Showing posts with label CDS. Show all posts
Showing posts with label CDS. Show all posts

Friday 10 February 2012

Collateralized Bond Obligations - a pile of junk is still junk no matter how you stack it.

Collateralized Junk-Bond Obligations

One of the last junk-bond-market innovations was the collateralized bond obligation (CBO). CBOs are diversified investment pools of junk bonds that issue their own securities with the underlying junk bonds as collateral. Several tranches of securities with different seniorities are usually created, each with risk and return characteristics that differ from those of the underlying junk bonds themselves.

What attracted underwriters as well as investors to junkbond CBOs was that the rating agencies, in a very accommodating decision, gave the senior tranche, usually about 75 percent of the total issue, an investment-grade rating. This means that an issuer could assemble a portfolio of junk bonds yielding 14 percent and sell to investors a senior tranche of securities backed by those bonds at a yield of, say, 10 percent, with proceeds equal to perhaps 75 percent of the cost of the portfolio. The issuer could then sell riskier junior tranches by offering much higher yields to investors.

The existence of CBOs was predicated on the receipt of this investment-grade credit rating on the senior tranche. Greedy institutional buyers of the senior tranche earned a handful of basis points above the yield available on other investment grade securities. As usual these yield pigs sacrificed credit quality for additional current return. The rating agencies performed studies showing that the investment-grade rating was warranted.  Predictably these studies used a historical default-rate analysis and neglected to consider the implications of either a prolonged economic downturn or a credit crunch that might virtually eliminate refinancings. Under such circumstances, a great many junk bonds would default; even the senior tranche of a CBO could experience significant capital losses. In other words, a pile of junk is still junk no matter how you stack it.

Wednesday 19 May 2010

German short-sell ban shocks markets

German short-sell ban shocks markets
May 19, 2010 - 6:59AM

Germany will temporarily ban naked short selling and naked credit-default swaps of euro-area government bonds at midnight after politicians blamed the practice for exacerbating the European debt crisis.

The ban will also apply to naked short selling in shares of 10 banks and insurers that will last until March 31, 2011, German financial regulator BaFin said today in an e-mailed statement. The step was needed because of "exceptional volatility" in euro-area bonds, the regulator said.

The move came as Chancellor Angela Merkel's coalition seeks to build momentum on financial-market regulation with lower- house lawmakers due to begin debating a bill tomorrow authorizing Germany's contribution to a $US1 trillion bailout plan to backstop the euro. US stocks fell and the euro dropped to $US1.2231, the lowest level since April 18, 2006, after the announcement.

"You cannot imagine what broke lose here after BaFin's announcement," Johan Kindermann, a capital markets lawyer at Simmons & Simmons in Frankfurt, said in an interview. "This will lead to an uproar in the markets tomorrow. Short-sellers will now, even tonight, try to close their positions at markets where they can still do so - if they find any possibilities left at all now."

Merkel, Sarkozy

Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy have called for curbs on speculating with sovereign credit-default swaps. European Union Financial Services Commissioner Michel Barnier this week called for stricter disclosure requirements on the transactions.

Allianz SE, Deutsche Bank AG, Commerzbank AG, Deutsche Boerse AG, Deutsche Postbank AG, Muenchener Rueckversicherungs AG, Hannover Rueckversicherungs AG, Generali Deutschland Holding AG, MLP AG and Aareal Bank AG are covered by the short-selling ban.

"Massive" short-selling was leading to excessive price movements which "could endanger the stability of the entire financial system," BaFin said in the statement.

The European Union last month proposed that the Financial Stability Board, the group set up by the Group of 20 nations to monitor global financial trends, should "closely examine the role" of CDS on sovereign bond spreads. Merkel said earlier today that she will press the Group of 20 to bring in a financial transactions tax.

Merkel's 'Battle'

"In some ways, it's a battle of the politicians against the markets" and "I'm determined to win," Merkel said May 6. "The speculators are our adversaries."

Germany, along with the US and other EU nations, banned short selling of banks and insurance company shares at the height of the global financial crisis in 2008. The country still has rules requiring disclosure of net short positions of 0.2 per cent or more of outstanding shares of 10 separate companies.

The disclosure of the rules drew criticism from lawyers who said that they should have been announced well ahead of time.

"The way it's been announced is very irresponsible, and it's sent many market participants into panic mode," said Darren Fox, a regulator lawyer who advises hedge funds at Simmons & Simmons in London. "We thought regulators had learned their lessons from September 2008. Where is the market emergency that necessitates the introduction of an overnight ban?"

Short-selling is when hedge funds and other investors borrow shares they don't own and sell them in the hope their price will go down. If it does, they buy back the shares at the lower price, return them to their owner and pocket the difference.

Credit-default swaps are derivatives that pay the buyer face value if a borrower -- a country or a company -- defaults. In exchange, the swap seller gets the underlying securities or the cash equivalent. Traders in naked credit-default swaps buy insurance on bonds they don't own.

A basis point on a credit-default swap contract protecting $US10 million of debt from default for five years is equivalent to $US1000 a year.

Bloomberg

Saturday 17 April 2010

Goldman Sach and CDOs: Banks Bundled Bad Debt, Bet Against It and Won


December 24, 2009

Banks Bundled Bad Debt, Bet Against It and Won



In late October 2007, as the financial markets were starting to come unglued, a Goldman Sachs trader, Jonathan M. Egol, received very good news. At 37, he was named a managing director at the firm.

Mr. Egol, a Princeton graduate, had risen to prominence inside the bank by creating mortgage-related securities, named Abacus, that were at first intended to protect Goldman from investment losses if the housing market collapsed. As the market soured, Goldman created even more of these securities, enabling it to pocket huge profits.

Goldman’s own clients who bought them, however, were less fortunate.

Pension funds and insurance companies lost billions of dollars on securities that they believed were solid investments, according to former Goldman employees with direct knowledge of the deals who asked not to be identified because they have confidentiality agreements with the firm.

Goldman was not the only firm that peddled these complex securities — known as synthetic collateralized debt obligations, or C.D.O.’s — and then made financial bets against them, called selling short in Wall Street parlance. Others that created similar securities and then bet they would fail, according to Wall Street traders, includeDeutsche Bank and Morgan Stanley, as well as smaller firms like Tricadia Inc., an investment company whose parent firm was overseen by Lewis A. Sachs, who this year became a special counselor to Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner.

How these disastrously performing securities were devised is now the subject of scrutiny by investigators in Congress, at the Securities and Exchange Commission and at the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Wall Street’s self-regulatory organization, according to people briefed on the investigations. Those involved with the inquiries declined to comment.

While the investigations are in the early phases, authorities appear to be looking at whether securities laws or rules of fair dealing were violated by firms that created and sold these mortgage-linked debt instruments and then bet against the clients who purchased them, people briefed on the matter say.

One focus of the inquiry is whether the firms creating the securities purposely helped to select especially risky mortgage-linked assets that would be most likely to crater, setting their clients up to lose billions of dollars if the housing market imploded.

Some securities packaged by Goldman and Tricadia ended up being so vulnerable that they soured within months of being created.

Goldman and other Wall Street firms maintain there is nothing improper about synthetic C.D.O.’s, saying that they typically employ many trading techniques to hedge investments and protect against losses. They add that many prudent investors often do the same. Goldman used these securities initially to offset any potential losses stemming from its positive bets on mortgage securities.

But Goldman and other firms eventually used the C.D.O.’s to place unusually large negative bets that were not mainly for hedging purposes, and investors and industry experts say that put the firms at odds with their own clients’ interests.

“The simultaneous selling of securities to customers and shorting them because they believed they were going to default is the most cynical use of credit information that I have ever seen,” said Sylvain R. Raynes, an expert in structured finance at R & R Consulting in New York. “When you buy protection against an event that you have a hand in causing, you are buying fire insurance on someone else’s house and then committing arson.”
Investment banks were not alone in reaping rich rewards by placing trades against synthetic C.D.O.’s. Some hedge funds also benefited, including Paulson & Company, according to former Goldman workers and people at other banks familiar with that firm’s trading.

Michael DuVally, a Goldman Sachs spokesman, declined to make Mr. Egol available for comment. But Mr. DuVally said many of the C.D.O.’s created by Wall Street were made to satisfy client demand for such products, which the clients thought would produce profits because they had an optimistic view of the housing market. In addition, he said that clients knew Goldman might be betting against mortgages linked to the securities, and that the buyers of synthetic mortgage C.D.O.’s were large, sophisticated investors, he said.

The creation and sale of synthetic C.D.O.’s helped make the financial crisis worse than it might otherwise have been, effectively multiplying losses by providing more securities to bet against. Some $8 billion in these securities remain on the books at American International Group, the giant insurer rescued by the government in September 2008.

From 2005 through 2007, at least $108 billion in these securities was issued, according to Dealogic, a financial data firm. And the actual volume was much higher because synthetic C.D.O.’s and other customized trades are unregulated and often not reported to any financial exchange or market.

Goldman Saw It Coming

Before the financial crisis, many investors large American and European banks, pension funds, insurance companies and even some hedge fundsfailed to recognize that overextended borrowers would default on their mortgages, and they kept increasing their investments in mortgage-related securities. As the mortgage market collapsed, they suffered steep losses.

A handful of investors and Wall Street traders, however, anticipated the crisis. In 2006, Wall Street had introduced a new index, called the ABX, that became a way to invest in the direction of mortgage securities. The index allowed traders to bet on or against pools of mortgages with different risk characteristics, just as stock indexes enable traders to bet on whether the overall stock market, or technology stocks or bank stocks, will go up or down.

Goldman, among others on Wall Street, has said since the collapse that it made big money by using the ABX to bet against the housing market. Worried about a housing bubble, top Goldman executives decided in December 2006 to change the firm’s overall stance on the mortgage market, from positive to negative, though it did not disclose that publicly.

Even before then, however, pockets of the investment bank had also started using C.D.O.’s to place bets against mortgage securities, in some cases to hedge the firm’s mortgage investments, as protection against a fall in housing prices and an increase in defaults.

Mr. Egol was a prime mover behind these securities. Beginning in 2004, with housing prices soaring and the mortgage mania in full swing, Mr. Egol began creating the deals known as Abacus. From 2004 to 2008, Goldman issued 25 Abacus deals, according to Bloomberg, with a total value of $10.9 billion.

Abacus allowed investors to bet for or against the mortgage securities that were linked to the deal. The C.D.O.’s didn’t contain actual mortgages. Instead, they consisted ofcredit-default swaps, a type of insurance that pays out when a borrower defaults. These swaps made it much easier to place large bets on mortgage failures.

Rather than persuading his customers to make negative bets on Abacus, Mr. Egol kept most of these wagers for his firm, said five former Goldman employees who spoke on the condition of anonymity. On occasion, he allowed some hedge funds to take some of the short trades.

Mr. Egol and Fabrice Tourre, a French trader at Goldman, were aggressive from the start in trying to make the assets in Abacus deals look better than they were, according to notes taken by a Wall Street investor during a phone call with Mr. Tourre and another Goldman employee in May 2005.

On the call, the two traders noted that they were trying to persuade analysts at Moody’s Investors Service, a credit rating agency, to assign a higher rating to one part of an Abacus C.D.O. but were having trouble, according to the investor’s notes, which were provided by a colleague who asked for anonymity because he was not authorized to release them. Goldman declined to discuss the selection of the assets in the C.D.O.’s, but a spokesman said investors could have rejected the C.D.O. if they did not like the assets.

Goldman’s bets against the performances of the Abacus C.D.O.’s were not worth much in 2005 and 2006, but they soared in value in 2007 and 2008 when the mortgage market collapsed. The trades gave Mr. Egol a higher profile at the bank, and he was among a group promoted to managing director on Oct. 24, 2007.

“Egol and Fabrice were way ahead of their time,” said one of the former Goldman workers. “They saw the writing on the wall in this market as early as 2005.” By creating the Abacus C.D.O.’s, they helped protect Goldman against losses that others would suffer.

As early as the summer of 2006, Goldman’s sales desk began marketing short bets using the ABX index to hedge funds like Paulson & Company, Magnetar and Soros Fund Management, which invests for the billionaire George SorosJohn Paulson, the founder of Paulson & Company, also would later take some of the shorts from the Abacus deals, helping him profit when mortgage bonds collapsed. He declined to comment.

A Deal Gone Bad, for Some

The woeful performance of some C.D.O.’s issued by Goldman made them ideal for betting against. As of September 2007, for example, just five months after Goldman had sold a new Abacus C.D.O., the ratings on 84 percent of the mortgages underlying it had been downgraded, indicating growing concerns about borrowers’ ability to repay the loans, according to research from UBS, the big Swiss bank. Of more than 500 C.D.O.’s analyzed by UBS, only two were worse than the Abacus deal.

Goldman created other mortgage-linked C.D.O.’s that performed poorly, too. One, in October 2006, was a $800 million C.D.O. known as Hudson Mezzanine. It included credit insurance on mortgage and subprime mortgage bonds that were in the ABX index; Hudson buyers would make money if the housing market stayed healthy — but lose money if it collapsed. Goldman kept a significant amount of the financial bets against securities in Hudson, so it would profit if they failed, according to three of the former Goldman employees.

A Goldman salesman involved in Hudson said the deal was one of the earliest in which outside investors raised questions about Goldman’s incentives. “Here we are selling this, but we think the market is going the other way,” he said.

A hedge fund investor in Hudson, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said that because Goldman was betting against the deal, he wondered whether the bank built Hudson with “bonds they really think are going to get into trouble.”

Indeed, Hudson investors suffered large losses. In March 2008, just 18 months after Goldman created that C.D.O., so many borrowers had defaulted that holders of the security paid out about $310 million to Goldman and others who had bet against it, according to correspondence sent to Hudson investors.

The Goldman salesman said that C.D.O. buyers were not misled because they were advised that Goldman was placing large bets against the securities. “We were very open with all the risks that we thought we sold. When you’re facing a tidal wave of people who want to invest, it’s hard to stop them,” he said. The salesman added that investors could have placed bets against Abacus and similar C.D.O.’s if they had wanted to.

A Goldman spokesman said the firm’s negative bets didn’t keep it from suffering losses on its mortgage assets, taking $1.7 billion in write-downs on them in 2008; but he would not say how much the bank had since earned on its short positions, which former Goldman workers say will be far more lucrative over time. For instance, Goldman profited to the tune of $1.5 billion from one series of mortgage-related trades by Mr. Egol with Wall Street rival Morgan Stanley, which had to book a steep loss, according to people at both firms.

Tetsuya Ishikawa, a salesman on several Abacus and Hudson deals, left Goldman and later published a novel, “How I Caused the Credit Crunch.” In it, he wrote that bankers deserted their clients who had bought mortgage bonds when that market collapsed: “We had moved on to hurting others in our quest for self-preservation.” Mr. Ishikawa, who now works for another financial firm in London, declined to comment on his work at Goldman.

Profits From a Collapse

Just as synthetic C.D.O.’s began growing rapidly, some Wall Street banks pushed for technical modifications governing how they worked in ways that made it possible for C.D.O.’s to expand even faster, and also tilted the playing field in favor of banks and hedge funds that bet against C.D.O.’s, according to investors.

In early 2005, a group of prominent traders met at Deutsche Bank’s office in New York and drew up a new system, called Pay as You Go. This meant the insurance for those betting against mortgages would pay out more quickly. The traders then went to the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, the group that governs trading in derivatives like C.D.O.’s. The new system was presented as a fait accompli, and adopted.

Other changes also increased the likelihood that investors would suffer losses if the mortgage market tanked. Previously, investors took losses only in certain dire “credit events,” as when the mortgages associated with the C.D.O. defaulted or their issuers went bankrupt.

But the new rules meant that C.D.O. holders would have to make payments to short sellers under less onerous outcomes, or “triggers,” like a ratings downgrade on a bond. This meant that anyone who bet against a C.D.O. could collect on the bet more easily.

“In the early deals you see none of these triggers,” said one investor who asked for anonymity to preserve relationships. “These things were built in to provide the dealers with a big payoff when something bad happened.”

Banks also set up ever more complex deals that favored those betting against C.D.O.’s. Morgan Stanley established a series of C.D.O.’s named after United States presidents (Buchanan and Jackson) with an unusual feature: short-sellers could lock in very cheap bets against mortgages, even beyond the life of the mortgage bonds. It was akin to allowing someone paying a low insurance premium for coverage on one automobile to pay the same on another one even if premiums over all had increased because of high accident rates.

At Goldman, Mr. Egol structured some Abacus deals in a way that enabled those betting on a mortgage-market collapse to multiply the value of their bets, to as much as six or seven times the face value of those C.D.O.’s. When the mortgage market tumbled, this meant bigger profits for Goldman and other short sellers — and bigger losses for other investors.

Selling Bad Debt

Other Wall Street firms also created risky mortgage-related securities that they bet against.

At Deutsche Bank, the point man on betting against the mortgage market was Greg Lippmann, a trader. Mr. Lippmann made his pitch to select hedge fund clients, arguing they should short the mortgage market. He sometimes distributed a T-shirt that read “I’m Short Your House!!!” in black and red letters.

Deutsche, which declined to comment, at the same time was selling synthetic C.D.O.’s to its clients, and those deals created more short-selling opportunities for traders like Mr. Lippmann.

Among the most aggressive C.D.O. creators was Tricadia, a management company that was a unit of Mariner Investment Group. Until he became a senior adviser to the Treasury secretary early this year, Lewis Sachs was Mariner’s vice chairman. Mr. Sachs oversaw about 20 portfolios there, including Tricadia, and its documents also show that Mr. Sachs sat atop the firm’s C.D.O. management committee.

From 2003 to 2007, Tricadia issued 14 mortgage-linked C.D.O.’s, which it called TABS. Even when the market was starting to implode, Tricadia continued to create TABS deals in early 2007 to sell to investors. The deal documents referring to conflicts of interest stated that affiliates and clients of Tricadia might place bets against the types of securities in the TABS deal.

Even so, the sales material also boasted that the mortgages linked to C.D.O.’s had historically low default rates, citing a “recently completed” study by Standard & Poor’sratings agency — though fine print indicated that the date of the study was September 2002, almost five years earlier.

At a financial symposium in New York in September 2006, Michael Barnes, the co-head of Tricadia, described how a hedge fund could put on a negative mortgage bet by shorting assets to C.D.O. investors, according to his presentation, which was reviewed by The New York Times.

Mr. Barnes declined to comment. James E. McKee, general counsel at Tricadia, said, “Tricadia has never shorted assets into the TABS deals, and Tricadia has always acted in the best interests of its clients and investors.”

Mr. Sachs, through a spokesman at the Treasury Department, declined to comment.

Like investors in some of Goldman’s Abacus deals, buyers of some TABS experienced heavy losses. By the end of 2007, UBS research showed that two TABS deals were the eighth- and ninth-worst performing C.D.O.’s. Both had been downgraded on at least 75 percent of their associated assets within a year of being issued.

Tricadia’s hedge fund did far better, earning roughly a 50 percent return in 2007 and similar profits in 2008, in part from the short bets.



Goldman Sachs Responds to The New York Times on Synthetic Collateralized Debt Obligations
December 24, 2009

Background: The New York Times published a story on December 24th primarily focused on the synthetic collateralized debt obligation business of Goldman Sachs. In response to questions from the paper prior to publication, Goldman Sachs made the following points.

As reporters and commentators examine some of the aspects of the financial crisis, interest has gravitated toward a variety of products associated with the mortgage market. One of these products is synthetic collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), which are referred to as synthetic because the underlying credit exposure is taken via credit default swaps rather than by physically owning assets or securities. The following points provide a summary of how these products worked and why they were created.

Any discussion of Goldman Sachs’ association with this product must begin with our overall activities in the mortgage market. Goldman Sachs, like other financial institutions, suffered significant losses in its residential mortgage portfolio due to the deterioration of the housing market (we disclosed $1.7 billion in residential mortgage exposure write-downs in 2008). These losses would have been substantially higher had we not hedged. We consider hedging the cornerstone of prudent risk management.

Synthetic CDOs were an established product for corporate credit risk as early as 2002. With the introduction of credit default swaps referencing mortgage products in 2004-2005, it is not surprising that market participants would consider synthetic CDOs in the context of mortgages. Although precise tallies of synthetic CDO issuance are not readily available, many observers would agree the market size was in the hundreds of billions of dollars.

Many of the synthetic CDOs arranged were the result of demand from investing clients seeking long exposure.

Synthetic CDOs were popular with many investors prior to the financial crisis because they gave investors the ability to work with banks to design tailored securities which met their particular criteria, whether it be ratings, leverage or other aspects of the transaction.

The buyers of synthetic mortgage CDOs were large, sophisticated investors. These investors had significant in-house research staff to analyze portfolios and structures and to suggest modifications. They did not rely upon the issuing banks in making their investment decisions.

For static synthetic CDOs, reference portfolios were fully disclosed. Therefore, potential buyers could simply decide not to participate if they did not like some or all the securities referenced in a particular portfolio.

Synthetic CDOs require one party to be long the risk and the other to be short so without the short position, a transaction could not take place.

It is fully disclosed and well known to investors that banks that arranged synthetic CDOs took the initial short position and that these positions could either have been applied as hedges against other risk positions or covered via trades with other investors.

Most major banks had similar businesses in synthetic mortgage CDOs.

As housing price growth slowed and then turned negative, the disruption in the mortgage market resulted in synthetic CDO losses for many investors and financial institutions, including Goldman Sachs, effectively putting an end to this market.

http://www2.goldmansachs.com/our-firm/on-the-issues/viewpoint/viewpoint-articles/response-scdo.html

Friday 27 November 2009

Cash: The real enemy of investors is not fluctuation of principal, it is inflation!

Many investors confuse safety of principal with a "sure thing investment."  Cash accounts provide investors with peace of mind because their principal does not fluctuate in value and because interest is added to the account on a periodic basis.  The institution providing the savings vehicle invests the money deposited by the investor in loans and bonds.  They take the dual risks of volatility and loss of capital - not the investor.  Unfortunately, investor peace of mind is an illusion, because the real enemy is not fluctuation of principal, it is inflation!  And "cash" investments do not keep pace with inflation!  As inflation robs investors of their purchasing power they must invade principal to buy the goods and services they need to live.  As the years go by, the investors' peace of mind is replaced by fear as they continually dip into their principal to pay for lifestyle expenses that rise with inflation.


In fact, cash flunks one of the most important tests we set for our perfect income investment.  In exchange for safety of principal and liquidity, the returns on cash are generally very low.  In fact, at current rates, the return on most cash alternatives isn't even as high as the rate of inflation, as measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI). 


On December 31, 2003, the average yield on a 30-day Treasury bill was a paltry 0.85 percent while the annual rate of change in the CPI was 1.88 percent.  In other words, the interest on your money, would not be sufficient to replace the purchasing power you're losing to inflation.


Even if you think cash passes the safety of principal test because your principal does not fluctuate in value, it fails three other important safety tests.
  • First, the safety of cash begins to look suspect if you're losing the true value of your money - the ability to buy the things you need - because of inflation.
  • Second, since the yield is so low, the income generated by cash is not sufficient to buy the goods and services you need, which will force you to liquidate your principal. 
  • Finally, the false illusion of safety is compounded because the low yield on cash is further reduced by taxes.  Worst yet, you will pay tax at your highest marginal rate.  Unfortunately the combination of a high tax rate and a low yield only increase your need to liquidate assets. 
So much for safety!


The more you study the inflation problem, the more you realize how important it is to a successful retirement plan.  Inflation has been pretty tame over the past 10 years, averaging only 2.75 percent per year.  Don't be lulled into a false sense of security and allow yourself to think that inflation is not going to be a big problem for you in the future.


In the 1970s inflation averaged just over 7.4%.  By the 1990s inflation had moderated to an average of just over 2.9%.  Still, the average inflation rate for the entire 30-year period from 1972 through 2002 was 5.12%.


Just a small increase can be crushing to retirees.  You would need to invest a lot more money initially in a cash investment to provide enough interest to be reinvested against the day when you need to take more income to keep up with rising costs.


Inflation is the Retired Person's Greatest Enemy


1972-2002 (30 years)  Average inflation rate 5.12%
1982-2002 (20 years)  Average inflation rate 3.36%
1992-2002 (10 years)  Average inflation rate 2.75%




Example:


Let's say you had an income need of $3,000 per month and you noticed that you could buy a five-year CD with a current yield of 4% (a generous assumption based on current yields).  To generate an income of $3,000 per month or $36,000 per year, you would need to deposit $900,000 in the bank.


The first year everything seems to work well, but in the second year you notice two problems:


1.  You had to pay taxes on your interest income, and you had not factored that into the question.  Where do you get the tax money?
2.  Your living costs are rising, and you forgot to factor in inflation.  If inflation averages just 3% for the first year, your annual expenses would increase by an additional $1,080, compounding your income need.  After only the first year, you would have to start liquidating principal to buy the same goods, and services you enjoyed the year before.


Safe but Sorry

Over the years we have seen many people make the same big mistake - they opt for the safety of principal that cash investments offer and ignore inflation risk.  Inflation robs them of the purchasing power of cash; this illusion of safety would cost dearly.  When interest rates drop, they maybe forced to dip into their original capital.  The more principal taken out, the less income will be produced putting them on a slippery slope. 

The classic problems of:
  • low yield,
  • high taxes and
  • no inflation protection
 are pretty common to all types of fixed-income investments. 

Bonds start out with a little more income for each dollar invested, but suffer the same defects that cash investments do.  And, although it may not be widely understood by most investors, bonds can also suffer from high volatility and risk under the right circumstances.

Is there another option to meet your income needs without impairing the capital base?  We shall take a look at the difference dividend paying stocks can make.  As an investor in dividend-paying stocks, you not only get to keep more of what you earn from dividends becasue of lower taxes, but it's likely your dividend income and value will increase over time to keep you with inflation.  These exciting fundamental benefits are also available in dividend-paying stocks for growth.

CDs, Savings and Money Market Accounts

The big attraction of the choices in this group is their safety of principal.  In fact, they are considered so safe that they are generally lumped together as an asset class called "Cash/Cash Equivalents."  For the purpose of this article, let's call them all "cash".

The main attraction of cash is simple - the value of the principal does not fluctuate and may even be guaranteed depending on the amount of the investment.  Put a dollar in, and you'll get a dollar back, plus interest.  In addition, the assets in cash group can generally be "cashed in" at full value on short notice (although CDs may have meaningful early surrender penalties).  No matter what gyrations the stock market or interest rates are going through , the value of these assets stays the same.  Most financial planners will recommend that you have enough money salted away in cash/cash equivalents to cover three to six months' living expenses, plus an amount to cover any known major outlays you'll have to make in the next year or two.  This group of assets can also add stability to your portfolio because their value is stable.  All in all, cash plays a key role in building a portfolio as a sound foundation for funding emergencies or contingent expenses - but not for income!

Saturday 11 April 2009

Derivatives trading crackdown begins

Derivatives trading crackdown begins

Banks start talks on bringing order to chaotic derivatives market for credit default swaps

Elena Moya guardian.co.uk,
Tuesday 7 April 2009 16.30 BST Article history

An attempt to bring order to the chaotic, multibillion-pound world of credit derivatives began in London today with moves to standardise contracts in the market.

Banks last year traded about $54tn of credit default swaps (CDSs), contracts that protect investors against the default of a bond or loan, but the global financial crisis triggered the collapse of the market, bringing down AIG, the world's biggest insurer.

The G20 summit in London last week made it a priority to bring order to the market and today specialists from banks including UBS and Morgan Stanley agreed to trade standardised contracts, as well as organise committees that would oversee cases where there was a default.

"The proposed changes provide a means to guarantee greater unanimity of results across positions, add more openness and transparency to the process, and give formal representation to members of the buy-side community," said Markit, a leading provider of data on CDSs.

The London-based firm has also started to publish CDS pricing data on its website. Apart from CDSs on specific corporate loans or bonds, the public can also see the price investors pay to protect themselves against debt issued by sovereign countries such as Britain or the US. The riskier a country is perceived to be, the more expensive its insurance.

"Regulators are very keen to see this being put into place," said David Austin, a director at Markit.

As the unsupervised market grew after 2000, the number of CDSs issued rose well above the number of loans or bonds outstanding, as any bank could issue these insurance products and receive hefty fees for them.

AIG issued large amounts of CDSs on products that contained sub-prime mortgages, and could not honour the payments when they defaulted. It was like selling insurance on a car to five people, even if only one owned the car. If the car crashed, five people claimed the insurance. AIG is now partially nationalised.

With so many CDSs linked to a particular loan or bond, creditors queue to receive payments but some will not be paid because there are more contracts than real lenders. With corporate defaults expected to soar, a better way of dealing with payments after a default is needed.

Standard contracts are seen as a first step towards a central clearing house – a place where all banks contribute collateral to be used as a lifeline in case a bank or institution collapses. At present, banks trade with each other, not through a central house.

The G20 said last week it would push for the creation of centralised clearing houses as a way of improving market confidence. US and European governments are spending billions of pounds to insure the banks' worst assets, or to buy them from their books, in order to restore inter-bank lending and kick-start the economy.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/global/2009/apr/07/derivatives-trading-crackdown

Sunday 30 November 2008

US Subprime: History of the Credit Crunch and Credit Crisis

US Subprime: History of the Credit Crunch and Credit Crisis

Geneva, 3 nov 2008.
In this multi-part series, we uncover the events that led to the subprime credit crunch, and analyze future financial prospects.

Part 1: INFLATING THE BUBBLE
Part 2: BURSTING THE BUBBLE
Part 3: CONFIDENCE
Part 4: UNWINDING
http://www.economywatch.com/us-subprime/History_of_subprime_credit_crunch_part_4.html


What now?

Well, this is difficult to predict as we are in uncharted territory. It has taken time for the severity of the situation to sink in with most governments. If they have been to slow to react, the IMF has given them a shake up this weekend by saying that we could see a major melt down in the world financial system if governments do not take strong action. As I write, more and more governments are coming out to support their banks.

We can be sure we are not at the end yet. There is more bad debt on the books of the banks that has not been fully written off yet. A change in accounting rules may stave off some of this, but there is still a problem. The equity markets are badly shaken and will undoubtedly be very volatile for some time to come.

The shock of it all has triggered a lack of confidence which takes time to be restored and will affect us all. The removal of the credit mountain will cause an economic slowdown, but the worry that ensues will filter down to the consumer, who will stop spending - even if he has the money to spend - and this will push the slowdown into recession. There is much pessimism around and many comparisons to the great depression of the 1930s. You have to remember when assimilating the news that bad news sells papers and keeps people glued to the news channels, far more than good news. Gloomy predictions sell better than optimistic ones. The news channels know this.

America is likely to bear the worst brunt of this, with UK close behind and then Europe. It is harder to predict the effect on the emerging markets. They will undoubtedly slow down as their export markets dry up, but the larger emerging countries have started to develop a domestic market and a new middle class and they do not carry the bad debt of the western banks. China is sitting on over $500 billion of US Treasury Bills. However, China has already started to feel the impact of a slow down with some 20 million jobs being lost already this year, according to the Sunday Times. This sounds a lot, but you have to remember they have population of over 1.3 billion, - more than 4.3 times that of USA.