Tuesday, 6 December 2011

Retail pharmacy business metamorphosis

Retail pharmacy business metamorphosis
Published: 2011/12/05

KUALA LUMPUR: A trip to your neighbourhood pharmacy may not be the same in the future.


The industry is undergoing a rapid change prompted by government policies and innovative business models.

Mandatory public service with the government has been cut to just a year from three previously. Dispensing separation is on the cards where doctors only prescribe medication and pharmacists dispense medicine.

The retail pharmacy business, meanwhile, is seeing the introduction of licensing and franchising concepts to assist pharmacists who do not have much business knowledge. Constant Pharmacy, a chain of pharmacies, has planned to expand its network to 500 stores within eight years via this method.

More recently, a new two-in-one model called eCosway Pharmacy is expected to take off. This incorporates a pharmacy and direct selling Cosway business.

Should all Cosway stores in Malaysia, believed to be in the hundreds, adopt the pharmacy business, this brand could very well turn into an overnight industry leader. Obtaining prescription drugs and walking out with Cosway items may be a norm in the future.

The emergence of this new breed of pharmacies may very well have been prompted by dispensing separation. But is there another reason for the sudden mushrooming of community stores?

Some say that this may be part of the planned 1Care system. The system, introduced to reduce the congestion in government hospitals, will require patients to visit a primary care physician for small ailments and referrals.

While no concrete information is available, talk is that dispensing separation will take place when this takes off. The primary care physician as well as the pharmacy which dispenses the medication will be paid by the government.

If indeed this is the scenario for the medication that will be prescribed to the poor, it then comes as no surprise that retail pharmacies are going out and targeting this piece of "government-guaranteed income". 

Today, there are a total of 8,900 registered pharmacies and some 2,000 community pharmacies. The major players include Guardian Pharmacy, Vitacare, CARiNG, Aeon Wellness and Tigas. 

Interestingly, the industry feels that it is unlikely for Malaysia's healthcare interest to be in the hands of foreign players like Guardian Pharmacy and Watsons. Remember what happened when Singapore's Parkway wanted to buy Pantai Hospitals which had two government concessions?

In such a scenario, preparing for a wider network of locally-owned community pharmacy becomes essential.

Other changes recommended by the Malaysian Pharmaceutical Society is for the pharmacies to be intermediaries for patients who choose to receive their medication via post.

MPS would also like to see pharmacists own a majority stake in an independent pharmacy and in the case of a chain pharmacies, the pharmacists to sit on the board and have an executive role.

Will retail pharmacies, as we know them, come to an end? If so, let's hope the metamorphosis is indeed something more appealing. 

We as consumers, place our trust on these pharmacists who are the professionals. In return, what we need is responsible dispensing.



Read more: Retail pharmacy business metamorphosis http://www.btimes.com.my/Current_News/BTIMES/articles/imv6/Article/index_html#ixzz1fhWIsoEw

Investments or eggs, don't put them all into one basket


Investments or eggs, don't put them all into one basket

Published: 2011/04/18


Most people are diversifying their consumption of eggs, a practice which should also be applied when it comes to managing one's money.


THE recent fake eggs scare has lifted the sales of locally produced eggs for a while, until it was proven that they were genuine eggs, only of lower quality.

Although most people may have reverted to buying eggs at the supermarkets and hypermarkets, some continue getting fresh eggs from the local poultry farms.

They are diversifying their consumption of eggs, a practice which should also be applied when it comes to managing one's money.

If one puts all his eggs in one basket, he may risk breaking all the eggs should he drop that basket.

Same goes to investing one's money, where one risks losing everything by putting all the money into one plan or one asset class, should markets fall.

The rule is to diversify the investments over several different assets and areas in order to limit the liability in adverse market conditions. Conversely, when the markets rise, investors will benefit from all the best performing sectors.

There are various savings and investment options which one could choose from, based on their respective risks. It is also useful to consider one's financial goals, including immediate and future needs.

With savings, one puts money aside without risk and earns interest on savings. With investing, there is potential for one's money to grow faster, but the returns are not guaranteed.


Safe investments include savings accounts, fixed deposits, government bonds, employees provident fund, and other savings schemes.


Moderate risk investments include mutual funds, property and gold. High risk investments are in stock market and forex (foreign exchange) trading.

Mutual funds or unit trusts are said to be the choice of passive investors who don't actively try to profit from short-term price fluctuations. Instead, passive investors believe that in the long run, their investments - based on a well-diversified portfolio will be profitable.

A unit trust fund builds a diversified investment portfolio that comprises stocks, bonds and other assets, in line with the fund's investment objective. Unit trusts, generally, aim to achieve returns higher than fixed deposits.

According to the Federation of Investment Managers Malaysia, the unit trust concept was introduced by Malaysia, ahead of its Asian neighbours. In 1959, two years after independence, a unit trust was established by Malayan Unit Trust Ltd.

Today, besides the privately-run mutual funds, there are various unit trust schemes managed by state-owned fund manager Permodalan Nasional Bhd (PNB).

The 1980s marked a significant development in the unit trust industry when PNB launched the Amanah Saham Nasional (ASN) scheme in 1981. The subscription by the public to the scheme was overwhelming and unprecedented.

The next decade saw the fastest growth of the unit trust industry in terms of the number of new management companies and funds under management.

Over the years, the unit trust industry has proven its resilience in adversity. During the global economic crisis, the industry's drop was less severe than the fall in share prices in Bursa Malaysia. This was due to the diverse nature of its assets.

PNB, through its subsidiary Amanah Saham Nasional Bhd (ASNB), operates a number of unit trust schemes. Some of the unit trust schemes are fixed priced, while some are variable priced.

After the launch of ASN scheme in 1981, there were several more unit trust schemes launched by PNB with the latest, Amanah Saham 1Malaysia (AS1M), launched on July 31 2009.


Most of the unit trust schemes are for Bumiputeras only, while a few are opened for non-Bumiputeras, including (AS1M). Other schemes under PNB stable include Amanah Saham Bumiputera, Amanah Saham Wawasan 2020, Amanah Saham Didik, Amanah Saham Malaysia and Amanah Saham Gemilang.

To date, Malaysia's biggest fund management company has a total of 10.38 million unit trust account holders.

PNB will hold its annual Minggu Saham Amanah Malaysia in Ipoh, Perak, starting Wednesday. The unit trust week, which has been held since 1999, is the group's social effort to educate the public on investment and encourage them to participate in the unit trust industry.

Maybe, that's where Malaysians should go this week in order to put their eggs in a number of baskets.


Read more: Investments or eggs, don't put them all into one basket http://www.btimes.com.my/Current_News/BTIMES/articles/MONVIEW18-2/Article/index_html#ixzz1fhU9V7Mz

Monday, 5 December 2011

Characteristics of Financial Service firms (banks, insurance companies and investment banks) and their Value Drivers


Characteristics of financial service firms

            There are many dimensions on which financial service firms differ from other firms in the market. In this section, we will focus on four key differences and look at why these differences can create estimation issues in valuation. The first is that many categories (albeit not all) of financial service firms operate under strict regulatory constraints on how they run their businesses and how much capital they need to set aside to keep operating. The second is that accounting rules for recording earnings and asset value at financial service firms are at variance with accounting rules for the rest of the market. The third is that debt for a financial service firm is more akin to raw material than to a source of capital; the notion of cost of capital and enterprise value may be meaningless as a consequence. The final factor is that the defining reinvestment (net capital expenditures and working capital) for a bank or insurance company may be not just difficult, but impossible, and cash flows cannot be computed.

The Regulatory Overlay

Financial service firms are heavily regulated all over the world, though the extent of the regulation varies from country to country. In general, these regulations take three forms. First, banks and insurance companies are required to maintain regulatory capital ratios, computed based upon the book value of equity and their operations, to ensure that they do not expand beyond their means and put their claimholders or depositors at risk. Second, financial service firms are often constrained in terms of where they can invest their funds. For instance, until a decade ago, the Glass-Steagall Act in the United States restricted commercial banks from investment banking activities as well as from taking active equity positions in non-financial service firms. Third, the entry of new firms into the business is often controlled by the regulatory authorities, as are mergers between existing firms.
            Why does this matter? From a valuation perspective, assumptions about growth are linked to assumptions about reinvestment. With financial service firms, these assumptions have to be scrutinized to ensure that they pass regulatory constraints. There might also be implications for how we measure risk at financial service firms. If regulatory restrictions are changing or are expected to change, it adds a layer of uncertainty (risk) to the future, which can have an effect on value. Put more simply, to value banks, insurance companies and investment banks, we have to be aware of the regulatory structure that governs them.

Differences in Accounting Rules

            The accounting rules used to measure earnings and record book value are different for financial service firms than the rest of the market, for two reasons. The first is that the assets of financial service firms tend to be financial instruments (bonds, securitized obligations) that often have an active market place. Not surprisingly, marking assets to market value has been an established practice in financial service firms, well before other firms even started talking about fair value accounting. The second is that the nature of operations for a financial service firm is such that long periods of profitability are interspersed with short periods of large losses; accounting standard have been developed to counter this tendency and create smoother earnings.
a.     Mark to Market: If the new trend in accounting is towards recording assets at fair value (rather than original costs), financial service firms operate as a laboratory for this experiment. After all, accounting rules for banks, insurance companies and investment banks have required that assets be recorded at fair value for more than a decade, based upon the argument that most of a bank/s assets are traded, have market prices and therefore do not require too many subjective judgments. In general, the assets of banks and insurance companies tend to be securities, many of which are publicly traded.  Since the market price is observable for many of these investments, accounting rules have tilted towards using market value (actual of estimated) for these assets.  To the extent that some or a significant portion of the assets of a financial service firms are marked to market, and the assets of most non-financial service firms are not, we fact two problems. The first is in comparing ratios based upon book value (both market to book ratios like price to book and accounting ratios like return on equity) across financial and non-financial service firms. The second is in interpreting these ratios, once computed. While the return on equity for a non-financial service firm can be considered a measure of return earned on equity invested originally in assets, the same cannot be said about return on equity at financial service firms, where the book equity measures not what was originally invested in assets but an updated market value.
b.     Loss Provisions and smoothing out earnings: Consider a bank that makes money the old fashioned way – by taking in funds from depositors and lending these funds out to individuals and corporations at higher rates. While the rate charged to lenders will be higher than that promised to depositors, the risk that the bank faces is that lenders may default, and the rate at which they default will vary widely over time – low during good economic times and high during economic downturns. Rather than write off the bad loans, as they occur, banks usually create provisions for losses that average out losses over time and charge this amount against earnings every year.  Though this practice is logical, there is a catch, insofar as the bank is given the responsibility of making the loan loss assessment. A conservative bank will set aside more for loan losses, given a loan portfolio, than a more aggressive bank, and this will lead to the latter reporting higher profits during good times.

Debt and Equity

            In the financial balance sheet that we used to describe firms, there are only two ways to raise funds to finance a business – debt and equity. While this is true for both all firms, financial service firms differ from non-financial service firms on three dimensions:
a. Debt is raw material, not capital: When we talk about capital for non-financial service firms, we tend to talk about both debt and equity. A firm raises funds from both equity investor and bondholders (and banks) and uses these funds to make its investments. When we value the firm, we value the value of the assets owned by the firm, rather than just the value of its equity. With a financial service firm, debt has a different connotation. Rather than view debt as a source of capital, most financial service firms seem to view it as a raw material. In other words, debt is to a bank what steel is to a manufacturing company, something to be molded into other products which can then be sold at a higher price and yield a profit. Consequently, capital at financial service firms seems to be narrowly defined as including only equity capital. This definition of capital is reinforced by the regulatory authorities, who evaluate the equity capital ratios of banks and insurance firms.
b. Defining Debt: The definition of what comprises debt also is murkier with a financial service firm than it is with a non-financial service firm. For instance, should deposits made by customers into their checking accounts at a bank be treated as debt by that bank? Especially on interest-bearing checking accounts, there is little distinction between a deposit and debt issued by the bank. If we do categorize this as debt, the operating income for a bank should be measured prior to interest paid to depositors, which would be problematic since interest expenses are usually the biggest single expense item for a bank.
c. Degree of financial leverage: Even if we can define debt as a source of capital and can measure it precisely, there is a final dimension on which financial service firms differ from other firms. They tend to use more debt in funding their businesses and thus have higher financial leverage than most other firms. While there are good reasons that can be offered for why they have been able to do this historically - more predictable earnings and the regulatory framework are two that are commonly cited – there are consequences for valuation. Since equity is a sliver of the overall value of a financial service firm, small changes in the value of the firm.s assets can translate into big swings in equity value.

Estimating cash flows is difficult

            We noted earlier that financial service firms are constrained by regulation in both where they invest their funds and how much they invest. If, as we have so far in this book, define reinvestment as necessary for future growth, there are problems associated with measuring reinvestment with financial service firms. Note that, we consider two items in reinvestment – net capital expenditures and working capital. Unfortunately, measuring either of these items at a financial service firm can be problematic.
Consider net capital expenditures first. Unlike manufacturing firms that invest in plant, equipment and other fixed assets, financial service firms invest primarily in intangible assets such as brand name and human capital. Consequently, their investments for future growth often are categorized as operating expenses in accounting statements. Not surprisingly, the statement of cash flows to a bank show little or no capital expenditures and correspondingly low depreciation. With working capital, we run into a different problem. If we define working capital as the difference between current assets and current liabilities, a large proportion of a bank's balance sheet would fall into one or the other of these categories. Changes in this number can be both large and volatile and may have no relationship to reinvestment for future growth.
            As a result of this difficulty in measuring reinvestment, we run into two practical problems in valuing these firms. The first is that we cannot estimate cash flows without estimating reinvestment. In other words, if we cannot identify how much a company is reinvesting for future growth, we cannot identify cash flows either. The second is that estimating expected future growth becomes more difficult, if the reinvestment rate cannot be measured.


Financial Service Companies: Value Drivers

Equity Risk

In keeping with the way we have estimated the cost of equity for firms so far in this book, the cost of equity for a financial service firm has to reflect the portion of the risk in the equity that cannot be diversified away by the marginal investor in the stock. This risk is estimated using a beta (in the capital asset pricing model) or betas (in a multi-factor or arbitrage pricing model).  There are three estimation notes that we need to keep in mind, when making estimates of the cost of equity for a financial service firm:
1.     Use bottom-up betas: In our earlier discussions of betas, we argued against the use of regression betas because of the noise in the estimates (standard errors) and the possibility that the firm has changed over the period of the regression. We will continue to hold to that proposition, when valuing financial service firms. In fact, the large numbers of publicly traded firm in this domain should make estimating bottom up betas much easier.
2.     Do not adjust for financial leverage: When estimating betas for non-financial service firms, we emphasized the importance of unlevering betas (whether they be historical or sector averages) and then relevering them, using a firm's current debt to equity ratio. With financial service firms, we would skip this step for two reasons. First, financial service firms tend to be much more homogeneous in terms of capital structure – they tend to have similar financial leverage primarily due to regulations. Second, and this is a point made earlier, debt is difficult to measure for financial service firms. In practical terms, this will mean that we will use the average levered beta for comparable firms as the bottom-up beta for the firm being analyzed.
3.     Adjust for regulatory and business risk: If we use sector betas and do not adjust for financial leverage, we are in effect using the same beta for every company in the sector. As we noted earlier, there can be significant regulatory differences across markets, and even within a market, across different classes of financial service firms. To reflect this, we would define the sector narrowly; thus, we would look the average beta across large money center banks, when valuing a large money center bank, and across small regional banks, when valuing one of these. We would also argue that financial service firms that expand into riskier businesses – securitization, trading and investment banking – should have different (and higher betas) for these segments, and that the beta for the company should be a weighted average.
4.     Consider the relationship between risk and growth: Through the book, we have emphasized the importance of modifying a company's risk profile to reflect changes that we are assuming to its growth rate. As growth companies mature, betas should move towards one. We see no need to abandon that principle, when valuing banks. We would expect high growth banks to have higher betas (and costs of equity) than mature banks.  In valuing such banks, we would therefore start with higher costs of equity but as we reduce growth, we would also reduce betas and costs of equity.

Quality of growth

To ensure that assumptions about dividends, earnings and growth are internally consistent, we have to bring in a measure of how well the retained equity is reinvested; the return on equity is the variable that ties together payout ratios and expected growth. Using a fundamental growth measure for earnings:
Expected growth in earnings = Return on equity * (1 – Dividend Payout ratio)
For instance, a bank that payout out 60% of its earnings as dividends and earns a return on equity of 12% will have an expected growth rate in earnings of 4.8%.  When we introduced the fundamental equation in chapter 2, we also noted that firms can deliver growth rates that deviate from this expectation, if the return on equity is changing.
Expected GrowthEPS 
Thus, if the bank is able to improve the return on equity on existing assets from 10% to 12%, the efficiency growth rate in that year will be 20%. However, efficiency growth is temporary and all firms ultimately will revert back to the fundamental growth relationship.
            The linkage between return on equity, growth and dividends is therefore critical in determining value in a financial service firm. At the risk of hyperbole, the key number in valuing a bank is not dividends, earnings or growth rate, but what we believe it will earn as return on equity in the long term. That number, in conjunction with payout ratios, will help in determining growth. Alternatively, the return on equity, together with expected growth rates, can be used to estimate dividends. This linkage is particularly useful, when we get to stable growth, where growth rates can be very different from the initial growth rates. To preserve consistency in the valuation, the payout ratio that we use in stable growth, to estimate the terminal value, should be:
Payout ratio in stable growth 
The risk of the firm should also adjust to reflect the stable growth assumption. In particular, if betas are used to estimate the cost of equity, they should converge towards one in stable growth.

Regulatory Buffers

The cashflow to equity is the cashflow left over for equity investors after debt payments have been made and reinvestment needs met. With financial service firms, the reinvestment generally does not take the form of plant, equipment or other fixed assets. Instead, the investment is in regulatory capital; this is the capital as defined by the regulatory authorities, which, in turn, determines the limits on future growth.
FCFEFinancial Service Firm = Net Income – Reinvestment in Regulatory Capital
To estimating the reinvestment in regulatory capital, we have to define two parameters. The first is the book equity capital ratio that will determine the investment; this will be heavily influenced by regulatory requirements but will also reflect the choices made by a bank.  Conservative banks may choose to maintain a higher capital ratio than required by regulatory authorities whereas aggressive banks may push towards the regulatory constraints. For instance, a bank that has a 5% equity capital ratio can make $100 in loans for every $5 in equity capital. When this bank reports net income of $15 million and pays out only $5 million, it is increasing its equity capital by $10 million. This, in turn, will allow it to make $200 million in additional loans and presumably increase its growth rate in future periods. The second is theprofitability of the activity, defined in terms of net income. Staying with the bank example, we have to specify how much net income the bank will generate with the additional loans; a 0.5% profitability ratio will translate into additional net income of $1 million on the additional loans.


Little Book on Valuation
Aswath Damodaran

Characteristics of Commodity and Cyclical companies and their Value Drivers.


Characteristics of commodity and cyclical companies

            While commodity companies can range the spectrum from food grains to precious metals and cyclical firms can be in diverse business, they do share some common factors that can affect both how we view them and the values we assign to them.
  1. The Economic/Commodity price cycle: Cyclical companies are at the mercy of the economic cycle. While it is true that good management and the right strategic and business choices can make some cyclical firms less exposed to movements in the economy, the odds are high that all cyclical companies will see revenues decrease in the face of a significant economic downturn. Unlike firms in many other businesses, commodity companies are, for the most part, price takers. In other words, even the largest oil companies have to sell their output at the prevailing market price. Not surprisingly, the revenues of commodity companies will be heavily impacted by the commodity price. In fact, as commodity companies mature and output levels off, almost all of the variance in revenues can be traced to where we are in the commodity price cycle. When commodity prices are on the upswing, all companies that produce that commodity benefit, whereas during a downturn, even the best companies in the business will see the effects on operations.
  2. Volatile earnings and cash flows: The volatility in revenues at cyclical and commodity companies will be magnified at the operating income level because these companies tend to have high operating leverage (high fixed costs). Thus, commodity companies may have to keep mines (mining), reserves (oil) and fields (agricultural) operating even during low points in price cycles, because the costs of shutting down and reopening operations can be prohibitive.
  3. Volatility in earnings flows into volatility in equity values and debt ratios: While this does not have to apply for all cyclical and commodity companies, the large infrastructure investments that are needed to get these firms started has led many of them to be significant users of debt financing. Thus, the volatility in operating income that we referenced earlier, manifests itself in even greater swing in net income.
  4. Even the healthiest firms can be put at risk if macro move is very negative: Building on the theme that cyclical and commodity companies are exposed to cyclical risk over which they have little control and that this risk can be magnified as we move down the income statement, resulting in high volatility in net income, even for the healthiest and most mature firms in the sector, it is easy to see why we have to be more concerned about distress and survival with cyclical and commodity firms than with most others. An extended economic downturn or a lengthy phase of low commodity prices can put most of these companies at risk.
  5. Finite resources: With commodity companies, there is one final shared characteristic. There is a finite quantity of natural resources on the planet; if oil prices increase, we can explore for more oil but we cannot create oil. When valuing commodity companies, this will not only play a role in what our forecasts of future commodity prices will be but may also operate as a constraint on our normal practice of assuming perpetual growth (in our terminal value computations).
In summary, then, when valuing commodity and cyclical companies, we have to grapple with the consequences of economic and commodity price cycles and how shifts in these cycles will affect revenues and earnings. We also have to come up with ways of dealing with the possibility of distress, induced not by bad management decisions or firm specific choices, but by macro economic forces.


Commodity and Cyclical companies: Value Drivers

Normalized Earnings

If we accept the proposition that normalized earnings and cash flows have a subjective component to them, we can begin to lay out procedures for estimating them for individual companies. With cyclical companies, there are usually three standard techniques that are employed for normalizing earnings and cash flows:
1.     Absolute average over time: The most common approach used to normalize numbers is to average them over time, though over what period remains in dispute. At least in theory, the averaging should occur over a period long enough to cover an entire cycle. In chapter 8, we noted that economic cycles, even in mature economies like the United States, can range from short periods (2-3 years) to very long ones (more than 10 years). The advantage of the approach is its simplicity. The disadvantage is that the use of absolute numbers over time can lead to normalized values being misestimated for any firm that changed its size over the normalization period.  In other words, using the average earnings over the last 5 years as the normalized earnings for a firm that doubled its revenues over that period will understate the true earnings.
2.     Relative average over time: A simple solution to the scaling problem is to compute averages for a scaled version of the variable over time. In effect, we can average profit margins over time, instead of net profits, and apply the average profit margin to revenues in the most recent period to estimate normalized earnings. We can employ the same tactics with capital expenditures and working capital, by looking at ratios of revenue or book capital over time, rather than the absolute values.
3.     Sector averages: In the first two approaches to normalization, we are dependent upon the company having a long history. For cyclical firms with limited history or a history of operating changes, it may make more sense to look at sector averages to normalize. Thus, we will compute operating margins for all steel companies across the cycle and use the average margin to estimate operating income for an individual steel company. The biggest advantage of the approach is that sector margins tend to be less volatile than individual company margins, but this approach will also fail to incorporate the characteristics (operating efficiencies or inefficiencies) that may lead a firm to be different from the rest of the sector.

Normalized commodity prices

            What is a normalized price for oil? Or gold? There are two ways of answering this question.
1.     One is to look at history. Commodities have a long trading history and we can use the historical price data to come up with an average, which we can then adjust for inflation. Implicitly, we are assuming that the average inflation-adjusted price over a long period of history is the best estimate of the normalized price.
2.     The other approach is more complicated. Since the price of a commodity is a function of demand and supply for that commodity, we can assess (or at least try to assess the determinants of that demand and supply) and try to come up with an intrinsic value for the commodity.
Once we have normalized the price of the commodity, we can then assess what the revenues, earnings and cashflows would have been for the company being valued at that normalized price. With revenues and earnings, this may just require multiplying the number of units sold at the normalized price and making reasonable assumptions about costs. With reinvestment and cost of financing, it will require some subjective judgments on how much (if any) the reinvestment and cost of funding numbers would have changed at the normalized price.
            Using a normalized commodity price to value a commodity company does expose us to the critique that the valuations we obtain will reflect our commodity price views as much as they do our views on the company. For instance, assume that the current oil price is $45 and that we use a normalized oil price of $100 to value an oil company. We are likely to find the company to be undervalued, simply because of our view about the normalized oil price. If we want to remove our views of commodity prices from valuations of commodity companies, the safest way to do this is to use market-based prices for the commodity in our forecasts. Since most commodities have forward and futures markets, we can use the prices for these markets to estimate cash flows in the next few years. For an oil company, then, we will use today's oil prices to estimate cash flows for the current year and the expected oil prices (from the forward and futures markets) to estimate expected cash flows in future periods. The advantage of this approach is that it comes with a built-in mechanism for hedging against commodity price risk. An investor who believes that a company is under valued but is shaky on what will happen to commodity prices in the future can buy stock in the company and sell oil price futures to protect herself against adverse price movements.


Little Book of Valuation
Aswath Damodaran


Characteristics of Declining Companies and their Value Drivers


Characteristics of Declining Companies

            In this section, we will look at characteristics that declining companies tend to share, with an eye towards the problems that they create for analysts trying to value these firms. Note again that not every declining company possesses all of these characteristics but they do share enough of them to make these generalizations.

1.     Stagnant or declining revenues: Perhaps the most telling sign of a company in decline is the inability to increase revenues over extended periods, even when times are good. Flat revenues or revenues that grow at less than the inflation rate is an indicator of operating weakness. It is even more telling if these patterns in revenues apply not only to the company being analyzed but to the overall sector, thus eliminating the explanation that the revenue weakness is due to poor management (and can thus be fixed by bringing in a new management team).
2.     Shrinking or negative margins:  The stagnant revenues at declining firms are often accompanied by shrinking operating margins, partly because firms are losing pricing power and partly because they are dropping prices to keep revenues from falling further. This combination results in deteriorating or negative operating income at these firms, with occasional spurts in profits generated by asset sales or one time profits.
3.     Asset divestitures: If one of the features of a declining firm is that existing assets are sometimes worth more to others, who intend to put them to different and better uses, it stands to reason that asset divestitures will be more frequent at declining firms than at firms earlier in the life cycle. If the declining firm has substantial debt obligations, the need to divest will become stronger, driven by the desire to avoid default or to pay down debt.
4.     Big payouts – dividends and stock buybacks: Declining firms have few or any growth investments that generate value, existing assets that may be generating positive cashflows and asset divestitures that result in cash inflows. If the firm does not have enough debt for distress to be a concern, it stands to reason that declining firms not only pay out large dividends, sometimes exceeding their earnings, but also buy back stock.
5.     Financial leverage – the downside: If debt is a double-edged sword, declining firms often are exposed to the wrong edge. With stagnant and declining earnings from existing assets and little potential for earnings growth, it is not surprising that many declining firms face debt burdens that are overwhelming. Note that much of this debt was probably acquired when the firm was in a healthier phase of the life cycle and at terms that cannot be matched today. In addition to difficulties these firms face in meeting the obligations that they have committed to meet, they will face additional trouble in refinancing the debt, since lenders will demand more stringent terms.



Declining companies: Value Drivers

Going concern value

To value a firm as a going concern, we consider only those scenarios where the firm survives. The expected cash flow is estimated only across these scenarios and thus should be higher than the expected cash flow estimated in the modified discounted cash flow model. When estimating discount rates, we make the assumption that debt ratios will, in fact, decrease over time, if the firm is over levered, and that the firm will derive tax benefits from debt as it turns the corner on profitability. This is consistent with the assumption that the firm will remain a going concern. Most discounted cash flow valuations that we observe in practice are going concern valuations, though they may not come with the tag attached.
            A less precise albeit easier alternative is to value the company as if it were a healthy company today. This would require estimating the cashflows that the firm would have generated if it were a healthy firm, a task most easily accomplished by replacing the firm's operating margin by the average operating margin of healthy firms in the business. The cost of capital for the distressed firm can be set to the average cost of capital for the industry and the value of the firm can be computed. The danger with this approach is that it will overstate firm value by assuming that the return to financial health is both painless and imminent.

Likelihood of Distress

A key input to this approach is the estimate of the cumulative probability of distress over the valuation period. In this section, we will consider three ways in which we can estimate this probability. The first is a statistical approach, where we relate the probability of distress to a firm's observable characteristics – firm size, leverage and profitability, for instance – by contrasting firms that have gone bankrupt in prior years with firms that did not. The second is a less data intensive approach, where we use the bond rating for a firm, and the empirical default rates of firms in that rating class to estimate the probability of distress. The third is to use the prices of corporate bonds issued by the firm to back out the probability of distress.
a. Statistical Approaches: The fact that hundreds of firms go bankrupt every year provides us with a rich database that can be examined to evaluate both why bankruptcy occurs and how to predict the likelihood of future bankruptcy. One of the earliest studies that used this approach was by Altman (1968), where he used linear discriminant analysis to arrive at a measure that he called the Z score. In this first paper, that he has since updated several times, the Z score was a function of five ratios:
Z = 0.012 (Working capital/ Total Assets) + 0.014 (Retained Earnings/ Total Assets) + 0.033 (EBIT/ Total Assets) + 0.006 (Market value of equity/ Book value of total liabilities) + 0.999 (Sales/ Total Assets)
Altman argued that we could compute the Z scores for firms and use them to forecast which firms would go bankrupt, and he provided evidence to back up his claim. Since his study, both academics and practitioners have developed their own versions of these credit scores.  Notwithstanding its usefulness in predicting bankruptcy, linear discriminant analysis does not provide a probability of bankruptcy.
b. Based upon Bond Rating: Many firms, especially in the United States, have bonds that are rated for default risk by the ratings agencies. These bond ratings not only convey information about default risk (or at least the ratings agency's perception of default risk) but they come with a rich history. Since bonds have been rated for decades, we can look at the default experience of bonds in each ratings class. Assuming that the ratings agencies have not significantly altered their ratings standards, we can use these default probabilities as inputs into discounted cash flow valuation models. What are the limitations of this approach? The first is that we are delegating the responsibility of estimating default probabilities to the ratings agencies and we assume that they do it well. The second is that we are assuming that the ratings standards do not shift over time. The third is that table measures the likelihood of default on a bond, but it does not indicate whether the defaulting firm goes out of business. Many firms continue to operate as going concerns after default. 
c. Based upon Bond Price: The conventional approach to valuing bonds discounts promised cash flows back at a cost of debt that incorporates a default spread to come up with a price. Consider an alternative approach. We could discount the expected cash flows on the bond, which would be lower than the promised cash flows because of the possibility of default, at the riskfree rate to price the bond. If we assume that a constant annual probability of default, we can write the bond price as follows for a bond with fixed coupon maturing in N years.
Bond Price = 
This equation can now be used, in conjunction with the price on a traded corporate bond to back out the probability of default. We are solving for an annualized probability of default over the life of the bond, and ignoring the reality that the annualized probability of default will be higher in the earlier years and decline in the later years. While this approach has the attraction of being a simple one, we would hasten to add the following caveats in using it. First, note that we not only need to find a straight bond issued by the company – special features such as convertibility will render the approach unusable – but the bond price has to be available. If the corporate bond issue is privately placed, this will not be feasible. Second, the probabilities that are estimated may be different for different bonds issued by the same firm. Some of these differences can be traced to the assumption we have made that the annual probability of default remains constant and others can be traced to the mispricing of bonds. Third, as with the previous approach, failure to make debt payments does not always result in the cessation of operations. Finally, we are assuming that the coupon is either fully paid or not at all; if there is a partial payment of either the coupon or the face value in default, we will over estimate the probabilities of default using this approach.

Consequences of Distress

Once we have estimated the probability that the firm will be unable to make its debt payments and cease to exist, we have to consider the logical follow-up question. What happens then? As noted earlier in the chapter, it is not distress per se that is the problem but the fact that firms in distress have to sell their assets for less than the present value of the expected future cash flows from existing assets and expected future investments. Often, they may be unable to claim even the present value of the cash flows generated even by existing investments. Consequently, a key input that we need to estimate is the expected proceeds in the event of a distress sale. We have three choices:
1.     Estimate the present value of the expected cash flows in a discounted cash flow model, and assume that the distress sale will generate only a percentage (less than 100%) of this value. Thus, if the discounted cash flow valuation yields $ 5 billion as the value of the assets, we may assume that the value will only be $ 3 billion in the event of a distress sale.
2.     Estimate the present value of expected cash flows only from existing investments as the distress sale value. Essentially, we are assuming that a buyer will not pay for future investments in a distress sale. In practical terms, we would estimate the distress sale value by considering the cash flows from assets in place as a perpetuity (with no growth).
3.     The most practical way of estimating distress sale proceeds is to consider the distress sale proceeds as a percent of book value of assets, based upon the experience of other distressed firms.
Note that many of the issues that come up when estimating distress sale proceeds – the need to sell at below fair value, the urgency of the need to sell – are issues that are relevant when estimating liquidation value.


Ref:
The Little Book of Valuation
Aswath Damodaran

Statement of Owners' Equity (Statement of Retained Earnings)

The equity statement explains the changes in retained earnings.

Retained earnings appear on the balance sheet and most commonly are influenced by income and dividends.  The Statement of Retained Earnings therefore uses information from the Income Statement and provides information to the Balance Sheet.

The following equation describes the equity statement for a sole proprietorship:

Beginning Equity
+ Investments
- Withdrawals
+ Income
----------------
= Ending Equity

For a corporation, substitute "Dividends Paid" for "Withdrawals".  The stockholders' equity in a corporation is  calculated as follows:

Common Stock (recorded at par value)
+ Premium on Common Stock (issue price minus par value)
+ Preferred Stock (recorded at par value)
+ Premium on Preferred Stock (issue price minus par value)
+ Retained Earnings
------------------------------------------------------------
= Stockholders' Equity


Note that the premium on the issuance of stock is based on the price at which the corporation actually sold the stock on the market.  Afterwards, market trading does not affect this part of the equity calculation.  Stockholders' equity does not change when the stock price changes!




Astonishing accident involving eight Ferraris 'world's most expensive car crash'


A fleet of high-performance cars, including eight Ferraris, has been involved in one of the most expensive accidents in history after an astonishing multi-car pile-up in Japan.


http://www.telegraph.co.uk/motoring/news/8934718/Astonishing-accident-involving-eight-Ferraris-worlds-most-expensive-car-crash.html

I don't understand why business schools don't teach the Warren Buffett model of investing.


I don't understand why business schools don't teach the Warren Buffett model of investing.


Or the Ben Graham model. Or the Peter Lynch model. Or the Martin Whitman model. (I could go on.) In English, you study great writers; in physics and biology, you study great scientists; in philosophy and math, you study great thinkers; but in most business school investment classes, you study modern finance theory, which is grounded in one basic premise--that markets are efficient because investors are always rational. It's just one point of view. A good English professor couldn't get away with teaching Melville as the backbone of English literature. How is it that business schools get away with teaching modern finance theory as the backbone of investing? Especially given that it's only a theory that, as far as I know, hasn't made many investors particularly rich.

Meanwhile, Berkshire Hathaway, under the stewardship of Buffett and vice chairman Charlie Munger, has made thousands of people rich over the past 30-odd years. And it has done so with integrity and a system of principles that is every bit as rigorous, if not more so, as anything modern finance theory can dish up.

On Monday, 11,000 Berkshire shareholders showed up at Aksarben Stadium in Omaha to hear Buffett and Munger talk about this set of principles. Together these principles form a model for investing to which any well-informed business-school student should be exposed--if not for the sake of the principles themselves, then at least to generate the kind of healthy debate that's common in other academic fields.

Whereas modern finance theory is built around the price behavior of stocks, the Buffett model is centered around buying businesses as if one were going to operate them. It's like the process of buying a house. You wouldn't buy a house on a tip from a friend or sight unseen from a description in a newspaper. And you surely wouldn't consider the volatility of the house's price in your consideration of risk. Indeed, regularly updated price quotes aren't available in the real estate market, because property doesn't trade the way common stocks do. Instead, you'd study the fundamentals--the neighborhood, comparable home sales, the condition of the house, and how much you think you could rent it for--to get an idea of its intrinsic value.

The same basic idea applies to buying a business that you'd operate yourself or to being a passive investor in the common stock of a company. Who cares about the price history of the stock? What bearing does it have on how the company conducts business? What's important is whether you can purchase at a reasonable price a business that generates good returns on capital (Buffett likes returns on equity in the neighborhood of 15% or better) without a lot of debt (which makes returns on capital less dependable). In the best of all worlds, the company will have a competitive advantage that allows it to sustain its above-average ROE for years, so you can hang on to it for a long time--just as you would live in your house--and reap the power of compounding.

Buffett further advocates investing in businesses that are easy to understand--Munger calls it "clearing one-foot hurdles"--so you can come up with more reliable estimates of their long-term economics. Coca-Cola's basic business is pretty staid, for example. Unit case sales and ROE determine the company's future earnings. Companies like Microsoftand Intel--good as they are--require clearing much higher hurdles of understanding because their business models are so dependent on the rapidly evolving world of high tech. Today it's a matter of selling the most word-processing programs; tomorrow it's the Internet presence; after that, who knows. For Coke, the challenge is always to sell more cases of beverage.

Buying a business or a stock just because it's cheap is a surefire way to lose money, according to the Buffett model. You get what you pay for. But if you're evaluating investments as businesses to begin with, you probably wouldn't make this mistake, because you'd recognize that a good business is worth buying at a fair price.

Finally, if you follow the Buffett model, you don't trade your investments just because our liquid stock markets invite you to do so. Activity for the sake of activity begets high transaction costs, high tax bills, and poor investment decisions ("if I make a mistake I can sell it in a minute"). Less is more.

I'm not trying to pick a fight with modern finance theory enthusiasts. I just find it unsettling that basic business-school curricula don't even consider models other than modern finance theory, even though those models are in the marketplace proving themselves every day.

http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/articles/teachbuffet.htm