Thursday 14 March 2024

Cyclicals

 CYCLICALS

Traits
• Sales and profits rise and fall in regular, if
not completely regular fashion, as business
expands and contracts.
• Timing is everything. Coming out of a
recession into a vigorous economy, they
flourish more than Stalwarts. In the opposite
direction, they can lose >50% very quickly
and may take years before another upswing.
• Most misunderstood type, and investors can
lose money in stocks considered safe. Large
Cyclicals are falsely classified as Stalwarts.
• If a defensive Stalwart loses 50% in a slump,
then Cyclicals may lose 80%.
• It’s much easier to predict upswing, vs, a
downturn, so one has to detect early signs of
business changes. You get a working edge if
you’re in the same industry – to be used to
your advantage. Most important in Cyclicals.
• Unreliable dividend payers. If they’ve
financial problems, then they become
potential Turnaround candidates.
• Inventory build-up = bad sign. Inventory
growth > Sales growth = red flag. Inventory
build-up with companies having fluctuating
end product pricing causes larger problems.
• Monitor inventory to figure out business
direction. If inventory is depleting in a
depressed company, it’s the first evidence of
a possible business turnaround.
• High Operating Profit Margin (OPM) = Lowest
Cost producer, who’s got a better chance of
survival if business conditions deteriorate.
• Upswing favours companies with Low
OPM’s. Therefore, what you want to do is to
Hold relatively High OPM companies for long
term and play relatively Low OPM companies
for successful Turnarounds / cycle turns.

• The best time to get involved with Cyclicals
is when the economy is at its weakest,
earnings are at their lowest, and public
sentiment is at its bleakest. Even though
Cyclicals have rebounded in the same way 8
times since WWII, buying them in the early
stages of an economic recovery is never easy.
• Every recession brings out sceptics who
doubt that we will ever come out of it, who
predict a depression and the country going
bankrupt. If there’s any time not to own
Cyclicals, it’s in a depression. “This one is
different,” is the doomsayer’s litany, and, in
fact, every recession is different, but that
doesn’t mean it’s going to ruin us.
• Whenever there was a recession, Lynch paid
attention to them. Since he always thought
positively and assumed that the economy
will improve, he was willing to invest in
Cyclicals at their nadir. Just when it seems
it can’t get any worse, things begin to get
better. A comeback of depressed Cyclicals
with strong balance sheets is inevitable.
• Cyclicals lead the market higher at the end
of a recession – how frequently today’s
mountains turn into tomorrow’s molehills,
and, vice versa.
• Cyclicals are like blackjack: stay in the game
too long and it’s bound to take back all your
profits. Things can go from good to worse
very quickly and it’s important to get out at
the right time.
• As business goes from lousy to mediocre,
investors in Cyclicals can make money; as it
goes from mediocre to good, they can make
money; from good to excellent, they may
make a little more money, though not as
much as before. It’s when business goes
from excellent back to good that investors
begin to lose; from good to mediocre, they
lose more; and from mediocre to lousy,
they’re back where they started.
• So, you have to know where we are in the
cycle. But it’s not quite as simple as it
sounds. Investing in Cyclicals has become a
game of anticipation, making it doubly hard
to make money. Large institutions try to get
a jump on competitors by buying Cyclicals
before they’ve shown any signs of recovery.
This can lead to false starts, when stock
prices run up and then fall back with each
contradictory statistic (we’re recovering,
we’re not recovering) that is released.
• The principal danger is that you buy too
early, then get discouraged, and, sell. To
succeed, you’ve to have some way of
tracking the fundamentals of the industry
and the company. It’s perilous to invest
without the working knowledge of the
industry and its rhythms.
• Timing the cycle is only half the battle.
Other half is picking companies that will
gain Most from an upturn. If Industry pick =
Right, but Company pick = Wrong, then you
can lose money just as easily as if you were
wrong about the industry.
• If investing in a troubled industry, buy
companies with staying power. Also, wait for
signs of revival. Some troubled industries
never came back.
• If you sell at 2x, you won’t get 10x. If the
original story is intact or improving, stick
around to see what happens and you’ll be
amazed at the results.

Examples
• Auto, airlines, steel, tyres, chemicals,
aerospace & defence, non-ferrous metals,
nursing, lodging, oil & gas
• Autos: 3-4 up years, after 3-4 down years.
Worse Slump = Better Recovery. An extra
bad year brings longer and more sustainable
upside. People will eventually replace their
cars, even if put off for 1-2 years.
o Units of pent up demand – compare
Actual Sales vs Trend, ie, estimate of
how many units should’ve been sold
based on demographics, previous year
sales, age of cars on road etc.
o 1980-83 = sluggish economy + people
saving up, therefore pent up demand =
7mm. 1984-89 boom, sales exceeded
trendline by 7.8mm.
o After 4-5 years below trend, it takes
another 4-5 years above trend, before
the car market can catch upto itself. If
you didn’t know this, you might sell your
auto stocks too soon. After 1983, sales
increased from 5mm to 12.3mm and you
might sell fearing the boom was over.
But if you follow the trend, you’d know
the pent up demand was 7mm, which
wasn’t exhausted until 1988, which was
the year to sell your auto stocks, since
pent up demand from early 80’s got used
up. Even though 1989 was a good year,
units sold fell by 1mm.
o If industry had 5 good years, it means
it’s somewhere in the middle of the cycle.
Can predict upturn, not downturn.
o Chrysler EPS for 1988, ’89, ’90 & ’91
was $4.7, $11.0, $0.3 & Loss,
respectively. When your best case is
worse than everyone’s worst case, worry
that the stock is floating on fantasy.
• At one point, high yield Utilities were 10% of
Magellan’s AUM. This usually happened
when interest rates were declining and the
economy was in a splutter. Therefore, treat
Utilities as interest rate Cyclicals and time
entry and exit accordingly. Can also treat
Fannie / NBFC’s as interest rate Cyclicals
benefitting from rate cuts.
• In the Gold Rush, people selling picks and
shovels did better than the miners. During
periods when mutual funds are popular,
investing in the fund companies is more
rewarding than putting money into their
funds. When interest rates are falling, bond
& equity funds attract most cash. Money
market funds prosper when rates rise.
• In US /Europe insurance companies, the
rates go up months before earnings show
any improvement. If you buy when the rates
first begin to rise, you can make a lot of
money. It’s not uncommon for a stock to
become 2x after a rate increase and another
2x on the higher earnings that result from a
rate increase.

People Examples
• Make all their money in short bursts, then
try to budget it through long, unprofitable
stretches. Farmers, resort employees, camp
operators, writers, actors. Some may also
become Fast Growers.

PE Ratio
• Slow Growers (7-9x) < Cyclicals (7-20x) <
Fast Growers (14-20x)
• Assigning PE’s: Peak EPS (3-4x) < Decent
EPS (5-8x) < Average EPS (8-10x)
• Stock Pattern: 1990 EPS = $6.5, Price Range
= $23 - $36, PE Range = 3.6-5.5x. 1991 EPS
= $3.9, Price drops to $26. PE = 6.7x, higher
than previous year PE, that had higher EPS.
• With most stocks, a Low PE is regarded as a
good thing, but not with Cyclicals. When
Low, it’s usually a sign that they are at the
end of a prosperous interlude.
• Unwary investors hold onto their shares
since business is still good & the company
continues to show higher earnings, but this
will change soon. Smart investors sell their
shares early to avoid the rush.
• When a large crowd begins to sell, the Price
and PE drops, making a Cyclical more
attractive to the uninitiated. This can be an
expensive misconception. Soon, the economy
will falter and earnings will decline at a
breathtaking speed. As more investors head
for the exit, price will plummet. Buying
Cyclicals after years of record earnings and
when PE has hit a low point is a proven
method to lose ~50% in a short time.
• Conversely, a High PE may be good news for
a Cyclical. Often, it means that a company is
passing through the worst of the doldrums
and soon its business will improve, earnings
will exceed expectations, and investors will
start buying the stock.

2 Minute Drill
• Script revolves around business conditions,
inventories and prices.
• There’s been a 3 year slump in autos but
this year things have turned around. I know
that because car sales are up across the
board for the first time in recent memory.
GM’s new models are selling well and in the
last 18 months GM closed down 5 inefficient
plants, cut 20% labour and earnings are
about to turn higher.

Checklist
• Inventories: keep a close eye on inventory
levels, changes, and, the supply & demand
relationship.
• Competition: new entrants / added supply =
dangerous development, because they may
cut prices to capture market share.
• Know your Cyclical: if you do, then you have
an advantage in figuring things out and
timing the cycles.
• Balance Sheet: strong enough to survive the
next downturn? Can it outlast competitors?
Is capex on upgradation / expansion a cause
for concern? How much of a drag is it on
FCF? Is CF > Capex, even in bad years? Are
plant & machinery in good shape?

Portfolio Allocation %
• 10-20% Allocation

Risk/Reward
• Low Risk – High Gain; or
High Risk – Low Gain, depending on
investor adeptness at anticipating cycles.
• +10x / (80-90% loss)
• Get out of situations where Price overtakes
Fundamentals and rotate into Fundamentals
> Price

Sell When
• Understand strange rules to play game
successfully, because Cyclicals are tricky.
Sell towards the end of the cycle, but who
knows when that is? Who even knows what
cycles they’re talking about? Sometimes, the
knowledgeable vanguard sells 1 year before
any signs of decline, so price falls for no
apparent reason.
• Whatever inspired you to buy after the last
bust, will help clue you in that the latest
boom is over. If you’d enough of an edge to
buy in the first place, then you’ll notice
changes in business and price.
• Company spends on new technological
expansion, instead of cheaper expenditures
on modernizing old plants.
• Sell when something has actually gone
wrong. Rising costs, 100% utilization but
spending on capacity expansion, labour asks
for increased wages, which were cut in the
previous bust etc.
• Final product demand slows down.
Inventory builds up and the company can’t
get rid of it. If storage is full of finished
goods, you may already be late in selling.
• Falling commodity prices, Futures < Spot
Price. Oil, steel prices turn lower much
earlier than EPS impact.
• Strong competition for market share leads to
price cuts. Company tries cost cuts but can’t
compete against cheap imports.


The Peter Lynch Playbook

Twitter@mjbaldbard 7 mayur.jain1@gmail.com

ASSET PLAYS

ASSET PLAYS

Traits
• Local edge is useful, since Wall Street 
ignores/overlooks valuable assets.

Examples
• Railroads, TV stations, minerals, oil &amp; gas,
timber, newspapers, real estate, depreciation
on assets that appreciate over time, patents,
cash, subsidiary valuations, foreign owner
priced cheaper than local subsidiary, tax
loss carry forwards, goodwill amortization,
brands, holding company / conglomerate
discount, depreciated assets that don’t need
maintenance capex but still produce FCF
(rental equipment EPS = 0, but FCF =3)

People Examples
• Never do wells, trust fund men, squires, bon
vivants
• Live off family fortunes but never labour –
issue is what will be left after payments for
travel, liquor, creditors etc.

PB Ratio
• If 2-5x is the expected return, then entry
point for P/NAV = 20-50%

2 Minute Drill
• What are the assets and what’s their worth?
• Stock = $8, but video cassette division = $4
and Real Estate = $7. That a bargain in itself
and the rest of the company = ($3). Insiders
are buying and the company has steady
earnings. There is no debt to speak of.

Checklist
• NAV? Any hidden assets?
• Debt – does leverage detract from asset
value? Is new debt being added?
• Catalyst – how will value get unlocked?
Raider / activist?

Portfolio Allocation %
• 0% - NO Allocation

Risk/Reward
• Low Risk – High Gain, IF you’re sure that
NAV = 2-5x current price
• If wrong, you probably don’t lose much

Hold
• If company isn’t going on a debt binge and
reducing NAV

Sell When
• Catalyst occurs – without raider/catalyst,
you may sit for ages
• Management dilutes/diworseifies
• Institutional ownership rises to 60% from 25
• Instead of a subsidiary selling for $100, it
sells for $60 - calculated NAV maybe inflated
• Tax rate deduction reduces value of tax loss
carry forwards



The Peter Lynch Playbook

Twitter@mjbaldbard 3 mayur.jain1@gmail.com

Monday 11 March 2024

Enduring multi-baggers and Transitory multi-baggers.

Stocks for the long run.

The power of compounding is truly remarkable, almost magical for those with the ability to identify these companies with earnings power over the long term.


Do you know that DLady was priced RM 1.60 per share, Nestle RM 6 to RM 8 per share and Petdag RM 2.00 per share in the 1990s?


Today, DLady is RM 23.00 per share, Nestle is RM 120.00 per share and Petdag is RM 22.00 per share.

The prices of these stocks have dropped from their highest.  DLady has dropped from its historical high price of RM 75.00 per share.  Nestle has dropped from its high of RM 160+ per share.  Similarly, Petdag has dropped from its high price of RM 30+ per share a few years ago.


DLady has dropped a lot and there are various reasons for these. 


How can you exploit any opportunities depend on how you approach your investing. 




Enduring multi-baggers and Transitory multi-baggers.


ENDURING multi-baggers are those companies whose wealth creation is long-lasting and correction from the peak valuation is limited.
In fact, they continue to exist as multi-baggers even after the correction.
The enduring multi-bagging companies are typically few and difficult to be spotted, and most of the time they appear to be expensive at the time of buying because of the lack of faith in their longevity and size of growth.


TRANSITORY multi-baggers, on the contrary, are easier to be spotted but they always end up giving nasty end results.
Corrections are typically almost 100 per cent.
Cyclicals broadly come under this category.
The tragedy with this class of companies is that if you cannot sell in time, nothing is left in your hand.
But as correction is inevitable, market as a whole is left high and dry with a bad experience.
These companies are plenty and easy to be found, and they attract a lot of crowd.



Ten-baggers operate in growth industries.


Ten-baggers are shares where you make 10 times your money (I believe the phrase is derived from baseball). Such opportunities are rare, but I have been fortunate enough over the years to be involved in a few such situations: DLady, Nestle, Petdag and others.

There tend to be some common characteristics among these winners. The businesses all operate in growth industries and the company in question must be able to grow the top line. No one ever made a tenfold return on a pure margin improvement, or cost-cutting story with no sales growth.

Turnarounds are, however, a rich source of 10-baggers. For these to work, one's timing has to be immaculate, and the underlying business has to be sound - just desperately unloved by the stock market.



Patience is needed.


Such returns need patience. A hedge fund that churns its holdings every few months will never enjoy a 10-bagger. And therein lies the greatest danger: selling too early to enjoy the 1,000 per cent gain.

When you have doubled or trebled your money, it is so tempting to cash in profits. It must have been tempting in the early 1950s to take profits on Glaxo shares, just a few years after their 1947 flotation. Or to have done the same for Tesco which floated in the same year. Or sell Racal in the late 1960s after its 1961 market debut, decades before it spun off Vodafone. Yet each of those shares rewarded patient investors with epic performances over many decades, all 20-baggers at least, not even allowing for dividend.

One of the advantages that private equity enjoys is that it is forced to take a reasonably long-term view, and so is usually unable to rush for the exit at the first opportunity. Venture capital's other edge over quoted investors is debt: gearing in successful situations always amplifies the return to equity-holders. Typically, buy-outs have structures where 70 per cent of the capital is borrowed.

Quoted companies probably have the reverse capitalisation, with equity providing three-quarters of the funding. And as ever in investing, those who regularly find 10-baggers say you should stick to your own sphere of competence: buy what you understand.




Usual rules apply:  Quality, Management & Valuation


But the usual rules apply: look for real companies with competent management and a proven business model.

You won't find a 10-bagger among much of the over-hyped, speculative froth. Search for the solid operation with strong fundamentals and a high quality of earnings.

Very few acquisitive vehicles are 10-baggers. Management in such firms focuses on doing deals rather than organically growing its core business. This can produce reasonable returns, but rarely delivers the stellar, long-run performance that can come from a strong business franchise in an attractive niche. 


And balance sheets matter: 10-baggers must be able to fund expansion internally or through debt. Companies that are forever issuing equity dilute their stock performance.



So good luck in your search for the next blockbuster. It may well be an obscure, neglected company now, but with the potential for greatness. The secret is to spot that potential.

Tuesday 5 March 2024

Is There An Opportunity With Johnson & Johnson's (NYSE:JNJ) 41% Undervaluation?

Comment:   

An example of using 2 stage growth model and discount cash flow method in valuing a company.

The discount cash flow method is based on 2 assumptions:   future cash flows and the applied discount rate.  

It is not an exact science.  One should you conservative assumptions in your valuation.

Charlie Munger mentioned that he had never seen Warren Buffett using the DCF method in his valuation.   There are better and easier ways to value a company.  Often you will know if a company is cheap or very expensive, even without having to do elaborate studies.   (An analogy is you do not need to know the weight to know that this person is overweight or obese or underweight.)  

Keep your valuation simple.  It is better to be approximately right than to be exactly wrong.

The article below shares how to do valuation in detail.

Happy investing.  




Key Insights

  • Using the 2 Stage Free Cash Flow to Equity, Johnson & Johnson fair value estimate is US$275

  • Johnson & Johnson is estimated to be 41% undervalued based on current share price of US$162

  • Analyst price target for JNJ is US$174 which is 37% below our fair value estimate

Does the March share price for Johnson & Johnson (NYSE:JNJ) reflect what it's really worth? Today, we will estimate the stock's intrinsic value by taking the forecast future cash flows of the company and discounting them back to today's value. We will use the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) model on this occasion. There's really not all that much to it, even though it might appear quite complex.

We generally believe that a company's value is the present value of all of the cash it will generate in the future. However, a DCF is just one valuation metric among many, and it is not without flaws. If you want to learn more about discounted cash flow, the rationale behind this calculation can be read in detail in the Simply Wall St analysis model.

Check out our latest analysis for Johnson & Johnson

What's The Estimated Valuation?

We're using the 2-stage growth model, which simply means we take in account two stages of company's growth. In the initial period the company may have a higher growth rate and the second stage is usually assumed to have a stable growth rate. To start off with, we need to estimate the next ten years of cash flows. Where possible we use analyst estimates, but when these aren't available we extrapolate the previous free cash flow (FCF) from the last estimate or reported value. We assume companies with shrinking free cash flow will slow their rate of shrinkage, and that companies with growing free cash flow will see their growth rate slow, over this period. We do this to reflect that growth tends to slow more in the early years than it does in later years.

A DCF is all about the idea that a dollar in the future is less valuable than a dollar today, so we discount the value of these future cash flows to their estimated value in today's dollars:

10-year free cash flow (FCF) estimate

2024

2025

2026

2027

2028

2029

2030

2031

2032

2033

Levered FCF ($, Millions)

US$22.8b

US$23.9b

US$24.5b

US$25.0b

US$26.4b

US$27.2b

US$28.0b

US$28.7b

US$29.4b

US$30.2b

Growth Rate Estimate Source

Analyst x5

Analyst x6

Analyst x5

Analyst x3

Analyst x3

Est @ 2.99%

Est @ 2.78%

Est @ 2.63%

Est @ 2.53%

Est @ 2.46%

Present Value ($, Millions) Discounted @ 6.0%

US$21.5k

US$21.3k

US$20.6k

US$19.9k

US$19.8k

US$19.2k

US$18.6k

US$18.1k

US$17.5k

US$16.9k

("Est" = FCF growth rate estimated by Simply Wall St)
Present Value of 10-year Cash Flow (PVCF) = US$193b

We now need to calculate the Terminal Value, which accounts for all the future cash flows after this ten year period. For a number of reasons a very conservative growth rate is used that cannot exceed that of a country's GDP growth. In this case we have used the 5-year average of the 10-year government bond yield (2.3%) to estimate future growth. In the same way as with the 10-year 'growth' period, we discount future cash flows to today's value, using a cost of equity of 6.0%.

Terminal Value (TV)= FCF2033 × (1 + g) ÷ (r – g) = US$30b× (1 + 2.3%) ÷ (6.0%– 2.3%) = US$838b

Present Value of Terminal Value (PVTV)= TV / (1 + r)10= US$838b÷ ( 1 + 6.0%)10= US$469b

The total value, or equity value, is then the sum of the present value of the future cash flows, which in this case is US$663b. To get the intrinsic value per share, we divide this by the total number of shares outstanding. Relative to the current share price of US$162, the company appears quite good value at a 41% discount to where the stock price trades currently. The assumptions in any calculation have a big impact on the valuation, so it is better to view this as a rough estimate, not precise down to the last cent.

dcf
dcf

The Assumptions

The calculation above is very dependent on two assumptions. The first is the discount rate and the other is the cash flows. If you don't agree with these result, have a go at the calculation yourself and play with the assumptions. The DCF also does not consider the possible cyclicality of an industry, or a company's future capital requirements, so it does not give a full picture of a company's potential performance. Given that we are looking at Johnson & Johnson as potential shareholders, the cost of equity is used as the discount rate, rather than the cost of capital (or weighted average cost of capital, WACC) which accounts for debt. In this calculation we've used 6.0%, which is based on a levered beta of 0.800. Beta is a measure of a stock's volatility, compared to the market as a whole. We get our beta from the industry average beta of globally comparable companies, with an imposed limit between 0.8 and 2.0, which is a reasonable range for a stable business.

SWOT Analysis for Johnson & Johnson

Strength

  • Debt is not viewed as a risk.

  • Dividends are covered by earnings and cash flows.

Weakness

  • Earnings declined over the past year.

  • Dividend is low compared to the top 25% of dividend payers in the Pharmaceuticals market.

Opportunity

  • Annual earnings are forecast to grow for the next 3 years.

  • Good value based on P/E ratio and estimated fair value.

Threat

  • Annual earnings are forecast to grow slower than the American market.

Next Steps:

Valuation is only one side of the coin in terms of building your investment thesis, and it shouldn't be the only metric you look at when researching a company. The DCF model is not a perfect stock valuation tool. Preferably you'd apply different cases and assumptions and see how they would impact the company's valuation. For instance, if the terminal value growth rate is adjusted slightly, it can dramatically alter the overall result. What is the reason for the share price sitting below the intrinsic value? For Johnson & Johnson, there are three pertinent aspects you should consider:

  1. Risks: Every company has them, and we've spotted 1 warning sign for Johnson & Johnson you should know about.

  2. Future Earnings: How does JNJ's growth rate compare to its peers and the wider market? Dig deeper into the analyst consensus number for the upcoming years by interacting with our free analyst growth expectation chart.

  3. Other Solid Businesses: Low debt, high returns on equity and good past performance are fundamental to a strong business. Why not explore our interactive list of stocks with solid business fundamentals to see if there are other companies you may not have considered!

PS. The Simply Wall St app conducts a discounted cash flow valuation for every stock on the NYSE every day. If you want to find the calculation for other stocks just search here.



 editorial-team@simplywallst.com (Simply Wall St)

https://uk.finance.yahoo.com/news/opportunity-johnson-johnsons-nyse-jnj-110049724.html

Saturday 2 March 2024

Selling is often a harder decision than buying

 

Selling is often a harder decision than buying

"If you have bought a good quality stock at bargain or reasonable price, you can often hold forever." 

Investing is fun.  For every rule, there is always an exception. 

The main reasons for selling a stock are:

1.  When the fundamental has deteriorated permanently,  (Sell urgently)
2.  When it is overpriced, whereby the upside gain will be unlikely or very small and the downside loss will be big or certain.

We shall examine reason No. 2 through the property market.  The property market is also cyclical.  There were periods of booms and dooms. 


If you have a good piece of property that is always 100% tenanted and which gives you good consistent return (let's say 2x or 3x risk free FD rates), would you not hold this property forever?  The answer is probably yes.

Then, when would you sell this property?

Note that the valuation of property, as with stocks, is both objective and subjective.

Would you sell when someone offered to buy at 500% above your perceived market price?  

Probably yes, as this is obviously overpriced.  You could cash out and probably easily re-employ the money to earn better returns in another property (or properties) or other assets. 

Would you sell when someone offered to buy at 50% above your perceived market price? 

Maybe yes or maybe no.  You can offer your many reasons.  

However, all these will be based on the perceived future returns you can hope to get from this property in the future.  This is both objective based on past returns obtained and subjective and speculative on future returns.

However, unlike reason No.1 when you would need to sell urgently to another buyer to prevent sustaining a permanent loss, you need not sell just because someone offered to buy the property at high price. (However, there are also those who "flip properties" for their earnings; they will sell quickly for a quick profit.)  You will not suffer a loss but only a diminished return at worse.  You can take your time to work out the mathematics.  

You maybe surprised that you may still achieve a return higher at a time in the near future by rejecting the present immediate gain based on the present high price offered.  

Also, you would need to price in the lost opportunity cost when the property is sold at this price, even though it is 50% above the perceived normal market price.  Could you buy a similar quality property with the same sustainable increasing income or return by offering the same price?



Similarly, the same line of thinking can be applied to your selling of shares.  

When should you sell your shares?  

Yes, definitely when the fundamentals have deteriorated permanently.  The business has suffered for various reasons and going forward, the earnings will be permanently impaired and deteriorating.  

Yes, when the price is very very overpriced.  However, you need not sell your shares in good quality companies that you bought at fair or bargain price.  As long as the fundamentals are strong and the business is adding value, selling now at a higher price may mean losing the return that you could have obtained in the future years from owning this stock and the opportunity cost of reinvesting the cash into another stock of similar quality and returns.  

Once again, the importance of sound reasoning and doing the mathematics in making a decision whether to sell or not.

Is it not true, that the really big fortunes from common stocks have been garnered by those
  • who made a substantial commitment in theearly years of a company in whose future they had great confidence and
  • who held their original shares unwaveringly while they increased 10-fold or 100-fold or more in value?

The answer is "Yes."




Additional notes: 

Other reasons for selling a stock (or property) are:
  • To raise cash to reinvest into another asset with better return.
  • A certain stock (or property sector) may be over-represented in your portfolio due to recent rapid price rises and you need to reduce its weightage to reduce your risk of over-exposure in this single stock (or property sector).


Footnote:
 

This is a true story. A rich man was approached by a buyer to sell his property. A few neighbouring lots were sold for $1.6 m the last 2 years. What offer will ensure that you sell your property to me?  Please let me know. The unwilling owner replied, "$5 million". There is a lesson here too. :-)