was the compromised facilitator who benefited indirectly but paid a heavy personal price when caught. Bursa's sanctions on the dealer send a clear message that professionals cannot hide behind client instructions and must actively prevent market abuse.


Friday, 5 December 2025

Malaysia has seen 4 times more foreign capital outflow from stock market this year

 

Malaysia has seen 4 times more foreign capital outflow from stock market this year. What’s at play?


While Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s government has repeatedly touted Malaysia as a high-value destination for foreign investment, international portfolio capital continues to leave the country’s financial markets.


KUALA LUMPUR: The Malaysian economy is not at risk of hitting any major bumps in the coming months, but the country’s tepid growth prospects and cautious political outlook are why foreign investors have been pulling out from its financial markets, economists and analysts say.

As of Sep 30, net portfolio equity outflow from the Malaysian stock market this year hit RM16.4 billion (U$3.9 billion), about four times the full-year outflow of RM4.2 billion in 2024, said RHB Research in a note earlier this month.

According to Bank Negara - the country’s central bank - the non-resident outflow from the stock market in 2023 was RM2.3 billion.

Foreign shareholding now stands at around 19 per cent of total market capitalisation and is at an all-time low, CIMB Research was quoted as saying in reports this month. The shareholding ratio has fluctuated between 22 per cent and 23 per cent for some years.

Bonds are bleeding too: September saw RM6.8 billion in net foreign selling, reversing a brief inflow in August, according to RAM Rating Services. 

RAM added in a note last week that foreign holdings in Malaysian bonds have already edged lower in the first half of this month, falling to RM285.8 billion as at Oct 14, down from RM287.0 billion as at end September. 

Bank Negara figures show that foreign holdings stood at about RM275 billion at the start of January, rising to a high of RM302 billion at end May this year, before retreating to current levels.

“It is a worrying trend,” former finance minister Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah told CNA of the haemorrhaging of foreign capital from the Malaysian financial markets.

“It is clear that foreign investors don’t have an upbeat long-term view on Malaysia, (with) little faith in … the management of the economy,” he added.

The exodus of foreign portfolio capital is a region-wide phenomenon because of the uncertainty in the international economy and concerns over new tariffs that the United States government has been threatening, investment analysts said.

Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand are also losing portfolio money from a broad cross-section of portfolio investors, comprising private equity interests, hedge funds, and large international pension and insurance companies.

But Malaysia’s outflow has been one of the sharpest among members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), raising serious concerns at a time when competition for limited overseas capital is becoming more intense among regional economies.

SLOWDOWN 

The Malaysian economy, ASEAN’s fifth-largest, is expected to grow at a slower pace of around 4.2 per cent next year, down slightly from the projected 4.5 per cent expansion in gross domestic product (GDP) this year, according to Kenanga Research.

The lukewarm outlook is despite the country’s success in attracting direct investments in key sectors of the economy.

According to the Malaysian Investment Development Authority (MIDA), the country attracted RM378.5 billion of approved investment in 2024, up 14.9 per cent from the previous year. 

For the January to June period this year, MIDA noted that approved investment hit RM190.3 billion, up 18.7 per cent from the same 2024 period.

"Very low-growth firms often have high PEs" seems counterintuitive at first, but it can be true under specific conditions.

The statement that "very low-growth firms often have high PEs" seems counterintuitive at first, but it can be true under specific conditions. Let's break down the mechanics and rationale behind this phenomenon.

The Core Principle: The P/E Ratio is a Function of Multiple Factors

The standard Gordon Growth Model (a simplified dividend discount model) helps explain this:
P = D / (r - g)
Where:

  • P = Price

  • D = Dividend

  • r = Required Rate of Return (discount rate)

  • g = Perpetual Growth Rate

Since Earnings (E) and Dividends (D) are linked by the payout ratio (p), we can reframe this for the P/E ratio:
P/E = p / (r - g)

This shows that the P/E ratio is inversely related to the spread between the discount rate (r) and the growth rate (g). A high P/E can result not only from high *g*, but also from a very low (r - g) spread.


Why Low-Growth Firms Can Command High P/E Multiples

  1. The "Stable Cash Flow" or "Bond Proxy" Effect

    • Low Risk (Low 'r'): Very low-growth firms are often mature, defensive businesses in non-cyclical industries (e.g., utilities, consumer staples, certain REITs). They have predictable, non-discretionary demand.

    • Implied Discount Rate: Because their cash flows are stable and less risky, the market assigns them a lower discount rate (r). In the formula P/E = p / (r - g), if r is very low, the denominator (r - g) remains small even if g is low, supporting a higher P/E.

    • Analogy: These stocks are treated like long-duration bonds. When interest rates fall, the value of stable, long-duration cash flows rises. A high P/E in this context reflects a low equity risk premium.

  2. High and Sustainable Dividend Yield (The "Income Stock")

    • Payout Ratio (p): These firms typically have limited reinvestment opportunities (low growth). Therefore, they return a large portion of earnings to shareholders as dividends, resulting in a high payout ratio (p). In our formula, a high p directly increases the justified P/E.

    • Yield Support: Investors bid up the price to capture the attractive, reliable dividend yield. This price appreciation pushes the P/E higher. The high P/E is not a bet on future earnings growth but a reflection of current income attractiveness in a low-interest-rate environment. If the dividend yield is 5% and 10-year bonds yield 3%, the stock becomes compelling despite no growth.

  3. The "Maturity" and "Fade" Assumption

    • For a high-growth firm, a high P/E embeds expectations of sustained high growth. Any stumble in growth (a "growth scare") leads to a severe P/E contraction (derating).

    • For a 0-2% growth utility, there is no growth to disappoint. The market already assumes perpetual low growth. The risk of a negative growth surprise is minimal, so the multiple is less volatile and can sustain at a higher level than the simplistic "growth vs. P/E" heuristic would suggest.

  4. Accounting and Cyclicality Factors

    • Low Point in the Cycle: Sometimes, a firm's trailing earnings (the 'E' in P/E) are temporarily depressed due to a cyclical trough or a one-time charge. If the market prices the company based on normalized future earnings, the trailing P/E will appear artificially high, even though the business is stable. This is a "P/E illusion."

    • Asset-Intensive Businesses: Some low-growth firms (e.g., industrial, telecom) have large depreciation charges that reduce accounting earnings (E) but do not impact cash flow. The Price-to-Cash-Flow multiple might be more normal, while the P/E looks high.


Important Caveats and Nuances

  • This is not a universal rule. Many low-growth firms trade at low P/Es (e.g., legacy automotive, some banks). The high P/E scenario applies to a specific subset: low-growth plus low-risk plus high payout.

  • Interest Rate Sensitivity: This phenomenon is most pronounced in low-interest-rate environments. When risk-free rates (like the 10-year Treasury yield) are low, the relative appeal of these "bond proxies" is high, inflating their P/EsWhen interest rates rise sharply, these stocks are often the hardest hit because their low (r - g) spread widens, causing their justified P/E to contract dramatically. 2022 was a perfect example of this.

  • The Growth Trap: A firm with a 5% growth rate but high volatility and risk might trade at a lower P/E than a firm with 2% growth but extreme stability. Risk (r) is just as important as growth (g).

Real-World Examples (Hypothetical & Historical)

  1. Utility Company (XLU): Grows at ~2-3% per year. Often trades at a P/E of 18-22x, higher than the market average, because its earnings are government-regulated, demand is inelastic, and it pays a ~4% dividend. It's a classic "widows-and-orphans" stock.

  2. Consumer Staples (KO, PG): Historically traded at premium P/Es (25x+) despite low growth, due to global brand stability, pricing power, and reliable dividends.

  3. Tobacco (PM, MO): A stark example. Facing long-term volume decline (negative growth), these companies often traded at high P/Es because they generated enormous, predictable cash flows and paid very high dividends, making them attractive income vehicles.

Conclusion

Your statement is astute. A high P/E on a low-growth firm is not a paradox but a signal that the market is valuing the firm primarily for the quality and safety of its cash flows and its income distribution, not for growth. It reflects a low discount rate (r) and a high payout ratio (p), rather than a high growth rate (g).

Key takeaway: The P/E ratio alone is meaningless. It must be interpreted through the lens of growth expectations, risk profile, dividend policy, and the prevailing interest rate environment. A high P/E on a low-growth stock is often a sign of a low-risk "bond-like" equity, not an overvaluation error by the market.

Valuing Nestle Malaysia like an equity bond of Warren Buffett

Very low-growth firms (<5%) often have high PEs due to stable cash flows or dividend yields.





Let's look at Nestle.  It has very stable cash flows and also dividend yields.  We can value it like an equity bond of Buffett.


Its PBT profit in FY 2024 was RM 2.36 per share
Today, its share price is RM 114.10 per share
Its business is projected to grow at a slow pace of 2.4% per year.

The share price is the bond, the PBT is the bond interest payment. 

Thus, at RM 114.10 per share, the equity bond of Nestle is paying a bond yield of  = RM 2.36/ RM 114.10 = 2.07%.


FD fixed interest rate (risk free) today is 3.5% to 4%.



=====

The price of Nestle went down to its lowest in March 2025 at RM 64.

At RM 64, this equity bond (Nestle) was paying a Bond Yield of RM 2.36/RM64 = 3.93%.

=====

Lesson: 

When you buy a great company with a great margin of safety, the lower the price you pay, the higher the potential returns. 

Always invert. Always invest. Be greedy when others are fearful. Be fearful when others are greedy. Shut out the noise. Focus on the business, the numbers and think independently.

****Earnings Multiples by Aswath Damodaran

 

****Earnings Multiples by Aswath Damodaran

PE Ratio and Fundamentals

Proposition: Other things held equal, higher growth firms will have higher PE ratios than lower growth firms.

Proposition: Other things held equal, higher risk firms will have lower PE ratios than lower risk firms

Proposition: Other things held equal, firms with lower reinvestment needs will have higher PE ratios than firms with higher reinvestment rates.

Of course, other things are difficult to hold equal since high growth firms, tend to have risk and high reinvestment rates.


PEG Ratios and Fundamentals: Propositions

Proposition 1: High risk companies will trade at much lower PEG ratios than low risk companies with the same expected growth rate.

• Corollary 1: The company that looks most under valued on a PEG ratio basis in a sector may be the riskiest firm in the sector

Proposition 2: Companies that can attain growth more efficiently by investing less in better return projects will have higher PEG ratios than companies that grow at the same rate less efficiently.

• Corollary 2: Companies that look cheap on a PEG ratio basis may be companies with high reinvestment rates and poor project returns.

Proposition 3: Companies with very low or very high growth rates will tend to have higher PEG ratios than firms with average growth rates. This bias is worse for low growth stocks.

• Corollary 3: PEG ratios do not neutralize the growth effect.


Relative PE: Definition

The relative PE ratio of a firm is the ratio of the PE of the firm to the PE of the market.

Relative PE = PE of Firm / PE of Market
While the PE can be defined in terms of current earnings, trailing earnings or forward earnings, consistency requires that it be estimated using the same measure of earnings for both the firm and the market.

Relative PE ratios are usually compared over time. Thus, a firm or sector which has historically traded at half the market PE (Relative PE = 0.5) is considered over valued if it is trading at a relative PE of 0.7.

The average relative PE is always one.

The median relative PE is much lower, since PE ratios are skewed towards higher values. Thus, more companies trade at PE ratios less than the market PE and have relative PE ratios less than one.


=====


Simple Summary:

Think of a company's stock price like the price tag on a car.

1. PE Ratio = Price tag ÷ yearly earnings

  • Faster growth = higher price tag (like a newer model)

  • More risky = lower price tag (like a car with problems)

  • Needs lots of repairs/reinvestment = lower price tag (takes money to maintain)

2. PEG Ratio = (PE Ratio) ÷ growth rate
Tries to be "fair" by considering growth, but has problems:

  • Doesn't account for risk (a dangerous but fast-growing company looks cheap)

  • Doesn't account for efficiency (a company that spends wastefully looks cheap)

  • Doesn't work well for very slow or very fast growers

3. Relative PE = Your car's price ÷ average car price

  • Helps see if your car is expensive compared to the market

  • Most cars are cheaper than average (because a few super-expensive cars pull the average up)

  • Best used to compare over time (is your car more expensive than it usually is?)

Big Picture:
You can't just look at the price tag alone. You need to ask:

  • Is it growing fast?

  • Is it risky?

  • Does it need lots of maintenance spending?

Two companies with the same PE might be completely different—one might be a safe, efficient grower while the other is a risky, wasteful grower. The numbers tell the story only when you understand what's behind them.


Not all growth is created equal.

Good Growth (Valuable) = Higher PE
This is efficient, profitable, and sustainable growth. The company grows its earnings by:

  • Reinvesting a smaller amount of money

  • Into projects with high returns (like 20-30% returns)

  • While taking on reasonable risk

Example: A software company that grows 15% per year simply because its existing customers love the product and pay more (high margins, low extra cost). This deserves a high price tag (high PE).

Bad Growth (Destructive) = Lower PE
This is inefficient, unprofitable, or risky growth. The company grows by:

  • Reinvesting a massive amount of money (eating up cash flow)

  • Into projects with low or mediocre returns (like 5-8% returns, maybe below its own cost of capital)

  • While taking on high risk

Example: A construction company that only grows by taking on huge, low-margin projects with lots of debt. It's growing revenue, but destroying shareholder value. This deserves a lower price tag (low PE).


Why the PEG Ratio Fools People:
A company with Bad Growth might look cheap on a PEG ratio because it has a low PE (bad) divided by a high growth rate (seemingly good).

PEG = (Low PE due to bad growth) / (High Growth Rate from risky projects)

The math gives you a small, "attractive" PEG number, tricking you into thinking it's a bargain. In reality, the market has given it a low PE for a good reason—its growth is dangerous or wasteful.

That's why Damodaran says: "Other things are difficult to hold equal." The moment you see high growth, you must immediately ask: "At what cost and at what risk?"


=====


More detailed discussion:


These are key principles from Aswath Damodaran’s work. 

Summary & Core Idea

Damodaran systematically links valuation multiples (PE, PEG, Relative PE) to the three fundamental drivers of value: Growth, Risk, and Reinvestment (which drives cash flows). The central theme is that multiples are not arbitrary but are determined by these underlying financial realities.


Elaboration & Commentary

1. PE Ratio and Fundamentals

Damodaran’s three propositions decompose the standard discounted cash flow model into its PE implications:

  • Growth ↑ → PE ↑: Because future earnings are more valuable.

  • Risk ↑ → PE ↓: Higher discount rate reduces present value.

  • Reinvestment Needs ↑ → PE ↓: More capital must be plowed back to sustain growth, reducing free cash flow to equity.

Key Insight: In practice, these variables are correlated. High-growth firms often face higher risk and require high reinvestment, creating a natural tension. A firm with high growth but very high risk and reinvestment may still have a low PE. This explains why a simplistic “high PE = overvalued” approach fails.

2. PEG Ratios and Fundamentals

The PEG ratio (PE / Growth Rate) attempts to standardize for growth, but Damodaran shows its severe limitations:

  • Proposition 1: Risk is ignored in PEG. A risky firm with high growth may have a deceptively low PEG, luring investors who don’t adjust for risk (Corollary 1).

  • Proposition 2: Reinvestment efficiency (ROIC vs. Cost of Capital) matters. Two firms with 20% growth aren’t equal if one achieves it by investing 50% of earnings at a 40% return, and the other invests 80% at a 25% return. The more efficient firm deserves a higher PEG (Corollary 2 warns of “cheap” PEG traps).

  • Proposition 3: PEG is non-linear and skewed. Very low-growth firms (<5%) often have high PEs due to stable cash flows or dividend yields, inflating PEG. Very high-growth firms (>30%) often have high PE due to anticipation of sustained advantage. Thus, comparing a 2% growth firm (PEG=15) to a 25% growth firm (PEG=1) is misleading.

Bottom linePEG does not neutralize growth and can be dangerously misleading across different risk, return, and growth ranges.

3. Relative PE

Relative PE (Firm PE / Market PE) is a normalization metric to compare across time or against historical norms.

  • It controls for market-level interest rates, risk premiums, and macroeconomic conditions affecting all PEs.

  • Comparison over time is its strength: If a firm historically traded at 0.8× market PE but now trades at 1.2×, it signals overvaluation relative to its own history, assuming fundamentals haven’t changed.

  • Skewness note: Damodaran highlights that the average relative PE is 1.0 (by definition), but the median is less than 1 because the PE distribution has a long right tail (some very high PE firms pull the average up). This means more than half of firms trade below the market PE—a crucial statistical insight often missed.


Critical Implications & Practical Use

  1. Multiples are proxies for DCF: Every multiple embeds assumptions about growth, risk, and reinvestment. Use them only after understanding what those assumptions are.

  2. PEG is flawed but popular: Its simplicity drives its use, but it’s unreliable for cross-sectional comparisons unless firms have similar risk, reinvestment needs, and growth rates. Better to use a PEG adjusted for risk and ROIC.

  3. Relative PE for historical context: More useful than absolute PE when judging whether a stock is expensive relative to its own historical range or the market cycle.

  4. The “other things held equal” caveat: This is the entire challenge in practice. When comparing multiples, you must ask: Are growth, risk, and reinvestment profiles similar? If not, difference in multiples may be justified.

  5. Screening pitfalls: Screening for low PE or low PEG often selects firms with high risk, poor growth prospects, or low efficiency—precisely the “value traps.”