US lurching towards 'debt explosion' with long-term interest rates on course to double
The US economy is lurching towards crisis with long-term interest rates on course to double, crippling the country’s ability to pay its debts and potentially plunging it into another recession, according to a study by the US’s own central bank
By Philip Aldrick, Banking Editor
Published: 5:44AM BST 06 Jul 2009
Comments 270 Comment on this article
Next Tim Geithner, the US Treasury Secretary, has faced searching question about the growing US Budget deficit
Alan Greenspan, the former chairman of the Federal Reserve, is blamed by many for keeping interest rates too low for too long
Wen Jiabao, the Chinese premier, has expressed his concern over the scale of the US deficit
The deficit is just one of the financial headaches confronting US President Obama, pictured here at the G20 Summit
The US budget deficit is expected to reach about 12pc of the country's gross domestic product this year
George Soros, the billionaire investor, has been among those to express concern about the size of the US deficit and those of other economies
Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke, pictured here with Tim Geither, has acknowledged that the mountain of US debt needs to be reined in
Politicians around the world have said that the bigger deficits are a necessary consequence of keeping a global depression at bay
Bank of England Governor Mervyn King, pictured on the right, has given explicit warnings to Alistair Darling, the Chancellor, to cut the deficit
UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown is arguing that more Government spending will prop up the economy and help cut the deficit
In a 2003 paper, Thomas Laubach, the US Federal Reserve’s senior economist, calculated the impact on long-term interest rates of rising fiscal deficits and soaring national debt. Applying his assumptions to the recent spike in the US fiscal deficit and national debt, long-term interests rates will double from their current 3.5pc.
The impact would be devastating by making it punitively expensive to finance national borrowings and leading to what Tim Congdon, founder of Lombard Street Research, called a “debt explosion”. Mr Laubach’s study has implications for the UK, too, as public debt is soaring. A US crisis would have implications for the rest of the world, in any case.
Using historical examples for his paper, New Evidence on the Interest Rate Effects of Budget Deficits and Debt, Mr Laubach came to the conclusion that “a percentage point increase in the projected deficit-to-GDP ratio raises the 10-year bond rate expected to prevail five years into the future by 20 to 40 basis points, a typical estimate is about 25 basis points”.
The US deficit has blown out from 3pc to 13.5pc in the past year but long-term rates are largely unchanged. Assuming Mr Laubach’s “typical estimate”, long-term rates have to climb 2.5 percentage points.
He added: “Similarly, a percentage point increase in the projected debt-to-GDP ratio raises future interest rates by about 4 to 5 basis points.” Economists are predicting a wide range of ratios but Mr Congdon said it was “not unreasonable” to assume debt doubling to 140pc. At that level, Mr Laubach’s calculations would see long-term rates rise by 3.5 percentage points.
The study is damning because Mr Laubach was the Fed’s economist at the time, going on to become its senior economist between 2005 and 2008, when he stepped down. As a result, the doubling in rates is the US central bank’s own prediction.
Mr Congdon said the study illustrated the “horrifying” consequences for leading western economies of bailing out their banks and attempting to stimulate markets by cutting taxes and boosting public spending. He said the markets had failed to digest fully the scale of fiscal largesse and said “current gilt yields [public debt] are extraordinary low given the size of deficits”.
Should the cost of raising or refinancing public debt in the markets double, “the debt could just explode”, he said, adding that it would come to a head in “five to 10 years”.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financetopics/financialcrisis/5754447/US-lurching-towards-debt-explosion-with-long-term-interest-rates-on-course-to-double.html
Thursday, 9 July 2009
Time for Buffett to answer some tough questions
Time for Buffett to answer some tough questions
Berkshire Hathaway shareholders are heading for the "Woodstock for capitalists" – the company's annual gathering in Omaha. Warren Buffett, the Berkshire boss, has changed the format to encourage more questions about the business. Investors should take him up on that.
By Richard Beales
Published: 6:20PM BST 01 May 2009
The legendary investor is 78 and his long-time sidekick, Charlie Munger, is 85. With his track record and public profile, Buffett is the epitome of the corporate "key man", as Fitch Ratings pointed out in knocking Berkshire's triple-A rating down a notch in March. He has, he says, chosen his successors. While their identities are undisclosed, it's a safe bet they know what they are doing. But the culture that brings 30,000-odd shareholders to Omaha every year will unavoidably change.
Another important Buffett decision of late has been to expose Berkshire to big derivatives bets – $67bn of potential exposure at the end of 2008. This is in spite of once calling such instruments "financial weapons of mass destruction".
Buffett recognises the apparent double standard, and brings to derivatives much of the common sense he applies to other investments. The contracts he has written, so far, are relatively straightforward and he has limited expected losses to an amount Berkshire could easily handle.
Berkshire shares have lost a third of their value in the past year. It is suddenly looking like what it is – a largely unhedged equity investment vehicle with a focus on the financial sector.
Its giant insurance businesses don't look so special at the moment. Large stakes in American Express, Wells Fargo and rating agency Moody's underline the finance focus. Along with the succession question, that may help to explain why Berkshire's shares appear to be trading at a discount to the market value of its holdings.
But another development should generate optimism among the Berkshire faithful: opportunities to invest on the cheap ought now to be plentiful. Buffett picked up some good deals last year, Berkshire still has strong credit and plenty of cash – and the Sage is still around.
After years in which few bargains were available and Berkshire's size made meaningful deals hard to come by, he has the chance to redeem himself.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/breakingviewscom/5258851/Time-for-Buffett-to-answer-some-tough-questions.html
Berkshire Hathaway shareholders are heading for the "Woodstock for capitalists" – the company's annual gathering in Omaha. Warren Buffett, the Berkshire boss, has changed the format to encourage more questions about the business. Investors should take him up on that.
By Richard Beales
Published: 6:20PM BST 01 May 2009
The legendary investor is 78 and his long-time sidekick, Charlie Munger, is 85. With his track record and public profile, Buffett is the epitome of the corporate "key man", as Fitch Ratings pointed out in knocking Berkshire's triple-A rating down a notch in March. He has, he says, chosen his successors. While their identities are undisclosed, it's a safe bet they know what they are doing. But the culture that brings 30,000-odd shareholders to Omaha every year will unavoidably change.
Another important Buffett decision of late has been to expose Berkshire to big derivatives bets – $67bn of potential exposure at the end of 2008. This is in spite of once calling such instruments "financial weapons of mass destruction".
Buffett recognises the apparent double standard, and brings to derivatives much of the common sense he applies to other investments. The contracts he has written, so far, are relatively straightforward and he has limited expected losses to an amount Berkshire could easily handle.
Berkshire shares have lost a third of their value in the past year. It is suddenly looking like what it is – a largely unhedged equity investment vehicle with a focus on the financial sector.
Its giant insurance businesses don't look so special at the moment. Large stakes in American Express, Wells Fargo and rating agency Moody's underline the finance focus. Along with the succession question, that may help to explain why Berkshire's shares appear to be trading at a discount to the market value of its holdings.
But another development should generate optimism among the Berkshire faithful: opportunities to invest on the cheap ought now to be plentiful. Buffett picked up some good deals last year, Berkshire still has strong credit and plenty of cash – and the Sage is still around.
After years in which few bargains were available and Berkshire's size made meaningful deals hard to come by, he has the chance to redeem himself.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/breakingviewscom/5258851/Time-for-Buffett-to-answer-some-tough-questions.html
How to invest like Warren Buffett
How to invest like Warren Buffett
The author's book on Warren Buffett, "The Midas Touch", summarises the favourite investing principles of the "Sage of Omaha".
By John Train
Published: 11:26AM BST 01 Jul 2009
Comments 12 Comment on this article
Fanatical: offered a glass of good wine at a dinner, Warren Buffett said: 'Just hand me the money' Photo: AFP/GETTY
My book on Warren Buffett, "The Midas Touch", has just been published in Britain. It contains most of his favourite investing principles. Although time has passed since its original appearance, his ideas today are much the same.
Here is a handful of the central ones. They aren't easy: this is a competitive game.
1. The key to investing is found in this rule: buy a share as though you were buying the whole company.
To do that, you have to know what the enterprise is worth. Therefore, the investor should live in the world of companies, never of mathematical formulae.
In the latest annual meeting of Berkshire Hathaway, Buffett's company, his partner Charles Munger put it this way: "The worst decisions are often made with the most formal projections. They look so professional that you begin to believe the numbers are reality.
"You are taken in by the false precision. Business schools teach this stuff because they have to teach something."
2. A recent heresy is that market volatility equals risk. Quite the contrary!
For a serious investor, volatility creates opportunity. To use my own language, investment opportunity consists of the difference between reality and perception. High volatility increases that difference, and thus increases opportunity for the knowledgeable investor.
Mr Buffett says sardonically that he favours the dotty "efficient market theory" because it creates more opportunities for him.
3. As to growth versus value, Mr Buffett observes that "value" should include projected growth, notably "growth at a reasonable price" or Garp.
He looks for companies with a business "moat" around them that should have steady, reasonably predictable growth.
Perhaps a better phraseology for the growth versus value dichotomy might be "high growth" versus "bargain hunting". The analytical techniques, and investor temperaments, in the two approaches are quite different. One calls for a futurologist, the other for an accountant.
That said, for a taxpaying investor long-term growth is more convenient and more tax-efficient than seeking one bargain after another.
4. High technology, most emerging markets, leveraged buyouts, real estate and other hard to appraise exotica might as well not exist for Mr Buffett.
He follows the safest approach: stick to what you know best. However, many approaches are valid. Your advantage will be the extent to which your knowledge of a valid situation exceeds the market's.
It makes little difference how broad your knowledge is. One correct investment decision is as valuable as another. Mr Buffett says that one should only seek a handful of really big ideas in one's investing career. The key is to be right when you do decide, not to flutter about spreading yourself thin.
5. Investing in bad industries, or turnarounds, usually doesn't work.
A skilled surgeon can excise a tumour but to revive a moribund patient requires a magician. The princess hopes that when she kisses the toad a beautiful prince will spring up. In fact, alas, she will probably end up awash in toads.
6. Businesses that generate cash that they can reinvest at high rates of return over long periods are particularly attractive holdings.
Low-margin businesses that periodically call for more cash from their investors, which they can only invest at a modest rate of return, are a dismal affair. Differently put, if all else is the same, feel free to marry an heiress rather than a pauper.
7. Don't sell a great stock just because it has doubled.
It could be better value afterwards than it was before. The greatest stocks may go up 20 or even 100 times in a generation or two.
Peter Lynch, who built up Fidelity's Magellan fund, points out that the deluded policy of "rebalancing" more or less automatically because a stock has risen is a lot like pulling out the flowers in the garden and watering the weeds. Don't do it!
8. A grave corporate folly is offering your own underpriced stock for the fully valued stock of an acquisition candidate.
In that scenario, instead of paying 50p for £1 of value, you are paying £1 for 50p of value. Lunacy! Still, such situations are often generated by the megalomania of chief executives.
9. Avoid long-term bonds.
"We are bound to have inflation, given current policies. There are a lot of incentives for politicians in all countries to inflate their currencies," Mr Buffett says.
10. To do superlatively well, an investor, like a company manager, must be a fanatic.
By relentless concentration, Mr Buffett has moved billions of dollars from other people's pockets into his own. Alas, he doesn't enjoy what money can buy. He's a miser.
Once, offered a glass of good wine at a dinner, he said: "Just hand me the money." So, it may be helpful in business terms to be that focused, but not necessarily in human terms.
Still, to preserve capital, which is difficult, one should understand the principles, and Mr Buffett's are all good ones.
"The Midas Touch" by John Train is published by Harriman House. Mr Train founded Train Smith Investment Counsel and he has written hundreds of columns for the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times and Forbes magazine. Apart from "The Midas Touch", his best-selling books include "The Craft of Investing", "The Money Masters" and "The New Money Masters".
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/investing/5708407/How-to-invest-like-Warren-Buffett.html
Wednesday, 8 July 2009
"Even Buffett Isn't Perfect"
Sunday, July 20, 2008
Book Review-"Even Buffett Isn't Perfect"
I am a complete sucker for investment books. My wife accuses me of owning several thousand books that have essentially the same title, usually some variant of Value Investing, valuation, or intrinsic value, or securities analysis. Of course, I have every Buffett or Munger book known to man as well as everything about or by Benjamin Graham. By the way, speaking of Graham, my good friend Geoff Gannon is putting together a series which will review Securities Analysis chapter by chapter. For those who are serious value investing students, I suspect that you will enjoy Geoff's always thorough and thoughtful posts.
Vahan Janjigian, a fellow CFA, is executive director of Forbes Investment Advisory Institute and publishes a number of newsletters with Forbes. He also has a blog and serves on the investment committee of a large RIA.
Dr. Janjigian's book gingerly attempts to criticize some of Buffett's mistaken investments and controversial points of view. I think the book is more successful with the latter than the former.
Janjigian admires Buffett's discipline and capital allocation methodologies. He admires Buffett's ability to manage executive talent. His last sentence in the book summarizes his viewpoint,"Based on the evidence, it is certainly fair to conclude that WB is one of the greatest investors-if not the greatest investor-of all time."
So where are Buffett's mistakes? Janjigian criticizes Buffett's views on taxation, especially those on estate taxes. I agree with Janjigian that there is an irony if not an artificiality or phoniness about urging the continuity of high estate taxes and concomitantly avoiding the situation through setting up trusts and foundations Evidence of avoiding income taxes is evident throughout Berkshire's life...the company and Buffett have always used the IRS Tax Code to their advantage. There is clearly nothing wrong with that but similarly. it is somewhat disingenuous to urge higher taxes after a career of avoiding them.
Like any investor, Buffett has made some mistakes. This is not a game of perfect, but rather one where investors should attempt to understand the downside risks in making an investment. The outcomes can be highly uncertain...the future always is hazy and usually, initial assumptions are plain wrong, either on the optimistic or the pessimistic side of expectations.
Janjigian addresses the Buffett diversification versus concentration question. "Buffett believes that if you can't invest enough money to have some say in how the company's capital is to be deployed, you are better off diversifying your portfolio." This is simply not true. Most Buffetteers and wannabes certainly attempt to focus their portfolios. WB does not say not to diversify...in fact, for the average investor who is not inclined to do sufficient due diligence, diversification is a salvation. For many professional portfolios, the great bulk of the portfolio is indexed. But in cases where one has specialized knowledge or skills, satellite investments outside the cord index are made and should add performance. Diversification is a protection against ignorance. If one is able to do due diligence, and select successful businesses at reasonable valuations, diversification will not serve you other than to reduce volatility and an unfortunate corollary, reduce returns.
VJ does a decent job in discussing attributes of diversification in a non-mathematical approach to statistical correlation. This is one of the strongest elements in this book.
Much of the rest of the book is in my view, completely obvious. "Buffett buys stocks cheap, not cheap stocks." "Successful investors must be able to distinguish between great companies and great stocks." VJ has an amazing grasp of the obvious and adds little insight into valuation of growth stocks. There are far better sources than this book for this element.
VJ addresses the fact that value works over the long run but growth or rather momentum can work over the short run. Buffett never trashes growth but views it as a partner in helping undervalued stocks recover when growth becomes temporarily disrupted. Other than Buffett's famous comments about lemmings, he has never discussed momentum investing per se, at least to my knowledge.
VJ makes some dangerous statements about PIPE stocks indicating that WB has been successful in buying special issue "Private Investment in Public Equity" holdings such as Salomon Brothers or US Air. True, these had special terms that a large buyer can extract but it is misleading to believe that what some brokers present as PIPEs will offer the average investor better returns. Most PIPE offerings are made in very small cap, highly risky businesses. VJ does suggest that the best access to such investments is through a hedge fund or through Berkie itself.
VJ makes the point that "Unless you have access to Buffett-like resources, it is better to think of yourself as a stock buyer than a business buyer." The argument that managements will rarely listen to outside advice is humbling for both institutional and retail investors. However, retail investors and small institutional investors can be very successful in motivating and organizing larger investors to add pressure to a board. The principle of thinking long term as an owner of a business rather than a punter of stocks is an important part of any real value investor's credo. I have known many managers who "played" stocks rather than owned businesses and who were looking for trends rather than valuation rationales for stocks. They are assuredly not value managers. I have had investee company managements who have indicated that I should just sell the stock if I didn't like what they are doing. Again, these are managements who just don't get "it." If the business has a strong moat that is not being defended, get rid of the management but hang onto the business. VJ's advice is ill-conceived at best in this topic.
Swinging for the fat pitch is WB's approach. WB does not suffer from analysis paralysis and VJ believes that some of WB's recent deals have had inadequate due diligence. Sometimes the obvious should not take very long!
WB readily admits to being "dead wrong." Salomon was a mistake that took an extraordinary amount of work to escape. Gen Re was much worse with poor judgment on WB's part re underwriting discipline and the derivatives book of GenRe securities. NetJets capital intensity does not seem to fit the usual Buffett textbook. Pier One had no moat. Mistkaes all. VJ actually misses the most egregious errors that I recall, namely Dexter Shoe which gave away 1.6% of BRK or about $3.5 Billion in value for what is now a tiny fragment of H.H. Brown Shoe Group, another BRK sub. Dexter, Buffett calls his worst mistake. VJ doesn't even address this. There have been others. WB was the largest investor in Handy and Harman, the silver processor and refiner. Unfortunately, it was also an auto parts supplier and metal bender. Buffett's endless fascination with silver attracted him to H&H. H&H ultimately merged into WHX, which went chapter 11 in 2003. Berky had escaped H&H many years before this ignominious end.
VJ dislikes WB's views about corporate governance. It is incorrect to say that Buffett opposes employee stock options. It was the accounting for them that he faulted as well as the low hurdles that most company's managements clear to get them. In many cases, the only requirement for managements to achieve is respiration, and there are even cases where compensation continues into the after-life! There is nothing misleading about WB issuing options in subsidiary companies with clear performance mandates versus his public statements about employee stock options issuance.
The composition of WB's board has been controversial in the past. No it certainly was not independent historically with Warren and Charlie, Susan and Howard Buffett; Malcolm Chace, Walter Scott were old business cronies; Ron Olson was a partner in Munger's old firm. But VJ missed the most obvious point, Buffett for most of the time that he was involved in BRK owned over half the stock. It was absolutely iron clad clear that management's interests were aligned with shareholders. Unlike most public corporations, management owned most of the stock. The role of the board is not to protect minority shareholder interests but rather to ensure that shareholders' interests are protected. This point is missed by VJ.
Bottom-line, if you are looking for advice to imitate WB's investment style, this is not the best source. If you are looking for a comprehensive list of WB's mistakes in judgment, this is incomplete. If you are looking for views on taxation contra to those of WB, read Steve Forbes rather than VJ's book.
The key takeaways after each chapter provide an excellent summary of each chapter. The final chapter, "Conclusion" successfully highlights the important points.
Dr. Janjigian has attempted to provide an antidote to the usual glorious heaping of praise that most Buffett books (and CNBC coverage) provide. The reality is that nobody walks on water (or parts the sea depending on your point of view.) Even great investors frankly screw up royally. But the incidence in the case of Buffett is remarkably low, the damage is a scratch or fender bender rather than a complete wreck. Should all of us be so fortunate, or disciplined!!
posted by Rick @ 6:52 PM 3 comments
http://valuediscipline.blogspot.com/2008/07/book-review-buffett-isn-perfect.html
Book Review-"Even Buffett Isn't Perfect"
I am a complete sucker for investment books. My wife accuses me of owning several thousand books that have essentially the same title, usually some variant of Value Investing, valuation, or intrinsic value, or securities analysis. Of course, I have every Buffett or Munger book known to man as well as everything about or by Benjamin Graham. By the way, speaking of Graham, my good friend Geoff Gannon is putting together a series which will review Securities Analysis chapter by chapter. For those who are serious value investing students, I suspect that you will enjoy Geoff's always thorough and thoughtful posts.
Vahan Janjigian, a fellow CFA, is executive director of Forbes Investment Advisory Institute and publishes a number of newsletters with Forbes. He also has a blog and serves on the investment committee of a large RIA.
Dr. Janjigian's book gingerly attempts to criticize some of Buffett's mistaken investments and controversial points of view. I think the book is more successful with the latter than the former.
Janjigian admires Buffett's discipline and capital allocation methodologies. He admires Buffett's ability to manage executive talent. His last sentence in the book summarizes his viewpoint,"Based on the evidence, it is certainly fair to conclude that WB is one of the greatest investors-if not the greatest investor-of all time."
So where are Buffett's mistakes? Janjigian criticizes Buffett's views on taxation, especially those on estate taxes. I agree with Janjigian that there is an irony if not an artificiality or phoniness about urging the continuity of high estate taxes and concomitantly avoiding the situation through setting up trusts and foundations Evidence of avoiding income taxes is evident throughout Berkshire's life...the company and Buffett have always used the IRS Tax Code to their advantage. There is clearly nothing wrong with that but similarly. it is somewhat disingenuous to urge higher taxes after a career of avoiding them.
Like any investor, Buffett has made some mistakes. This is not a game of perfect, but rather one where investors should attempt to understand the downside risks in making an investment. The outcomes can be highly uncertain...the future always is hazy and usually, initial assumptions are plain wrong, either on the optimistic or the pessimistic side of expectations.
Janjigian addresses the Buffett diversification versus concentration question. "Buffett believes that if you can't invest enough money to have some say in how the company's capital is to be deployed, you are better off diversifying your portfolio." This is simply not true. Most Buffetteers and wannabes certainly attempt to focus their portfolios. WB does not say not to diversify...in fact, for the average investor who is not inclined to do sufficient due diligence, diversification is a salvation. For many professional portfolios, the great bulk of the portfolio is indexed. But in cases where one has specialized knowledge or skills, satellite investments outside the cord index are made and should add performance. Diversification is a protection against ignorance. If one is able to do due diligence, and select successful businesses at reasonable valuations, diversification will not serve you other than to reduce volatility and an unfortunate corollary, reduce returns.
VJ does a decent job in discussing attributes of diversification in a non-mathematical approach to statistical correlation. This is one of the strongest elements in this book.
Much of the rest of the book is in my view, completely obvious. "Buffett buys stocks cheap, not cheap stocks." "Successful investors must be able to distinguish between great companies and great stocks." VJ has an amazing grasp of the obvious and adds little insight into valuation of growth stocks. There are far better sources than this book for this element.
VJ addresses the fact that value works over the long run but growth or rather momentum can work over the short run. Buffett never trashes growth but views it as a partner in helping undervalued stocks recover when growth becomes temporarily disrupted. Other than Buffett's famous comments about lemmings, he has never discussed momentum investing per se, at least to my knowledge.
VJ makes some dangerous statements about PIPE stocks indicating that WB has been successful in buying special issue "Private Investment in Public Equity" holdings such as Salomon Brothers or US Air. True, these had special terms that a large buyer can extract but it is misleading to believe that what some brokers present as PIPEs will offer the average investor better returns. Most PIPE offerings are made in very small cap, highly risky businesses. VJ does suggest that the best access to such investments is through a hedge fund or through Berkie itself.
VJ makes the point that "Unless you have access to Buffett-like resources, it is better to think of yourself as a stock buyer than a business buyer." The argument that managements will rarely listen to outside advice is humbling for both institutional and retail investors. However, retail investors and small institutional investors can be very successful in motivating and organizing larger investors to add pressure to a board. The principle of thinking long term as an owner of a business rather than a punter of stocks is an important part of any real value investor's credo. I have known many managers who "played" stocks rather than owned businesses and who were looking for trends rather than valuation rationales for stocks. They are assuredly not value managers. I have had investee company managements who have indicated that I should just sell the stock if I didn't like what they are doing. Again, these are managements who just don't get "it." If the business has a strong moat that is not being defended, get rid of the management but hang onto the business. VJ's advice is ill-conceived at best in this topic.
Swinging for the fat pitch is WB's approach. WB does not suffer from analysis paralysis and VJ believes that some of WB's recent deals have had inadequate due diligence. Sometimes the obvious should not take very long!
WB readily admits to being "dead wrong." Salomon was a mistake that took an extraordinary amount of work to escape. Gen Re was much worse with poor judgment on WB's part re underwriting discipline and the derivatives book of GenRe securities. NetJets capital intensity does not seem to fit the usual Buffett textbook. Pier One had no moat. Mistkaes all. VJ actually misses the most egregious errors that I recall, namely Dexter Shoe which gave away 1.6% of BRK or about $3.5 Billion in value for what is now a tiny fragment of H.H. Brown Shoe Group, another BRK sub. Dexter, Buffett calls his worst mistake. VJ doesn't even address this. There have been others. WB was the largest investor in Handy and Harman, the silver processor and refiner. Unfortunately, it was also an auto parts supplier and metal bender. Buffett's endless fascination with silver attracted him to H&H. H&H ultimately merged into WHX, which went chapter 11 in 2003. Berky had escaped H&H many years before this ignominious end.
VJ dislikes WB's views about corporate governance. It is incorrect to say that Buffett opposes employee stock options. It was the accounting for them that he faulted as well as the low hurdles that most company's managements clear to get them. In many cases, the only requirement for managements to achieve is respiration, and there are even cases where compensation continues into the after-life! There is nothing misleading about WB issuing options in subsidiary companies with clear performance mandates versus his public statements about employee stock options issuance.
The composition of WB's board has been controversial in the past. No it certainly was not independent historically with Warren and Charlie, Susan and Howard Buffett; Malcolm Chace, Walter Scott were old business cronies; Ron Olson was a partner in Munger's old firm. But VJ missed the most obvious point, Buffett for most of the time that he was involved in BRK owned over half the stock. It was absolutely iron clad clear that management's interests were aligned with shareholders. Unlike most public corporations, management owned most of the stock. The role of the board is not to protect minority shareholder interests but rather to ensure that shareholders' interests are protected. This point is missed by VJ.
Bottom-line, if you are looking for advice to imitate WB's investment style, this is not the best source. If you are looking for a comprehensive list of WB's mistakes in judgment, this is incomplete. If you are looking for views on taxation contra to those of WB, read Steve Forbes rather than VJ's book.
The key takeaways after each chapter provide an excellent summary of each chapter. The final chapter, "Conclusion" successfully highlights the important points.
Dr. Janjigian has attempted to provide an antidote to the usual glorious heaping of praise that most Buffett books (and CNBC coverage) provide. The reality is that nobody walks on water (or parts the sea depending on your point of view.) Even great investors frankly screw up royally. But the incidence in the case of Buffett is remarkably low, the damage is a scratch or fender bender rather than a complete wreck. Should all of us be so fortunate, or disciplined!!
posted by Rick @ 6:52 PM 3 comments
http://valuediscipline.blogspot.com/2008/07/book-review-buffett-isn-perfect.html
The 15 Most Important Investing Blogs For New Investors or Traders
Saturday, January 05, 2008
The 15 Most Important Investing Blogs For New Investors or Traders
As I mentioned in my last post I had a good year and have done well in my first two years investing. While it may be luck I would like to think that at least part of my success the past two yeas is due to skill. Not my own of course but rather the skills I have appropriated from reading various blogs.
In what has become a semi-annual feature I like to recognize the blogs that I feel have contributed most to my education as an investor and trader. At the end of my first year I posted on the top five blogs I read my first year investing. I followed up with an another top five blogs for the first half of 2007.
To recap the first ten are:
1. Gannon On Investing
One of the few bloggers I would actually pay to read.
2. Nodoodahs Investing
Smartest blogger I read.
3. Capital Markets & Social Equity
Best all around site to learn about every aspect of investing.
4. Trader Mike
Short term, long term, chart analysis, book reviews, educational links, reviews of trading tools; you name it Mike seems to provide it.
5. Howard Lindzon: Trends - Find Them, Ride Them, and Get Off
Part Groucho Marx and J.P. Morgan, Howard Lindzon does a great job of discussing, with humor, the underlying businesses represented by stocks.
6. Traderfeed
Read this site and you just may unleash the inner power of your mind to increase market performance while at the same time controlling the destructive mental tendencies we all have that decrease investing performance.
7. Daily Options Report
Great resource for an investor or trader looking to utilize options as a means to enhance market performance.
8. Maoxian
Think of him as the Bo Jackson of blogging. Can do it all and do it well. Insightful market commentary on all time frames and every style of investing and trading.
9. Cheap Stocks
Perhaps the best blog to read on applying the teachings of Benjamin Graham.
10. Abnormal Returns
Provides a comprehensive review, with links, to some of the best investment and economic related posts on the Internet.
Adding to the above ten are the following five blogs that I have found worthwhile reading during the second half of 2007:
11. Chris Perruna's Successful Education Through Investing
Great site that mixes different styles of investing and trading. One of the best things about this blog is that the blog does a good job of explaining why and how to have buy and sell discipline in selecting stocks.
12. Fat Pitch Financials
Great resource for the new value investor looking to learn more about value investing and how it is practiced.
13. Covered Call Writer Blog
The blog is a trading journal of an individual who has a system for writing covered calls. The blog details that system as well as the trades made using the aforementioned system. Good starting point for those interested in options.
14. Reflections on Value Investing
Best site that provides links to the best articles, blog posts, and resources for the value investor.
15. Rising Dividend Investing
Solid site that provides worthwhile market insight from a professional money management firm.
While I read a lot of great blogs, the above fifteen are those that I feel have done the most to advance my understanding of investing and trading.
Posted by Steven at 1/05/2008 01:25:00 PM
http://valueblogreview.blogspot.com/2008/01/15-most-important-investing-blogs-for.html
The 15 Most Important Investing Blogs For New Investors or Traders
As I mentioned in my last post I had a good year and have done well in my first two years investing. While it may be luck I would like to think that at least part of my success the past two yeas is due to skill. Not my own of course but rather the skills I have appropriated from reading various blogs.
In what has become a semi-annual feature I like to recognize the blogs that I feel have contributed most to my education as an investor and trader. At the end of my first year I posted on the top five blogs I read my first year investing. I followed up with an another top five blogs for the first half of 2007.
To recap the first ten are:
1. Gannon On Investing
One of the few bloggers I would actually pay to read.
2. Nodoodahs Investing
Smartest blogger I read.
3. Capital Markets & Social Equity
Best all around site to learn about every aspect of investing.
4. Trader Mike
Short term, long term, chart analysis, book reviews, educational links, reviews of trading tools; you name it Mike seems to provide it.
5. Howard Lindzon: Trends - Find Them, Ride Them, and Get Off
Part Groucho Marx and J.P. Morgan, Howard Lindzon does a great job of discussing, with humor, the underlying businesses represented by stocks.
6. Traderfeed
Read this site and you just may unleash the inner power of your mind to increase market performance while at the same time controlling the destructive mental tendencies we all have that decrease investing performance.
7. Daily Options Report
Great resource for an investor or trader looking to utilize options as a means to enhance market performance.
8. Maoxian
Think of him as the Bo Jackson of blogging. Can do it all and do it well. Insightful market commentary on all time frames and every style of investing and trading.
9. Cheap Stocks
Perhaps the best blog to read on applying the teachings of Benjamin Graham.
10. Abnormal Returns
Provides a comprehensive review, with links, to some of the best investment and economic related posts on the Internet.
Adding to the above ten are the following five blogs that I have found worthwhile reading during the second half of 2007:
11. Chris Perruna's Successful Education Through Investing
Great site that mixes different styles of investing and trading. One of the best things about this blog is that the blog does a good job of explaining why and how to have buy and sell discipline in selecting stocks.
12. Fat Pitch Financials
Great resource for the new value investor looking to learn more about value investing and how it is practiced.
13. Covered Call Writer Blog
The blog is a trading journal of an individual who has a system for writing covered calls. The blog details that system as well as the trades made using the aforementioned system. Good starting point for those interested in options.
14. Reflections on Value Investing
Best site that provides links to the best articles, blog posts, and resources for the value investor.
15. Rising Dividend Investing
Solid site that provides worthwhile market insight from a professional money management firm.
While I read a lot of great blogs, the above fifteen are those that I feel have done the most to advance my understanding of investing and trading.
Posted by Steven at 1/05/2008 01:25:00 PM
http://valueblogreview.blogspot.com/2008/01/15-most-important-investing-blogs-for.html
Dividends Are Still the Linchpin
Thursday, May 14, 2009
Dividends Are Still the Linchpin
With all of the dividend cuts of the last 18 months, many pundits are sounding the death knell for the dividend. There are lots of reasons they give:
- Companies can't afford them anymore
- They complicate capital adequacy and flexibility
- The capital they represent is too hard to raise
- Obama tax hike will make them less attractive to investors
The arguments that dividends are a relic of the past or a fatality of the credit crunch are silly. The recession we are crawling through will not last forever, and when it ends, companies will once again reinstate most of the dividend cuts as soon as they are able.
The reason is simple: almost all of the companies that have cut their dividends by any significant amount have faced a hornet's nest of angry shareholders. In addition, it is hard to find a company whose price is higher after a dividend cut. Indeed, in most cases, if a company has cut its dividend, it has been hammered.
According to Bloomberg data, dividends are very much alive. Bloomberg shows that of the 500 stocks in the S&P Index, 362 currently pay a dividend. During the past twelve months,
- 94 companies reduced their dividends,
- 115 paid the same amount as last year, and
- 130 raised their dividends.
Thus, in a year when the headlines have been full of dividend cuts, there were actually more dividend hikes than cuts.
The median dividend hike for the 130 companies that raised their dividends during the year was about 6%. Importantly, the median total return of these companies outperformed the S&P Index by nearly 8%.
There are still many great companies that are quietly raising their dividends and in doing so, reconfirming their commitment to give back to their "owners" a fair cut of the profits.
As I have said before, the root of the word dividend is dividere, which means to cut or divide. Dividends are not a bonus or a gift; dividends are the shareholders' cut of the profits. Corporate managers who ignore this may find themselves looking for a new job.
The linchpin that best ties the interests of corporate America together with its shareholders is a consistent and intelligent dividend policy. Most shareholders understand that recessions mean lower earnings and dividends. But, in my judgement, the pundits are wrong if they assume that shareholders will be less interested in dividends after the recession than they were before. I think it will be just the opposite.
More on this topic (What's this?)
The Top 40 Dividend Stocks for 2009 book review (Dividend Growth Investor, 5/15/09)
Dividend Portfolios – concentrate or diversify? (Dividend Growth Investor, 6/17/09)
The Latest In Dividend Research (Disciplined Approach to Investing, 5/24/09)
http://risingdividendinvesting.blogspot.com/2009/05/dividends-are-still-linchpin.html
Ten Principles of Dividend Growth Investing
Thursday, July 02, 2009
Ten Principles of Dividend Growth Investing
Many people forward on to me articles on dividend investing. These articles cover the waterfront from writers opposed to dividends completely to those who believe companies should pay a stated amount of their earnings in dividends. I find that I agree with very few of the articles I see. In most cases, I find it is not a theoretical objection but a practical objection: I have tried it their way and found it didn't work for me.
Elsewhere in earlier blogs I explained how I first learned of the merits of dividend investing in the 1980s and how those early ideas have evolved over time. The following is a short list of the principles of dividend investing as practiced by Donaldson Capital Management.
1. Consistent Dividend Growth is the most important element of dividend investing.
2. Beware of high dividend yields where dividend payouts are in excess of :
In three years, as the birds sing softly in the background, re-read today's duck and cover article. As you hear the band warming up in the background and the media are cautiously suggesting that things are looking up call me. Surprise me and ask me the following question: How much is Procter and Gamble overvalued?
We own Procter and Gamble.
More on this topic
(What's this?)
The Sweet Spot of Dividend Investing (Dividend Growth Investor, 5/26/09)
The Top 40 Dividend Stocks for 2009 book review (Dividend Growth Investor, 5/15/09)
6 Steps for High Yield Dividends (Investment U, 7/7/09)
Read more on Growth Investing, Dividend Investing, Dividends at Wikinvest
http://risingdividendinvesting.blogspot.com/
Ten Principles of Dividend Growth Investing
Many people forward on to me articles on dividend investing. These articles cover the waterfront from writers opposed to dividends completely to those who believe companies should pay a stated amount of their earnings in dividends. I find that I agree with very few of the articles I see. In most cases, I find it is not a theoretical objection but a practical objection: I have tried it their way and found it didn't work for me.
Elsewhere in earlier blogs I explained how I first learned of the merits of dividend investing in the 1980s and how those early ideas have evolved over time. The following is a short list of the principles of dividend investing as practiced by Donaldson Capital Management.
1. Consistent Dividend Growth is the most important element of dividend investing.
2. Beware of high dividend yields where dividend payouts are in excess of :
- 60% for industrial companies,
- 70% for utilities, and
- 90% for REITs.
3. Beware of any company that pays out more in dividends than their free cash flows.
4. Look for companies where there is at least a 70% correlation between price growth and dividend growth over the long run.
5. Companies with consistent dividend growth permit valuation using regression models. These regression models can offer an investor an educated guess at the expected total return of a stock over a future period of time.
6. It is remarkable that many so-called cyclical companies with volatile earnings will have a much lower price volatility if they employ a normalized dividend approach, instead of a lumpy approach.
7. We are always on the prowl for dividend-paying companies that the market has rewarded with a high correlation between their dividend growth and their price growth and who have temporarily fallen out of favor.
8. For almost all companies, even the most highly predictable companies in our universe, changes in interest rates will affect relative valuation.
9. Consistent dividend growing stocks seldom get highly over or undervalued. They get overvalued when the band is playing, the birds are singing, and stocks are flying high. They get undervalued when the media is shouting duck and cover.
10. Watch carefully at dividend actions in good times and in bad. In good times, dividend growth should be less than earnings growth. In bad times dividend growth should be higher than earnings growth.
In three years, as the birds sing softly in the background, re-read today's duck and cover article. As you hear the band warming up in the background and the media are cautiously suggesting that things are looking up call me. Surprise me and ask me the following question: How much is Procter and Gamble overvalued?
We own Procter and Gamble.
(What's this?)
The Sweet Spot of Dividend Investing (Dividend Growth Investor, 5/26/09)
The Top 40 Dividend Stocks for 2009 book review (Dividend Growth Investor, 5/15/09)
6 Steps for High Yield Dividends (Investment U, 7/7/09)
Read more on Growth Investing, Dividend Investing, Dividends at Wikinvest
http://risingdividendinvesting.blogspot.com/
Opportunity Cost and Opportunity Lost
A value investor's mind operates in a continuous buzz, deciding whether an investment is achieving its best possible returns or whether it should be replaced.
Value investors like cheap stocks, but if the stocks get cheap on an investor's watch, the investor should consider a serious reappraisal of a company's prospects.
Value investors continuously check for dead branches and aren't afraid to get out the pruning shears. Value investors know the cost of dead wood.
Likewise, the frugal citizens, value investors avoid squandering money that could be put to better use and always think of the best use for their capital. For Warren Buffett, a penny found on a sidewalk is "the start of the next billion."
Value investors like cheap stocks, but if the stocks get cheap on an investor's watch, the investor should consider a serious reappraisal of a company's prospects.
Value investors continuously check for dead branches and aren't afraid to get out the pruning shears. Value investors know the cost of dead wood.
Likewise, the frugal citizens, value investors avoid squandering money that could be put to better use and always think of the best use for their capital. For Warren Buffett, a penny found on a sidewalk is "the start of the next billion."
Has Mr. ttb bought his Lampo-genie?
I am pretty sure that I spelt the name of this car incorrectly. Anyway, you can see where this discussion is heading.
You are a successful value investor achieving consistent 12%, 15% or greater returns, and you have the discipline and fortitude to hang on to investments. Now even successful value investors can have fun, right? They can splurge on a new car, a vacation, a really nice outdoor barbecue. But savvy value investors also know how much this costs in the long run.
Suppose that you're a modestly successful 12% value investor. You spend $1,000 on that new barbecue today. You can see that you could have had $3,106 in 10 years, $9,646 in 20 years, $29,960 in 30 years, and $93,051 in 40 years instead. Spend $30,000 on a new car today, and forgo $289,380 20 years from now, $898,800 in 30 years, and $2.8 million in 40 years, at 12%! And if you're a better investor (an investor normally capable of 12% returns or better), the "losses" grow faster! So, the better an investor you are, the more the "good things" in life may cost. Ironic, right?
It's always right and safer to be frugal.
You are a successful value investor achieving consistent 12%, 15% or greater returns, and you have the discipline and fortitude to hang on to investments. Now even successful value investors can have fun, right? They can splurge on a new car, a vacation, a really nice outdoor barbecue. But savvy value investors also know how much this costs in the long run.
Suppose that you're a modestly successful 12% value investor. You spend $1,000 on that new barbecue today. You can see that you could have had $3,106 in 10 years, $9,646 in 20 years, $29,960 in 30 years, and $93,051 in 40 years instead. Spend $30,000 on a new car today, and forgo $289,380 20 years from now, $898,800 in 30 years, and $2.8 million in 40 years, at 12%! And if you're a better investor (an investor normally capable of 12% returns or better), the "losses" grow faster! So, the better an investor you are, the more the "good things" in life may cost. Ironic, right?
It's always right and safer to be frugal.
Pruning the Dead Branches
It isn't hard to show what happens when you hang on to losers, or even the inferior "winners."
Click here:
Compared to market returns, an investor underperforming the market by 2% (or achieving an 8% return) falls:
Click here:
Compared to market returns, an investor underperforming the market by 2% (or achieving an 8% return) falls:
- 17% behind a market performer after 10 years,
- 31% behind over 20 years, and
- 42% behind over 30 years.
- 43% to the market-performing investor over 10 years,
- 67% over 20 years, and,
- 81% over 30 years.
That's quite a price to pay for underperformance.
Now, if your investments are producing negative returns, the results can be quite ugly indeed.
There's a lesson in these numbers: Don't hang on to chronic losers! Not only do you lose, but you also lose the out on opportunities to gain. If it's broke, fix it!
Opportunity Lost
The mathematical power of compounding makes a small increase in investing return, or i, very compelling. To increase the chances of achieving a higher i, buy cheap. Buy expensive, and you'll be lucky to match market returns.
Investors should know how beating the market with even slightly higher rates of return is a shorter path to wealth.
This is especially true if the investments are left on the table to perform, and perform consistently, over time.
What about investments achieving less than market average return?
What happens when you cling to these investments?
Are they like a bad marriage, not only producing inferior returns but also consuming valuable time that you could put to work elsewhere?
From an investment perspective, the answer is yes.
Investors should know how beating the market with even slightly higher rates of return is a shorter path to wealth.
This is especially true if the investments are left on the table to perform, and perform consistently, over time.
What about investments achieving less than market average return?
What happens when you cling to these investments?
Are they like a bad marriage, not only producing inferior returns but also consuming valuable time that you could put to work elsewhere?
From an investment perspective, the answer is yes.
Quick Rules for Recognizing Value and Un-Value
This summarizes how to use PE and its "family of measures to recognize value and un-value in stocks and stock prices.
Many of these can be found in common stock screeners, so it's possible to use these factors not only for final valuation but also for stock selection.
Value
First, find sound and improving business fundamentals - improving ROE drivers and intangibles. Then:
Earnings yield > bond yield (now or soon, some compensation for equity risk)
PEG 2 or less (growth at a reasonable price)
Stock price growth potential exceeds hurdle rate (e.g. 15%, 10 years, probably better than most other investments)
P/S less than 3 and profit margin greater than 10% (good profitability at reasonable price)
P/B less than 5 and ROE greater than 15% (good overall returns at reasonable price)
Shares of companies that fit the preceding factors (the more factors, the better) are more likely to be a good value for the price.
Un-value
Earnings yield < bond yield with low growth prospects
PEG greater than 3 with low margins
Stock price growth falls short of hurdle rate (e.g., 15%)
P/S greater than 3 with low margins
P/B greater than 5 with low ROE
Many of these can be found in common stock screeners, so it's possible to use these factors not only for final valuation but also for stock selection.
Value
First, find sound and improving business fundamentals - improving ROE drivers and intangibles. Then:
Earnings yield > bond yield (now or soon, some compensation for equity risk)
PEG 2 or less (growth at a reasonable price)
Stock price growth potential exceeds hurdle rate (e.g. 15%, 10 years, probably better than most other investments)
P/S less than 3 and profit margin greater than 10% (good profitability at reasonable price)
P/B less than 5 and ROE greater than 15% (good overall returns at reasonable price)
Shares of companies that fit the preceding factors (the more factors, the better) are more likely to be a good value for the price.
Un-value
Earnings yield < bond yield with low growth prospects
PEG greater than 3 with low margins
Stock price growth falls short of hurdle rate (e.g., 15%)
P/S greater than 3 with low margins
P/B greater than 5 with low ROE
STOCK HaiO C0DE 7668
8.7.2009
STOCK HaiO C0DE 7668
Price $ 4.66 Curr. PE (ttm-Eps) 7.48 Curr. DY 9.01%
Rec. qRev 132845 q-q % chg 30% y-y% chq -1%
Rec. qPbt 22957 q-q % chg 24% y-y% chq 20%
Rec. qEps 17.80 q-q % chg 22% y-y% chq -29%
ttm-Eps 62.30 q-q % chg -11% y-y% chq -5%
Using VERY CONSERVATIVE ESTIMATES:
EPS GR 5% Avg.H PE 7.48 Avg. L PE 5.00
Current price is at Middle 1/3 of valuation zone.
RISK: Upside 47% Downside 53%
One Year Appreciation Potential 6% Avg. yield 12%
Avg. Total Annual Potential Return over next 5 years 17%
CPE/SPE 1.20 P/NTA 2.34 Sig. PE 6.2 Sig. Pr 3.86
STOCK HaiO C0DE 7668
Price $ 4.66 Curr. PE (ttm-Eps) 7.48 Curr. DY 9.01%
Rec. qRev 132845 q-q % chg 30% y-y% chq -1%
Rec. qPbt 22957 q-q % chg 24% y-y% chq 20%
Rec. qEps 17.80 q-q % chg 22% y-y% chq -29%
ttm-Eps 62.30 q-q % chg -11% y-y% chq -5%
Using VERY CONSERVATIVE ESTIMATES:
EPS GR 5% Avg.H PE 7.48 Avg. L PE 5.00
Current price is at Middle 1/3 of valuation zone.
RISK: Upside 47% Downside 53%
One Year Appreciation Potential 6% Avg. yield 12%
Avg. Total Annual Potential Return over next 5 years 17%
CPE/SPE 1.20 P/NTA 2.34 Sig. PE 6.2 Sig. Pr 3.86
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