The Investor and Market Fluctuations: Mr. Market Parable (7)

Mr.Market Parable.

Imagine that in some private business you own a small share that cost you $1,000. One of your partners, named Mr. Market, is very obliging indeed.

• Every day he tells you what he thinks your interest is worth and furthermore offers either to buy you out or to sell you an additional interest on that basis. 
• Sometimes his idea of value appears plausible and justified by business developments and prospects as you know them. 
• Often, on the other hand, Mr.Market lets his enthusiasm or his fears run away with him, and the value he proposes seems to you a little short of silly.

If you are a prudent investor or a sensible businessman, will you let Mr. Market’s daily communication determine your view of the value of a $1,000 interest in the enterprise? Only in case you agree with him, or in case you want to trade with him. 

• You may be happy to sell out to him when he quotes you a ridiculously high price, and 
• equally happy to buy from him when his price is low. 
• But the rest of the time you will be wiser to form your own ideas of the value of your holdings, based on full reports from the company about its operations and financial position.

The Investor and Market Fluctuations: Stock Market Equity Ownership has the important attribute of Liquidity (6)

Critics of the value approach to stock investment argue that listed common stocks cannot properly be regarded or appraised in the same way as an interest in a similar private enterprise, because the presence of an organized security market “injects into equity ownership the new and extremely important attribute of liquidity.”

But what this liquidity really means is, 

• first, that the investor has the benefit of the stock market’s daily and changing appraisal of his holdings, for whatever that appraisal may be worth, and, 
• second, that the investor is able to increase or decrease his investment at the market’s daily figure—if he chooses. 

Thus the existence of a quoted market gives the investor  certain options that he does not have if his security is unquoted.

But it does not impose the current quotation on an investor who prefers to take his idea of value from some other source.

The Investor and Market Fluctuations: The Single Most Important Paragraph in Graham's entire book for the Bear Markets (5)

Let us return to our comparison between the holder of marketable shares and the man with an interest in a private business.  We have said that the former has the option of considering himself merely

• as the part owner of the various businesses he has invested in, or 
• as the holder of shares which are salable at any time he wishes at their quoted market price.

But note this important fact:
The true investor scarcely ever is forced to sell his shares, and at all other times he is free to disregard the current price quotation. He need pay attention to it and act upon it only to the extent that it suits his book, and no more.* Thus the investor who permits himself to be stampeded or unduly worried by unjustified market declines in his holdings is perversely transforming his basic advantage into a basic disadvantage. That man would be better off if his stocks had no market quotation at all, for he would then be spared the mental anguish caused him by other persons’ mistakes of judgment.†



* “Only to the extent that it suits his book” means “only to the extent that the price is favorable enough to justify selling the stock.” In traditional brokerage lingo, the “book” is an investor’s ledger of holdings and trades.

† This may well be the single most important paragraph in Graham’s entire book. In these 113 words Graham sums up his lifetime of experience. You cannot read these words too often; they are like Kryptonite for bear markets.  If you keep them close at hand and let them guide you throughout your investing life, you will survive whatever the markets throw at you.






Incidentally, a widespread situation of this kind actually existed during the dark depression days of 1931–1933.  There was then a psychological advantage in owning business interests that had no quoted market. 

• For example, people who owned first mortgages on real estate that continued to pay interest were able to tell themselves that their investments had kept their full value, there being no market quotations to indicate otherwise. 
• On the other hand, many listed corporation bonds of even better quality and greater underlying strength suffered severe shrinkages in their market quotations, thus making their owners believe they were growing distinctly poorer. 

In reality the owners were better off with the listed securities, despite the low prices of these.

• For if they had wanted to, or were compelled to, they could at least have sold the issues—possibly to exchange them for even better bargains. 
• Or they could just as logically have ignored the market’s action as temporary and basically meaningless. 

But it is self-deception to tell yourself that you have suffered no shrinkage in value  merely because your securities have no quoted market at all.

Returning to our A. & P. shareholder in 1938, we assert that as long as he held on to his shares he suffered no loss in their price decline, beyond what his own judgment may have told him was occasioned by a shrinkage in their underlying or intrinsic value. 

• If no such shrinkage had occurred, he had a right to expect that in due course the market quotation would return to the 1937 level or better—as in fact it did the following year. 
• In this respect his position was at least as good as if he had owned an interest in a private business with no quoted market for its shares. 
• For in that case, too, he might or might not have been justified in mentally lopping off part of the cost of his holdings because of the impact of the 1938 recession—depending on what had happened to his company.

Ref:  Intelligent Investor by Benjamin Graham

The Investor and Market Fluctuations: The story of the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company Shares (4)

There are two chief morals to this story.

• The first is that the stock market often goes far wrong, and sometimes an alert and courageous investor can take advantage of its patent errors. 
• The other is that most businesses change in character and quality over the years, sometimes for the better, perhaps more often for the worse.  The investor need not watch his companies’ performance like a hawk; but he should give it a good, hard look from time to time.

The Investor and Market Fluctuations: The story of the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company Shares (3)

We see in this history how wide can be the vicissitudes of a major American enterprise in little more than a single generation, and also with what miscalculations and excesses of optimism and pessimism the public has valued its shares.

• In 1938 the business was really being given away, with no takers; 
• in 1961 the public was clamoring for the shares at a ridiculously high price. 
• After that came a quick loss of half the market value, and some years later a substantial further decline. 

In the meantime the company was to turn from an outstanding to a mediocre earnings performer; 

• its profit in the boom-year 1968 was to be less than in 1958;
• it had paid a series of confusing small stock dividends not warranted by the current additions to surplus; and so forth. 
• A. & P. was a larger company in 1961 and 1972 than in 1938, but not as well-run, not as profitable, and not as attractive.*

* The more recent history of A & P is no different.

• At year-end 1999, its share price was $27.875; 
• at year-end 2000, $7.00; 
• a year later, $23.78; 
• at year-end 2002, $8.06. 

Although some accounting irregularities later came to light at A & P, it defies all logic to believe that the value of a relatively stable business like groceries could

• fall by three-fourths in one year, 
• triple the next year, 
• then drop by two-thirds the year after that.

Ref:  Intelligent Investor  by Benjamin Graham

The Investor and Market Fluctuations: The story of the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company Shares (2)

A. & P. shares  were introduced to trading on the “Curb” market, now the American Stock Exchange, in 1929 and sold as high as 494.  

• By 1932 they had declined to 104, although the company’s earnings were nearly as large in that generally catastrophic year as previously. 
• In 1936 the range was between 111 and 131. 
• Then in the business recession and bear market of 1938 the shares fell to a new low of 36.

Sequel and Reflections

The following year, 1939, A. & P. shares advanced to 117 1⁄2, or three times the low price of 1938 and well above the average of 1937. 

• Such a turnabout in the behavior of common stocks is by no means uncommon, but in the case of A. & P. it was more striking than most. 
• In the years after 1949 the grocery chain’s shares rose with the general market 
• until in 1961 the split-up stock (10 for 1) reached a high of 70 1⁄2 which was equivalent to 705 for the 1938 shares.  

This price of 70 1⁄2 was remarkable for the fact it was 30 times the earnings of 1961. 

• Such a price/earnings ratio—which compares with 23 times for the DJIA in that year—must have implied expectations of a brilliant growth in earnings. 
• This optimism had no justification in the company’s earnings record in the preceding years, and it proved completely wrong. 
• Instead of advancing rapidly, the course of earnings in the ensuing period was generally downward.  
• The year after the 70 1⁄2 high the price fell by more than half to 34.   
• But this time the shares did not have the bargain quality that they showed at the low quotation in 1938. 
• After varying sorts of fluctuations the price fell to another low of 211/2 in 1970 and 18 in 1972—having reported the first quarterly deficit in its history.

Ref: Intelligent Investor by Benjamin Graham

The Investor and Market Fluctuations: The story of the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company Shares (1)

The A. & P. Example

At this point we shall introduce one of our original examples, which dates back many years but which has a certain fascination for us because it combines so many aspects of corporate and investment experience. It involves the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. Here is the story:

A. & P. shares  were introduced to trading on the “Curb” market, now the American Stock Exchange, in 1929 and sold as high as 494.  

• By 1932 they had declined to 104, although the company’s earnings were nearly as large in that generally catastrophic year as previously. 
• In 1936 the range was between 111 and 131. 
• Then in the business recession and bear market of 1938 the shares fell to a new low of 36.

That price was extraordinary.

• It meant that the preferred and common were together selling for $126 million, although the company had just reported that it held $85 million in cash alone and a working capital (or net current assets) of $134 million. 
• A. & P. was the largest retail enterprise in America, if not in the world, with a continuous and impressive record of large earnings for many years. 
• Yet in 1938 this outstanding business was considered on Wall Street to be worth less than its current assets alone—which means less as a going concern than if it were liquidated. 

Why? 

• First, because there were threats of special taxes on chain stores; 
• second, because net profits had fallen off in the previous year; and, 
• third, because the general market was depressed. 
• The first of these reasons was an exaggerated and eventually groundless fear; the other two were typical of temporary influences.

Let us assume that the investor had bought A. & P. common in 1937 at, say, 12 times its five-year average earnings, or about 80.  We are far from asserting that the ensuing decline to 36 was of no importance to him.

• He would have been well advised to scrutinize the picture with some care, to see whether he had made any miscalculations. 
• But if the results of his study were reassuring—as they should have been—he was entitled then to disregard the market decline as a temporary vagary of finance, unless he had the funds and the courage to take advantage of it by buying more on the bargain basis offered.

Ref; Intelligent Investor by Benjamin Graham

Good managements produce a good average market price, and bad managements produce bad market prices.

Market Price Fluctuations:  An Added Consideration

Something should be said about the significance of average market prices as a measure of managerial competence. 

• The shareholder judges whether his own investment has been successful in terms both of dividends received and of the long-range trend of the average market value. 
• The same criteria should logically be applied in testing the effectiveness of a company’s management and the soundness of its attitude toward the owners of the business.

This statement may sound like a truism, but it needs to be emphasized.

• For as yet there is no accepted technique or approach by which management is brought to the bar of market opinion. 

On the contrary, managements have always insisted that they have no responsibility of any kind for what happens to the market value of their shares.

• It is true, of course, that they are not accountable for those fluctuations in price which, as we have been insisting, bear no relationship to underlying conditions and values. 
• But it is only the lack of alertness and intelligence among the rank and file of shareholders that permits this immunity to extend to the entire realm of market quotations, including the permanent establishment of a depreciated and unsatisfactory price level. 

Good managements produce a good average market price, and bad managements produce bad market prices.

The investor with a portfolio of sound stocks should expect their prices to fluctuate

The investor with a portfolio of sound stocks should expect their prices to fluctuate and should

• neither be concerned by sizable declines 
• nor become excited by sizable advances. 

He should always remember that market quotations are there for his convenience,

• either to be taken advantage of or 
• to be ignored. 

He should never 

• buy a stock because it has gone up or 
• sell one because it has gone down. 

He would not be far wrong if this motto read more simply: “Never buy a stock immediately after a substantial rise or sell one immediately after a substantial drop.”

Activities that emphasize price movements first and underlying values second tend to be self-neutralizing and self-defeating over the years.

Aside from forecasting the movements of the general market, much effort and ability are directed on Wall Street toward selecting stocks or industrial groups that in matter of price will “do better” than the rest over a fairly short period in the future. 

Logical as this endeavor may seem, we do not believe it is suited to the needs or temperament of the true investor—particularly since he would be competing with a large number of stock-market traders and firstclass financial analysts who are trying to do the same thing.

As  in all other activities that emphasize price movements first and underlying values second, the work of many intelligent minds constantly engaged in this field tends to be self-neutralizing and selfdefeating over the years.

The most realistic distinction between the investor and the speculator is found in their attitude toward stock-market movements.

The most realistic distinction between the investor and the speculator is found in their attitude toward stock-market movements.  

The speculator’s primary interest lies in anticipating and profiting from market fluctuations. 

The investor’s primary interest lies in acquiring and holding suitable securities at suitable prices.

Market movements are important to him in a practical sense, because they alternately create 

• low price levels at which he would be wise to buy and 
• high price levels at which he certainly should refrain from buying and probably would be wise to sell.

Market price fluctuations have only one significant meaning for the true investor.

Basically, price fluctuations have only one significant meaning for the true investor. They provide him with an opportunity 

• to buy wisely when prices fall sharply and 
• to sell wisely when they advance a great deal. 

At other times he will do better if he forgets about the stock market and pays attention to his dividend returns and to the operating results of his companies.

Investor of marketable shares has a double status, with the privilege of taking advantage of either at his choice.

The impact of market fluctuations upon the investor’s true situation may be considered also from the standpoint of the shareholder as the part owner of various businesses.

The holder of marketable shares actually has a double status, and with it the privilege of taking advantage of either at his choice. 

1.  On the one hand his position is analogous to that of a minority shareholder or silent partner in a private business.

• Here his results are entirely dependent on the profits of the enterprise or on a change in the underlying value of its assets. 
• He would usually determine the value of such a private-business interest by calculating his share of the net worth as shown in the most recent balance sheet. 

2.  On the other hand, the common-stock investor holds a piece of paper, an engraved stock certificate.

• This stock certificate can be sold in a matter of minutes at a price which varies from moment to moment—when the market is open, that is—and often is far removed from the balance sheet value.

Two ways to profit from the market swings: Timing or Pricing

Since common stocks, even of investment grade, are subject to recurrent and wide fluctuations in their prices, the intelligent investor should be interested in the possibilities of profiting from these pendulum swings. There are two possible ways by which  he may try to do this:

• the way of timing and 
• the way of  pricing.

By timing we mean the endeavor to anticipate the action of the stock market—

• to buy or hold when the future course is deemed to be upward, 
• to sell or refrain from buying when the course is downward. 

By pricing we mean the endeavor

• to buy stocks when they are quoted below their fair value and 
• to sell them when they rise above such value. 

A less ambitious form of pricing is  the simple effort to make sure that when you buy you do not  pay too much for your stocks. 

• This may suffice for the defensive investor, whose emphasis is on long-pull holding; but as  such it represents an essential minimum of attention to market levels.

We are convinced that the intelligent investor can derive satisfactory results from pricing of either type. 

We are equally sure that if he places his emphasis on timing, in the sense of forecasting, he will end up as a speculator and with a speculator’s financial results. 

This distinction may seem rather tenuous to the layman, and it is not commonly accepted on Wall Street. As a matter of business practice, or perhaps of thoroughgoing conviction, the stock brokers and the investment services seem wedded to the principle that both investors and speculators in common stocks should devote careful attention to market forecasts.

The Investor and Market Fluctuations

To the extent that the investor’s funds are placed

• in high-grade bonds of relatively short maturity—say, of seven years or less—he will not be affected significantly by changes in market prices and need not take them into account. 
• (This applies also to his holdings of U.S. savings bonds, which he can always turn in at his cost price or more.) 
• His longer-term bonds may have relatively wide price swings during their lifetimes, and 
• his common-stock portfolio is almost certain to fluctuate in value over any period of several years.

The investor should know about these possibilities and should be prepared for them both financially and psychologically.  He will want to benefit from changes in market levels—

• certainly through an advance in the value of his stock holdings as time goes on, and 
• perhaps also by making purchases and sales at advantageous prices. 

This interest on his part is inevitable, and legitimate enough. But it involves the very real danger that it will lead him into speculative attitudes and activities. 

• It is easy for us to tell you not to speculate; the hard thing will be for you to follow this advice. 
• Let us repeat what we said at the outset: If you want to speculate do so with your eyes open, knowing that you will probably lose money in the end; be sure to limit the amount at risk and to separate it completely from your investment program.

What can the past record of the market actions promises the investor—

• in either the form of long-term appreciation of a portfolio held relatively unchanged through successive rises and declines, 
• or in the possibilities of buying near bear-market lows and selling not too far below bull-market highs?

Ref:  Intelligent Investor by Benjamin Graham.

Market Analysis and Market Traders

Investors are continually bombarded with market analyses, all of which fall into one of two categories:

1. The first approach is backward looking. It constitutes "chart reading" of past behaviour.
2. The second is forward looking. It anticipates interest rate changes, industry cycles, business and political conditions that might impact corporate earnings or investor attitude.

Trading on market movements seems easier and maybe more PROFITABLE IN THE SHORT RUN, but it is MORE DIFFICULT FOR MARKET TRADERS to ACCUMULATE LONG-RUN PROFITS AND HOLD ON TO GAINS.

In market analysis there are NO margin of safety; you are either right or wrong, and if you are wrong, you lose money.

Benjamin Graham took a conservative approach to investments. He viewed the stock market as a RISKY PLACE where investors can make money as long as they keep their heads about them.

Thriving in Every Market

Understand the market's reason for being. "It is important that an issue be readily saleable, it is still more important that it command a satisfactory price."

"Value in relation to price, not price alone, must determine your investment decisions." Just because a stock seems cheap or dear doesn't,t mean that it should be bought or sold.

Though investors cannot predict market conditions, they can take advantage of conditions once they are recognised.

It's not a stock market, it's a market of stocks. Any company can be out of step with the market, ready to be bought and sold in it's own good time.

Market Behaviour: Crowd Behaviour IMPACTS Stock Prices

As a value investor, it is important to think for yourself and not follow the crowd.  But it is still important to understand market crowd behaviour and, by understanding that behaviour, know when the stock market is ripe for the picking.  (BFS, STS).

Be careful not to get caught up in the financial press hype if you do choose to listen to it.

Related topics:

Market Behaviour: The Least You Need to Know
Market Behaviour: Crowd Impacts on Stock Prices

Market Behaviour: Can You Beat the Market?
Market Behaviour: Bull Runs
Market Behaviour: Bear Stalls
Market Behaviour: Pendulum Swings (Volatility)
Market Behaviour: Irrational Exuberance
Market Behaviour: Unjustifiable Pessimism
Market Behaviour: Control Yourself (Patience)

Famous Mr. Market Parable

Stocks will fluctuate substantially in value. For a true investor, the only significant meaning of price fluctuations is that they offer ". . . an opportunity to buy wisely when prices fall sharply and to sell wisely when they advance a great deal." 

Using his famous Mr. Market parable, Graham suggests the attitude one should adopt toward fluctuations in prices. Imagine owning a $1,000 interest in a business along with a partner, Mr. Market. 

Every day the accommodating Mr. Market offers either to buy your interest or to sell you a larger interest. Sometimes his price is ridiculously high, allowing you a good opportunity to sell. At other times his price is ridiculously low, allowing you a good opportunity to buy. Still at other times, his quotes are roughly justified by the business outlook, and you can ignore them. 

The point is that the market is there for your convenience and profit. And market valuations are often wrong. Price fluctuations, Graham believes ". . . bear no relationship to underlying conditions and values." It is a mistake, he argued, to let the market determine what stocks are worth. Generally an investor will be wiser to form independent stock valuations, and then to exploit divergences between those valuations and the market's prices.

Graham's Mr. Market parable is related to his view of technical analysis. According to Graham, nearly all of technical analysis is based on buying stock when prices have risen and selling when they have fallen. Based on over 50 years' experience, he had ". . . not known a single person who had consistently or lastingly made money by thus 'following the market.'" This approach, he declared, ". . . is as fallacious as it is popular." 

What determines the share price changes?

Some of the stocks have gained hugely and some have not moved upwards significantly. A few actually went lower in price.

What determines these share price changes?

Changes in these 3 areas influence the share prices of these stocks the last few months (from March 2009). Let me, based on my rule of thumb assessment, post these below.

HaiO

Business fundamental change +++

Sector change +/-
Market cycle change ++

PBB

Business fundamental change +

Sector change +

Market cycle change ++

HLB

Business fundamental change +

Sector change +

Market cycle change ++

Tong Herr

Business fundamental change ---

Sector change --

Market cycle change ++

LionDiv

Business fundamental change ---

Sector change --

Market cycle change ++

Maybulk

Business fundamental change --

Sector change --

Market cycle change ++

Coastal

Business fundamental change +++

Sector change --

Market cycle change ++

KNM

Business fundamental change -

Sector change -

Market cycle change ++

Nestle

Business fundamental change +

Sector change +/-

Market cycle change ++

Dutch Lady

Business fundamental change +

Sector change +/-

Market cycle change ++

PPB

Business fundamental change ++

Sector change +/-

Market cycle change ++

Top Glove

Business fundamental change +++

Sector change ++

Market cycle change ++

Latexx

Business fundamental change +++

Sector change ++

Market cycle change ++

KLK

Business fundamental change +

Sector change +/-

Market cycle change ++

PetDag

Business fundamental change +

Sector change +/-

Market cycle change ++

Parkson

Business fundamental change +

Sector change +/-

Market cycle change ++

UMW

Business fundamental change +/-

Sector change +/-

Market cycle change ++

Observations:

The market cycle has turned upwards since March 2009. The impact of the market cycle on individual stock prices is not uniform.

The individual stock price is driven mostly, upwards or downwards, by the changes in its underlying business fundamentals.

Though certain sectors may have a negative outlook, some individual stocks within these sectors perform well due to their good business fundamentals.