Showing posts with label AIG. Show all posts
Showing posts with label AIG. Show all posts

Friday 22 June 2012

Investor's Checklist: Asset Management and Insurance

Look for diversity in asset management companies.  Firms that manage a number of asset classes - such as stocks, bonds, and hedge funds - are more stable during market gyrations.  One-hit wonders are much more volatile and are subject to wild swings.

Keep an eye on asset growth.  Make sure an asset manager is successful in consistently bringing in inflows greater than outflows.

Look for money managers with attractive niche markets, such as tax-managed funds or international investing.

Sticky assets add stability.  Look for firms with a high percentage of stable assets, such as institutional money managers or fund firms who specialize in retirement savings.

Bigger is often better.  Firms with more assets, longer track records, and multiple asset classes have much more to offer finicky customers.

Be wary of any insurance firm that grows faster than the industry average (unless the growth can be explained by acquisitions).

One of the best ways to protect against investment risk in the life insurance world is to consider companies with diversified revenue bases.  Some products, such as variable annuities, have exhibited a good degree of cyclicality.

Look for life insurers with high credit ratings (AA) and a consistent ability to realise ROEs above their cost of capital.

Seek out property/casualty insurers who consistently achieve ROEs above 15 percent.  This is a good indication of underwriting discipline and cost control.

Avoid insurers who take repeated reserving charges.  This often indicates pricing below cost or deteriorating cost inflation.

Look for management teams committed to building shareholder value.  These teams often have significant personal wealth invested in the businesses they run.



Ref:  The Five Rules for Successful Stock Investing by Pat Dorsey


Read also:
Investor's Checklist: A Guided Tour of the Market...




Tuesday 27 July 2010

AIG truly was too big to fail.

U.S. to Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout; Central Banks Inject Cash as Credit Dries Up


SEPTEMBER 16, 2008




The U.S. government seized control of American International Group Inc. -- one of the world's biggest insurers -- in an $85 billion deal that signaled the intensity of its concerns about the danger a collapse could pose to the financial system.

The step marks a dramatic turnabout for the federal government, which had been strongly resisting overtures from AIG for an emergency loan or some intervention that would prevent the insurer from falling into bankruptcy. Just last weekend, the government essentially pulled the plug on Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., allowing the big investment bank to go under instead of giving it financial support. This time, the government decided AIG truly was too big to fail.

[AIG chart]

AIG's cash squeeze is driven in large part by losses in a unit separate from its traditional insurance businesses. That financial-products unit, which has been a part of AIG for years, sold the credit-default swap contracts designed to protect investors against default in an array of assets, including subprime mortgages.

But as the housing market has crumbled, the value of those contracts has dropped sharply, driving $18 billion in losses over the past three quarters and forcing AIG to put up billions of dollars in collateral. AIG raised $20 billion earlier this year. But the ongoing demands are straining the holding company's resources.

That strain contributed to the ratings downgrades on Monday. Those downgrades, in turn, ratcheted up the pressure on the company to come up with more cash, quickly.

Most insurance companies don't have financial-products units like these. But over nearly four decades, former CEO, Maurice R. "Hank" Greenberg built AIG into a firm that resembled no other. He transformed its insurance business, both by expanding abroad -- notably in China, where AIG has its roots -- and by buying up other firms.

http://online.wsj.com/article/NA_WSJ_PUB:SB122156561931242905.html

Tuesday 25 May 2010

AIA bosses predict ‘disastrous’ Pru takeover

May 25, 2010

AIA bosses predict ‘disastrous’ Pru takeover

Christine Seib in New York and Leo Lewis in Hong Kong


Prudential’s $35.5 billion takeover of AIG’s Asian insurance business will be a disaster, according to senior executives at AIA, the Hong Kong-based company that the Pru is struggling to acquire.

One source at AIA in Hong Kong told The Times that there was a “tangible undercurrent” of concern over the takeover and that several executives had questioned Prudential’s ability to manage AIA effectively.

The executives’ comments came as it was reported that Mark Wilson, AIA’s chief executive, had told friends and industry executives that he planned to quit if the deal went through.

According to press reports last night, Mr Wilson said that he would step down because the combination of AIA and the Pru’s Asian business was “unworkable”.

Two senior executives, Steve Roder, AIA’s finance director, and Peter Cashin, its legal head, have already quit the company.

The timing of the comments are inconvenient for Prudential, coming just hours before it debuts its dual listing in Hong Kong, with a secondary listing in Singapore.

Traders arriving early at their desks in Asia on Tuesday said that rumours over possible executive quittings would have a “definite negative” impact on today’s dual listing of the Prudential in Hong Kong and Singapore.

Prudential had said earlier this month that the 43-year-old American, who joined AIA in 2002 from AXA, the French insurer, would remain as chief executive under the new ownership.

AIG, which must extract maximum value from AIA in order to repay its giant US government bailout, scrapped a plan to float AIA in favour of a sale to Prudential, which was announced in March.

Mr Wilson had stood to make a fortune out of the float and would have been chief executive of the independent listed company.

Other top AIA executives are expected to follow him out the door, if the deal closes. One person at the company told The Times that a number of workers, also annoyed by the fact that AIA’s float was scuppered, were watching how Mark Wilson responds and intend to take their lead from him.

But the source also suggested that Mr Wilson may be allowing rumours of his intention to quit to try to get an early sense of his worth to Prudential, and that his decision to quit or stay would actually depend on how “hands on” Prudential intends to be in a region it has only limited experience in.

The Pru said on May 17 when it published its prospectus that Mr Wilson would remain as chief executive of AIA, suggesting he had given at least an informal commitment to stay on.

The timing couldn’t be more inconvenient for the Pru, coming just hours before its shares are due to start trading in hong kong and singapore.

The Pru declined to comment.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article7135625.ece

Saturday 22 May 2010

A.I.G.’s Derivatives at European Banks Could Expose It to Debt Crisis

May 21, 2010
A.I.G.’s Derivatives at European Banks Could Expose It to Debt Crisis
By MARY WILLIAMS WALSH

The waves of financial trouble rippling across Europe could end up splashing at least one American institution: the taxpayer-owned American International Group.

A.I.G. has sought to unwind its derivatives business, which gave it a big exposure to Europe.

After an outcry over details disclosed last year about how the government’s bailout helped a number of European banks, the company intended to rid itself of the derivatives it sold to those institutions to help them comply with their capital requirements.

But its latest quarterly filing with regulators shows that the insurance behemoth still has significant exposure to those banks. A.I.G. listed the total notional value of these derivatives, credit-default swaps, as $109 billion at the end of March. That means if events in Europe turned sharply against A.I.G., its maximum possible loss on these derivatives would be $109 billion.

No one is suggesting that is likely.

Still, it would be a sore spot if A.I.G. once again had to make good on a European bank’s investment losses, even on a small scale. A spokesman for A.I.G., Mark Herr, declined to name the European banks that bought its swaps to shore up their capital.

A.I.G.’s stock has also fallen in recent days amid uncertainty over whether the continuing European debt crisis could set back an important, $35.5 billion asset sale. A.I.G.’s chief executive, Robert Benmosche, announced in March that the company would sell its big Asian life insurance business to Prudential of Britain, raising money to pay back part of its rescue loans.

The transaction needs the approval of 75 percent of Prudential’s shareholders.

Shares of A.I.G. fell seven consecutive trading days to close at $34.81 on Thursday. That was a drop of 23 percent since May 11. The shares recovered slightly on Friday, closing at $35.96.

A.I.G.’s swaps work something like bond insurance. The European banks that bought them could keep riskier assets on their books without running afoul of their capital requirements, because the insurer promised to make the banks whole if the assets soured. The contracts call for A.I.G.’s financial products unit to pay in cases of bankruptcy, payment shortfalls or asset write-downs.

A.I.G. is also required to post collateral to the European banks under certain circumstances, but the company said it could not forecast how much.

It was the collateral provisions of a separate portfolio of credit-default swaps that caused A.I.G.’s near collapse in September 2008. Those swaps were tied to complex assets whose values were hard to track.

The European bank assets now in question consist mostly of pooled corporate loans and residential mortgages. A.I.G. has said they are easier to evaluate and therefore less risky.

A.I.G. had hoped these swaps would become obsolete at the end of 2009, when European banking was to have completed its adoption of a detailed new set of capital adequacy rules, known as Basel II. Since A.I.G.’s swaps were designed to help banks comply with the more simplistic previous regime, the insurer thought they would serve no useful purpose after the changeover and could be terminated without incident.

But international bank regulators have yet to fully adopt Basel II. A.I.G.’s first-quarter report said “it remains to be seen” which capital adequacy rules would be used in different parts of Europe. Mr. Herr said A.I.G. could not comment beyond the information already filed with regulators. In its first-quarter report, the insurer said the banks were holding the loans and mortgages in blind pools, making it hard to know how they would weather Europe’s storm. Some pools have fallen below investment grade.

A.I.G. said the pools of loans and mortgages were not generally concentrated in any industry or country. They have an expected average maturity, over all, of a little less than two years. The company said it was getting regular reports on the blind pools and losses so far had been modest.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/22/business/22aig.html?ref=business

Monday 7 December 2009

AIG Reduces Fed Borrowings by $25 Billion

AIG Reduces Fed Borrowings by $25 Billion
By AP / STEPHEN BERNARD Tuesday, Dec. 01, 2009


(NEW YORK) — American International Group Inc. on Tuesday slashed the amount of money it owes the government by $25 billion as it moved two subsidiaries into special holding units ahead of their planned spinoff or sale.

AIG moved American International Assurance Co. and American Life Insurance Co. into special purpose vehicles, which are used ahead of a move to separate a unit from a parent company. The government is receiving preferred equity stakes in the two life insurance companies worth $25 billion in exchange for a reduction in the amount of money AIG owes the government.

AIG will continue to hold the common stakes in AIA and Alico until it determines whether to complete initial public offerings for the companies or sell them privately. No timetable yet has been announced for when an IPO or sale will be completed.

Shares of the conglomerate based in New York rose $1.49, or 5.2 percent, to $29.89 in premarket trading.

AIG was bailed out by the government last fall at the peak of the credit crisis. As losses continued to pile up, the government eventually extended AIG an aid package worth more than $180 billion. The government also received a nearly 80 percent stake in AIG in return for the support.

The insurance giant has been selling assets and spinning off divisions in an effort to help repay the government debt.

As of Sept. 30, AIG had tapped $122.31 billion of the aid package and owed the government $85.66 billion in loans. Tuesday's separation of AIA and Alico would reduce the outstanding aid package to $97.31 billion and the amount owed in loans to $60.66 billion. "AIG continues to make good on its commitment to pay the American people back," AIG CEO Robert Benmosche said in a statement.

The government received a preferred stake in AIA, an Asian life insurer with more than 20 million customers, worth $16 billion. The preferred stake in Alico, an international life insurance firm that operates in more than 50 countries around the world offering life and health insurance, is worth $9 billion.

AIG said it would take a $5.7 billion charge during the fourth quarter tied to accelerating the moves of AIA and Alico into separate, stand-alone units.

Benmosche reiterated AIG continues to expect volatility in quarterly results as the insurer continues to restructure its operations to repay the government.

The plan to separate AIA and Alico and give the government $25 billion in preferred shares of the two companies was first announced in late June. AIG had been discussing sales of the units as early as March.



Read more: http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1943739,00.html#ixzz0Yy1gaCuf

Saturday 11 April 2009

Derivatives trading crackdown begins

Derivatives trading crackdown begins

Banks start talks on bringing order to chaotic derivatives market for credit default swaps

Elena Moya guardian.co.uk,
Tuesday 7 April 2009 16.30 BST Article history

An attempt to bring order to the chaotic, multibillion-pound world of credit derivatives began in London today with moves to standardise contracts in the market.

Banks last year traded about $54tn of credit default swaps (CDSs), contracts that protect investors against the default of a bond or loan, but the global financial crisis triggered the collapse of the market, bringing down AIG, the world's biggest insurer.

The G20 summit in London last week made it a priority to bring order to the market and today specialists from banks including UBS and Morgan Stanley agreed to trade standardised contracts, as well as organise committees that would oversee cases where there was a default.

"The proposed changes provide a means to guarantee greater unanimity of results across positions, add more openness and transparency to the process, and give formal representation to members of the buy-side community," said Markit, a leading provider of data on CDSs.

The London-based firm has also started to publish CDS pricing data on its website. Apart from CDSs on specific corporate loans or bonds, the public can also see the price investors pay to protect themselves against debt issued by sovereign countries such as Britain or the US. The riskier a country is perceived to be, the more expensive its insurance.

"Regulators are very keen to see this being put into place," said David Austin, a director at Markit.

As the unsupervised market grew after 2000, the number of CDSs issued rose well above the number of loans or bonds outstanding, as any bank could issue these insurance products and receive hefty fees for them.

AIG issued large amounts of CDSs on products that contained sub-prime mortgages, and could not honour the payments when they defaulted. It was like selling insurance on a car to five people, even if only one owned the car. If the car crashed, five people claimed the insurance. AIG is now partially nationalised.

With so many CDSs linked to a particular loan or bond, creditors queue to receive payments but some will not be paid because there are more contracts than real lenders. With corporate defaults expected to soar, a better way of dealing with payments after a default is needed.

Standard contracts are seen as a first step towards a central clearing house – a place where all banks contribute collateral to be used as a lifeline in case a bank or institution collapses. At present, banks trade with each other, not through a central house.

The G20 said last week it would push for the creation of centralised clearing houses as a way of improving market confidence. US and European governments are spending billions of pounds to insure the banks' worst assets, or to buy them from their books, in order to restore inter-bank lending and kick-start the economy.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/global/2009/apr/07/derivatives-trading-crackdown

Sunday 1 March 2009

Propping Up a House of Cards: AIG

Talking Business
Propping Up a House of Cards

By JOE NOCERA
Published: February 27, 2009

Next week, perhaps as early as Monday, the American International Group is going to report the largest quarterly loss in history. Rumors suggest it will be around $60 billion, which will affirm, yet again, A.I.G.’s sorry status as the most crippled of all the nation’s wounded financial institutions. The recent quarterly losses suffered by Merrill Lynch and Citigroup — “only” $15.4 billion and $8.3 billion, respectively — pale by comparison.

Related
Times Topics: American International Group Inc.

At the same time A.I.G. reveals its loss, the federal government is also likely to announce — yet again! — a new plan to save A.I.G., the third since September. So far the government has thrown $150 billion at the company, in loans, investments and equity injections, to keep it afloat. It has softened the terms it set for the original $85 billion loan it made back in September. To ease the pressure even more, the Federal Reserve actually runs a facility that buys toxic assets that A.I.G. had insured. A.I.G. effectively has been nationalized, with the government owning a hair under 80 percent of the stock. Not that it’s worth very much; A.I.G. shares closed Friday at 42 cents.
Donn Vickrey, who runs the independent research firm Gradient Analytics, predicts that A.I.G. is going to cost taxpayers at least $100 billion more before it finally stabilizes, by which time the company will almost surely have been broken into pieces, with the government owning large chunks of it. A quarter of a trillion dollars, if it comes to that, is an astounding amount of money to hand over to one company to prevent it from going bust. Yet the government feels it has no choice: because of A.I.G.’s dubious business practices during the housing bubble it pretty much has the world’s financial system by the throat.
If we let A.I.G. fail, said Seamus P. McMahon, a banking expert at Booz & Company, other institutions, including pension funds and American and European banks “will face their own capital and liquidity crisis, and we could have a domino effect.” A bailout of A.I.G. is really a bailout of its trading partners — which essentially constitutes the entire Western banking system.
I don’t doubt this bit of conventional wisdom; after the calamity that followed the fall of Lehman Brothers, which was far less enmeshed in the global financial system than A.I.G., who would dare allow the world’s biggest insurer to fail? Who would want to take that risk? But that doesn’t mean we should feel resigned about what is happening at A.I.G. In fact, we should be furious. More than even Citi or Merrill, A.I.G. is ground zero for the practices that led the financial system to ruin.
“They were the worst of them all,” said Frank Partnoy, a law professor at the University of San Diego and a derivatives expert. Mr. Vickrey of Gradient Analytics said, “It was extreme hubris, fueled by greed.” Other firms used many of the same shady techniques as A.I.G., but none did them on such a broad scale and with such utter recklessness. And yet — and this is the part that should make your blood boil — the company is being kept alive precisely because it behaved so badly.

When you start asking around about how A.I.G. made money during the housing bubble, you hear the same two phrases again and again: “regulatory arbitrage” and “ratings arbitrage.” The word “arbitrage” usually means taking advantage of a price differential between two securities — a bond and stock of the same company, for instance — that are related in some way. When the word is used to describe A.I.G.’s actions, however, it means something entirely different. It means taking advantage of a loophole in the rules. A less polite but perhaps more accurate term would be “scam.”
As a huge multinational insurance company, with a storied history and a reputation for being extremely well run, A.I.G. had one of the most precious prizes in all of business: an AAA rating, held by no more than a dozen or so companies in the United States. That meant ratings agencies believed its chance of defaulting was just about zero. It also meant it could borrow more cheaply than other companies with lower ratings.
To be sure, most of A.I.G. operated the way it always had, like a normal, regulated insurance company. (Its insurance divisions remain profitable today.) But one division, its “financial practices” unit in London, was filled with go-go financial wizards who devised new and clever ways of taking advantage of Wall Street’s insatiable appetite for mortgage-backed securities. Unlike many of the Wall Street investment banks, A.I.G. didn’t specialize in pooling subprime mortgages into securities (CDO). Instead, it sold credit-default swaps.
These exotic instruments acted as a form of insurance for the securities. In effect, A.I.G. was saying if, by some remote chance (ha!) those mortgage-backed securities suffered losses, the company would be on the hook for the losses. And because A.I.G. had that AAA rating, when it sprinkled its holy water over those mortgage-backed securities, suddenly they had AAA ratings too. That was the ratings arbitrage. “It was a way to exploit the triple A rating,” said Robert J. Arvanitis, a former A.I.G. executive who has since become a leading A.I.G. critic.
Why would Wall Street and the banks go for this? Because it shifted the risk of default from themselves to A.I.G., and the AAA rating made the securities much easier to market. What was in it for A.I.G.? Lucrative fees, naturally. But it also saw the fees as risk-free money; surely it would never have to actually pay up. Like everyone else on Wall Street, A.I.G. operated on the belief that the underlying assets — housing — could only go up in price.
That foolhardy belief, in turn, led A.I.G. to commit several other stupid mistakes. When a company insures against, say, floods or earthquakes, it has to put money in reserve in case a flood happens. That’s why, as a rule, insurance companies are usually overcapitalized, with low debt ratios. But because credit-default swaps were not regulated, and were not even categorized as a traditional insurance product, A.I.G. didn’t have to put anything aside for losses. And it didn’t. Its leverage was more akin to an investment bank than an insurance company. So when housing prices started falling, and losses started piling up, it had no way to pay them off. Not understanding the real risk, the company grievously mispriced it.
Second, in many of its derivative contracts, A.I.G. included a provision that has since come back to haunt it. It agreed to something called “collateral triggers,” meaning that if certain events took place, like a ratings downgrade for either A.I.G. or the securities it was insuring, it would have to put up collateral against those securities. Again, the reasons it agreed to the collateral triggers was pure greed: it could get higher fees by including them. And again, it assumed that the triggers would never actually kick in and the provisions were therefore meaningless. Those collateral triggers have since cost A.I.G. many, many billions of dollars. Or, rather, they’ve cost American taxpayers billions.
The regulatory arbitrage was even seamier. A huge part of the company’s credit-default swap business was devised, quite simply, to allow banks to make their balance sheets look safer than they really were. Under a misguided set of international rules that took hold toward the end of the 1990s, banks were allowed use their own internal risk measurements to set their capital requirements. The less risky the assets, obviously, the lower the regulatory capital requirement.
How did banks get their risk measures low? It certainly wasn’t by owning less risky assets. Instead, they simply bought A.I.G.’s credit-default swaps. The swaps meant that the risk of loss was transferred to A.I.G., and the collateral triggers made the bank portfolios look absolutely risk-free. Which meant minimal capital requirements, which the banks all wanted so they could increase their leverage and buy yet more “risk-free” assets. This practice became especially rampant in Europe. That lack of capital is one of the reasons the European banks have been in such trouble since the crisis began.

At its peak, the A.I.G. credit-default business had a “notional value” of $450 billion, and as recently as September, it was still over $300 billion. (Notional value is the amount A.I.G. would owe if every one of its bets went to zero.) And unlike most Wall Street firms, it didn’t hedge its credit-default swaps; it bore the risk, which is what insurance companies do.
It’s not as if this was some Enron-esque secret, either. Everybody knew the capital requirements were being gamed, including the regulators. Indeed, A.I.G. openly labeled that part of the business as “regulatory capital.” That is how they, and their customers, thought of it.
There’s more, believe it or not. A.I.G. sold something called 2a-7 puts, which allowed money market funds to invest in risky bonds even though they are supposed to be holding only the safest commercial paper. How could they do this? A.I.G. agreed to buy back the bonds if they went bad. (Incredibly, the Securities and Exchange Commission went along with this.) A.I.G. had a securities lending program, in which it would lend securities to investors, like short-sellers, in return for cash collateral. What did it do with the money it received? Incredibly, it bought mortgage-backed securities. When the firms wanted their collateral back, it had sunk in value, thanks to A.I.G.’s foolish investment strategy. The practice has cost A.I.G. — oops, I mean American taxpayers — billions.
Here’s what is most infuriating: Here we are now, fully aware of how these scams worked. Yet for all practical purposes, the government has to keep them going. Indeed, that may be the single most important reason it can’t let A.I.G. fail. If the company defaulted, hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of credit-default swaps would “blow up,” and all those European banks whose toxic assets are supposedly insured by A.I.G. would suddenly be sitting on immense losses. Their already shaky capital structures would be destroyed. A.I.G. helped create the illusion of regulatory capital with its swaps, and now the government has to actually back up those contracts with taxpayer money to keep the banks from collapsing. It would be funny if it weren’t so awful.
I asked Mr. Arvanitis, the former A.I.G. executive, if the company viewed what it had done during the bubble as a form of gaming the system. “Oh no,” he said, “they never thought of it as abuse. They thought of themselves as satisfying their customers.”
That’s either a remarkable example of the power of rationalization, or they were lying to themselves, figuring that when the house of cards finally fell, somebody else would have to clean it up.
That would be us, the taxpayers.

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/28/business/28nocera.html?em=&pagewanted=all

Sunday 14 December 2008

Is Your AIG Insurance Policy Safe?

Is Your AIG Insurance Policy Safe?
Will the struggling insurer be able to meet its financial obligations? Here's what you need to know.
By BRETT ARENDS

People are in a panic about AIG. In the last 24 hours I have been swamped with emails from anxious readers around America who want to know: Is my mom's retirement annuity safe? Is grandma's long-term care insurance policy safe? Is my car or homeowner's policy OK?
Here's what you need to know.

There are three separate barriers between your policy and the AIG crisis that you're hearing about on TV.
1. The AIG that's in crisis and the one that wrote your insurance policy are to a large degree separate companies. The AIG on Wall Street is an umbrella company that owns the stock in a lot of smaller insurance subsidiaries. But your policy is held with the subsidiary in your state. They are tightly regulated, they are required to hold conservative assets to back up your policy, and those assets are walled off from the troubles at the parent company. It is perfectly possible for AIG to file for chapter 11 and your policy to be OK.
2. Even if your local AIG subsidiary got into financial difficulties, there's a second level of protection for policyholders. Your state insurance commissioner would step in and take over the company and run it in the interests of policyholders. Under the law, policyholders should get back 100 cents on the dollar before the company's other creditors can get a penny.
3. And even if those first two steps didn't cover you completely, there's a third protection: your local state guaranty funds. These are pools of money put together by insurance companies to provide a backstop. As a general rule of thumb, you're covered to at least $100,000 on most policies and $300,000 on life insurance death benefits. The levels may be even higher in your state.
No system is perfect. It is understandable that people are nervous. Anything shaking their insurance provider is going to rattle their confidence. But at least insurance customers have some protections to help them.
There may be one more protection as well. AIG is simply too big to be allowed to fail. If the worst came to the worst, the federal government could let the stock and bondholders lose their money. But it would be a monumental blunder of the first order to let the policyholders lose. These are people on Main Street, not Wall Street. There are hundreds of thousands of them, perhaps millions. Oh yes -- and they vote.
Write to Brett Arends at brett.arends@wsj.com

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122159859013744663.html

Sunday 30 November 2008

US Subprime: History of the Credit Crunch and Credit Crisis

US Subprime: History of the Credit Crunch and Credit Crisis

Geneva, 3 nov 2008.
In this multi-part series, we uncover the events that led to the subprime credit crunch, and analyze future financial prospects.

Part 1: INFLATING THE BUBBLE
Part 2: BURSTING THE BUBBLE
Part 3: CONFIDENCE
Part 4: UNWINDING
http://www.economywatch.com/us-subprime/History_of_subprime_credit_crunch_part_4.html


What now?

Well, this is difficult to predict as we are in uncharted territory. It has taken time for the severity of the situation to sink in with most governments. If they have been to slow to react, the IMF has given them a shake up this weekend by saying that we could see a major melt down in the world financial system if governments do not take strong action. As I write, more and more governments are coming out to support their banks.

We can be sure we are not at the end yet. There is more bad debt on the books of the banks that has not been fully written off yet. A change in accounting rules may stave off some of this, but there is still a problem. The equity markets are badly shaken and will undoubtedly be very volatile for some time to come.

The shock of it all has triggered a lack of confidence which takes time to be restored and will affect us all. The removal of the credit mountain will cause an economic slowdown, but the worry that ensues will filter down to the consumer, who will stop spending - even if he has the money to spend - and this will push the slowdown into recession. There is much pessimism around and many comparisons to the great depression of the 1930s. You have to remember when assimilating the news that bad news sells papers and keeps people glued to the news channels, far more than good news. Gloomy predictions sell better than optimistic ones. The news channels know this.

America is likely to bear the worst brunt of this, with UK close behind and then Europe. It is harder to predict the effect on the emerging markets. They will undoubtedly slow down as their export markets dry up, but the larger emerging countries have started to develop a domestic market and a new middle class and they do not carry the bad debt of the western banks. China is sitting on over $500 billion of US Treasury Bills. However, China has already started to feel the impact of a slow down with some 20 million jobs being lost already this year, according to the Sunday Times. This sounds a lot, but you have to remember they have population of over 1.3 billion, - more than 4.3 times that of USA.