17.3.2012 | ||||
TSM Global | ||||
Income Statement | 9M | 9M | ||
31.10.2011 | 31.10.2010 | Absolute Chg | Change | |
Revenue | 272.46 | 288.92 | -16.46 | -5.70% |
Gross Profit | 0.00 | #DIV/0! | ||
Operating Profit | 31.194 | 45.847 | -14.65 | -31.96% |
Financing costs | -0.273 | -0.655 | 0.38 | -58.32% |
PBT | 34.795 | 52.596 | -17.80 | -33.84% |
PAT | 26.279 | 41.7 | -15.42 | -36.98% |
EPS (basic) sen | 12.73 | 20.73 | -8.00 | -38.59% |
Balance Sheet | 31.10.2011 | 31.1.2011 | ||
NCA | 91.007 | 75.462 | 15.55 | 20.60% |
CA | 250.299 | 176.154 | 74.15 | 42.09% |
Total Assets | 341.306 | 251.616 | 89.69 | 35.65% |
Total Equity | 284.042 | 300.543 | -16.50 | -5.49% |
NCL | 3.965 | 2.319 | 1.65 | 70.98% |
CL | 53.3 | 48.753 | 4.55 | 9.33% |
Total Liabilities | 57.265 | 51.072 | 6.19 | 12.13% |
Total Eq + Liab | 341.307 | 351.615 | -10.31 | -2.93% |
Net assets per share | 1.370 | 1.540 | -0.17 | -11.04% |
Short term Investm | 41.089 | 37.869 | ||
Cash & Eq | 91.433 | 96.833 | -5.40 | -5.58% |
LT Borrowings | 0.316 | 0.516 | -0.20 | -38.76% |
ST Borrowings | 19.002 | 9.104 | 9.90 | 108.72% |
Net Cash | 113.204 | 125.082 | -11.88 | -9.50% |
Inventories | 54.093 | 42.26 | 11.83 | 28.00% |
Trade receivables | 63.685 | 64.693 | -1.01 | -1.56% |
Trade payables | 33.918 | 25.237 | 8.68 | 34.40% |
Working capital | 196.999 | 127.401 | 69.60 | 54.63% |
Quick Ratio | 3.68 | 2.75 | 0.93 | 34.04% |
Current Ratio | 4.70 | 3.61 | 1.08 | 29.97% |
Cash flow statement | 31.10.2011 | 31.1.2011 | ||
PBT | 34.795 | 52.596 | -17.80 | -33.84% |
OPBCWC | 71.386 | 81.839 | -10.45 | -12.77% |
Cash from Operations | 87.630 | 49.731 | 37.90 | 76.21% |
Net CFO | 70.241 | 34.237 | 36.00 | 105.16% |
CFI | -58.578 | -11.998 | -46.58 | 388.23% |
CFF | -2.893 | -36.286 | 33.39 | -92.03% |
Capex | -23.846 | -16.860 | -6.99 | 41.44% |
FCF | 46.395 | 17.377 | 29.02 | 166.99% |
Dividends paid | -6.370 | -3.132 | -3.24 | 103.38% |
DPS (sen) | 5.01 | 2.46 | 2.55 | 103.38% |
No of ord shares (m) | 127.213 | 127.213 | 0.00 | 0.00% |
Financial Ratios | ||||
Gross Profit Margin | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% | #DIV/0! |
Net Profit Margin | 9.64% | 14.43% | -4.79% | -33.17% |
Asset Turnover * | 1.06 | 1.53 | -0.47 | -30.48% |
Financial Leverage | 1.20 | 0.84 | 0.36 | 43.53% |
*annualised | ||||
ROA | 10.27% | 22.10% | -11.83% | -53.54% |
ROC | 12.40% | 19.55% | -7.15% | -36.56% |
ROE | 12.34% | 18.50% | -6.16% | -33.32% |
Valuation | 6.3.2012 | 4.3.2011 | ||
Price | 1.22 | 1.65 | -0.43 | -26.06% |
Market cap (m) | 155.20 | 209.90 | -54.70 | -26.06% |
P/E** | 5.91 | 5.03 | 0.87 | 17.33% |
P/BV | 0.55 | 0.70 | -0.15 | -21.77% |
P/FCF | 3.35 | 12.08 | -8.73 | -72.31% |
P/Div | 24.36 | 67.02 | -42.65 | -63.65% |
DPO ratio | 0.24 | 0.08 | 0.17 | 222.73% |
EY** | 16.93% | 19.87% | -2.93% | -14.77% |
FCF/P | 29.89% | 8.28% | 21.62% | 261.09% |
DY | 4.10% | 1.49% | 2.61% | 175.07% |
Cash per share RM | 0.89 | 0.98 | -9.34% | -9.50% |
**9M Earnings | ||||
Keep INVESTING Simple and Safe (KISS) ****Investment Philosophy, Strategy and various Valuation Methods**** The same forces that bring risk into investing in the stock market also make possible the large gains many investors enjoy. It’s true that the fluctuations in the market make for losses as well as gains but if you have a proven strategy and stick with it over the long term you will be a winner!****Warren Buffett: Rule No. 1 - Never lose money. Rule No. 2 - Never forget Rule No. 1.
Saturday, 17 March 2012
TSM Global (At a Glance)
Friday, 16 March 2012
TOP GLOVE NET PROFIT SURGED BY 109%
Financial results for the second quarter ended February 29, 2012 (“2QFY12”)
Klang, Thursday, March 15, 2012 –Top Glove Corporation Bhd (Top Glove) today announced sales revenue of RM549.0 million and net profit of RM54.2 million in 2QFY12 for the financial year ending 31 August 2012.
Revenue for 2QFY12 recorded a growth of 13% to RM549.0 million from RM485.2 million in the corresponding quarter last financial year, and net profit surged 109% to RM54.2 million from RM25.9 million.
On a six month cumulative (September to February) comparison between 1HFY12 and 1HFY11, revenue rose 13% to RM1,103.8 million from RM976.7 million and net profit improved 39% to RM86.7 million from RM62.3 million. The improved performance was attributed to an increase in glove demand, improved operational efficiency and a downtrend in latex prices which reduced from an average of RM8.14/kg in 1HFY11 to RM7.58/kg in 1HFY12.
Top Glove’s Group Chairman, Tan Sri Lim Wee Chai commented “The stronger US dollar and lower latex prices gave us better net profit for 2QFY12. We have learnt from past experience on excessive increases in latex prices and shall remain cautious to continue with our planned strategy for a more balanced product mix of latex and nitrile gloves to cater to on-going customer preference.”
Thursday, 15 March 2012
Nestle - Projecting its future
Nestle | CAGR | CAGR | ||||
15.3.12 | 31.12.10 | 31.12.06 | 2006-2010 | 2006-2011 | ||
2011 | 2010 | 2006 | 4 Years | 5 Years | ||
Market Price $ | 56.3 | 43.34 | 24.8 | 17.82% | 14.98% | |
Turnover $ | 4,700,994 | 4,026,319 | 3,275,541 | 7.49% | 5.29% | |
Earnings (sen) | 194.58 | 166.91 | 112.67 | 11.55% | 10.32% | |
Div (sen) | 180 | 165 | 100 | 12.47% | 13.34% | |
P/E | 28.9 | 26.0 | 22.0 | |||
EY | 3.46% | 3.85% | 4.54% | |||
DY | 3.20% | 3.81% | 4.03% |
Projections of Nestle using the following assumptions:
- EPS GR of 8% per year, that is, its earnings double in 9 years from 2011.
- At the end of the 9 year period in 2020, its intrinsic value was at PE of 22x.
Projections | EPS GR 8% | Projections | |||||
PE 22 | 15.3.12 | CAGR | Using Historical Price | ||||
Year | 2020 | 2011 | 2020 | ||||
Market Price $ | 85.6152 | 56.3 | 4.77% | 56.3 | |||
Turnover $ | 4700994 | ||||||
Earnings (sen) | 389.16 | 194.58 | 8.01% | 389.16 | |||
Div (sen) | 360 | 180 | 8.01% | 360 | |||
P/E | 22.0 | 28.9 | 14.5 | ||||
EY | 4.55% | 3.46% | 6.91% | ||||
DY | 4.20% | 3.20% | 6.39% | ||||
Using the above 2 CONSERVATIVE assumptions, you can expect a total return per year of about 9.6% if you were to invest into Nestle today. This return is derived thus: about 4.77% from capital appreciation and about 4.8% from dividends.
The more enterprising investor may wish to look for investments with a higher return of 15% or more. Nevertheless, a return of 9.6% is good for many.
Please note that the projections are over a long period of 9 years. Over the short term, the price of Nestle can be volatile too and your return may even be negative depending on the price you paid to own it.
Graham defined investment thus: An INVESTMENT OPERATION is one which, upon THOROUGH ANALYSIS, promises SAFETY OF PRINCIPAL and a SATISFACTORY RETURN. Operations NOT meeting these requirements are speculative.
Wednesday, 14 March 2012
Nestle revisited
In the year 2001, the after tax EPS of Nestle was 87 sen. and its share price was trading between $19.30 to $21.20, with a P/E ranging from 22.2 to 24.4.
For someone who bought Nestle in 2001, where was the margin of safety of this company?
Margin of safety in a company comes from various sources. Among these are the qualitative factors which are difficult to quantify mathematically. Nestle has durable competitive advantage and economic moat. The only assessment for the investor is to "guess intelligently" what its earnings growth will be over the next few years.
Margin of safety concept can be applied in two ways. One that is obvious is buying a company at a big discount to its intrinsic value. Of course, intrinsic value is not easy to determine and does vary widely depending on the assumptions one makes in deriving this value. Another method that is not obvious, is the margin of safety that exists too when the present price that you are paying is at a discount to its intrinsic value based on its growth projections, conservatively estimated.
Let's look at Nestle. In 2001, you were paying 22.2 times for $1 of its after tax earnings. Was this underpriced, fair price or overpriced relative to its intrinsic value, conservatively estimated based on its growth potential? Growth projections are at best intelligent guesstimates. Nestle was projected to grow its business profit at 8% per year at that time. Therefore in 9 years from 2001, it was projected then to have an EPS of 2 x 87 sen = 174 sen.
Assuming that Nestle in 2010 had the same PE of 22.2, its share price in 2010 should be 22.2 x 174 sen = $.38.63, or CAGR of 8%. The average DY of Nestle was 4%. Nestle paid out virtually all its earnings as dividends. Therefore, its DY in 2001 based on historical cost was 4% but in 2010, its DY based on historical cost was 8% (dividend paid had also doubled). This was an average dividend yield of about 6% per year for that period. Should you have reinvested all the dividends back into Nestle, you would probably be able to compound your initial investment at more than 14% per year.
So, in 2001, Nestle's PE was 22.2x. Yet, knowing its earning growth potential, conservatively estimated, there was margin of safety even buying at this price, with a reasonable degree of probability. Using a conservative growth estimate in earnings of 8% per year, its earnings was projected to double in 2010. Based on this EPS projection, its (future) intrinsic value would be higher and herein was the margin of safety demanded by the value investor.
Such way of investing may not appeal to some investors. It is too difficult for them to realise that growth creates value. One should be happy to pay a higher PE to own a stock of higher quality, better earnings growth, lesser risk and greater certainty of a positive sustainable return.
Buying a wonderful company at a fair price has made those who know how, very rewarding and rich indeed. There is no reason to change something that has worked consistently over 2 decades of investing.
Nestle
Closing price on 14.3.2012
$56.30
How does an investor hope to profit from investing into a high quality growth company?
He can obtain his returns from:
1. The dividends distributed by the company.
2. The share price appreciation that reflects the better earnings of the company over time.
3. Buying the share at a bargain to its fair or intrinsic price.
The long term investor will derive most of his gains from dividends and the share price appreciation of the above stock.
Let's assume that the investor was poor in his pricing of this stock and bought in 1996 at $24 per share (the highest price for that period), he would still has a lot of gains from the dividends and share appreciation of this stock when he holds this share to today.
If the investor was very good in his pricing of this stock and bought at the lowest price in 1998 at $13 per share, he would have a better return from the dividends and share appreciation of this stock when he holds this share to today.
The "worse" case scenario is not buying into this stock and holding cash, hoping to buy at very steep bargains that never arise. The opportunity costs for holding cash instead of being invested into this stock over the short and long term can be very costly.
Warrants trading: What you need to know
Structured Warrants – Gearing & Greeks
In this article we will look at gearing factor and sensitivity coefficients – the Greeks which measure change in warrant value via change in other variables. Gearing & Effective Gearing: Structured warrants cost only a fraction of their underlying shares. They provide holders with greater exposure to price movements as they generally rise and fall more steeply in percentage terms. If a warrant is priced at RM0.30, and the underlying share is trading at RM1.50, the gearing is 5 times. The price of one warrant offers exposure to 5 shares. In bull markets, warrants will always be among the top risers and the opposite holds true in bear markets.
The definition of gearing is:
Gearing = Share Price / Warrant Price (adjusted by exercise ratio)
The following chart plots the relative price movements of a call and put warrant against corresponding movements in the underlying share price. Note the percentage change in the value of the underlying share compared with the value change in the call warrant and the put warrant. During a 3-month period, the underlying share price falls by 10% (at Point A) and increases by 8% (at Point B) - share price varies over an 18% range. In contrast, the call warrant fluctuates within a 75% range, while the put warrant fluctuates within an 80% range but in an opposite direction to the call.
Delta & Gamma: Delta refers to the rate of change of warrant price for a given change in the underlying share price. For call warrants, the delta will fall between 0 and 1; for puts it will be between 0 and -1. At 0, the warrant is impartial to any moves on the underlying share. At 1, the warrant is expected to move sen-for-sen with the underlying share. Typically, at-the-money warrants will have a delta of 0.5. As the warrant moves in-the-money, the delta will approach 1.
The most savvy of traders will aim for medium-delta warrants, in the range of 0.4 to 0.5. Any delta too low will denote an out-of-money warrant with strike too far away.
The delta is a constantly changing number. The rate of change of delta is known as the gamma. One could visualise delta as the speed of the warrant, and gamma as the acceleration. The gamma simulates the changes on the warrant price for different underlying share price. Any move on the underlying share will move the delta higher, as with the gamma.
Vega: Vega measures the sensitivity of warrant price to change in volatility. Vega is the highest for at-the-money warrants, and tends to be higher for longer-dated warrants.
With several issuers issuing warrants on the same shares, the belief is that investors and traders should focus on the warrant with the lowest implied volatility. This is only true if the issuers will buy back their warrants at a proportionate volatility level. An example would be buying a warrant at an implied volatility of 45%, which the issuer buys back at 42% versus buying a warrant at a volatility of 40% that is bought back at a volatility of 30%.
Theta: Also known as time decay, Theta is expressed in terms of sen or percentage per week (or per day closer to expiry). Eventually, the warrant will need to lose the time value entirely. But theta is not linear to time – it will get proportionately larger as it approaches expiry.
Rho: Rho measures the sensitivity of warrant prices to changes in interest rates. However, the level of interest rates, as a variable, is likely to influence neither warrant pricing nor trading decision making process.
Final Thoughts: The Greeks do not help answer which warrant to buy. However, they are reliable forecasting tools on the changes in warrant prices versus the underlying share price movements.
Related:
Warrants trading: What you need to know Parameters & Variables of Structured Warrants
Tuesday, 13 March 2012
Business Valuation
Day One
Session One:
• The Discounted Cash Flow Model
• Setting up the Model
Session Two :
• The Big Picture of DCF Valuation
• Valuation Examples
• The Discount Rate Question
Session Three :
• Open Q&A
Session Four :
• Risk premiums and Betas
• The Cost of Debt
• Estimating Cash Flows
Session Five :
• Estimating Growth Rates
• Estimating Growth Patterns
• The Terminal Value
• Closing Thoughts on DCF valuation
Session Six :
• Open Q&A
• The Discounted Cash Flow Model
• Setting up the Model
Session Two :
• The Big Picture of DCF Valuation
• Valuation Examples
• The Discount Rate Question
Session Three :
• Open Q&A
Session Four :
• Risk premiums and Betas
• The Cost of Debt
• Estimating Cash Flows
Session Five :
• Estimating Growth Rates
• Estimating Growth Patterns
• The Terminal Value
• Closing Thoughts on DCF valuation
Session Six :
• Open Q&A
Day Two
Session Seven :
• Loose Ends in Valuation
-Cash, Cross holdings and other assets
-The Value of Control, Synergy and Transparency
-The Liquidity Discount
-Employee Stock Options
Session Eight :
• The Allure of Relative Valuation
• Categorizing Multiples
• The Four Steps in Analyzing Multiples
Session Nine :
• Open Q&A
Session Ten :
• Applying Multiples in Valuation
• Finding Comparable firms
• Controlling for differences
• Picking the Right Multiple
Session Elven :
• The Real Options Story
• The Option to Delay (and valuing patents and natural resource companies)
• The Option to Abandon
• The Option to Expand
• Equity in Troubled firms as options
Session Twelve :
• Open Q&A
• Loose Ends in Valuation
-Cash, Cross holdings and other assets
-The Value of Control, Synergy and Transparency
-The Liquidity Discount
-Employee Stock Options
Session Eight :
• The Allure of Relative Valuation
• Categorizing Multiples
• The Four Steps in Analyzing Multiples
Session Nine :
• Open Q&A
Session Ten :
• Applying Multiples in Valuation
• Finding Comparable firms
• Controlling for differences
• Picking the Right Multiple
Session Elven :
• The Real Options Story
• The Option to Delay (and valuing patents and natural resource companies)
• The Option to Abandon
• The Option to Expand
• Equity in Troubled firms as options
Session Twelve :
• Open Q&A
Monday, 12 March 2012
China suffers biggest trade deficit in 20 years
Rachel Cooper
March 12, 2012 - 8:04AM
China has recorded its largest trade deficit in more than two decades as Europe's sovereign debt crisis subdued exports and oil imports rocketed.
The country's customs bureau said the shortfall was $US31.5 billion, thought to be its biggest since at least 1989. Imports rose 39.6 per cent from a year earlier, after a 15.3 per cent slump in January, while exports increased 18.4 per cent.
Analysts had expected a deficit as imports rebounded from temporary disruption after the unusually early Lunar New Year in January but they had predicted a greater rise in exports and a smaller increase in imports.
Efforts by Chinese companies to sell to the West have been hampered by the effects of the eurozone debt crisis and an anaemic economic recovery in the United States, although shipments to the US climbed 22.6 per cent from a year earlier to $US19.4b. Overseas sales to the European Union rose 2.2 per cent to $US19.4b after a 3.2 per cent drop in January.
Illustrating the increasing importance of trading with emerging markets, during the first two months of the year trade volumes with Russia jumped 31.9 per cent to $US13.51b.
Imports of copper last month were the second-highest on record, while net crude oil imports increased to a record to meet rising demand as farmers prepare for the planting season and the government adds to emergency stockpiles.
The figures came after statistics on Friday showed China's inflation rate slowing sharply in February and factory output growth also slipping. Data showed that inflation had fallen to 3.2 per cent last month, down from 4.5 per cent in January.
"Overall, economic conditions are getting weaker at a fast pace," said Zhiwei Zhang, a Nomura economist. "The slowdown is happening faster than the government expected."
There is speculation that China's moderating inflation and growth will lead the Government to loosen policy. Citigroup believes a cut in banks' reserve requirements may come as soon as this month.
"We would suggest that the inflation bubble in China last year is well and truly burst, and the policy easing can accelerate," said Gerard Lane, equity strategist at Shore Capital. "This would be beneficial for the likes of miners and other emerging market related stocks."
Song Yu, an economist at Goldman Sachs, suggested that the nation will still see a sizeable trade surplus for the full year as the deficit in early 2012 is largely seasonal.
Data in January and February was distorted by the timing of the New Year holiday, which fell in January this year and February last year.
The Daily Telegraph, London
Read more: http://www.smh.com.au/business/world-business/china-suffers-biggest-trade-deficit-in-20-years-20120312-1ut5z.html#ixzz1oqvZZGTL
Sunday, 11 March 2012
Efficient Market Hypothesis: Fact Or Fiction? "Efficient" refers to informational efficiency only.
The efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) in all of its forms, whether strong, semi-strong, or weak, is normative, not positive, i.e., it is an assertion about the way markets should behave in an ideal, utopian world, not a statement about the way markets actually do work in the real, practical world. Simple observation shows that the EMH in all its forms is fallacious. Both Kindleberger and Mackay give historical examples of stock market irrationality and inefficiency.
The efficient markets hypothesis may have advanced many academic careers, but it has not demonstrably increased the wealth of any investor over what would have been created otherwise. The EMH and the related capital asset pricing model, as opposed to the operating enterprise valuation model, may be useful as a standard of market perfection in studies of the market as a whole, but not in the valuation or selection of common stocks for investment.
The term "efficient" in the efficient markets hypothesis refers to informational efficiency only. It does not include mechanical operational efficiency or necessarily societal welfare efficiency.
The EMH explicitly assumes that all market participants have access to the same information in either a strong, semi-strong, or weak sense of the hypothesis.
- This simplifying assumption is chosen because it is necessary for mathematical tractability and thus highly convenient.
- What makes this assumption unacceptably implausible is the meaning of the term "information" which is often overlooked.
- Data is not information. Rather, information is data that has been processed and interpreted with judgment based on intelligence, knowledge and experience.
- Does anyone believe that all market participants are endowed equally, not with access to data, but with the same intelligence, knowledge and experience?
Competitive, properly-regulated markets may approach the semblance of "data efficiency" in the relative sense of eliminating arbitrage opportunities subject to trading costs and taxes, but no market is efficient in any absolute sense of equating price at all times to intrinsic economic value. This margin between value and price is the major key to successful value investing.
Intrinsic economic valuation versus price bidding in the market.
There are over 5,000 stocks listed on the major U.S. stock exchanges. Each common stock is continuously changing and never stays the same. Thus the number of stock "deals" is unlimited.
Intrinsic economic valuation versus price bidding in the market.
The stock market participants at the price-setting margin and occasionally the market as a whole are exceedingly irrational. The most important that concerns us is that, in stock market investing, no bidding system can ever replace human judgment and interpretation of the facts based on intelligence, knowledge, and experience.
- You do not have enough time to estimate the intrinsic economic value of every common stock for every moment of every trading session.
- The competitive, open-outcry, price-auction markets continuously provide bid and ask price quotations.
- price multiples such as the price/earnings, price/book value, price/dividends, price/cash flow, price/sales and other accounting ratios.
- Stock pricing conventions vary in applicability and popularity.
The stock market participants at the price-setting margin and occasionally the market as a whole are exceedingly irrational. The most important that concerns us is that, in stock market investing, no bidding system can ever replace human judgment and interpretation of the facts based on intelligence, knowledge, and experience.
The Relationship of Intrinsic Value to Market Price - tracing the various steps culminating in market price.
In Security Analysis by Graham and Dodd, 1934 edition on page 23: "The Relationship of Intrinsic Value to Market Price.--The general question of the relation of intrinsic value to the market quotation may be made clearer by the appended chart [see table below], which traces the various steps culminating in market price.
http://www.numeraire.com/margin.htm
It will be evident from the chart that the influence of what we call analytical factors over the market price is both partial and indirect--
- partial, because it frequently competes with purely speculative factors which influence the price in the opposite direction; and
- indirect, because it acts through the intermediary of people's sentiments and decisions.
Relationship of Intrinsic Value Factors to Market Price | ||||
I.General market factors | } Attitude of public toward the issue (leads to) } Bids and offers (lead to) } Market price | |||
II.Individual factors | A.Speculative | 1.Market factors | a.Technical | |
b.Manipulative | ||||
c.Psychological | ||||
A.Speculative B.Investment | 2.Future value factors | a.Management and reputation | ||
b.Competitive conditions and prospects | ||||
c.Possible and probably changes in volume, price, and costs | ||||
B.Investment | 3.Intrinsic value | a.Earnings | ||
b.Dividends | ||||
c.Assets | ||||
d.Capital structure | ||||
e.Terms of the issue | ||||
f.Others |
The radical difference between value and price is explained by John Burr Williams in The Theory of Investment Value as indicated in the following quotations: (1938: 33):
- "If opinion were not founded in part on current dividends and changes therein, there would be nothing to prevent price and value from drifting miles apart." (1938: 191):
- "Since market price depends on popular opinion, and since the public is more emotional than logical, it is foolish to expect a relentless convergence of market price toward investment value. Corroboration of estimates [of intrinsic economic value] by subsequent market action, therefore, ought not to be expected. After all, investment value and market price are two quite different things."
Thus:
Price is not value. Pricing is not valuation. Pricing models are not valuation models. Pricing models include: capital asset pricing model (CAPM), arbitrage pricing theory (APT), and option pricing. |
http://www.numeraire.com/margin.htm
Value versus Price - Two Perspectives on Worth
Value versus Price
Two Perspectives on Worth
VALUATION | PRICING | |
End | truth -- intrinsic value | illusion -- marginal opinion |
Means | method of appraisal * | auction mechanism |
Terms | case-by-case | standardized |
Institution | private contracts | public exchanges |
Approach | rational, logical | arational, emotional |
Knowledge | economics | psychology, sociology |
Principle | theory of investment | ad hoc, empirical |
Result | value range | single price |
Precision | highly imprecise | highly precise |
Accuracy | within value range | outside value range |
Investment | real assets | claims on assets |
Units | operating enterprise | common stock issue |
Data Source | company reports | market-generated |
Measurement | absolute | relative, comparative |
Analysis Type | investment | portfolio of stocks |
Analysis-Units | one company | compare two stocks |
Analysis-Time | one point in time | compare two times |
Horizon | long-term (years) | short-term (minutes) |
Frequency | sporadic, on demand | continuous supply |
Stability | slow, small changes | quick, large changes |
Application | individual stock selection | stock trading |
* In contrast, the method of anticipation emphasizes earnings growth for the sake of growth rather than the sake of value. Thus, it is not recommended for purposes of estimating value. |
Margin of Safety
Intrinsic value is independent of the market and current quoted price.
It is the absolute standard against which all market prices are compared.
The concept of price is not without ambiguity.
Thus we focus on the important concept of safety margin rather than emphasize price with its potential quick and large changes from one transaction to the next.
John Maynard Keynes in his General Theory (Book IV "The Inducement to Invest", Chapter 12 "The State of Long-Term Expectation", Section V, pages 156-157) introduced the metaphor of newspaper photograph competitions to explain the working of the stock market.
Safety margin represents an excess of intrinsic value over market price, or alternately, a discount of price below intrinsic value.
It is more important to wait for a favorable buy price than to be dependent on fortuitous timing to realize a profitable sell price.
It is the absolute standard against which all market prices are compared.
- Thus with the method of valuation, companies are considered neither under-valued nor over-valued relative to the stock market.
- Rather, common stock issues are considered either under-priced or over-priced in the market relative to the intrinsic value of their companies.
- To identify mispriced stocks, the value of a company is compared to its stock market price.
The concept of price is not without ambiguity.
- We can choose among closing price, opening price, asking price, bidding price, actual price of latest trade for any number of shares, or actual price of latest trade for the same number of shares in the contemplated transaction.
Thus we focus on the important concept of safety margin rather than emphasize price with its potential quick and large changes from one transaction to the next.
- The variability of the price of a stock in part represents mispricing by the market.
- Such lack of convergence of market price to intrinsic value, however transient, represents market inefficiency.
- The irrationality of the stock market has been observed by de la Vega, John Maynard Keynes, Kindleberger, Lefèvre, Mackay, and others.
John Maynard Keynes in his General Theory (Book IV "The Inducement to Invest", Chapter 12 "The State of Long-Term Expectation", Section V, pages 156-157) introduced the metaphor of newspaper photograph competitions to explain the working of the stock market.
- His explanation emphasized anticipation of the opinions of other market participants and the resulting infinite regress, i.e., I think that he thinks that I think that he thinks, ad infinitum.
- This stresses that market prices are determined by opinion.
Safety margin represents an excess of intrinsic value over market price, or alternately, a discount of price below intrinsic value.
- A safety margin of at least twenty percent is desirable.
- Intrinsic value is what a company would be worth to a private owner independent of the stock market and its daily quotations.
- The concept of a margin of safety was introduced by Graham and Dodd in Security Analysis.
It is more important to wait for a favorable buy price than to be dependent on fortuitous timing to realize a profitable sell price.
- A buy and hold approach involves more than the platitudinous adage to "buy low and sell high."
- The margin of safety requires knowing when the buying price is low in absolute terms rather than merely relative to the market as a whole.
Warrants trading: What you need to know
Parameters & Variables of Structured Warrants
To figure out the relationship between share price and the associated warrant price, the investor has to break down the premium factor that he/she pays for. Premium, Intrinsic & Time Values: The premium measures the extra cost incurred when buying a warrant and “exercising” the warrant into share over direct share purchase.
Premium = [(Warrant Price + Exercise Price) - Share Price) / Share Price] x 100%
Example (Diagram 1): if a warrant priced at RM0.50, has an exercise price of RM1.00, while the underlying share price is RM1.20, the premium on the warrant is 25%.
Premium (%) = [(0.50+1.00)-1.20]/1.20 x 100% = 25%
Warrant Price = Intrinsic Value + Time Value
The intrinsic value of a warrant is the difference between share and exercise price. In our example, the warrant’s intrinsic value of RM0.20 represents the possibility of buying shares for RM1.00, even though the market share price is RM1.20 (Diagram 2).
The additional RM0.30 is known as the time value. It reflects the payment for profit opportunity if the underlying share moves in the warrant buyer’s favour. In our example, if the warrant was to expire tomorrow, it would be priced around RM0.20. But if the warrant has 9 months before expiry, there's a high chance of the share price increasing. At a time value of RM0.30, this tells us that investors are willing to pay RM0.30 for the potential future gains before warrant expiry. The downside is that time value will fall closer to zero as the expiry date approaches. This is known as time decay.
If a warrant is out-of-the-money, by definition the warrant has no intrinsic value. In this case, the time value component accounts wholly for warrant price.
The price will not be lower than its intrinsic value due to the possibility of a risk-less arbitrage – where one buys the warrants and exercises them into shares, for a lower market share price. If a warrant is deep in-the-money, or expires shortly, the price may trade at a small discount to its intrinsic value.
Valuing Premium & Time Value: A warrant with a time value of RM0.20 is not necessarily “cheaper” than one at RM0.30. Both premium and time value parameters must be used in comparisons.
Deep out-of-the-money warrants have high premiums, which get lower when becoming more in-the-money. Premiums are regarded as measures of warrant price. While intrinsic value is directly related to share and fixed exercise price, the unpredictable nature of time value makes analysis difficult.
Implied Volatility: In determining “fair value” of warrants, the most adopted pricing model is the Black-Scholes one. It takes into account the inter-relationship between share and exercise price, expiry date, risk-free interest rate and volatility.
Volatility represents absolute price movements, of the underlying share over a time period. Traders need to understand that huge volatility is actually beneficial due to “limited loss, unlimited upside” characteristics of structured warrants.
There are two volatility types – historical, which calculates past variations of underlying share price, and implied, which represents market expectations of future volatility in underlying share price.
Examining historical volatility requires care, since short-term can differ from longer term. Besides underlying share direction, investors need to question if current volatility is likely to continue.
Implied volatility is derived from working backwards the current warrant price through the Black-Scholes equation. A warrant is expensive if implied volatility outweighs historical volatility assuming full market efficiency. In reality, implied volatility takes into account maturity length, nature of warrants, and spot/strike levels. Implied volatility is generally higher for longer-dated warrants and put warrants and at-the-money warrants.
http://bursaedge.blogspot.com/2012/02/warrants-education-2.html
Saturday, 10 March 2012
Types of Growth and DCF models
Models of Investment Valuation
Declining DDM
Constant DDM
Slow Growth DDM
Fast Growth DDM
Forecasts of Dividends or Free Cash Flow
Logit Growth DDM
2-Stage Growth DDM
FCF Constant D/E
FCF Rising D/E
http://www.numeraire.com/value.htm
Declining DDM
Constant DDM
Slow Growth DDM
Fast Growth DDM
Forecasts of Dividends or Free Cash Flow
Logit Growth DDM
2-Stage Growth DDM
FCF Constant D/E
FCF Rising D/E
http://www.numeraire.com/value.htm
Some of the most common types of intrinsic economic valuation model.
Instead of estimating each cash flow for each time period using a general-purpose DCF model that can be used for any investment asset, we can make reasonable simplifying assumptions for different kinds of specific investments in order to develop formulas by which these estimates can be made.
- These formulas provide shortcuts to operationalize the theory, and represent different types of the dividend discount model (DDM).
- In each model type, dividends or free-cash-flow continue forever, but a terminal price may be assumed to simplify the analysis.
- These model types can be given names so as to emphasize their specific simplifying assumptions.
Some of the most common types of intrinsic economic valuation model are
Following the example of John Burr Williams (1938), four types of models of investment valuation and four types of dividend forecasts are illustrated below.
- constant dividend in perpetuity,
- constant dividend growth rate in perpetuity, e.g., decline (negative growth), slow growth, and fast growth,
- constant multistage dividend growth rates, e.g., two-stage and three-stage,
- variable logistic (LOGIT) dividend growth rates,
- free-cash-flow (FCF) used to estimate the cash distributions to equity owners, e.g., free-cash-flow with constant financial leverage (debt/equity ratio) and free-cash-flow with increasing financial leverage (rising debt/equity ratio), which in turn can be used either in a general DCF model or in a specific DDM model,
- special situations handled by a general-purpose DCF model that is customized to fit the circumstances of each investment case, e.g., rapid growth by external merger or acquisition (M&A) or by internal sudden expansion. Relatively complex M&A models are available elsewhere. In such cases the capital gains component of total return can greatly dominate the dividend component, especially when the number of years of dividends in the analysis is small.
- The vertical axis is cash flow, and the scale is log-linear except for FCF forecasts which is linear.
- The horizontal axis is time in years, and it continues to infinity.
- A company lives forever, but its estimate of dividends or cash flow can have a finite life with a capital gain at the end of the forecast period.
Types of Growth | |||
Models of Investment Valuation | |||
Declining DDM | Constant DDM | Slow Growth DDM | Fast Growth DDM |
Forecasts of Dividends or Free Cash Flow | |||
Logit Growth DDM | 2-Stage Growth DDM | FCF Constant D/E | FCF Rising D/E |
- Slow and fast growth are relative to current average growth rates, historical precedents and the discount rate used in the model.
- Fast growth includes speculative growth.
- LOGIT growth is a special case of S-curve growth for rapid followed by slower growth phases.
- These growth patterns may be used in multi-stage models with different patterns for different stages of growth. See theory for the mathematics behind these models.
These models have been implemented in DCF Valuator, a free online web-based application that estimates intrinsic value per share, goal implied value, range of value with Monte Carlo simulation scenarios, and rate of return on investment for any common stock in any currency. For a walk-through tour of the DCF Valuator, click here and invoke any of the model types in the table.
http://www.numeraire.com/value.htm
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