Monday 2 July 2012

Warren Buffett Explains Why Fear Overshadows Greed



Warren Buffett
Getty Images
Warren Buffett

It's a good time to remember one of Warren Buffett's classic rules "Be fearful when others are greedy, and be greedy when others are fearful."

With so much fear in the financial markets right now, it's not a surprise that Buffett is being greedy.

He reminds Fortune's Andy Serwer that "the lower things go, the more I buy.  We are in the business of buying."  (He, of course, won't say exactly what he's buying.)

Buffett often makes a comparison to the price of hamburgers at McDonalds.  If the price tag is reduced he doesn't get worried, he buys more and feels good that he's paying less for the same hamburger than it would have cost him the day before.

He acknowledges, however, that overcoming fear is easier said than done.  "There is no comparison between fear and greed.  Fear is instant, pervasive and intense.  Greed is slower.  Fear hits."

WARREN BUFFETT THE BILLIONAIRE NEXT DOOR GOES GLOBAL


Sunday 1 July 2012

Jeremy Siegel Still Invests For The Long Run (Video)


Charlie Rose - An Hour with Warren Buffett


How Management Affects Moats - Morningstar Video


How to Choose Dividend Stocks - Morningstar Video


How to Handle No-Moat Firms (Morningstar)


Pat Dorsey Explains Economic Moats - Morningstar Video


Pat Dorsey Interview 04/01/2008 Value Investing


Bargain or Value Trap? (Morningstar)


5 Tips for a Better Stock Portfolio (Morningstar)


Finding Firms with an Edge (Morningstar)


Scale = Scalable Mountain = Monopoly Buy = Brand Low = Low Cost Produce Sell = Secret (Patent) High = High Cost of Switching

Four Good Reasons to Sell a Stock (Morningstar)


When to Sell a Dividend Stock - Morningstar Video


Four Signs of Dividend Safety (Morningstar)


Dividend Policy


Loss Aversion



It's no secret, for example, that many investors will focus obsessively
on one investment that's losing money, even if the rest of their
portfolio is in the black. This behavior is called loss aversion.

Investors have been shown to be more likely to sell winning stocks in
an effort to "take some profits," while at the same time not wanting
to accept defeat in the case of the losers. Philip Fisher wrote in his
excellent book Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits that, "More
money has probably been lost by investors holding a stock they really
did not want until they could 'at least come out even' than from any
other single reason."

Regret also comes into play with loss aversion. It may lead us to be
unable to distinguish between a bad decision and a bad outcome.
We regret a bad outcome, such as a stretch of weak performance
from a given stock, even if we chose the investment for all the right
reasons. In this case, regret can lead us to make a bad sell decision,
such as selling a solid company at a bottom instead of buying more.
It also doesn't help that we tend to feel the pain of a loss more
strongly than we do the pleasure of a gain. It's this unwillingness to
accept the pain early that might cause us to "ride losers too long" in
the vain hope that they'll turn around and won't make us face the
consequences of our decisions.

http://news.morningstar.com/classroom2/course.asp?docId=145104&page=5&CN=COM#

Dividends and Total Returns



During the bull market, the pursuit of rapidly growing businesses
obscured the real nature of equity returns. But growth isn't all there
is to successful investing; it's just one piece of a larger puzzle.
Total return includes not only price appreciation, but income as well.


And what causes price appreciation? In strictly theoretical terms,
there's only one answer: anticipated dividends. Earnings are just a
proxy for dividend-paying power. And dividend potential is not solely
driven by growth of the underlying business--in fact, rapid growth in
certain capital-intensive businesses can actually be a drag on
dividend prospects.

Investors who focus only on sales or earnings growth--or even just
the appreciation of the stock price--stand to miss the big picture. In
fact, a company that isn't paying a healthy dividend may be setting
its shareholders up for an unfortunate fate.

In Jeremy Siegel's The Future for Investors, the market's top
professor analyzed the returns of the original S&P 500 companies
from the formation of the index in 1957 through the end of 2003.

What was the best-performing stock? Was it in color televisions
(remember Zenith)? Telecommunications (AT&T T)? Groundbreaking
pharmaceuticals (Syntex/Roche)? Surely, it must have been a
computer stock (IBM IBM)?

None of the above. The best of the best hails not from a hot, rapidly
growing industry, but instead from a field that was actually
surrendering customers the entire time: cigarette maker Philip
Morris, now known as Altria Group MO. Over Siegel's 46-year time
frame, Philip Morris posted total returns of an incredible 19.75% per
year.

What was the secret? Credit a one-two punch of high dividends and
profitable, moat-protected growth. Philip Morris made some
acquisitions over the years, which were generally successful--but the
overwhelming majority of its free cash flow was paid out as
dividends or used to repurchase shares. As Marlboro gained market
share and raised prices, Philip Morris grew the core business at a
decent (if uninspiring) rate over the years. But what if the company-
-listening to the fans of growth and the foes of taxes--attempted to
grow the entire business at 19.75% per year? At that rate it would
have subsumed the entire U.S. economy by now.

The lesson is that no business can grow faster than the economy
indefinitely, but that lack of growth doesn't cap investor returns.
Amazingly, by maximizing boring old dividends and share buybacks, a
low-growth business can turn out to be the highest total return
investment of all time. As Siegel makes abundantly clear, "growth
does not equal return." Only profitable growth--in businesses
protected by an economic moat--can do that.


http://news.morningstar.com/classroom2/course.asp?docId=145248&page=3&CN=COM

Two Approaches to Stock Valuation



There are two broad approaches to stock valuation. One is the ratio
based approach and the other is the intrinsic value approach.

If you have ever talked about a P/E ratio, you've valued a stock using
the ratio-based approach. Valuation ratios compare the company's
market value with some financial aspect of its performance--
earnings, sales, book value, cash flow, and so on. The ratio-based
approach is the most commonly used method for valuing stocks,
because ratios are easy to calculate and readily available.


The downside is that making sense of valuation ratios requires quite
a bit of context. A P/E ratio of 15 does not mean a whole lot unless
you also know the P/E of the market as a whole, the P/Es of the
company's main competitors, the company's historical P/Es, and
similar information. A ratio that looks sky-high for one company
might seem quite reasonable for another.

The other major approach to valuation tries to estimate what a
stock should intrinsically be worth. A stock's intrinsic value is based
on projecting the company's future cash flows along with other
factors. You can compare this intrinsic or fair value with a stock's 
market price to determine whether the stock looks underpriced, fairly
 valued, or overpriced.


http://news.morningstar.com/classroom2/course.asp?docId=145096&page=5&CN=COM

Fisher's advice: Don't quibble over eighths and quarters.



After extensive research, you've found a company that you think will
prosper in the decades ahead, and the stock is currently selling at a
reasonable price. Should you delay or forgo your investment to wait
for a price a few pennies below the current price?

Fisher told the story of a skilled investor who wanted to purchase
shares in a particular company whose stock closed that day at $35.50
per share. However, the investor refused to pay more than $35. The
stock never again sold at $35 and over the next 25 years, increased
in value to more than $500 per share. The investor missed out on a
tremendous gain in a vain attempt to save 50 cents per share.
Even Warren Buffett is prone to this type of mental error. Buffett
began purchasing Wal-Mart many years ago, but stopped buying
when the price moved up a little. Buffett admits that this mistake
cost Berkshire Hathaway shareholders about $10 billion. Even the
Oracle of Omaha could have benefited from Fisher's advice not to
quibble over eighths and quarters.

http://news.morningstar.com/classroom2/course.asp?docId=145662&page=4&CN=COM