Tuesday, 6 March 2012

LPI (At a Glance)


6.3.2012
LPI 31/12/2011 31/12/2010 Change
Revenue 902.70 751.70 20.09%
Net earned premium 526.70 462.5 13.88%
Operating Profit 201.2 183.2 9.83%
Financing costs -1.9 -2.6 -26.92%
PBT 200.1 181.3 10.37%
PAT 154.5 137.9 12.04%
EPS (basic) sen 70.1 63.8 9.87%
NCA #DIV/0!
CA #DIV/0!
Total Assets 2405.215 2246.462 7.07%
Total Equity 1181.584 1160.242 1.84%
NCL #DIV/0!
CL #DIV/0!
Total Liabilities 1223.631 1086.22 12.65%
Total Eq + Liab 2405.215 2246.462 7.07%
Net assets per share 5.34 5.24 1.84%
Cash & Eq 415.424 600.074 -30.77%
LT Borrowings 39.5 52.88 -25.30%
ST Borrowings #DIV/0!
Net Cash 375.924 547.194 -31.30%
Inventories #DIV/0!
Trade receivables 105.087 79.906 31.51%
Trade payables 61.333 56.068 9.39%
Current Ratio #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0!
PBT 200.100 181.300 10.37%
OPBCWC #DIV/0!
Cash from Operations -31.365 367.406 -108.54%
Net CFO -12.173 380.996 -103.20%
CFI -6.248 -5.507 13.46%
CFF -167.017 4.230 -4048.39%
Capex 0.317 0.243 30.45%
FCF -11.856 381.239 -103.11%
Dividends paid -154.198 -70.555 118.55%
DPS (sen) 0.70 0.32 118.55%
No of ord shares (m) 221.324 221.324 0.00%
Financial Ratios
Net Profit Margin 17.12% 18.35% -6.70%
Asset Turnover 0.38 0.33 12.16%
Financial Leverage 2.04 1.94 5.13%
ROA 6.42% 6.14% 4.64%
ROC 19.18% 22.49% -14.75%
ROE 13.08% 11.89% 10.01%
Valuation
Price (5.3.2012) 13.5
Market cap (m) 2987.87
P/E 19.34
P/BV 2.53
P/FCF -252.01
P/Div 19.38
DPO ratio 1.00
EY 5.17%
FCF/P -0.40%
DY 5.16%






Announcement
Date
Financial
Yr. End
QtrPeriod EndRevenue
RM '000
Profit/Lost
RM'000
EPSAmended
09-Jan-1231-Dec-11431-Dec-11239,32339,33417.85-
06-Oct-1131-Dec-11330-Sep-11236,38545,11620.48-
07-Jul-1131-Dec-11230-Jun-11213,88931,41814.26-
07-Apr-1131-Dec-11131-Mar-11213,41238,62617.54-

ttm-EPS 70.13 sen
Price 13.50 (5.3.2012)
PE (ttm) 19.25x





Stock Performance Chart for LPI Capital Berhad

Monday, 5 March 2012

Dutch Lady (At a Glance)


Dutch Lady 31/12/2011 31/12/2010 Change
Revenue 810.65 696.63 16.37%
Gross Profit 304.47 248.664 22.44%
Operating Profit 139.372 89.221 56.21%
Financing costs -0.919 0 #DIV/0!
PBT 141.553 90.104 57.10%
PAT 108.082 63.887 69.18%
EPS (basic) sen 168.88 99.82 69.18%
NCA 74.048 73.246 1.09%
CA 324.465 234.244 38.52%
Total Assets 398.513 307.49 29.60%
Total Equity 259.154 197.472 31.24%
NCL 4.051 3.757 7.83%
CL 135.308 106.261 27.34%
Total Liabilities 139.359 110.018 26.67%
Total Eq + Liab 398.513 307.49 29.60%
Net assets per share 4.05 3.09 31.07%
Cash & Eq 193.143 85.657 125.48%
LT Borrowings 0 0 #DIV/0!
ST Borrowings 0 0 #DIV/0!
Net Cash 193.143 85.657 125.48%
Inventories 93.448 72.722 28.50%
Trade receivables 36.713 75.176 -51.16%
Trade payables 121.831 99.638 22.27%
Current Ratio 2.40 2.20 8.78%
PBT 141.553 90.104 57.10%
OPBCWC #DIV/0!
Cash from Operations 188.290 123.391 52.60%
Net CFO 161.940 98.389 64.59%
CFI -7.135 -8.064 -11.52%
CFF -47.319 -46.400 1.98%
Capex -10.882 -9.089 19.73%
FCF 151.058 89.300 69.16%
Dividends paid -46.400 -46.400 0.00%
DPS (sen) 72.5 72.5 0.00%
No of ord shares (m) 64 64 0.00%
Financial Ratios
Net Profit Margin 13.33% 9.17% 45.38%
Asset Turnover 2.03 2.27 -10.21%
Financial Leverage 1.54 1.56 -1.24%
ROA 27.12% 20.78% 30.54%
ROC 163.73% 57.14% 186.57%
ROE 41.71% 32.35% 28.91%
Valuation
Price (5.3.2012) 29.5
Market cap (m) 1888.00
P/E 17.47
P/BV 7.29
P/FCF 12.50
P/Div 40.69
DPO ratio 0.43
EY 5.72%
FCF/P 8.00%
DY 2.46%



FYE 31st Dec
Qtr  Year Revenue Earnings  EPS Div NAV ttm-EPS ROE
Q4 2011 211.404 28.37 44.33 37.5 4.05 168.88 41.70%
Q3 2011 201.708 23.6 36.87 35 3.98 141.48 35.55%
Q2 2011 200.892 27.775 43.4 0 3.61 125.43 34.75%
Q1 2011 196.643 28.338 44.28 0 3.53 111.59 31.61%
Q4 2010 156.768 10.835 16.93 37.5 3.09 99.83 32.31%
Q3 2010 183.619 13.822 20.82 35 3.27 107.98 33.02%
Q2 2010 185.784 18.918 29.56 0 3.07 118.74 38.68%
Q1 2010 170.454 20.812 32.52 0 3.14 113.23 36.06%
Q4 2009 169.521 16.048 25.08 57.19 2.81 94.39 33.59%
Q3 2009 177.129 20.21 31.58 8.44
Q2 2009 176.631 15.389 24.05 0
Q1 2009 168.566 8.753 13.68 0






Announcement
Date
Financial
Yr. End
QtrPeriod EndRevenue
RM '000
Profit/Lost
RM'000
EPSAmended
24-Feb-1231-Dec-11431-Dec-11211,40428,37044.33-
15-Nov-1131-Dec-11330-Sep-11201,70823,60036.87-
18-Aug-1131-Dec-11230-Jun-11200,89227,77543.40-
18-May-1131-Dec-11131-Mar-11196,64328,33844.28-




Stock Performance Chart for Dutch Lady Milk Industries Berhad


The stock market's obsession with the short term gives private investors an advantage.

Why The Stock Market Is Failing Britain

Published in Investing on 5 March 2012

A new report highlights fundamental failings.
Last year John Kay, a very accomplished economist who is a director of several companies, was asked by the government to see if the stock market is serving the needs of Britain's investors and companies. His interim findings were published last week and they make interesting reading.
Kay argues that today's stock market primarily serves the interests of the fund management industry, rather than those of companies and investors. He goes on to say that a culture of chasing short-term performance targets has developed, which is damaging the British economy and also harms investors' returns.

Secondary markets are good

The London Stock Exchange (LSE: LSE) consists of two markets. Companies come to the primary market to raise capital by selling shares and bonds through initial public offerings, but afterwards these are traded on the secondary market, which is where most of the action occurs.
Many investors would be reluctant to invest in the first place if they didn't have an easy way out via the secondary market. Since they do, this encourages them to buy shares and bonds, and it allows companies to charge a higher price for their shares and bonds in the primary market.
You can always sell your shares in BP (LSE: BP), HSBC (LSE: HSBA), or indeed most other quoted companies when the market is open, but if you couldn't access the secondary market, you'd have to find a willing buyer, which could take quite some time and would greatly increase your transaction costs.
Another well-known secondary market, one which has revolutionised the trade in second-hand goods, is the auction website eBay (NASDAQ: EBAY.US). Before eBay you had to rely on word-of-mouth, classified newspaper adverts and/or specialist dealers -- today eBay gives you access to a global marketplace.

Obsessed with the short-term

Kay and his team say that the stock market tail now wags the economic dog to such an extent that it damages Britain's interests. Many contributors to the report consider that the combination of quarterly reporting and institutional fund management has caused the investing community to obsess about the next set of figures at the expense of everything else.
As a result, many companies focus on meeting the institutions' short-term expectations, often by "managing" their quarterly earnings, to such an extent that they take their eye off the long term.
Another problem is that chasing short-term targets and concentrating on beating the forecasts can encourage excessive risk-taking. This can reduce your long-term returns, as well as having some serious consequences for the economy.
We saw this happen in a big way several years ago when Royal Bank of Scotland (LSE: RBS) collapsed during the credit crunch, due to a reckless expansion programme, and it had to be bailed out by the long-suffering taxpayer.

Take advantage of the short termers

I believe that the stock market's obsession with the short term gives private investors an advantage. Unlike the typical fund manager, you won't be sacked if you have a bad quarter, so you should be able to take a long-term view.
This can pay off handsomely when the stock market is having one of its hissy fits, because when this happens, there are bargains to be had. Benjamin Graham summed this up nicely when he said; "In the short run, the market is a voting machine, but in the long run it is a weighing machine."

Separation of owner and manager

Another of Kay's concerns is that because most people nowadays invest through funds, rather than by directly owning shares, the economic interest of share ownership has been separated from the decision-making process. The choice of whether to buy, sell and exercise the voting rights attaching to shares is now overwhelmingly concentrated in the hands of the institutions.
This is nothing new; separating the control over property from its ownership has been a cornerstone of English trust law ever since the 11th century, when the King's Knights left their lands under stewardship before they went off to fight in the Crusades.
But it has mushroomed with the growth of the fund management industry during the last few decades, and the result is that most shareholders are absentee landlords with little interest in how their companies are run. The industry encourages this by offering nominee accounts, and making it very hard (and often expensive) for shareholders to exercise their votes.

The paradox of voting your shares

The difficulty that private investors have in voting shares held in nominee accounts is a bone of contention for some people. Personally I couldn't care less about exercising my voting rights unless my stake is large enough that that it might actually have an effect. If I don't like what I see, I "vote" by selling my shares.
When it comes to voting I'm a big fan of Downs Paradox, named after the public policy expert Anthony Downs who described it in his 1957 book An Economic Theory of Democracy. Downs says that if a rational self-interested person has just one vote in a very large electorate, then they should not bother to vote because this will not influence the outcome.
So, if you own 1% of the company, your vote is substantial and is thus worth exercising. The same goes if you are a constituent in a parliamentary election, which was won last time by just a few hundred votes. In both of these instances, your vote is very valuable.
But if you own 0.0005% of a company's shares, Downs Paradox says that a much better use of your time is to do something else, such as reading its report and accounts! Even though I attended Diageo's (LSE: DGE) annual general meeting last October, I didn't bother to vote -- my stake, whilst fairly substantial, is but one vote amongst more than a million others.
Kay's full report will be published this summer along with his recommendations. If you want to read his interim report you can find it at this webpage.

http://www.fool.co.uk/news/investing/2012/03/05/why-the-stock-market-is-failing-britain.aspx?source=ufwflwlnk0000001

Definition of 'Market Capitalization'

Definition of 'Market Capitalization'
The total dollar market value of all of a company's outstanding shares. Market capitalization is calculated by multiplying a company's shares outstanding by the current market price of one share. The investment community uses this figure to determine a company's size, as opposed to sales or total asset figures.

Frequently referred to as "market cap".

Investopedia explains 'Market Capitalization'
If a company has 35 million shares outstanding, each with a market value of $100, the company's market capitalization is $3.5 billion (35,000,000 x $100 per share).

Company size is a basic determinant of asset allocation and risk-return parameters for stocks and stock mutual funds. The term should not be confused with a company's "capitalization," which is a financial statement term that refers to the sum of a company's shareholders' equity plus long-term debt.

The stocks of large, medium and small companies are referred to as large-cap, mid-cap, and small-cap, respectively. Investment professionals differ on their exact definitions, but the current approximate categories of market capitalization are:


Large Cap: $10 billion plus and include the companies with the largest market capitalization.
Mid Cap: $2 billion to $10 billion
Small Cap: Less than $2 billion


Read more: http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/marketcapitalization.asp?partner=TOD03&utm_source=22&utm_medium=Email&utm_campaign=TOD-3/5/2012#ixzz1oFXiR874

Guinness (At a Glance)


Guinness 30.6.2011 30.6.2010 Change
Revenue 1,488.72 1,358.63 9.57%
Gross Profit 469.47 385.373 21.82%
Operating Profit 240.598 203.332 18.33%
Financing costs -0.429 -0.345 24.35%
PBT 242.883 204.991 18.48%
PAT 181.378 152.691 18.79%
EPS (basic) sen 60 50.5 18.81%
NCA 233.229 239.677 -2.69%
CA 451.909 422.885 6.86%
Total Assets 685.138 662.562 3.41%
Total Equity 516.616 470.928 9.70%
NCL 32.592 31.846 2.34%
CL 135.93 159.788 -14.93%
Total Liabilities 168.522 191.634 -12.06%
Total Eq + Liab 685.138 662.562 3.41%
Cash & Eq 179.777 149.626 20.15%
LT Borrowings 0 0 #DIV/0!
ST Borrowings 0 0 #DIV/0!
Inventories 65.402 75.691 -13.59%
Trade receivables 205.966 196.135 5.01%
Trade payables 132.577 155.064 -14.50%
CA 451.909 422.885 6.86%
CL 135.93 159.788 -14.93%
Current Ratio 3.32 2.65 25.62%
PBT 242.88 204.99 18.48%
OPBCWC 286.19 233.07 22.80%
Cash from Operations 256.82 201.00 27.78%
Net CFO 196.345 143.12 37.19%
CFI -30.25 -33.406 -9.45%
CFF -135.944 123.86 -209.76%
Capex -31.81 -29.91 6.35%
FCF 164.535 113.21 45.34%
Dividends paid -135.944 -123.86 9.76%
No of ord shares 302.098 302.098 0.00%
Financial Ratios
Net Profit Margin 12.18% 11.24% 8.41%
Asset Turnover 2.17 2.05 5.96%
Financial Leverage 1.33 1.41 -5.74%
ROA 26.47% 23.05% 14.87%
ROC 53.85% 47.52% 13.31%
ROE 35.11% 32.42% 8.28%
Valuation
Price (5.3.2012) 13.68
Market cap 4132.70
P/E 22.79
P/BV 8.00
P/FCF 25.12
P/Div 30.40
DPO ratio 0.75
EY 4.39%
FCF/P 3.98%
DY 3.29%








Announcement
Date
Financial
Yr. End
QtrPeriod EndRevenue
RM '000
Profit/Lost
RM'000
EPSAmended
23-Feb-1230-Jun-12231-Dec-11468,32265,82221.79-
02-Nov-1130-Jun-12130-Sep-11444,62355,20818.28-
04-Aug-1130-Jun-11430-Jun-11348,75929,0769.63-
04-Aug-1130-Jun-11430-Jun-11348,75929,0769.63-




Stock Performance Chart for Guinness Anchor Berhad


FYE 30th June
Qtr  Year Revenue Earnings  EPS ttm-EPS
Q2 2012 468.322 65.822 21.79 65.91
Q1 2012 444.623 55.208 18.28 65.52
Q4 2011 348.759 29.076 9.63 60.05
Q3 2011 351.916 48.972 16.21 62.16
Q2 2011 421.414 64.635 21.4 61.4
Q1 2011 366.631 38.695 12.81 54.51
Q4 2010 308.713 35.477 11.74 50.54
Q3 2010 370.817 46.679 15.45
Q2 2010 378.134 43.836 14.51
Q1 2010 300.969 26.699 8.84




Petronas Dagangan (At a Glance)






Announcement
Date
Financial
Yr. End
QtrPeriod EndRevenue
RM '000
Profit/Lost
RM'000
EPSAmended
24-Feb-1231-Dec-11Other31-Dec-117,422,923223,06122.30-
23-Nov-1131-Dec-11Other30-Sep-117,304,943225,72822.60-
10-Aug-1131-Dec-11Other30-Jun-117,539,927210,51121.00-
26-May-1131-Mar-11431-Mar-116,382,665229,77323.00-

ttm-EPS 88.9 sen
Price RM 18.34
PE (ttm) 20.6x
EY 4.85%



Stock Performance Chart for Petronas Dagangan Berhad



















Is Mr. Market still around? Is he still bipolar? You bet he is.


 M  R .   M A R  K  E T

Most of the time, the market is mostly accurate in pricing most stocks.  Millions of buyers and sellers haggling over price do a remarkably good job of valuing companies—on average. But sometimes, the price is not right; occasionally, it is very wrong indeed. And at such times, you need to understand Graham’s image of Mr. Market, probably the most brilliant metaphor ever created for explaining how stocks can become mispriced.

The manic-depressive Mr. Market does not always price stocks the way an appraiser or a private buyer would value a business. Instead, when stocks are going up, he happily pays more than their objective value; and, when they are going down, he is desperate to dump them for less than their true worth.  Is Mr. Market still around? Is he still bipolar? You bet he is

Keep these 113 words of Graham close at hand and let them guide you throughout your investing life.


The true investor scarcely ever is forced to sell his shares, and at  all other times he is free to disregard the current price quotation. He need pay attention to it and act upon it only to the extent that it suits his book, and no more.* Thus the investor who permits himself to be stampeded or unduly worried by unjustified market declines in his holdings is perversely transforming his basic advantage into a basic disadvantage. That man would be better off if his stocks had no market quotation at all, for he would then be spared the mental anguish caused him by other persons’ mistakes of judgment.†



* “Only to the extent that it suits his book” means “only to the extent that the price is favorable enough to justify selling the stock.” In traditional brokerage lingo, the “book” is an investor’s ledger of holdings and trades.

† This may well be the single most important paragraph in Graham’s entire book. In these 113 words Graham sums up his lifetime of experience. You cannot read these words too often; they are like Kryptonite for bear markets.  If you keep them close at hand and let them guide you throughout your investing life, you will survive whatever the markets throw at you.