Showing posts with label Madoff. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Madoff. Show all posts

Saturday 18 December 2010

Game changer for Madoff victims: $7.3b recovered

Game changer for Madoff victims: $7.3b recovered
December 18, 2010 - 8:24AM

The widow of a Florida philanthropist who had been the single largest beneficiary of Bernard Madoff’s colossal Ponzi scheme has agreed to return $US7.2 billion ($7.3 billion) in bogus profits to the victims of the fraud.

The trustee recovering money for Madoff’s burned investors have filed court papers formalising the settlement with the estate of Jeffry Picower, a businessman who drowned after suffering a heart attack in the swimming pool of his Palm Beach, Florida, mansion in October last year.

‘‘We will return every penny received from almost 35 years of investing with Bernard Madoff,’’ Picower’s wife, Barbara, said in a written statement.

‘‘I believe the Madoff Ponzi scheme was deplorable and I am deeply saddened by the tragic impact it continues to have on the lives of its victims,’’ she said. ‘‘It is my hope that this settlement will ease that suffering.’’

US Attorney Preet Bharara called the settlement a ‘‘game changer’’ for Madoff’s victims.

A recovery of that size would mean that a sizable number could get at least half of their money back - a remarkable turnaround for people and institutions that thought two years ago they had lost everything.

‘‘Barbara Picower has done the right thing,’’ Bharara said.

Jeffry Picower, who was 67 when he died, was one of Madoff’s oldest clients. Over the decades, he withdrew about $US7 billion in bogus profits from his accounts with the schemer. That amounts to more than a third of the dollars that disappeared in the scandal.

That money was supposedly made on stock trades, but authorities said that in reality it was simply stolen from other investors.

Picower’s lawyers claimed he knew nothing about the scheme, but court-appointed trustee Irving Picard had argued in court papers he must have known the returns were ‘‘implausibly high’’ and based on fraud.

In her statement, Barbara Picower said she was ‘‘absolutely confident that my husband Jeffry was in no way complicit in Madoff’s fraud and want to underscore the fact that neither the trustee, nor the US attorney, has charged him with any illegal act’’.

Lawyers for Picower’s estate have been in negotiations with the trustee for some time.

After Picower drowned, his will revealed he had earmarked most of his fortune for charity, but his widow said in a statement that the family wished to return some of it to Madoff’s victims through ‘‘a fair and generous settlement’’.

A huge charitable foundation Picower had created with part of his fortune closed in 2009 after its assets were wiped out in the Madoff fraud.It had donated hundreds of millions of dollars to colleges, libraries and other nonprofit groups.

Thousands of people, banks and hedge funds that invested money with Madoff saw their savings wiped out when the fraud was revealed to be a hoax. Many, though, like Picower, had been drawing bogus profits from their Madoff accounts for years and wound up walking away from the scheme having taken out more money than they put in.

Picard has been involved in a two-year effort to claw back those false profits and return the stolen money to people who were net-losers in the scheme.

It is those people, who lost more than they withdrew, who could now be poised to recover half of their original investment.

The person said Picower’s estate would pay $US5 billion to settle the civil lawsuit brought by Picard and another $US2.2 billion to resolve a civil forfeiture claim by federal prosecutors investigating Madoff’s crimes. All the money will go to victims of the fraud.

Bharara called the total ‘‘a truly staggering sum that was really always other people’s money’’.

Madoff’s clients had thought, based on his fraudulent account statements, they collectively had more than $US60 billion invested in stocks through the money manager’s funds.

Investigators found, though, no investments had ever been made, and the $US20 billion in principal contributed by Madoff’s clients was simply being paid out bit by bit to other investors.

Bharara said roughly half of that lost money has been recovered.

AP

Saturday 11 December 2010

Madoff trustee sues HSBC for nine billion dollars

Business 2010-12-07 11:56

NEW YORK, Tuesday 7 December 2010 (AFP) - The trustee charged with recouping assets for victims of Wall Street fraudster Bernard Madoff is suing British banking giant HSBC and related entities for at least nine billion dollars.

In a statement issued Sunday, Irving Picard accused the firms of enabling Madoff's massive Ponzi scheme by creating, marketing and supporting "an international network of a dozen feeder funds based in Europe, the Caribbean and Central America."

HSBC and the related funds led investors to direct over 8.9 billion dollars into Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (BLMIS) -- Madoff's fraudulent investment advisory business, according to Picard.

"The defendants also earned hundreds of millions of dollars by selling, marketing, lending to and investing in financial instruments designed to substantially assist Madoff by pumping money into BLMIS and prolonging the Ponzi scheme," despite being aware of the fraud, he added.

Italian bank UniCredit, Austrian banker Sonja Kohn and her Bank Medici are among those accused of helping the former Nasdaq chairman expand his scheme.

"Had HSBC and the defendants reacted appropriately to such warnings and other obvious badges of fraud outlined in the complaint, the Madoff Ponzi scheme would have collapsed years, billions of dollars and countless victims sooner," Picard said.

"The defendants were willfully and deliberately blind to the fraud, even after learning about numerous red flags surrounding Madoff."

Last week, Picard said he was seeking 6.4 billion dollars from JPMorgan Chase for supporting the scam and he has filed a suit against Swiss bank UBS seeking two billion dollars in damages for its part in the massive fraud.

Madoff, who touted himself as one of New York's most successful money managers, was arrested in early December 2008 for running a pyramid scheme. He was sentenced in June 2009 to 150 years in prison.

Madoff's victims, including charities, major banks, Hollywood moguls and savvy financial players, handed him tens of billions of dollars over more than two decades.

The crime rocked Wall Street, where Madoff was a pillar of the New York and Florida Jewish communities.

Madoff's right hand man, Frank DiPascali, and his accountant, David Friehling, have since pleaded guilty in an investigation that has yet to fully unravel the crime or compensate the approximately 16,000 direct victims.

Even the amount of money stolen remains elusive: Madoff originally claimed to have been managing 65 billion dollars, but in October the court-appointed liquidator said the real bottom line was 21.2 billion dollars.

Madoff has insisted he acted alone, but a handful of others, including an assistant, two executives, computer experts and a bookkeeper have also been arrested.

Madoff, who rose from a humble start as a lifeguard in New York to become one of Wall Street's most trusted and powerful money managers, is incarcerated in North Carolina.

His luxury watches, piano and other personal items were sold at auction to raise money for his fraud victims on November 13.

MySinchew 2010.12.07

Saturday 13 March 2010

The story of Madoff and the slightly eccentric Harry Markopolos


Books: How I brought down Madoff

Exclusive excerpt: In his thrilling new memoir, famed whistleblower Harry Markopolos details how he uncovered Madoff's ponzi scheme — and why nobody would listen until it was too late


In early 2000, Harry Markopolos, a math whiz and former career soldier in the U.S. army, was employed as an equity derivatives portfolio manager at the Rampart Investment Management Co. in Boston. Tasked with developing a financial product that might compete with Bernie Madoff’s legendary hedge fund, Markopolos examined Madoff’s numbers backwards and forwards, only to conclude the returns Madoff was claiming to get for his investors were quantifiably impossible. When Markopolos’s employers kept pushing him — the implication being that he wasn’t a strong enough mathematician to replicate Madoff’s model — he grew frustrated and took it upon himself to launch an independent investigation into Madoff’s operation with the help of a crack team of financial sleuths. Over a span of eight years, Markopolos lobbied the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission and major news organizations for an investigation into Madoff, presenting them with a steady stream of damning evidence, only to be ignored. By the time Madoff’s scheme collapsed under its own weight in 2008, it was too late. The former Wall Street bigwig had carried out the largest Ponzi scheme in history, defrauding his investors out of $65 billion. Now, Markopolos works full-time investigating fraud and conflicts of interest in Fortune 500 companies. In his newly published memoir, No One Would Listen: A True Financial Thriller, he details his whirlwind eightyear whistle-blowing campaign, which began with a set of numbers that wouldn’t add up.
Month after month, year after year, no matter how wildly the market performed, Madoff’s returns remained steady. He reported only three down months in more than seven years. His returns were as reliable as the swallows returning to Capistrano. For example, in 1993 when the S&P 500 returned 1.33%, Bernie returned 14.55%; in 1999 the S&P 500 returned 21.04%, and there was Bernie at 16.69%. His returns were always good, but rarely spectacular. For limited periods of time, other funds returned as much, or even more than Madoff’s. So it wasn’t his returns that bothered me so much — his returns each month were possible — it was that he always returned a profit. There was no existing mathematical model that could explain that consistency. Bernie Madoff was among the most powerful and respected men on Wall Street. How could he be perpetrating such a blatant fraud? And if it was so obvious, why hadn’t other people picked it up? I kept looking at these numbers. I had to be missing something.
During the next few weeks, I began modelling his strategy. He claimed that his basket of about 35 securities correlated to the S&P 100. Right from the beginning that made no sense to me, because it meant he had single stock risk. He couldn’t afford for even one of his 35 stocks to go down substantially, because it would kill his returns. While I knew that in reality it was impossible to successfully pick 35 stocks that would not go down, I accepted the dubious assumption that information from his brokerage dealings allowed him to select the strongest 35 stocks. But because this basket represented about a third of the entire index, there still should have been a strong correlation between his returns and those of the underlying index. But that’s not what he was reporting. Whatever the index did, up or down, he returned the same 1% per month.
Modelling his strategy was complex. It had a lot of moving parts—at least 35 different securities moving at different rates of change—so it required making some simplifying assumptions. For this exercise, I assumed he was front-running, using buy and sell information from his brokerage clients to illegally buy and sell securities based on trades he knew he was going to make. That meant that he knew from his order flow what stocks were going to go up, which obviously would have been extremely beneficial when he was picking stocks for his basket. We found out later that several hedge funds believed he was doing this.
I created hypothetical baskets using the best-performing stocks and followed his split-strike strategy, selling the call option to generate income and buying the put option for protection. The following week I’d pick another basket. I expected the correlation coefficient—the relationship between Bernie’s returns and the movement of the entire S&P 100—legitimately to be around 50%, but it could have been anywhere between 30% and 80% and I would have accepted it naively. Instead Madoff was coming in at about 6%. Six per cent! That was impossible. That number was much too low. It meant there was almost no relationship between those stocks and the entire index. I was so startled that the legendary Bernie Madoff was running a hedge fund that supposedly produced these crazy numbers that I didn’t trust my math. Maybe I’m wrong, I figured. I asked my colleague Neil Chelo to check my numbers. Neil went through my math with the precision of a forensic accountant. If I’d made any mistakes, he decided, he couldn’t find them.
By this time, I had been working in the financial industry for 13 years and had built up a reasonably large network of people I knew and respected. In this situation, I turned to a man named Dan DiBartolomeo, who had been my advanced quant teacher. Dan is the founder of Northfield Information Services, a collection of math whizzes who provide sophisticated analytical and statistical risk management tools to portfolio managers. I told him that I thought we’d discovered a fraud, that Bernie Madoff was either front-running or running a Ponzi scheme. I could almost see his brain cells perk up when I said that. Every mathematician loves the hunt for the sour numbers in an equation. After going through my work, Dan told us that whatever Madoof, as he referred to him, was doing, he was not getting his results from the market. Pointing to the 6% correlation and the 45-degree return line, he said, “That doesn’t look like it came from a finance distribution. We don’t have those kinds of charts in finance.” I was right, he agreed. Bernie Madoff was a fraud. And whatever he was actually doing, it was enough to put him in prison.
That might have been the end of it for me. I might have filed a complaint with the Boston office of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and it would have made great pub conversation: “I’ll bet you didn’t know Bernie Madoff—you know, Madoff Securities—is running some kind of scam,” and it wouldn’t have gone any further. But this was the financial industry, and there was money to be made following Bernie—potentially hundreds of millions of dollars.
Frank really pushed me to work on the new product. At times, we both got a little testy. He was pretty blunt about it. His deal with Rampart guaranteed him a percentage of the business he brought in, and he had a client who could raise hundreds of millions of dollars if he provided the right product. “C’mon, Harry, I need a product to sell. Rampart needs the product. Let’s just build the frickin’ thing and get it out the door. ”
But each time he asked me if I was making progress, I explained to him that it was impossible to compete with a man who simply made up his numbers. I couldn’t do it. Nobody could. I thought this was a complete waste of my time and did my best to avoid working on it. I had a lot of responsibilities at Rampart. But Dave Fraley kept banging on me hard.
Finally, one afternoon as he walked past my desk I stopped him. “Hey, Dave, you know what? I think I’ve got it figured out. I know how we can duplicate it.” “OK,” Fraley said, sitting down at my desk. “How’s it work?” “Well, actually we have a choice. We can either front-run our order flow or just type in our returns every month. It’s probably a Ponzi scheme, and that’s the only way we can compete with him.” Fraley stood up. “What?” I’d done what they had asked. I’d figured out Madoff’s magic formula, but they didn’t believe me. They thought I was blowing smoke with my accusations.
I was really starting to get pissed off. Neil and I had no doubt that Madoff was running some kind of scam, but at least two of the three principals in the firm and maybe Frank Casey weren’t so sure. My pride was at stake. I knew my math was better than Bernie’s, but even then, even at the very beginning, people just refused to believe me. This was the legendary Bernie Madoff we were talking about. And I was just the slightly eccentric Harry Markopolos.
At that point, I still had no idea how much money Madoff was handling or for how many clients. Nobody did. As we rapidly discovered, that secrecy was key to his success. Because this operation was so secret, everybody thought they were among a select few whose money he had agreed to handle. Madoff had not registered with the SEC as an investment advisory firm or a hedge fund, so he wasn’t regulated. He was simply a guy you gave your money to, to do whatever he wanted to do with it, and in return he handed you a nice profit.
Madoff practically swore his investors to secrecy. He threatened to give them back their money if they talked about him, claiming his success depended on keeping his proprietary strategy secret. Obviously, though, his goal was to keep flying below the radar. Madoff’s clients believed he was exclusive to only a few investors, and that he carefully picked those few for their discretion. When I started speaking with his investors, I discovered that they felt privileged that he had taken their money.

Madoff’s unique structure gave him substantial advantages. As far as we knew at the time, the only entrance to Madoff was through an approved feeder fund. That meant his actual investors couldn’t ask him any questions, and they had to rely completely on their funds—who were being well rewarded—to conduct due diligence. I knew about the world’s biggest hedge funds: George Soros’s Quantum Fund, Julian Robertson’s Tiger Fund, Paul Tudor Jones’s Tudor Fund, Bruce Kovner’s Caxton Associates and Lewis Bacon’s Moore Capital. Everybody did, and we estimated they each managed about $2 billion. So when we started trying to figure out how much money Madoff was running, we were stunned. According to what we were able to piece together, Madoff was running at least $6 billion—or three times the size of the largest known hedge funds. He was the largest hedge fund in the world by far—and most market professionals didn’t even know he existed!
The fortunate thing was that at that point we didn’t know enough to be scared. It never occurred to us that we were going to be stepping on some potentially very dangerous toes. So at the beginning, at least, I didn’t hesitate to ask people I knew throughout the industry about Madoff. I began questioning some of the brokers I worked with on the Chicago Board of Exchange. A lot of these guys were longtime phone friends; I did business with them regularly and had gotten to know them on that level. I began bringing up Bernie Madoff in our conversations. It didn’t surprise me that almost all of them knew about Bernie’s brokerage arm, but knew nothing about his secretive asset management firm. I asked numerous traders if they had ever seen his volume, and they all responded negatively. But a few people who were aware he was running a hedge fund asked us if we could give them his contact information. Everyone wanted to do business with him. But nobody admitted they were doing business with him. He was the ultimate mystery man.
Talking to Wall Street people was extremely informative. Most of these people I was talking with during the normal course of Rampart business, but whenever I had an opportunity I would ask a few questions about Madoff. I spoke with the heads of research, traders on derivatives desks, portfolio managers and investors. Neil was doing the same thing, and both of us were doing it secretly, because if our bosses found out about it they would have demanded that we stop.
Probably what surprised me most was how many people knew Madoff was a fraud. Years later, after his surrender, the question most often asked would be: How could he have fooled the brightest people in the business for so long? The answer, as I found out rather quickly, was that he didn’t. The fact that there was something strange going on with Bernie Madoff’s operation was not a secret on Wall Street. But even those people who had questioned his strategy had accepted his nonsensical explanations—as long as the returns kept rolling in.
The response I heard most often from people at the funds was that his returns were accuratebut he was generating them illegally from front-running. By paying for order flow for his broker-dealer firm, he had unique access to market information. He knew what stocks were going to move up, and that enabled him to fill his basket with them at a low price and then resell them to his brokerage clients at a higher price.
There were at least some people who told Neil and me, confidentially of course, that Madoff was using the hedge fund as a vehicle for borrowing money from investors. According to these people, Madoff was making substantially more on his trading than the 1% to 2% monthly that he was paying in returns, so that payout was simply his cost of obtaining the money.
Some of the explanations I heard bordered on the incredible. These were sophisticated guys who knew they had a great thing going and wanted it to keep going. They were smart enough to see the potholes, so they had to invent some preposterous explanation to fill them. “Here’s what I think it is, Harry,” a portfolio manager told me. “He’s really smart. It’s really important to him that he show his investors low volatility to keep them happy, so what he does when the market is down is he subsidizes them.” In other words, in those months when Madoff’s fund loses money, he absorbs the loss and continues to return a profit to the investors. “He can afford to eat the losses.” But of all the stories I heard those first few weeks, the one that probably shocked Neil and me the most was told to Frank Casey by the representative of a London-based fund of funds. It was handling a substantial amount of Arab oil money, and before investing with Madoff it had asked his permission to hire one of the Big Six accounting firms to verify his performance. Madoff refused, saying that the only person allowed to see the secret sauce, to audit his books, was his brother-in-law’s accounting firm. Actually, we heard this from multiple sources. The fact is that Madoff’s accountant for 17 years, beginning in 1992, was David Friehling, who definitely was not his brother-in-law. Friehling operated out of a small storefront office in the upstate New York town of New City. It seems likely that Madoff claimed he was a relative because it was the only plausible reason he could think of to explain why a sophisticated multibillion-dollar hedge fund would use a two-person storefront operation in a small town as its auditor. Brother-in-law or not, this certainly should have been a major stop sign. Even a marginally competent fund manager should have said, “Thank you very much, Mr. Madoff, but no thanks,” and run as fast as possible in the other direction. But this fund of funds didn’t. Instead, this firm, which had been entrusted by investors with hundreds of millions of dollars, handed Bernie Madoff $200 million.
None of us—Frank, Neil, or myself—was naive. We had been in the business longenough to see the corners cut, the dishonesty and the legal financial scams. But I think even we were surprised at the excuses really smart people made for Bernie. The fact that seemingly sophisticated investors would give Madoff hundreds of millions of dollars after he refused to allow them to conduct ordinary due diligence was a tribute to either greed or stupidity.
The feeder funds—funds that basically raised money for a larger master fund—knew. They knew as much as they wanted to know. They knew they could make money with him; they knew that if they kept their money with him for six years they basically would double their original investment, so they were betting against the clock. And it wasn’t like everybody else in the business was completely honest and he was the only one cheating. This was just another guy cutting some corners. It was a great deal; they were reaping the benefits of this financial theft without having any of the risk. My guess, and this is just a guess, is they assumed that even if Bernie got caught, their ill-gotten profits would end but their money was safe. How could it not be safe? Bernie Madoff was a respected businessman, a respected philanthropist, a respected political donor, a self-proclaimed co-founder of Nasdaq and a great man.
We were beginning to see him as he really was: a monster preying on others; a master con artist. Unfortunately, we were only at the beginning of our investigation. We couldn’t even imagine how much of that we would encounter in the next eight years.



Monday 22 December 2008

How to Steer Clear of Shady Advisers

How to Steer Clear of Shady Advisers

By MARY PILON
Bernard Madoff's alleged Ponzi scheme took a devastating toll on scores of victims. But any investor can draw important lessons from the tale of the disappearing $50 billion. Here's a guide to protecting yourself when you choose a financial adviser.
Be wary of guaranteed returns.
Mr. Madoff allegedly wooed many investors by promising consistent returns regardless of market activity. Also be wary about promises of speedy returns. If something sounds too good to be true, it most likely is.
Reputation and referrals aren't enough.
Mr. Madoff was a former Nasdaq Stock Market chairman and fixture on Wall Street -- it's understandable that people felt comfortable with him managing their money. Many investors are happy if they just have an adviser a friend recommends.
But don't make a decision based on the good things you hear.
Check credentials and verify certification with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (Finra), which issues licenses for financial advisers.
You should seek out other information, too.
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (sec.gov) lets you search Investment Adviser Public Disclosure forms online, which give information about advisers' business affiliations and any disciplinary actions. Finra also has background information on approximately 660,000 currently registered brokers and 5,100 currently registered securities firms. The information on both the SEC and Finra sites are available at no cost to the public.
Demand transparency.
It's your money, so you have a right to know where it's being invested. Ask lots of questions about your allocation and your money manager's past performance. And set aside time to read through your brokerage statement -- most firms send one a month -- and make sure you're clear on everything documented in it.
Make sure you get a statement from your adviser's firm, not your adviser.
There are claims that Mr. Madoff cooked his books. A firm is less likely to do that, since it's accountable to more parties. Likewise, you should be wary about writing checks directly to your adviser. They should go to a registered investment company.
Get it in writing.
Make sure that both your investments and their explanations are spelled out in writing, for future reference. While you're at it, read the fine print -- and be extremely suspicious if there's no fine print to read.

If you've been a victim of fraud or are suspicious, report it. The SEC has a tip and complaint form on its Web site, sec.gov/complaint.shtml.
Write to Mary Pilon at mary.pilon@wsj.com

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122981065261124223.html

Sunday 21 December 2008

Financial Services Industry: How things can have gone so wrong

Op-Ed Columnist
The Madoff Economy

By PAUL KRUGMAN
Published: December 19, 2008

The revelation that Bernard Madoff — brilliant investor (or so almost everyone thought), philanthropist, pillar of the community — was a phony has shocked the world, and understandably so. The scale of his alleged $50 billion Ponzi scheme is hard to comprehend.

Yet surely I’m not the only person to ask the obvious question: How different, really, is Mr. Madoff’s tale from the story of the investment industry as a whole?
The financial services industry has claimed an ever-growing share of the nation’s income over the past generation, making the people who run the industry incredibly rich. Yet, at this point, it looks as if much of the industry has been destroying value, not creating it. And it’s not just a matter of money: the vast riches achieved by those who managed other people’s money have had a corrupting effect on our society as a whole.
Let’s start with those paychecks. Last year, the average salary of employees in “securities, commodity contracts, and investments” was more than four times the average salary in the rest of the economy. Earning a million dollars was nothing special, and even incomes of $20 million or more were fairly common. The incomes of the richest Americans have exploded over the past generation, even as wages of ordinary workers have stagnated; high pay on Wall Street was a major cause of that divergence.
But surely those financial superstars must have been earning their millions, right? No, not necessarily. The pay system on Wall Street lavishly rewards the appearance of profit, even if that appearance later turns out to have been an illusion.
Consider the hypothetical example of a money manager who leverages up his clients’ money with lots of debt, then invests the bulked-up total in high-yielding but risky assets, such as dubious mortgage-backed securities. For a while — say, as long as a housing bubble continues to inflate — he (it’s almost always a he) will make big profits and receive big bonuses. Then, when the bubble bursts and his investments turn into toxic waste, his investors will lose big — but he’ll keep those bonuses.
O.K., maybe my example wasn’t hypothetical after all.
So, how different is what Wall Street in general did from the Madoff affair? Well, Mr. Madoff allegedly skipped a few steps, simply stealing his clients’ money rather than collecting big fees while exposing investors to risks they didn’t understand. And while Mr. Madoff was apparently a self-conscious fraud, many people on Wall Street believed their own hype. Still, the end result was the same (except for the house arrest): the money managers got rich; the investors saw their money disappear.
We’re talking about a lot of money here. In recent years the finance sector accounted for 8 percent of America’s G.D.P., up from less than 5 percent a generation earlier. If that extra 3 percent was money for nothing — and it probably was — we’re talking about $400 billion a year in waste, fraud and abuse.
But the costs of America’s Ponzi era surely went beyond the direct waste of dollars and cents.
At the crudest level, Wall Street’s ill-gotten gains corrupted and continue to corrupt politics, in a nicely bipartisan way. From Bush administration officials like Christopher Cox, chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, who looked the other way as evidence of financial fraud mounted, to Democrats who still haven’t closed the outrageous tax loophole that benefits executives at hedge funds and private equity firms (hello, Senator Schumer), politicians have walked when money talked.
Meanwhile, how much has our nation’s future been damaged by the magnetic pull of quick personal wealth, which for years has drawn many of our best and brightest young people into investment banking, at the expense of science, public service and just about everything else?
Most of all, the vast riches being earned — or maybe that should be “earned” — in our bloated financial industry undermined our sense of reality and degraded our judgment.
Think of the way almost everyone important missed the warning signs of an impending crisis. How was that possible? How, for example, could Alan Greenspan have declared, just a few years ago, that “the financial system as a whole has become more resilient” — thanks to derivatives, no less? The answer, I believe, is that there’s an innate tendency on the part of even the elite to idolize men who are making a lot of money, and assume that they know what they’re doing.
After all, that’s why so many people trusted Mr. Madoff.
Now, as we survey the wreckage and try to understand how things can have gone so wrong, so fast, the answer is actually quite simple: What we’re looking at now are the consequences of a world gone Madoff.


http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/19/opinion/19krugman.html?em







The Reckoning: On Wall Street, Bonuses, Not Profits, Were Real

Friday 19 December 2008

Those that went with Madoff chose faith over evidence

Who isn't a Madoff victim? The list is telling.
Although many smart people seem to have been taken in, one expert argues that anyone who really did their homework would have seen the warning signs.
By Nicholas Varchaver
Last Updated: December 17, 2008: 10:14 AM ET

Untangling Madoff's web
More Videos
Financial frauds ruin lives

NEW YORK (Fortune) -- As the number of victims of Bernard Madoff, the criminally charged founder of the investment firm that bears his name, seems to multiply with the speed and force of a hurricane, certain types of investors seem to be absent -- so far, anyway -- from the casualty list.
That's no accident, argues James Hedges IV of LJH Global Investments, a boutique firm that invests in hedge funds and private equity for high-net-worth families. In other words, score one for the big institutions that stick to standard rules rather than allowing their managers to invest on personal connections or hunches.
"There's no Duke Endowment [among the list of Madoff investors]," Hedges says. "There's no Harvard management, there's no Yale, there's no Penn, there's no Weyerhauser, no State of Texas or Virginia Retirement system."
The reason is simple, in Hedges' view. Letting Madoff manage your money "wouldn't pass an institutional-quality due diligence process," he says. "Because when you get to page two of your 30-page due diligence questionnaire, you've already tripped eight alarms and said 'I'm out of here.' "
In short, in Hedges' opinion, any sophisticated entity that actually did its homework would have seen the warning signs.
Hedges got the chance to see those signs up close: In 1997, when he was advising the Bessemer Trust, the giant wealth manager, he visited Bernard Madoff to discuss investing with Madoff's firm.
"I found him stylistically like a lot of traders: fast-talking, distractable, not remarkable," Hedges says of Madoff. But during their two-hour meeting, Hedges says, "there was one red flag after another."
For starters, he couldn't grasp Madoff's investing strategy. "I kept saying, 'you've got to explain it to me like I'm in first grade,' " he says. To no avail.
Then there was the fact that Madoff was charging no fees other than trading commissions: "The notion that something is fee-less -- which is what they largely proferred -- is too good to be true."
The fact that Madoff's operation was audited by a microscopic accounting firm also worried him. "He was also so secretive about his asset base -- that was another red flag."
In the end, Hedges was uncomfortable and Bessemer decided not to let Madoff manage any of its money.
In Hedges' view, those that went with Madoff chose faith over evidence. "You've got people who
  • were disintermediated [i.e., didn't have a professional representative], or
  • unsophisticated, or
  • went in through a personal relationship.
That's what a con man is -- a confidence man is somebody that engenders a relationship and then subsequently lures somebody into doing something that they shouldn't do." (According to the federal criminal complaint against him, Madoff has confessed that he ran a "giant Ponzi scheme." His lawyer, Ira Sorkin, declined to comment.)
Certainly many of the institutions that turned to Madoff will challenge Hedges' views, as many will face litigation from their own clients. So far, two of the large fund-of-funds with the largest sums under Madoff's control, Tremont and Fairfield Greenwich, have already asserted that they conducted extensive due diligence before investing. Many others will take the same position.
Should Hedges' opinion be borne out and corporate and state pension funds remain absent from the roster of Madoff victims -- of course, there will be many more names added to the list -- it will only heighten the Madoff tragedy. Because, in the end, it would show that this was one investing disaster that could easily have been avoided.
First Published: December 16, 2008: 5:51 PM ET

Sunday 14 December 2008

Fund Fraud Hits Big Names: "I'm wiped out."

DECEMBER 13, 2008
Fund Fraud Hits Big Names
Madoff's Clients Included Mets Owner, GMAC Chairman, Country-Club Recruits

By ROBERT FRANK, PETER LATTMAN, DIONNE SEARCEY and AARON LUCCHETTI

New potential victims emerged of Wall Street veteran Bernard Madoff's alleged giant Ponzi scheme, with international banks, hedge funds and wealthy private investors among those sorting out what could amount to tens of billions of dollars in losses.

New York Mets owner Fred Wilpon, GMAC LLC Chairman J. Ezra Merkin and former Philadelphia Eagles owner Norman Braman were among the dozens of seemingly sophisticated investors who placed money on what could prove to be history's largest financial scam.

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Giant French bank BNP Paribas, Tokyo-based Nomura Holdings Inc. and Neue Privat Bank in Zurich are also exposed, according to people familiar with the matter.
And at least three funds of hedge funds -- which raise money from investors and farm it out to hedge funds -- may have significant losses. Fairfield Greenwich Group and Tremont Capital Management of New York placed hundreds of millions of their investors' dollars into funds overseen by Mr. Madoff. On Friday, Maxam Capital Management LLC reported a combined loss of $280 million on funds they had invested with Mr. Madoff.
"I'm wiped out," said Sandra Manzke, Maxam's founder and chairman. The Darien, Conn., fund of hedge funds will have to close as a result of the losses, she said.
Mr. Madoff, the founder and primary owner of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC in New York, was arrested and charged Thursday. Prosecutors allege that the 70-year-old Mr. Madoff hid losses, paying certain investors returns using principal he received from other investors. Prosecutors and regulators have yet to determine how much has been lost, or the amount in assets still held by Mr. Madoff's business.
The alleged fraud has "swept up some of the most prominent and wealthy Americans, along with many people who thought they were embarking on a comfortable retirement and have now been left destitute," says Brad Friedman, a lawyer at Milberg LLP, which with Seeger Weiss LLP represents more than 30 investors with losses they believe could total more than $1 billion.
In criminal and civil complaints, Mr. Madoff is quoted as saying the losses could amount to $50 billion.
"This is a real tragedy," Mr. Madoff's attorney, Ike Sorkin, said Friday. "We're going to fight through these events and do what we can to minimize the loss."

Details emerged Friday of how Mr. Madoff ran the alleged scam, fostering a veneer of exclusivity and creating an A-list of investors that became his most powerful marketing tool. From New York and Florida to Minnesota and Texas, the money manager became an insider's choice among well-heeled investors seeking steady returns. By hiring unofficial agents, tapping into elite country clubs and creating "invitation only" policies for investors, he recruited a steady stream of new clients.
During golf-course and cocktail-party banter, Mr. Madoff's name frequently surfaced as a money manager who could consistently deliver high returns. Older, Jewish investors called Mr. Madoff " 'the Jewish bond,' " says Ken Phillips, head of a Boulder, Colo., investment firm. "It paid 8% to 12%, every year, no matter what."
As his reputation grew, Mr. Madoff gained the trust of prominent businessmen, including ex-Eagles owner Mr. Braman, who owns a chain of Florida auto dealers. A voicemail message left with Mr. Braman's office was not immediately returned.
Mets owner Mr. Wilpon, who also owns real-estate investor Sterling Equities, often raved about Mr. Madoff's investment prowess and invested tens of millions of dollars of both his own money and the team's with his company, say financiers who have worked with him. Mr. Madoff handled investments for the Judy & Fred Wilpon Family Foundation, which distributed about $1 million a year in 2005 and 2006 to charities, according to its most recent federal tax returns..

Mets spokesman Jay Horowitz declined to comment Friday. Mr. Wilpon's Sterling Equities said in a statement: "We are shocked by recent events and, like all investors, will continue to monitor the situation."
Mr. Merkin, the chairman of former General Motors Corp. financing arm GMAC, is also a money manager at Ascot Partners LLC in New York. Ascot, which had $1.8 billion under management as of Sept. 30, had substantially all of its assets invested with Mr. Madoff, according to a letter to Mr. Merkin sent to clients Thursday night. Mr. Merkin said as one of the largest investors in Ascot, he believed he had personally "suffered major losses from this catastrophe."
Mr. Merkin could not be reached for comment.
Mr. Madoff tapped social networks in Dallas, Chicago, Boston and Minneapolis. In Minnesota, he attracted investors from Hillcrest Golf Club of St. Paul and Oak Ridge Country Club in Hopkins, investors say. One of them estimated that investors from the two clubs may have invested more than $100 million combined.
One of the largest clusters of Madoff investors was in Florida, where losses could be substantial. Mr. Madoff relied on a network of friends, family and business colleagues to attract investors. According to investors and agents, some of these agents were paid commissions for harvesting investors. Others had separate, lucrative business relationships with Mr. Madoff.
"If you were eating lunch at the club or golfing, everyone was always talking about how Madoff was making them all this money," one investor says. "Everyone wanted to sign up."
Jeff Fischer, a top divorce attorney in Palm Beach, says many of his clients were also Mr. Madoff's clients. "Every big divorce that came through my office had portfolio positions with Madoff," he says.
Two of his investors said that among his clients, Mr. Madoff was considered a money-management legend; they would joke that if Mr. Madoff was a fraud, he'd take down half the world with him.
Richard Spring, a Boca Raton resident and former securities analyst, says he had about $11 million -- or 95% of his net worth -- invested with Mr. Madoff. "That's how much I believed in him," Mr. Spring said.

Inside Wall Street's Madoff Scandal3:55
Another large-scale scandal rocks Wall Street as Bernard Madoff, a Wall Street titan and investment advisor was arrested for an alleged $50 billion dollar fraud against investors, WSJ's Kelsey Hubbard and Amir Efrati discuss.
Mr. Spring said he was also one of the unofficial agents who connected Mr. Madoff with dozens of investors, from a teacher who put in $50,000 to entrepreneurs and executives who would put in millions. Mr. Spring said Mr. Madoff didn't want people to put in large amounts right away. "Bernie would tell me, 'Let them start small, and if they're happy the first year or two, they can put it more.' "
Mr. Spring says he never was paid a commission, but he received fees from a small investment-research firm that counted Mr. Madoff as a client; he declined to say how much he received. He said investors would always come to him asking to invest with Mr. Madoff. "I never solicited anyone," he says.
Mr. Spring says he never detected signs of impropriety with Mr. Madoff's investing, but he concedes that he may receive some blame from some investors. "I can understand where people who lost money are looking for a scapegoat," he says. "I'm heartbroken that so many people have been hurt so badly."
Mr. Madoff's main go-between in Palm Beach was Robert Jaffe, say several investors. Mr. Jaffe is the son-in-law of Carl Shapiro, the founder and former chairman of apparel company Kay Windsor Inc. and an early investor and close friend of Mr. Madoff's. Mr. Jaffe, a philanthropist in Palm Beach, attracted many investors from the Palm Beach Country Club in Palm Beach, Fla.
A spokeswoman for Mr. Jaffe's family said several family members were investors with Mr. Madoff and were "significantly adversely impacted" by recent events. There are no indications that Mr. Jaffe or Mr. Spring are implicated in the alleged fraud. Mr. Jaffe didn't return messages yesterday.
Other investors stand to lose through their investments with the likes of Fairfield Greenwich Group and Tremont Capital Management, funds of hedge funds that invested their cash with Mr. Madoff.
"Needless to say, our level of anger and dismay over the apparent betrayal by Mr. Madoff and his organization of his 14-year relationship with Tremont is immeasurable," Tremont told clients in a letter Friday.
Fairfield Greenwich said in a statement late Friday that it is trying to assess the extent of potential losses. The firm said that on Nov. 1, it had $7.5 billion in investments connected to Mr. Madoff's firm, slightly more than half of its total assets. Founding partner Jeffrey Tucker said the firm had no indication of any potential wrongdoing. "We are shocked an appalled by this news," he said.
Ms. Manzke, 60, of Maxam Capital Management, said she met Mr. Madoff through investors in the mid-1980s and introduced him to Tremont, where she was then chief executive. That introduction led to Tremont's decision to market Mr. Madoff as a money manager to its own investors, she adds.
In November, she says, Maxam asked to pull $30 million from Mr. Madoff, and he returned the money.
"He was a low-key guy," Ms. Manzke says. "He would say, 'Look, I'm a market-maker, and I don't want anyone to know I'm running money.' It was always for select people. He was always closed, he wasn't taking new money."
Several European investors were also apparent victims. Bramdean Alternatives in the U.K. said it had more than 9% of its portfolio invested in Madoff funds. Geneva-based Banque Benedict Hentsch, a white-glove private bank, said it is exposed for $47.5 million.
BNP Paribas's exposure, the extent of which is not clear, may stem from BNP's lending relationship with a fund of funds that was a big Madoff client, said people familiar with the matter. A BNP spokeswoman declined to comment.
Nomura and Neue Privat Bank, meanwhile, together marketed access to Fairfield Sentry Ltd., a fund overseen by Mr. Madoff and sold through Fairfield Greenwich. The shares offered by Neue Privat and Nomura were leveraged three times -- meaning $3 of borrowed money was added to every $1 of capital invested in order to magnify returns, greatly increasing the potential losses for those investors.
A Nomura spokesman declined to comment. A message left with Neue Privat was not returned.
The federal complaints against Mr. Madoff allege his fraudulent activities came through a secretive private wealth-management wing of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, the investment firm he founded in 1960. On Wall Street, his company was perhaps better known for its operations in market-making -- the business of serving as a middleman between buyers and sellers -- and proprietary trading.
Through those higher-profile parts of his operation, Mr. Madoff was a pioneer in trading New York Stock Exchange shares away from the exchange.
He is a past chairman of the board of directors of the Nasdaq Stock Market as well as a member of the board of governors of the National Association of Securities Dealers and a member of numerous committees of the organization, according to his firm's Web site.
Mr. Madoff owns a home in Roslyn, N.Y., records show, and an elaborate beachfront home and grounds in Montauk on Long Island.
Mr. Madoff and his wife live in an apartment building on Manhattan's Upper East Side where property records list individual apartments valued at more than $5 million. One property database estimated the 2008 market value of Mr. Madoff's two-floor unit to be roughly $9 million. For years he has served as president of the building's co-op board, according to a tenant.
Tenants say he appeared down-to-earth, friendly and always greeted everyone by their first name.
Colleagues of Mr. Madoff said he was fair to those he dealt with and generous to charities including the Special Olympics. Mr. Madoff treated employees well and loved to take friends and colleagues on his 55-foot fishing boat, called Bull, said Frank Christensen, a retired New York Stock Exchange broker. "I really think very highly of him," said Mr. Christensen. "People make mistakes."—Matthew Futterman, Jenny Strasburg, David Enrich, and Craig Karmin contributed to this article.
Write to Robert Frank at robert.frank@wsj.com, Peter Lattman at peter.lattman@wsj.com, Dionne Searcey at dionne.searcey@wsj.com and Aaron Lucchetti at aaron.lucchetti@wsj.com

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122914169719104017.html

Fees, Even Returns and Auditor All Raised Flags



BUSINESS
DECEMBER 13, 2008
Fees, Even Returns and Auditor All Raised Flags
Interactive Graphics
By GREGORY ZUCKERMAN
Bernard L. Madoff is alleged to have pulled off one of the biggest frauds in Wall Street history. But there were multiple red flags along the way, including a series of accusations leveled against Mr. Madoff's operation. Now some are asking why regulators and investors didn't pick up on the alleged scheme long ago.
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Bernard Madoff
"There's no smoking gun, but if you added it all up you wonder why people either did not get it or chose to ignore the red flags," says Jim Vos, who runs Aksia LLC, a firm that advises investors and came away worried after examining Mr. Madoff's operation.
On Thursday, Mr. Madoff was arrested for what federal agents described as a massive Ponzi scheme, which could leave investors with billions in losses. A spokesman for Mr. Madoff said: "Bernie Madoff is a longstanding leader in the financial services industry and we are cooperating fully with the government and regulators investigations into this unfortunate set of events."
The first tip-off for some was the steady returns generated by the firm in every kind of market. Mr. Madoff would buy a basket of stocks resembling an S&P index while simultaneously selling options that pay off for the buyer if these stocks soar, while also buying options that pay off if the index tumbles. The supposed goal was to have smooth, steady returns.
Harry Markopolos, who years ago worked for a rival firm, researched Mr. Madoff's stock-options strategy and was convinced the results likely weren't real.
"Madoff Securities is the world's largest Ponzi Scheme," Mr. Markopolos, wrote in a letter to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in 1999.
Mr. Markopolos pursued his accusations over the past nine years, dealing with both the New York and Boston bureaus of the SEC, according to documents he sent to the SEC reviewed by The Wall Street Journal.

In a statement late Friday, the SEC said "staff from the Division of Enforcement in New York completed an investigation in 2007, and did not refer the matter to the Commission for enforcement action." The SEC said it reopened the investigation Thursday. It's not clear what the focus of the 2007 investigation was, or why it was closed. A person familiar with the matter said it related to issues raised by Mr. Markopolos.
Also striking some as odd: Mr. Madoff operated as a broker dealer with an asset management division. Why not simply act as a hedge fund and pocket big gains, rather than profit from trading commissions as the firm seemed to be doing, they asked.
Joe Aaron, for long a hedge fund professional, found that structure suspicious and in 2003 warned a colleague to steer clear of the fund. "Why would a good businessman work his magic for pennies on the dollar?"
Conflicts of interest also proved a concern. "There was no independent custodian involved who could prove the existence of assets," says Chris Addy, founder of Montreal-based Castle Hall Alternatives, which vets hedge funds for clients seeking to invest money. "There's a clear and blatant conflict of interest with a manager using a related-party broker-dealer. Madoff is enormously unusual in that this is not a structure I've seen."
Some trading pros said Mr. Madoff's purported strategy couldn't be pulled off profitably while managing tens of billions of dollars.
"It seemed implausible that the S&P 100 options market that Madoff purported to trade could handle the size of the combined feeder funds' assets which we estimated to be $13 billion," Mr. Vos says.
Recent securities filings showed that the firm held less than $1 billion of shares, raising questions about where the rest of the money was. Some of Mr. Madoff's investors say they were told the firm put the bulk of its money in cash-equivalents at the end of each quarter, explaining why the public filings showed so few shares, but raising questions about where the proof was for all the cash.

Inside Wall Street's Madoff Scandal3:55
Another large-scale scandal rocks Wall Street as Bernard Madoff, a Wall Street titan and investment advisor was arrested for an alleged $50 billion dollar fraud against investors, WSJ's Kelsey Hubbard and Amir Efrati discuss.
Until at least November, 2006, the firm, which claimed to manage billions of dollars and be among the largest market makers in the stock market, used as its auditor Friehling & Horowitz, a small New City, New York firm.
Mr. Vos says his firm hired a private investigator and determined that the accounting firm had only three employees, one of whom was 78 and lived in Florida, and another was a secretary, and that it operated in a 13 foot by 18 foot office. His firm felt that was too small an operation to keep an eye on such a large firm operating a complicated trading strategy. A message left for the accounting firm was not returned.
Meanwhile, a series of media stories also raised questions about Madoff's operations, including a piece entitled "Madoff Tops Charts; Skeptics Ask How" in industry publication MAR/Hedge in May, 2001, and a subsequent story in Barron's. Mr. Madoff generally brushed off reporters' questions, citing the audited results and arguing that his business was too complicated for outsiders to understand.—Kara Scannell and Jenny Strasburg contributed to this article
Write to Gregory Zuckerman at gregory.zuckerman@wsj.com

How Bernie Madoff Made Smart Folks Look Dumb

THE INTELLIGENT INVESTOR
DECEMBER 13, 2008
How Bernie Madoff Made Smart Folks Look Dumb
By JASON ZWEIG

What do George Carlin and Bernard Madoff have in common?
The late comedian immortalized oxymorons, those absurd word pairs like "jumbo shrimp" and "military intelligence." Mr. Madoff just put the silliest of all financial oxymorons into the spotlight: "sophisticated investor."
The accounts managed by Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC reported gains of roughly 1% a month like clockwork, with nary a loss, for two decades. Why did that freakishly smooth return not set off alarms among current and prospective investors?
Of all people, sophisticated investors like Mr. Madoff's clients should know that if something sounds too good to be true, then it's not. But they believed it anyway. Why?

Mr. Madoff emphasized secrecy, lending his investment accounts a mysterious allure and sense of exclusivity. The initial marketing often was in the hands of what one source described as "a macher" (the Yiddish term for a big shot). At the country club or another exclusive rendezvous, the macher would brag, "I've got my money invested with Madoff and he's doing really well." When his listener expressed interest, the macher would reply, "You can't get in unless you're invited...but I can probably get you in."
Robert Cialdini, a psychology professor at Arizona State University and author of "Influence: Science and Practice," calls this strategy "a triple-threat combination." The "murkiness" of a hedge fund, he says, makes investors feel that it is "the inherent domain of people who know more than we do." This uncertainty leads us to look for social proof: evidence that other people we trust have already decided to invest. And by playing up how exclusive his funds were, Mr. Madoff shifted investors' fears from the risk that they might lose money to the risk they might lose out on making money.
If you did get invited in, then you were anointed a member of this particular club of "sophisticated investors." Once someone you respect went out of his way to grant you access, says Prof. Cialdini, it would seem almost an "insult" to do any further investigation. Mr. Madoff also was known to throw investors out of his funds for asking too many questions, so no one wanted to rock the boat.
This members-only feeling blinded many buyers of Mr. Madoff's funds to the numerous red flags fluttering around his operation. When you are in an exclusive private club, you do not go rummaging around in the kitchen to make sure that the health code is being followed.
Here we have the biggest dirty secret of the "sophisticated investor": Due diligence often goes undone. For a brief window in 2006, the Securities and Exchange Commission required hedge funds to file standardized disclosure forms. William Goetzmann, a finance professor at Yale School of Management, found that hedge funds disclosing legal or regulatory problems and conflicts of interest ended up with lower future performance. But the disclosure of these risks had no impact at all on how much money flowed into the hedge funds.
In other words, investors were getting useful information -- and paying no attention to it.
Amaranth Advisors LLC, the commodity hedge fund that collapsed in 2006 with $6 billion in losses, did not even file the required SEC form at the beginning of that year, a clear signal that something might be wrong. Instead of standing pat or pulling money out, investors poured more money in.
Last year, the Greenwich Roundtable, a nonprofit that researches alternative investments, conducted a survey of consultants, pension plans, "family offices," funds of funds and other large investors who shop for hedge funds. It's hard to imagine a more sophisticated crowd.
Yet one out of five investors in the survey reported that they "always follow" not a formal checklist or analytical procedure, but rather "an informal process" of due diligence.
That's for sure.

  • One out of four investors surveyed will write a check without having studied the financial statements of the fund.
  • Nearly one in three will not always run a background check on fund managers;
  • 6% may not even read the prospectus before ever committing money.
"Due diligence," says Stephen McMenamin of the Greenwich Roundtable, "is the art of asking good questions." It's also the art of not taking answers on faith.

If you invest with anyone who claims never to lose money, reports amazingly smooth returns, will not explain his strategy, refuses to disclose basic information or discuss potential risks, you're not sophisticated. You're an oxymoron.
Email: intelligentinvestor@wsj.com

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122912266389002855.html