Three central elements to a value-investment philosophy.

There are three central elements to a value-investment philosophy.

• First, value investing is a bottom-up strategy entailing the identification of specific undervalued investment opportunities.
• Second, value investing is absolute-performance,  not relative performance oriented. 
• Finally, value investing is a risk-averse approach; attention is paid as much to what can go wrong (risk) as to what can go right (return)

It is hard to prove an overly optimistic investor wrong in the short run

To some extent value, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder; virtually any security may appear to be a bargain to someone. It is hard to prove an overly optimistic investor wrong in the short run since value is not precisely measurable and since stocks can remain overvalued for a long time. Accordingly, the buyer of virtually any security can claim to be a value investor at least for a while.

Ironically, many true value investors fell into disfavor during the late 1980s. As they avoided participating in the fully valued and overvalued securities that the value pretenders claimed to be bargains, many of them temporarily underperformed the results achieved by the value pretenders . The mos t conservative were actually criticized for their "excessive" caution, prudence that proved well founded in 1990.

Even today many of the value pretenders have not been defrocked of their value-investor mantle. There were many articles in financial periodicals chronicling the poor investment results posted by many so-called value investors in 1990. The top of the list, needless to say, was dominated by va lue pretenders

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Avoiding loss should be the primary goal of every investor

Warren Buffett likes to say that the first rule of investing is "Don't lose money," and the second rule is, "Never forget the first rule." I too believe that avoiding loss should be the primary goal of every investor. This does not mean that investors should never incur the risk of any loss at all. Rather "don't lose money" means that over several years an investment portfolio should not be exposed to appreciable loss of principal.

While no one wishes to incur losses, you couldn't prove it from an examination of the behavior of most investors and speculators. The speculative urge that lies within most of us is strong; the prospect of a free lunch can be compelling, especially when others have already seemingly partaken. It can be hard to concentrate on potential losses while others are greedily reaching for gains and your broker is on the phone offering shares in the latest "hot" initial public offering. Yet the avoidance of loss is the surest way to ensure a profitable outcome.

A loss-avoidance strategy is at odds with recent conventional market wisdom. Today many people believe that risk comes, not from owning stocks, but from not owning them. Stocks as a group, this line of thinking goes, will outperform bonds or cash equivalents over time, just as they have in the past. Indexing is one manifestation of this view. The tendency of most institutional investors to be fully invested at all times is another.

There is an element of truth to this notion; stocks do figure to outperform bonds and cash over the years. Being junior in a company's capital structure and lacking contractual cash flows and maturity dates, equities are inherently riskier than debt instruments. In a corporate liquidation, for example, the equity only receives the residual after all liabilities are satisfied.  To persuade investors to venture into equities rather than safer debt instruments, they must be enticed by the prospect of higher returns. However, the actual risk of a particular investment cannot be determined from historical data. It depends on the price paid. If enough investors believe the argument that equities will offer the best long-term returns, they may pour money into stocks, bidding prices up to levels at which they no longer offer the superior returns. The risk of loss stemming from equity's place in the capital structure is exacerbated by paying a higher price.

Waiting for the Right Pitch

For a value investor a pitch must not only be in the strike zone, it must be in his "sweet spot."  Results will be best when the investor is not pressured to invest prematurely.  There may be times when the investor does not lift the bat from his shoulder, the cheapest security in an overvalued market may still be overvalued.  You wouldn't want to settle for an investment offering a safe 10 percent return if you thought it very likely that another offering an equally safe 15 percent return would soon materialize.

An investment must be purchased at a discount from underlying worth.  This makes it a good absolute value.  Being a good absolute value alone, however, is not sufficient for investors must choose only the best absolute values among those that are currently available.  A stock trading at one-half of the underlying value may be attractive, but another trading at one-fourth of its worth is the better bargain.  This dual discipline compounds the difficulty of the investment task for value investors compared with most others.

Value investors continually compare potential new investments with their current holdings in order to ensure that they own only the most undervalued opportunities available.  Investors should never be afraid to reexamine current holdings as new opportunities appear, even if that means realizing losses on the sale of current holdings.  In other words, no investment should be considered sacred when a better one comes along.

Sometimes dozens of good pitches are thrown consecutively to a value investor. In panicky markets, for example, the number of undervalued securities increases and the degree of undervaluation also grows. In buoyant markets, by contrast, both the number of undervalued securities and their degree of undervaluation declines. When attractive opportunities are plentiful, value investors are able to sift carefully through all the bargains for the ones they find most attractive. When attractive opportunities are scarce, however, investors mus t exhibit great self-discipline in order to maintain the integrity of the valuation process and limit the price paid. Above all, investors must always avoid swinging at bad pitches.

Be willing to hold cash reserves when no bargains are available

Absolute-performance-oriented investors, by contrast, are willing to hold cash reserves when no bargains are available.

Cash is liquid and provides a modest, sometimes attractive nominal return, usually above the rate of inflation.

The liquidity of cash affords flexibility, for it can quickly be channelled into other investment outlets with minimal transaction costs. 

Finally, unlike any other holding, cash does not involve any risk of incurring opportunity cost (losses from the inability to take advantage of future bargains) since it does not drop in value during market declines

Value Investment Philosophy

Value investing is the discipline of buying securities at a significant discount from their current underlying values and holding them until more of their value is realized. The element of a bargain is the key to the process. In the language of value investors, this is referred to as buying a dollar for fifty cents. Value investing combines the conservative analysis of underlying value with the requisite discipline and patience to buy only when a sufficient discount from that value is available. The number of available bargains varies, and the gap between the price and value of any given security can be very narrow or extremely wide. Sometimes a value investor will review in depth a great many potential investments without finding a single one that is sufficiently attractive. Such persistence is necessary, however, since value is often well hidden.


The disciplined pursuit of bargains makes value investing very much a risk-averse approach. The greatest challenge for value investors is maintaining the required discipline. Being a value investor usually means standing apart from the crowd, challenging conventional wisdom, and opposing the prevailing investment winds . It can be a very lonely undertaking. A value investor may experience poor, even horrendous , performance compared with that of other investors or the market as a whole during prolonged periods of market overvaluation. Yet over the long run the value approach works so successfully that few, if any, advocates of the philosophy ever abandon it.

A notable feature of value investing is its strong performance in periods of overall market decline.

Whenever the financial markets fail to fully incorporate fundamental values into securities prices, an investor's margin of safety is high.

• Stock and bond prices may anticipate continued poor business results, yet securities priced to reflect those depressed fundamentals may have little room to fall further. 
• Moreover, securities priced as if nothing could go right stand to benefit from a change in perception. If investors refocused on the strengths rather than on the difficulties, higher security prices would result. 
• When fundamentals do improve, investors could benefit both from better results and from an increased multiple applied to them.

Example:


In early 1987 the shares of Telefonos de Mexico, S.A., sold for prices as low as ten cents. The company was not doing badly, and analysts were forecasting for the shares annual earnings of fifteen cents and a book value of approximately seventy-five cents in 1988. Investors seemed to focus only on the continual dilution of the stock, stemming from quarterly 6.25 percent stock dividends and from the issuance of shares to new telephone subscribers, ostensibly to fund the required capital outlays to install their phones. The market ignored virtually every criterion of value, pricing the shares at extremely low multiples of earnings and cash flow while completely disregarding book value.

In early 1991 Telefonos's share price rose to over $3.25. The shares, out of favor several years earlier, became an institutional favorite. True, some improvement in operating results did contribute to this enormous price appreciation, but the primary explanation was an increase in the multiple investors were willing to pay. The higher multiple reflected a change in investor psychology more than any fundamental developments at the company.




Ref:  Margin of Safety by Seth Klarman

Should investors worry about the possibility that business value may decline? Absolutely.

The possibility of sustained decreases in business value is a dagger at the heart of value investing (and is not a barrel of laughs for other investment approaches either). Value investors place great faith in the principle of assessing value and then buying at a discount. If value is subject to considerable erosion, then how large a discount is sufficient?

Should investors worry about the possibility that business value may decline? Absolutely. Should they do anything about it? There are three responses that might be effective.

• First, since investors cannot predict when values will rise or fall, valuation should always be performed conservatively, giving considerable weight to worst-case liquidation value as well as to other methods. 
• Second, investors fearing deflation could demand a greater than usual discount between price and underlying value in order to make new investments or to hold current positions. This means that normally selective investors would probably let even more pitches than usual go by. 
• Finally, the prospect of asset deflation places a heightened importance on the time frame of investments and on the presence of a catalyst for the realization of underlying value. In a deflationary environment, if you cannot tell whether or when you will realize underlying value, you may not want to get involved at all. If underlying value is realized in the near-term directly for the benefit of shareholders, however, the longer-term forces that could cause value to diminish become moot.

Ref:  Margin of Safety by Seth Klarman