Money figures show there's trouble ahead
Private credit is contracting on both sides of the Atlantic. The M3 money data is flashing early warning signals of a deflation crisis next year in nearly half the world economy. Emergency schemes that have propped up spending are being withdrawn, gently or otherwise.
By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard
Published: 8:48PM BST 26 Sep 2009
Comments 92 | Comment on this article
Unemployment benefits have masked social hardship unto now but these are starting to expire with cliff-edge effects.The jobless army in Spain will be reduced to €100 a week; in Estonia to €15.
Whoever wins today's elections in Germany will face the reckoning so deftly dodged before. Kurzarbeit, that subsidises firms not to fire workers, is running out. The cash-for-clunkers scheme ended this month. It certainly "worked".
Car sales were up 28pc in August, but only by stealing from the future. The Center for Automotive Research says sales will fall by a million next year: "It will be the largest downturn ever suffered by the German car industry."
Fiat's Sergio Marchionne warns of "disaster" for Italy unless Rome renews its car scrappage subsidies. Chrysler too will see some "harsh reality" following the expiry of America's scheme this month. Some expect US car sales to slump 40pc in September.
Weaker US data is starting to trickle in. Shipments of capital goods fell by 1.9pc in August. New house sales are stuck near 430,000 – down 70pc from their peak – despite an $8,000 tax credit for first-time buyers. It expires in November.
We are moving into a phase when most OECD states must retrench to head off debt-compound traps.
Britain faces the broad sword; Spain has told ministries to slash 8pc of discretionary spending; the IMF says Japan risks a funding crisis.
If you look at the sheer scale of global stimulus this year, what shocks is how little has been achieved. China's exports were down 23pc in August; Japan's were down 36pc; industrial production has dropped by 23pc in Japan, 18pc in Italy, 17pc in Germany, 13pc in France and Russia and 11pc in the US.
Call this a "V-shaped" recovery if you want. Markets are pricing in economic growth that is not occurring.
The overwhelming fact is that private spending has slumped in the deficit countries of the Anglosphere, Club Med, and East Europe but has not risen enough in the surplus countries (East Asia and Germany) to compensate. Excess capacity remains near post-war highs across the world.
Yet hawks are already stamping feet at key central banks.
Are they about to repeat the errors made in early 2007, and then again in the summer of 2008, when they tightened – or made hawkish noises – even as the underlying credit system fell apart?
Fed chairman Ben Bernanke spoke in April 2008 of "a return to growth in the second half of this year", and again in July 2008 that growth would "pick up gradually over the next two years".
He could only have thought such a thing if he was ignoring the money data. Key aggregates had been in free-fall for months.
I cited monetarists in July 2008 warning that the lifeblood of the Western credit was "draining away". For whatever reason (the lockhold of New Keynesian ideology?) the Fed missed the signal.
So did the European Central Bank when it raised rates weeks before the Lehman collapse, blathering about a "1970s inflation spiral."
Yes, the money entrails can mislead. The gurus squabble like Trotskyists. But you ignore the data at your peril.
Tim Congdon from International Monetary Research says that US bank loans have been falling at an annual pace of almost 14pc since early Summer: "There has been nothing like this in the USA since the 1930s."
M3 money has been falling at a 5pc rate; M2 fell by 12pc in August; the Commercial Paper market has shrunk from $1.6 trillion to $1.2 trillion since late May; the Monetary Multiplier at the St Louis Fed is below zero (0.925). In Europe, M3 money has been contracting at a 1pc rate since April.
Private loans have fallen by €111bn since January. Whether you see a credit crunch in Euroland depends where you sit. It is already garrotting Spain. Germany's Mittelstand says it is "a reality", even if not for big companies that issue bonds. The Economy Ministry is drawing up plans for €250bn in state credit, knowing firms will be unable to roll over debts.
Bundesbank chief Axel Weber sees no crunch now, yet fears a second pulse of the crisis this winter. "We are threatened by stress from our domestic credit industry through the rise in the insolvency of firms and households," he says.
Draw your own conclusion. Western central banks will have to "monetize" deficits on a huge scale to stave off debt deflation. The longer they think otherwise, the worse it will be.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/ambroseevans_pritchard/6234939/Money-figures-show-theres-trouble-ahead.html
Tuesday 29 September 2009
The dollar is dead - long live the renminbi
The dollar is dead - long live the renminbi
Whatever happens at the G20, the days of Western dominance are at an end, says Jeremy Warner.
By Jeremy Warner
Published: 7:42PM BST 25 Sep 2009
Comments 70
Comment on this article
The balance of global economic power has shifted Photo: PA Sometimes it takes a crisis to restore reason and equilibrium to the world, and so it is with the trade and capital imbalances that were arguably the root cause of the financial collapse of the past two years.
To economic purists, the changes now under way in demand and trade are inevitable, necessary and even desirable. Even so, dollar supremacy and the geo-political dominance of the West are both likely long-term casualties.
One, almost unnoticed, effect of the downturn is that past imbalances in trade and capital flows are correcting themselves of their own volition, the simple consequence of lower demand in once profligate consumer nations.
Current-account surpluses in China, Germany and Japan are narrowing, as are the deficits of the major consumer nations – primarily America, but also smaller profligates such as Britain and Spain.
The key question for G20 leaders as they meet in Pittsburgh is not bankers' bonuses, financial regulation and other issues of peripheral importance, but whether this correction in trade might be used as the basis for a permanently more balanced world economy.
In direct contradiction of US objectives, Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor, accuses Britain and America of using the issue of trade imbalances to backtrack on financial reform and bankers' bonuses. "We should not start looking for ersatz [substitute] issues and forget the topic of financial market regulation," she said before boarding the plane to Pittsburgh.
To the big export nations, the primary cause of the crisis was Anglo Saxon financiers, whose wicked and avaricious ways created a catastrophe in the financial system, which led to a collapse in world trade. Once bankers are tamed, this one-off shock can be put behind us and the world will return to business as usual.
Blaming bankers is politically popular – Ms Merkel has an election to fight on Sunday – but the idea that the world economy will return to the way it was once this supposed cancer is removed is fanciful.
A seminal shift in behaviour is being forced on the deficit nations where, despite massive fiscal, monetary and financial system support, there is a continuing scarcity of credit and a growing propensity to save. Neither of these two constraints on demand will reverse any time soon.
This, in turn, is forcing change on surplus countries, whether they like it or not. Export-orientated nations can no longer rely on once profligate neighbours to buy their goods. Against all instinct, they are having to stimulate their own domestic demand.
The most startling results are evident in China, where retail sales grew an astonishing 15.4 per cent in August. Fiscal action has succeeded in boosting consumption in Germany, too, despite mistrust of what one German politician has dubbed "crass Keynesianism".
Unfortunately for him, Germany will have to persist with its Keynesian medicine for some time yet if it is to avoid a collapse back into recession. Tax cuts and perhaps the removal of fiscal incentives to save are essential to the process of supporting domestic demand.
The challenge for a developing nation such as China is a rather different one. In China, the propensity to export and save is driven by an absence of any meaningful social security net, in combination with the legacy of its oppressive one child policy, which has deprived great swathes of the population of children to fall back on for support in old age.
What's more, most Chinese don't earn enough to buy the products they are producing, so in what has become the customary path for developing nations, they export the surplus and save the proceeds.
Yet even in China the establishment of a newly affluent, free-spending middle class may now have gained an unstoppable momentum. In any case, the country can no longer rely on American consumers to provide jobs and growth. It needs a new growth model, which means ultimately adopting the Henry Ford principle that if you want a sustainable market for your products, you have to pay your workers enough to buy them.
These trends – all of which pre-date the crisis but which, out of necessity, are being greatly accelerated by it – will eventually drive a move away from the dollar as the world's reserve currency of choice. As China takes control of its economic destiny, spends more and saves less, there will be less willingness both to hold dollar assets and to submit to the domestic priorities of US monetary policy.
None of this will happen overnight. Depressed it might be, but US consumption is still substantially bigger than that of all the surplus nations put together. All the same, that the dollar's reign as the world's dominant currency is drawing to a close is no longer in doubt.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/jeremy-warner/6232623/The-dollar-is-dead---long-live-the-renminbi.html
Whatever happens at the G20, the days of Western dominance are at an end, says Jeremy Warner.
By Jeremy Warner
Published: 7:42PM BST 25 Sep 2009
Comments 70
Comment on this article
The balance of global economic power has shifted Photo: PA Sometimes it takes a crisis to restore reason and equilibrium to the world, and so it is with the trade and capital imbalances that were arguably the root cause of the financial collapse of the past two years.
To economic purists, the changes now under way in demand and trade are inevitable, necessary and even desirable. Even so, dollar supremacy and the geo-political dominance of the West are both likely long-term casualties.
One, almost unnoticed, effect of the downturn is that past imbalances in trade and capital flows are correcting themselves of their own volition, the simple consequence of lower demand in once profligate consumer nations.
Current-account surpluses in China, Germany and Japan are narrowing, as are the deficits of the major consumer nations – primarily America, but also smaller profligates such as Britain and Spain.
The key question for G20 leaders as they meet in Pittsburgh is not bankers' bonuses, financial regulation and other issues of peripheral importance, but whether this correction in trade might be used as the basis for a permanently more balanced world economy.
In direct contradiction of US objectives, Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor, accuses Britain and America of using the issue of trade imbalances to backtrack on financial reform and bankers' bonuses. "We should not start looking for ersatz [substitute] issues and forget the topic of financial market regulation," she said before boarding the plane to Pittsburgh.
To the big export nations, the primary cause of the crisis was Anglo Saxon financiers, whose wicked and avaricious ways created a catastrophe in the financial system, which led to a collapse in world trade. Once bankers are tamed, this one-off shock can be put behind us and the world will return to business as usual.
Blaming bankers is politically popular – Ms Merkel has an election to fight on Sunday – but the idea that the world economy will return to the way it was once this supposed cancer is removed is fanciful.
A seminal shift in behaviour is being forced on the deficit nations where, despite massive fiscal, monetary and financial system support, there is a continuing scarcity of credit and a growing propensity to save. Neither of these two constraints on demand will reverse any time soon.
This, in turn, is forcing change on surplus countries, whether they like it or not. Export-orientated nations can no longer rely on once profligate neighbours to buy their goods. Against all instinct, they are having to stimulate their own domestic demand.
The most startling results are evident in China, where retail sales grew an astonishing 15.4 per cent in August. Fiscal action has succeeded in boosting consumption in Germany, too, despite mistrust of what one German politician has dubbed "crass Keynesianism".
Unfortunately for him, Germany will have to persist with its Keynesian medicine for some time yet if it is to avoid a collapse back into recession. Tax cuts and perhaps the removal of fiscal incentives to save are essential to the process of supporting domestic demand.
The challenge for a developing nation such as China is a rather different one. In China, the propensity to export and save is driven by an absence of any meaningful social security net, in combination with the legacy of its oppressive one child policy, which has deprived great swathes of the population of children to fall back on for support in old age.
What's more, most Chinese don't earn enough to buy the products they are producing, so in what has become the customary path for developing nations, they export the surplus and save the proceeds.
Yet even in China the establishment of a newly affluent, free-spending middle class may now have gained an unstoppable momentum. In any case, the country can no longer rely on American consumers to provide jobs and growth. It needs a new growth model, which means ultimately adopting the Henry Ford principle that if you want a sustainable market for your products, you have to pay your workers enough to buy them.
These trends – all of which pre-date the crisis but which, out of necessity, are being greatly accelerated by it – will eventually drive a move away from the dollar as the world's reserve currency of choice. As China takes control of its economic destiny, spends more and saves less, there will be less willingness both to hold dollar assets and to submit to the domestic priorities of US monetary policy.
None of this will happen overnight. Depressed it might be, but US consumption is still substantially bigger than that of all the surplus nations put together. All the same, that the dollar's reign as the world's dominant currency is drawing to a close is no longer in doubt.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/jeremy-warner/6232623/The-dollar-is-dead---long-live-the-renminbi.html
Sunday 27 September 2009
Price and Dividend Growth Trends of Share
Esso
in 1975
$1.5 Per share
end of 1983
$12.7 Per share
Capital gain
747%
Malayawata
in 1975
$1.5 Per share
end of 1983
$2.32 Per share
Capital gain
55%
Why is there such an enormous difference in the capital gain?
http://spreadsheets.google.com/pub?key=t43WD4CWVAy-DW46q0q892Q&output=html
What can we learn from the above table?
1. We can see that both shares seem to sell at prices which fall within a range of dividend multiples which is fairly stable for each of the shares.
2. We can see that the occasional freak year can take place when the prices move well out of the normal range.
3. We can see very clearly that the sharp increase in the price of Malayawata during 1981 was almost certainly due to speculation or manipulation.
4. We can see quite clearly that the Malaysian/Singaporean stock market is not an efficient one (i.e. one which prices shares correctly).
5. In eight years, the DPS of Esso increased from 18 cents to 140 cents, an increase of 678%. It experienced an increase in the share price of about 747%. This means that, nett of the dividend effect, the price of Esso went up by about 70% for the period examined.
In contrast, there had been a decrease in the DPS of Malayawata of about 25% and the price went up by about 55%. This means that the nett of the dividend range, there was a price increase of 80%.
This is roughly in line with the increase experienced by Esso after the dividend effect has been excluded.
Conclusion:
A careful study of the table provides evidence that the long term growth in a share's price is closely related to the amount of dividend it pays out.
Over the short run, there may be temporary market aberrations which cause the price to reach unreasonable levels.
But such madness is usually of short duration and within a year or two, the price will go back to its usual level.
Ref:
Stock Market Investment in Malaysia and Singapore by Neoh Soon Kean
in 1975
$1.5 Per share
end of 1983
$12.7 Per share
Capital gain
747%
in 1975
$1.5 Per share
end of 1983
$2.32 Per share
Capital gain
55%
Why is there such an enormous difference in the capital gain?
What can we learn from the above table?
1. We can see that both shares seem to sell at prices which fall within a range of dividend multiples which is fairly stable for each of the shares.
- If we ignore the freak year of 1975, Esso appears to sell for a price that is between five and eleven times its dividend.
- Malayawata, in contrast, seems to sell at a price that is between fifteen and forty times its dividend, except for the freak year of 1981.
2. We can see that the occasional freak year can take place when the prices move well out of the normal range.
- In 1975, Esso was selling at a price that was far too low by its historical standard.
- In 1981, Malayawata was selling at a price that was far too high.
- In the event, both prices have corrected themselves and moved back into the usual range within a year.
3. We can see very clearly that the sharp increase in the price of Malayawata during 1981 was almost certainly due to speculation or manipulation.
- The price rise could not be sustained in the absence of a big increase in dividend and the price fell back very sharply.
- In sharp contrast, the price of Esso could be sustained even though the overall market dropped. This was because of the very high dividend which was being paid out.
4. We can see quite clearly that the Malaysian/Singaporean stock market is not an efficient one (i.e. one which prices shares correctly).
- By all usual standards, Esso is a far superior company compared with Malayawata and yet, it continuously sells at a dividend multiple that is well below that of the latter.
- This is very strong evidence that Malaysian investors do not always consider the fundamentals when purchasing shares. To them, the stock market is more a place for a gamble than an investment.
5. In eight years, the DPS of Esso increased from 18 cents to 140 cents, an increase of 678%. It experienced an increase in the share price of about 747%. This means that, nett of the dividend effect, the price of Esso went up by about 70% for the period examined.
In contrast, there had been a decrease in the DPS of Malayawata of about 25% and the price went up by about 55%. This means that the nett of the dividend range, there was a price increase of 80%.
This is roughly in line with the increase experienced by Esso after the dividend effect has been excluded.
- Thus it is clear that dividend increase accounts for much of the price increase experienced by Esso while some other factors account for a small part of the increase.
- Although Malayawata has experienced no increase in dividend, its price went up nevertheless due to the same factors which caused Esso price to go up more than the increase in dividend.
- As to what factors these are, we are not yet in a position to answer.
Conclusion:
A careful study of the table provides evidence that the long term growth in a share's price is closely related to the amount of dividend it pays out.
Over the short run, there may be temporary market aberrations which cause the price to reach unreasonable levels.
But such madness is usually of short duration and within a year or two, the price will go back to its usual level.
Ref:
Stock Market Investment in Malaysia and Singapore by Neoh Soon Kean
Some rights issues are good, others can be very bad
Like most things in investment, rights issues are not simple matters.
Rights are not automatically "good things" from the shareholders' point of view. Some of the rights are good, others can be very bad.
Investors have to be careful and they should not rush in every time there is an annoucement of rights. They should classify the rights issue they are considering in accordance with the three categories indicated below:
(1) The case of the improperly managed companies
(2) The case of moving into new business area
(3) The case of the very fast growing company
They should purchase only those of the last category.
Many will protest that they have neither the time nor the knowledge to carry out a detailed analysis of the company which announces the rights.
It is not possible for each and every one to carry out a careful analysis but there is an easier way out for the small timers. The dividend yield approach to stock valuation can be readily used to value a rights issue.
Rights are not automatically "good things" from the shareholders' point of view. Some of the rights are good, others can be very bad.
Investors have to be careful and they should not rush in every time there is an annoucement of rights. They should classify the rights issue they are considering in accordance with the three categories indicated below:
(1) The case of the improperly managed companies
(2) The case of moving into new business area
(3) The case of the very fast growing company
They should purchase only those of the last category.
Many will protest that they have neither the time nor the knowledge to carry out a detailed analysis of the company which announces the rights.
It is not possible for each and every one to carry out a careful analysis but there is an easier way out for the small timers. The dividend yield approach to stock valuation can be readily used to value a rights issue.
New capital requirement of a growing company
A hypothetical example to understand the above more clearly. The following reasonable assumptions can be made based on this example:
Sales to Assets Ratio = 2x
Profit after Tax to Sales = 6%
Debt to Equity Ratio = 1.2
Dividend Payout Ratio = 0.5
Sales in Year 0 = $10 million
Growth Rate = 10% pa
Simplified Balance Sheet ($M)
At End of Year 0
Assets 5.00
Financed by:
Shareholders' Equity 3.33
Borrowing 1.67
Simplified P&L Statement ($M)
For Year 1
Sales 11.00
Profit after Tax 0.66
Dividend 0.33
Retained Profit 0.33
Simplified Balance Sheet ($M)
At End of Year 1
# Assets 5.50
Financed by:
@ Shareholders' Equity 3.66
** Borrowing 1.84
Notes on Balance Sheet at Year 1
# Increase at the same rate as sales
@ = 3.33 (at Year 0) + 0.33 (Retained Profit of Year 1)
** By difference = 5.50 - 3.66
----------
Under the normal circumstances, a company should be able to finance its additional purchase of assets from either
(1) The company is improperly managed such that it is either not very profitable (or even losing a lot of money) such that the incoming cash is not adequate to support the need to purchase more assets. Or owing to poor management of its assets, it now requires a lot more assets to support its operations.
(2) The company is moving into another line of business which is large relative to its current size and it requires a great deal of additional capital to start up the new venture.
(3) The company is in a very fast growing business. In fact, it is so fast growing that retained earnings and new borrowing alone are insufficient to sustain the growth.
In order to be a prudent investor, we must analyse the situation of the company which has announced a rights issue carefully to see which category it falls into in the first place.
Sales to Assets Ratio = 2x
Profit after Tax to Sales = 6%
Debt to Equity Ratio = 1.2
Dividend Payout Ratio = 0.5
Sales in Year 0 = $10 million
Growth Rate = 10% pa
Simplified Balance Sheet ($M)
At End of Year 0
Assets 5.00
Financed by:
Shareholders' Equity 3.33
Borrowing 1.67
Simplified P&L Statement ($M)
For Year 1
Sales 11.00
Profit after Tax 0.66
Dividend 0.33
Retained Profit 0.33
Simplified Balance Sheet ($M)
At End of Year 1
# Assets 5.50
Financed by:
@ Shareholders' Equity 3.66
** Borrowing 1.84
Notes on Balance Sheet at Year 1
# Increase at the same rate as sales
@ = 3.33 (at Year 0) + 0.33 (Retained Profit of Year 1)
** By difference = 5.50 - 3.66
- From the above example, by maintaining the D/E ratio at around 1:2 (3.66 = 2 x 1.83), the company has no difficulty in financing a 10 percent increase in sales in one year.
- By having a zero dividend payout, it can in fact grow at 18 percent per year without increasing its D/E ratio.
----------
Under the normal circumstances, a company should be able to finance its additional purchase of assets from either
- retained earnings or
- new borrowing or
- a combination of the two.
(1) The company is improperly managed such that it is either not very profitable (or even losing a lot of money) such that the incoming cash is not adequate to support the need to purchase more assets. Or owing to poor management of its assets, it now requires a lot more assets to support its operations.
(2) The company is moving into another line of business which is large relative to its current size and it requires a great deal of additional capital to start up the new venture.
In order to be a prudent investor, we must analyse the situation of the company which has announced a rights issue carefully to see which category it falls into in the first place.
Why Companies Have to Make Rights Issue?
To put it bluntly, a company only needs to make a rights issue when it is short of money.
A business, any business, requires investment in various forms of assets in order to carry out its operations. A company is usually required to continually buy new assets in order to carry on its business either because its old assets have to be replaced or its expanding business requires more assets. To buy new assets, it will need new capital.
A company can obtain necessary money to purchase its assets from any one of three sources or a combination of all three.
Under the normal circumstances, a company should be able to finance its additional purchase of assets from either retained earnings or new borrowing or a combination of the two. There are many examples of very fast growing businesses in Malaysia that have prospered without recourse to issuing rights (for examples: Nestle and BAT )
But, companies may have to raise new capital by making rights issues under three types of abnormal circumstances. These three cases are:
(1) The company is improperly managed such that it is either not very profitable (or even losing a lot of money) such that the incoming cash is not adequate to support the need to purchase more assets. Or owing to poor management of its assets, it now requires a lot more assets to support its operations.
(2) The company is moving into another line of business which is large relative to its current size and it requires a great deal of additional capital to start up the new venture.
(3) The company is in a very fast growing business. In fact, it is so fast growing that retained earnings and new borrowing alone are insufficient to sustain the growth.
In order to be a prudent investor, we must analyse the situation of the company which has announced a rights issue carefully to see which category it falls into in the first place.
Depending on which category of rights it is issuing, we can then carry out a further analysis to decide whether the rights issue is a good or a bad one.
A business, any business, requires investment in various forms of assets in order to carry out its operations. A company is usually required to continually buy new assets in order to carry on its business either because its old assets have to be replaced or its expanding business requires more assets. To buy new assets, it will need new capital.
A company can obtain necessary money to purchase its assets from any one of three sources or a combination of all three.
- It can borrow the money,
- retain part or all of its profit or
- it can sell new shares.
Under the normal circumstances, a company should be able to finance its additional purchase of assets from either retained earnings or new borrowing or a combination of the two. There are many examples of very fast growing businesses in Malaysia that have prospered without recourse to issuing rights (for examples: Nestle and BAT )
But, companies may have to raise new capital by making rights issues under three types of abnormal circumstances. These three cases are:
(1) The company is improperly managed such that it is either not very profitable (or even losing a lot of money) such that the incoming cash is not adequate to support the need to purchase more assets. Or owing to poor management of its assets, it now requires a lot more assets to support its operations.
(2) The company is moving into another line of business which is large relative to its current size and it requires a great deal of additional capital to start up the new venture.
(3) The company is in a very fast growing business. In fact, it is so fast growing that retained earnings and new borrowing alone are insufficient to sustain the growth.
In order to be a prudent investor, we must analyse the situation of the company which has announced a rights issue carefully to see which category it falls into in the first place.
Depending on which category of rights it is issuing, we can then carry out a further analysis to decide whether the rights issue is a good or a bad one.
- Through examining each type of rights issue, an intelligent investor can tell the wolves from the sheep.
- Pricing the rights also requires proper evaluation.
Not all right issues are the same; ought to treat them with a bit more suspicion
Many companies are making rights issues in this recent bull market..
Whenever a company announces that it is making a rights issue, the market in Malaysia/Singapore, on the whole, does not react adversely especially when the right issues are accompanied by a bonus issue.
In Britain and more in particular, the US, the market seldom reacts so kindly to rights issues.
Though not all rights are automatically bad, local investors could do with a good dose of cynicism and ought to treat rights issues with a bit more suspicion.
If we blindly follow the market without knowledge what we are doing, we can so easily be taken advantage of.
In order to understand why the Western investors are so suspicious of rights, we must go back to the first principle and try to understand:
Whenever a company announces that it is making a rights issue, the market in Malaysia/Singapore, on the whole, does not react adversely especially when the right issues are accompanied by a bonus issue.
- The price of the company's shares usually moves up and seldom does one come across cases where rights are badly undersubscribed.
In Britain and more in particular, the US, the market seldom reacts so kindly to rights issues.
- Most rights issues are treated with great suspicion.
- The market usually takes a "wait and see" attitude and will only react favourably if it is convinced that the new capital obtained from the rights issue is put to good use and that the profit of the company can increase as a result of the rights issue.
- In fact, the market in the US is so suspicious of rights issues that it is most unusual for a large US corporation to make a right issue.
Though not all rights are automatically bad, local investors could do with a good dose of cynicism and ought to treat rights issues with a bit more suspicion.
- Local investors ought to be aware of the fact that not all rights issues are the same.
- Each rights issue should be treated on its own merit and if it is truly good, then there is a case for bidding up the price of the shares and taking up the rights issues.
If we blindly follow the market without knowledge what we are doing, we can so easily be taken advantage of.
- Opportunists, insiders and rumour-mongers are abound in the local market.
- Here, as with everywhere else, Caveat Emptor (Latin for "let the buyer beware") is the key.
In order to understand why the Western investors are so suspicious of rights, we must go back to the first principle and try to understand:
- what is so bad about a right issue and
- the reason a company has for making a rights issue.
The concept of valuing a share according to its dividend
Hypothetical Company A:
EPS 30 cents (1987) 36 cents (1988)
DPS 15 cents (1987) 18 cents (1988)
Annual increase in dividend 20%
Assuming the intrinsic value of the share = 25 times its dividend (i.e. the dividend yield of a share should be 4%), what should be the correct price of a share of Company A in 1987 and 1988?
Correct market price:
1987: 25 x 15 cents = $ 3.75
1988: 25 X 18 cents = $ 4.50
The intrinsic value of Company's A shares increased from $3.75 to $4.50 in a year, thus giving a capital gain of 75 cents or 20% on the 1987 price.
To recapitulate:
Question: "But why should the price go up just because the dividend of a share has increased?"
Summary:
The concept of valuing a share according to its dividend is a very alien one to most of the investors.
Most would find it difficult to accept and may even think that it is too simple a concept to be true.
However, the dividend yield approach works well as an investment tool over the long term.
It is beyond doubt that over the long run, the price of a share is dependent on the amount of dividend it pays out. The higher the growth rate of the dividend, the higher the growth rate of the share.
EPS 30 cents (1987) 36 cents (1988)
DPS 15 cents (1987) 18 cents (1988)
Annual increase in dividend 20%
Assuming the intrinsic value of the share = 25 times its dividend (i.e. the dividend yield of a share should be 4%), what should be the correct price of a share of Company A in 1987 and 1988?
Correct market price:
1987: 25 x 15 cents = $ 3.75
1988: 25 X 18 cents = $ 4.50
The intrinsic value of Company's A shares increased from $3.75 to $4.50 in a year, thus giving a capital gain of 75 cents or 20% on the 1987 price.
- This is exactly the same as the increase in dividend.
- So long as the dividend of Company A goes on rising, its intrinsic value would continue to rise, thus providing its shareholders with continuous opportunity for capital gain.
To recapitulate:
- This does not mean that the market price would indeed be at these levels.
- It merely means that the price would be oscillating around these prices in the respective years.
Question: "But why should the price go up just because the dividend of a share has increased?"
- The reason is quite simple. If the price does not go up while the dividend keeps on increasing, the dividend yield of the share will become higher and higher.
- Since the shares of Company A are traded in the same market as many other shares, its shares cannot sell at a dividend yield that is much higher than its competitors. If its dividend yield is very attractive (i.e. very high) it will attract more buyers and its price would go up.
- Similarly, there is no reason at all why the price of a share should rise unless it has a prospect of paying more dividend in the future. Otherwise, its dividend yield would get out of place compared with the other shares.
- This is why all too often, the speculative shares which are bidded up to stratospheric levels will eventually decline to their previous level.
Summary:
The concept of valuing a share according to its dividend is a very alien one to most of the investors.
Most would find it difficult to accept and may even think that it is too simple a concept to be true.
However, the dividend yield approach works well as an investment tool over the long term.
It is beyond doubt that over the long run, the price of a share is dependent on the amount of dividend it pays out. The higher the growth rate of the dividend, the higher the growth rate of the share.
Saturday 26 September 2009
Importance of dividend yield in the evaluation of the worth of a share.
Shares should sell at prices which will provide their owners with a reasonable return.
As an investment, shares have 3 characteristics:
1. They are relatively illiquid.
2. The return is uncertain.
3. A large part of the return is in the form of capital gains.
Even the most inexperienced investor is aware of the last characteristic.
Question: We should buy shares in accordance with their expected dividend yield (DY). "If we buy a share for its dividend, why should its price go up so that we can get capital gains?"
Question: "Why should the price of a share, any share for that matter, go up in the first place?"
Here are some reasons for share not to go up:
Share price should not go up as a result of reorganization.
Share price should not go up as a result of share split or bonus.
Share price should not go up as a result of property injection.
Share price should not go up as a result of rights issues.
There is only one good reason why a share's price should go up in the first place:
If one accepts the dividend yield approach to share valuation, the only reason why the price of a share should increase is that the share
As an investment, shares have 3 characteristics:
1. They are relatively illiquid.
2. The return is uncertain.
3. A large part of the return is in the form of capital gains.
Even the most inexperienced investor is aware of the last characteristic.
Question: We should buy shares in accordance with their expected dividend yield (DY). "If we buy a share for its dividend, why should its price go up so that we can get capital gains?"
Question: "Why should the price of a share, any share for that matter, go up in the first place?"
Here are some reasons for share not to go up:
Share price should not go up as a result of reorganization.
Share price should not go up as a result of share split or bonus.
Share price should not go up as a result of property injection.
Share price should not go up as a result of rights issues.
There is only one good reason why a share's price should go up in the first place:
If one accepts the dividend yield approach to share valuation, the only reason why the price of a share should increase is that the share
- now pays a higher dividend than before or
- has the prospect of paying a higher dividend.
- That is, the intrinsic value tends to be a constant multiple (i.e. so many times) of the dividend.
- "How many times?" - this is a very complex subject which will be looked at later.
Dividend yield prevents investors from being side-tracked by irrelevant events.
The Malaysian/Singaporean stock market can be characterised by the occurrence of events which are of no real benefit to the existing shareholders and yet which excite them greatly.
This is referring to the large numbers of bonus announcements, rights issues, property injections, take-overs and mergers which have made their appearnace in many years.
Most of these events are of little, if any, real economic benefit to the existing shareholders of the companies involved. Despite this, the price of shares of a company involved in an event of this nature tends to rise sharply. These events are, in the main, irrelevant and some of them may even be damaging.
According to the dividend yield approach to share valuation, a share can have increased value only if there is a likelihood that its dividend will rise faster than originally expected.
In what way can events like bonuses, rights, mergers and reorganizations in themselves improve the future dividend picture of a company. If these events cannot lead to such an increase, the share surely does not deserve a higher valuation.
Here is an often quoted advice to first time share buyers:
A cow for its milk,
Bees for their honey,
And shares, by golly,
For their dividend.
This is referring to the large numbers of bonus announcements, rights issues, property injections, take-overs and mergers which have made their appearnace in many years.
Most of these events are of little, if any, real economic benefit to the existing shareholders of the companies involved. Despite this, the price of shares of a company involved in an event of this nature tends to rise sharply. These events are, in the main, irrelevant and some of them may even be damaging.
According to the dividend yield approach to share valuation, a share can have increased value only if there is a likelihood that its dividend will rise faster than originally expected.
In what way can events like bonuses, rights, mergers and reorganizations in themselves improve the future dividend picture of a company. If these events cannot lead to such an increase, the share surely does not deserve a higher valuation.
Here is an often quoted advice to first time share buyers:
A cow for its milk,
Bees for their honey,
And shares, by golly,
For their dividend.
Dividend provides a "floor" for shares during bear markets
Stock markets of the world, especially the Malaysian/Singaporean market, are not readily predictable. They can collapse so easily into a "bear pit" with little warning.
If we wish to protect our hard earned capital, we must be defensive in our investment approach.
One of the best defence is to buy shares with reasonable dividend yield (i.e. a yield of between one-third to half of the expected long run deposit interest rate).
If we buy a share becasue it pays a reasonable dividend, our loss is likely to be small even during periods of sharp market decline.
For example, we can buy a share which pays 30 cents dividend at $5.00 a share and this gives us a dividend yield of 6%. If the marekt goes into a sharp decline, the amount this share can fall to is limited by the fact that it pays a 30 cents dividend. If the price is to fall as low as $3.00, it will be giving a dividend yield of 10% which is an excellent return compared to what one can get from fixed deposit and with the additional opportunity to capital gain thrown in.
Most people can see that at that price, the share is probably a good bargain and it is therefore unlikely to fall lower. From experience, a dividend yield of 10% seems to be the floor below which most stocks will not drop.
In sharp contrast, shares which pay low or no dividend at all do not seem to have any bottom and price decline can hit 90% or more.
If we wish to protect our hard earned capital, we must be defensive in our investment approach.
One of the best defence is to buy shares with reasonable dividend yield (i.e. a yield of between one-third to half of the expected long run deposit interest rate).
If we buy a share becasue it pays a reasonable dividend, our loss is likely to be small even during periods of sharp market decline.
For example, we can buy a share which pays 30 cents dividend at $5.00 a share and this gives us a dividend yield of 6%. If the marekt goes into a sharp decline, the amount this share can fall to is limited by the fact that it pays a 30 cents dividend. If the price is to fall as low as $3.00, it will be giving a dividend yield of 10% which is an excellent return compared to what one can get from fixed deposit and with the additional opportunity to capital gain thrown in.
Most people can see that at that price, the share is probably a good bargain and it is therefore unlikely to fall lower. From experience, a dividend yield of 10% seems to be the floor below which most stocks will not drop.
In sharp contrast, shares which pay low or no dividend at all do not seem to have any bottom and price decline can hit 90% or more.
Dividend provides a link with reality
When the market is truly "hot", few of us can remain rational as we tend to be swept along the general atmosphere of optimism.
But the dividend yield of a share keeps us in close touch with the real world.
Anyone who closely watched the dividend yield of a share would have realised that the price level was totally unreal. A good dividend yield stock presently giving a dividend yield of 0.4% due to rising share price, it would be better to sell the share and invest the proceed in other assets or leave the money in fixed deposit.
In the established stock markets of the world, the dividend yield usually has a steady relationship with fixed deposit and its interest rate.
It is normal for dividend yield to fluctuate at around one-third to half of the long-term fixed deposit interest rate. This means that when fixed deposit interest is around 6% per annum, stock should sell at a price to provide a yield of 2% or 3%.
Take a look at the yield provided by local shares during bull markets, the dividend yield is usually so low as to be meaningless.
Furthermore, one should not forget that some fixed deposits and fixed deposits in National Savings Bank are tax free in Malaysia while dividend has a withholding tax applied at source.
But the dividend yield of a share keeps us in close touch with the real world.
Anyone who closely watched the dividend yield of a share would have realised that the price level was totally unreal. A good dividend yield stock presently giving a dividend yield of 0.4% due to rising share price, it would be better to sell the share and invest the proceed in other assets or leave the money in fixed deposit.
In the established stock markets of the world, the dividend yield usually has a steady relationship with fixed deposit and its interest rate.
It is normal for dividend yield to fluctuate at around one-third to half of the long-term fixed deposit interest rate. This means that when fixed deposit interest is around 6% per annum, stock should sell at a price to provide a yield of 2% or 3%.
Take a look at the yield provided by local shares during bull markets, the dividend yield is usually so low as to be meaningless.
Furthermore, one should not forget that some fixed deposits and fixed deposits in National Savings Bank are tax free in Malaysia while dividend has a withholding tax applied at source.
Dividend is a sure thing
All too often, investors and speculators pay too much attention to profit forecast.
It is amazing that so many of the Malaysian companies have the courage to make profit forecast for many years into the future. What is even more amazing is that so many of the investors seem to believe these forecasts absolutely.
It is difficult to make a profit forecast a year ahead, let alone five years or even ten years. Such profit forecasts can only be regarded as extremely shaky.
Dividend is real and it is something which the shareholders can put to some use.
Most companies keep dividend at a level which they can afford to pay out irrespective of whether it is a good or a bad year and is hence a great deal more certain than profit forecast.
It is amazing that so many of the Malaysian companies have the courage to make profit forecast for many years into the future. What is even more amazing is that so many of the investors seem to believe these forecasts absolutely.
It is difficult to make a profit forecast a year ahead, let alone five years or even ten years. Such profit forecasts can only be regarded as extremely shaky.
Dividend is real and it is something which the shareholders can put to some use.
Most companies keep dividend at a level which they can afford to pay out irrespective of whether it is a good or a bad year and is hence a great deal more certain than profit forecast.
Why is dividend important?
The most important reason is dividend is the only benefit from which a shareholder can obtain from a company under the normal circumstances.
Earnings, per se, is hardly of any use to him directly and the assets are only of value if the company is liquidated which is unlikely in a great majority of cases.
Apart from the above reason, dividend is important for the following reasons:
(1) Dividend is a sure thing.
(2) Dividend provides a link with reality.
(3) Dividend provides a "floor" for shares during bear markets.
(4) Dividend yield prevents investors from being side-tracked by irrelevant events.
A cow for its milk,
Bees for their honey,
And shares, by golly,
For their dividends.
Earnings, per se, is hardly of any use to him directly and the assets are only of value if the company is liquidated which is unlikely in a great majority of cases.
Apart from the above reason, dividend is important for the following reasons:
(1) Dividend is a sure thing.
(2) Dividend provides a link with reality.
(3) Dividend provides a "floor" for shares during bear markets.
(4) Dividend yield prevents investors from being side-tracked by irrelevant events.
A cow for its milk,
Bees for their honey,
And shares, by golly,
For their dividends.
Friday 25 September 2009
Boustead
Share Price Performance
High Low
Prices 1 Month
3.590 (25-Aug-09) 3.470 (04-Sep-09)
Prices 3 Months
4.100 (16-Jul-09) 3.470 (04-Sep-09)
Prices 12 Months
4.660 (30-Sep-08) 2.180 (28-Oct-08)
Volume 12 Months
39,296 (30-Oct-08) 51 (24-Sep-08)
Last Updated: Friday ,September 25 2009 3:30 pm
Bursa Malaysia Summary
Composite: 1215.66
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