Research shows executives are tempted take short-cuts to hit quarterly numbers
WEI JIANG
Are our markets really too focused on immediate results at the expense of long-term growth?
Wei Jiang JULY 25 2019
Charges of short-termism have been aimed at financial markets and companies for decades, but concerns have intensified recently. Now US regulators are asking whether rule changes are needed to address the issue.
But are our markets really too focused on immediate results at the expense of long-term growth? As an academic finance professor, I believe we can rely on empirical research on how the market values highly innovative companies. Innovation, after all, is the ultimate proof that companies are investing for the long haul.
First, let’s look at whether companies are discouraged from risky investments aimed at ambitious discoveries or from deploying unconventional methods. A 2013 study found that highly innovative companies — as identified by high levels of research and development spending — are fairly priced, rather than heavily discounted as “market short-termism” would predict. Their future stock returns are comparable with those earned by other companies in the same class.
In fact, the study found that many high R&D companies with lower past success — as reflected in their ability to convert R&D spending future sales growth — are, if anything, overvalued for an extended period of time. That suggests public market investors are rather tolerant of failure.
We must consider, too, the impact of hedge fund activists, who often seek payouts through share buybacks. Critics say that these reduce the value of the companies in the long run by leading to reduced investment in innovation. But not all R&D spending is created equal. A study that three co-authors and I published last year found that while corporate spending on R&D does tend to fall in the year following interventions by shareholder activists, the R&D spending that remains becomes more productive.
At such companies, the number of new patents increased by 15 per cent, three to five years after the activists’ intervention, and the number of citations per patent — an indicator of patent impact or quality — also rose by 15 per cent. That suggests increased R&D efficiency and additional innovation.
Some investors, then, are more than willing to take the long view. But what about corporate managers? Evidence suggests that executive shortsightedness is not only a possibility, but can be a likely outcome in today’s markets.
Here’s why: most businesses are at risk of “stakeholder runs.” Creditors, suppliers and employees may seek to flee at the first sign of trouble, so the perception — possibly distinguished from the reality — of financial health is vital. Hence managers will often take actions that favour current observable results — think earnings here — to convince (or in some cases mislead) the market about a company’s fundamental health.
Investors are typically not fooled: they understand the incentives for managers to set and then beat earnings targets, and they correctly suspect that there will be “short-termist” efforts to meet those targets — stuffing inventories into the supply chain or cutting productive R&D if necessary.
Once it becomes clear managers are willing to play the earnings “game”, investors adjust when pricing the stock. For such companies, missing forecasts by small amounts can trigger a big sell-off because investors expect executives to exhaust all possible resources to meet their targets. Companies can short-circuit this unproductive cycle by avoiding quarterly earnings guidelines and a number of them have done so. This allows them to focus on other measures of performance, such as R&D spending and patent filing.
While short-termism can be a problem for our financial markets, the long-term is, of course, nothing more than a continuous series of short-terms. Investors can make it easier for companies to arrive at the right long-term mark by encouraging them to pick intermediate goals that keep them on the right path.
The writer is a Columbia Business School professor of finance
https://www.ft.com/content/3249bce4-ac8c-11e9-b3e2-4fdf846f48f5
WEI JIANG
Are our markets really too focused on immediate results at the expense of long-term growth?
Wei Jiang JULY 25 2019
Charges of short-termism have been aimed at financial markets and companies for decades, but concerns have intensified recently. Now US regulators are asking whether rule changes are needed to address the issue.
But are our markets really too focused on immediate results at the expense of long-term growth? As an academic finance professor, I believe we can rely on empirical research on how the market values highly innovative companies. Innovation, after all, is the ultimate proof that companies are investing for the long haul.
First, let’s look at whether companies are discouraged from risky investments aimed at ambitious discoveries or from deploying unconventional methods. A 2013 study found that highly innovative companies — as identified by high levels of research and development spending — are fairly priced, rather than heavily discounted as “market short-termism” would predict. Their future stock returns are comparable with those earned by other companies in the same class.
In fact, the study found that many high R&D companies with lower past success — as reflected in their ability to convert R&D spending future sales growth — are, if anything, overvalued for an extended period of time. That suggests public market investors are rather tolerant of failure.
We must consider, too, the impact of hedge fund activists, who often seek payouts through share buybacks. Critics say that these reduce the value of the companies in the long run by leading to reduced investment in innovation. But not all R&D spending is created equal. A study that three co-authors and I published last year found that while corporate spending on R&D does tend to fall in the year following interventions by shareholder activists, the R&D spending that remains becomes more productive.
At such companies, the number of new patents increased by 15 per cent, three to five years after the activists’ intervention, and the number of citations per patent — an indicator of patent impact or quality — also rose by 15 per cent. That suggests increased R&D efficiency and additional innovation.
Some investors, then, are more than willing to take the long view. But what about corporate managers? Evidence suggests that executive shortsightedness is not only a possibility, but can be a likely outcome in today’s markets.
Here’s why: most businesses are at risk of “stakeholder runs.” Creditors, suppliers and employees may seek to flee at the first sign of trouble, so the perception — possibly distinguished from the reality — of financial health is vital. Hence managers will often take actions that favour current observable results — think earnings here — to convince (or in some cases mislead) the market about a company’s fundamental health.
Investors are typically not fooled: they understand the incentives for managers to set and then beat earnings targets, and they correctly suspect that there will be “short-termist” efforts to meet those targets — stuffing inventories into the supply chain or cutting productive R&D if necessary.
Once it becomes clear managers are willing to play the earnings “game”, investors adjust when pricing the stock. For such companies, missing forecasts by small amounts can trigger a big sell-off because investors expect executives to exhaust all possible resources to meet their targets. Companies can short-circuit this unproductive cycle by avoiding quarterly earnings guidelines and a number of them have done so. This allows them to focus on other measures of performance, such as R&D spending and patent filing.
While short-termism can be a problem for our financial markets, the long-term is, of course, nothing more than a continuous series of short-terms. Investors can make it easier for companies to arrive at the right long-term mark by encouraging them to pick intermediate goals that keep them on the right path.
The writer is a Columbia Business School professor of finance
https://www.ft.com/content/3249bce4-ac8c-11e9-b3e2-4fdf846f48f5
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