The Investor and Market Fluctuations: The story of the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company Shares (1)

The A. & P. Example

At this point we shall introduce one of our original examples, which dates back many years but which has a certain fascination for us because it combines so many aspects of corporate and investment experience. It involves the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. Here is the story:

A. & P. shares  were introduced to trading on the “Curb” market, now the American Stock Exchange, in 1929 and sold as high as 494.  

• By 1932 they had declined to 104, although the company’s earnings were nearly as large in that generally catastrophic year as previously. 
• In 1936 the range was between 111 and 131. 
• Then in the business recession and bear market of 1938 the shares fell to a new low of 36.

That price was extraordinary.

• It meant that the preferred and common were together selling for $126 million, although the company had just reported that it held $85 million in cash alone and a working capital (or net current assets) of $134 million. 
• A. & P. was the largest retail enterprise in America, if not in the world, with a continuous and impressive record of large earnings for many years. 
• Yet in 1938 this outstanding business was considered on Wall Street to be worth less than its current assets alone—which means less as a going concern than if it were liquidated. 

Why? 

• First, because there were threats of special taxes on chain stores; 
• second, because net profits had fallen off in the previous year; and, 
• third, because the general market was depressed. 
• The first of these reasons was an exaggerated and eventually groundless fear; the other two were typical of temporary influences.

Let us assume that the investor had bought A. & P. common in 1937 at, say, 12 times its five-year average earnings, or about 80.  We are far from asserting that the ensuing decline to 36 was of no importance to him.

• He would have been well advised to scrutinize the picture with some care, to see whether he had made any miscalculations. 
• But if the results of his study were reassuring—as they should have been—he was entitled then to disregard the market decline as a temporary vagary of finance, unless he had the funds and the courage to take advantage of it by buying more on the bargain basis offered.

Ref; Intelligent Investor by Benjamin Graham

Good managements produce a good average market price, and bad managements produce bad market prices.

Market Price Fluctuations:  An Added Consideration

Something should be said about the significance of average market prices as a measure of managerial competence. 

• The shareholder judges whether his own investment has been successful in terms both of dividends received and of the long-range trend of the average market value. 
• The same criteria should logically be applied in testing the effectiveness of a company’s management and the soundness of its attitude toward the owners of the business.

This statement may sound like a truism, but it needs to be emphasized.

• For as yet there is no accepted technique or approach by which management is brought to the bar of market opinion. 

On the contrary, managements have always insisted that they have no responsibility of any kind for what happens to the market value of their shares.

• It is true, of course, that they are not accountable for those fluctuations in price which, as we have been insisting, bear no relationship to underlying conditions and values. 
• But it is only the lack of alertness and intelligence among the rank and file of shareholders that permits this immunity to extend to the entire realm of market quotations, including the permanent establishment of a depreciated and unsatisfactory price level. 

Good managements produce a good average market price, and bad managements produce bad market prices.

The investor with a portfolio of sound stocks should expect their prices to fluctuate

The investor with a portfolio of sound stocks should expect their prices to fluctuate and should

• neither be concerned by sizable declines 
• nor become excited by sizable advances. 

He should always remember that market quotations are there for his convenience,

• either to be taken advantage of or 
• to be ignored. 

He should never 

• buy a stock because it has gone up or 
• sell one because it has gone down. 

He would not be far wrong if this motto read more simply: “Never buy a stock immediately after a substantial rise or sell one immediately after a substantial drop.”

Activities that emphasize price movements first and underlying values second tend to be self-neutralizing and self-defeating over the years.

Aside from forecasting the movements of the general market, much effort and ability are directed on Wall Street toward selecting stocks or industrial groups that in matter of price will “do better” than the rest over a fairly short period in the future. 

Logical as this endeavor may seem, we do not believe it is suited to the needs or temperament of the true investor—particularly since he would be competing with a large number of stock-market traders and firstclass financial analysts who are trying to do the same thing.

As  in all other activities that emphasize price movements first and underlying values second, the work of many intelligent minds constantly engaged in this field tends to be self-neutralizing and selfdefeating over the years.

When to Buy? When Not to Buy? It is far from certain that the typical investor should regularly hold off buying until low market levels appear.

It is far from certain that the typical investor should regularly hold off buying until low market levels appear, because

• this may involve a long wait, 
• very likely the loss of income, and 
• the possible missing of investment opportunities. 

On the whole it may be better for the investor to do his stock buying whenever he has money to put in stocks, except when the general market level is much higher than can be justified by well-established standards of value. 

If he wants to be shrewd he can look for the ever-present bargain opportunities in individual securities.

It is far from certain that the typical investor should regularly hold off buying until low market levels appear

It is far from certain that the typical investor should regularly hold off buying until low market levels appear, because

• this may involve a long wait, 
• very likely the loss of income, and 
• the possible missing of investment opportunities. 

On the whole it may be better for the investor to do his stock buying whenever he has money to put in stocks, except when the general market level is much higher than can be justified by well-established standards of value. 

If he wants to be shrewd he can look for the ever-present bargain opportunities in individual securities.

The most realistic distinction between the investor and the speculator is found in their attitude toward stock-market movements.

The most realistic distinction between the investor and the speculator is found in their attitude toward stock-market movements.  

The speculator’s primary interest lies in anticipating and profiting from market fluctuations. 

The investor’s primary interest lies in acquiring and holding suitable securities at suitable prices.

Market movements are important to him in a practical sense, because they alternately create 

• low price levels at which he would be wise to buy and 
• high price levels at which he certainly should refrain from buying and probably would be wise to sell.

Market price fluctuations have only one significant meaning for the true investor.

Basically, price fluctuations have only one significant meaning for the true investor. They provide him with an opportunity 

• to buy wisely when prices fall sharply and 
• to sell wisely when they advance a great deal. 

At other times he will do better if he forgets about the stock market and pays attention to his dividend returns and to the operating results of his companies.

Do Not Overpay to Own a Company with Brilliant Prospects; Use the Vagaries of the Market to Play the Master Game of Buying Low and Selling High

Growth Stock Paradox: The more successful the company, the greater are likely to be the fluctuations in the price of its shares.

This leads us to a conclusion of practical importance to the conservative investor in common stocks.

• If he is to pay some special attention to the selection of his portfolio, it might be best for him to concentrate on issues selling at a reasonably close approximation to their tangible-asset value—say, at not more than one-third above that figure. 
• Purchases made at such  levels, or lower, may with logic be regarded as related to the company’s balance sheet, and as having a justification or support independent of the fluctuating market prices. 
• The premium over book value that may be involved can be considered as a kind of extra fee paid for the advantage of stock-exchange listing and the marketability that goes with it.

A caution is needed here.

• A stock does not become a sound investment merely because it can be bought at close to its asset value. 
• The investor should demand, in addition, a satisfactory ratio of earnings to price, a sufficiently strong financial position, and the prospect that its earnings will at least be maintained over the years. 

This may appear like demanding a lot from a modestly priced stock, but the prescription is not hard to fill under all but dangerously high market conditions. 


Once the investor is willing to forgo brilliant prospects—i.e., better than average expected growth—he will have no difficulty in finding a wide selection of issues meeting these criteria.



More than half of the DJIA issues met our asset-value criterion at the end of 1970.

• The most widely held investment of all—American Tel. & Tel.—actually sells below its tangible-asset value as we write. 
• Most of the light-and power shares, in addition to their other advantages, are now (early 1972) available at prices reasonably close to their asset values. 

The investor with a stock portfolio having such book values behind it can take a much more independent and detached view of stock-market fluctuations than those who have paid high multipliers of both earnings and tangible assets.


As long as the earning power of his holdings remains satisfactory, he can give as little attention as he pleases to the vagaries of the stock market. 

More than that, at times he can use these vagaries to play the master game of buying low and selling high.

Explanations for the Erratic Price Behaviour of some of the Most Successful and Impressive Enterprises

Growth Stock Paradox: The more successful the company, the greater are likely to be the fluctuations in the price of its shares.

The argument made above should explain the often erratic price behavior of our most successful and impressive enterprises. 

• Our favorite example is the monarch of them all—International Business Machines. The price of its shares fell from 607 to 300 in seven months in 1962–63; after two splits its price fell from 387 to 219 in 1970. 
• Similarly, Xerox—an even more impressive earnings gainer in recent decades—fell from 171 to 87 in 1962–63, and from 116 to 65 in 1970. 

These striking losses 

• did not indicate any doubt about the future long-term growth of IBM or Xerox; 
• they reflected instead a lack of confidence in the premium valuation that the stock market itself had placed on these excellent prospects.

Growth Stock Paradox: The more successful the company, the greater are likely to be the fluctuations in the price of its shares.

The development of the stock market in recent decades has made the typical investor

• more dependent on the course of price quotations and 
• less free than formerly to consider himself merely a business owner. 

The reason is that the successful enterprises in which he is likely to concentrate his holdings

• sell almost constantly at prices well above their net asset value (or book value, or  “balance-sheet value”). 
• In paying these market premiums the investor gives precious hostages to fortune, for he must depend on the stock market itself to validate his commitments.†

This is a factor of prime importance in present-day investing, and it has received less attention than it deserves. The whole structure of stock-market quotations contains a built-in contradiction. 

• The better a company’s record and prospects, the less relationship the price of its shares will have to their book value. 
• But the greater the premium above book value, the less certain the basis of determining its intrinsic value—i.e., the more this “value” will depend on the changing moods and measurements of the stock market.  

Thus we reach the final paradox, that the more successful the company, the greater are likely to be the fluctuations in the price of its shares. 

• This really means that, in a very real sense, the better the quality of a common stock, the more speculative it is likely to be—at least as compared with the unspectacular middle-grade issues.*  
• (What we have said applies to a comparison of the leading growth companies with the bulk of well-established concerns; we exclude from our purview here those issues which are highly speculative because the businesses themselves are speculative.)

† Net asset value, book value, balance-sheet value, and tangible-asset value are all synonyms for net worth, or the total value of a company’s physical and financial assets minus all its liabilities. It can be calculated using the balance sheets in a company’s annual and quarterly reports; from total shareholders’ equity, subtract all “soft” assets such as goodwill, trademarks, and other intangibles. Divide by the fully diluted number of shares outstanding to arrive at book value per share.



* Graham’s use of the word “paradox” is probably an allusion to a classic article by David Durand, “Growth Stocks and the Petersburg Paradox,” The Journal of Finance, vol. XII, no. 3, September, 1957, pp. 348–363, which compares investing in high-priced growth stocks to betting on a series of coin flips in which the payoff escalates with each flip of the coin. Durand points out that if a growth stock could continue to grow at a high rate for an indefinite period of time, an investor should (in theory) be willing to pay an infinite price for its shares. Why, then, has no stock ever sold for a price of infinity dollars per share? Because the higher the assumed future growth rate, and the longer the time period over which it is expected, the wider the margin for error grows, and the higher the cost of even a tiny miscalculation becomes. 


Ref:  Intelligent Investor by Benjamin Graham

Investor of marketable shares has a double status, with the privilege of taking advantage of either at his choice.

The impact of market fluctuations upon the investor’s true situation may be considered also from the standpoint of the shareholder as the part owner of various businesses.

The holder of marketable shares actually has a double status, and with it the privilege of taking advantage of either at his choice. 

1.  On the one hand his position is analogous to that of a minority shareholder or silent partner in a private business.

• Here his results are entirely dependent on the profits of the enterprise or on a change in the underlying value of its assets. 
• He would usually determine the value of such a private-business interest by calculating his share of the net worth as shown in the most recent balance sheet. 

2.  On the other hand, the common-stock investor holds a piece of paper, an engraved stock certificate.

• This stock certificate can be sold in a matter of minutes at a price which varies from moment to moment—when the market is open, that is—and often is far removed from the balance sheet value.

Substantial rise in the market: Practical questions and psychological problems confronting the investors

A serious investor is not likely to believe that the day-to-day or even month-to-month fluctuations of the stock market make him richer or poorer.


But what about the longer-term and wider changes in the stock market? Here practical questions present themselves, and the psychological problems are likely to grow complicated.

A substantial rise in the market is 

• at once a legitimate reason for satisfaction and 
• a cause for prudent concern, 
• but it may also bring a strong temptation toward imprudent action.

Your shares have advanced, good!  You are richer than you were, good!

• But has the price risen too high, and should you think of selling? 
• Or should you kick yourself for not having bought more shares when the level was lower? 
• Or— worst thought of all—should you now give way to the bull-market atmosphere, become infected with the enthusiasm, the overconfidence and the greed of the great public (of which, after all, you are a part), and make larger and dangerous commitments? 

Presented thus in print, the answer to the last question is a self-evident no, but even the intelligent investor is likely to need considerable will power to keep from following the crowd.

It is for these reasons of human nature, even more than by calculation of financial gain or loss, that we favor some kind of mechanical method for varying the proportion of bonds to stocks in the investor’s portfolio.

• The chief advantage, perhaps, is that such a formula will give him something to do. 
• As the market advances he will from time to time make sales out of his stockholdings, putting the proceeds into bonds; as it declines he will reverse the procedure. 
• These activities will provide some outlet for his otherwise too-pent-up energies. 
• If he is the right kind of investor he will take added satisfaction from the thought that his operations are exactly opposite from those of the crowd.*

* For today’s investor, the ideal strategy for pursuing this “formula” is rebalancing.

Every investor who owns common stocks must expect to see them fluctuate in value over the years.

Market Fluctuations of the Investor’s Portfolio

Every investor who owns common stocks must expect to see them fluctuate in value over the years. 

The behavior of the DJIA since our last edition was written in 1964 probably reflects pretty well what has happened to the stock portfolio of a conservative investor who limited his stock holdings to those of large, prominent, and conservatively financed corporations.

• The overall value advanced from an average level of about 890 to a high of 995 in 1966 (and 985 again in 1968), fell to 631 in 1970, and made an almost full recovery to 940 in early 1971. 
• (Since the individual issues set their high and low marks at different times, the fluctuations in the Dow Jones group as a whole are less severe than those in the separate components.) 
• We have traced through the price fluctuations of other types of diversified and conservative common-stock portfolios and we find that the overall results are not likely to be markedly different from the above. 
• In general, the shares of second-line companies* fluctuate more widely than the major ones, but this does not necessarily mean that a group of well established but smaller companies will make a poorer showing over a fairly long period. 

In any case the investor may as well resign himself in advance to the probability rather than the mere possibility that most of his holdings will advance, say, 50% or more from their low point and decline the equivalent one-third or more from their high point at various periods in the next five years.†




* Today’s equivalent of what Graham calls “second-line companies” would be any of the thousands of stocks not included in the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index. A regularly revised list of the 500 stocks in the S & P index is available at www.standardandpoors.com.

† Note carefully what Graham is saying here. It is not just possible, but probable, that most of the stocks you own will gain at least 50% from their lowest price and lose at least 33% from their highest price—regardless of which stocks you own or whether the market as a whole goes up or down. 

• If you can’t live with that—or you think your portfolio is somehow magically exempt from it—then you are not yet entitled to call yourself an investor. 
• (Graham refers to a 33% decline as the “equivalent one-third” because a 50% gain takes a $10 stock to $15. From $15, a 33% loss [or $5 drop] takes it right back to $10, where it started.

Ref:  Intelligent Investor by Benjamin Graham

Various methods of taking advantage of the stock market’s cycles: "Formula Investment Plans"

Formula Plans

In the early years of the stock-market rise that began in 1949–50 considerable interest was attracted to various methods of taking advantage of the stock market’s cycles. These have been known as “formula investment plans.” 

• The essence of all such plans—except the simple case of dollar averaging—is that the investor automatically does  some selling of common stocks when the market advances substantially. 
• In many of them a very large rise in the market level would result in the sale of all common-stock holdings; others provided for retention of a minor proportion of equities under all circumstances.

This approach had the double appeal of sounding logical (and conservative) and of showing excellent results when applied retrospectively to the stock market over many years in the past. Unfortunately, its vogue grew greatest at the very time when it was destined to work least well.

• Many of the “formula planners” found themselves entirely or nearly out of the stock market at some level in the middle 1950s. 
• True, they had realized excellent profits, but in a broad sense the market “ran away” from them thereafter, an their formulas gave them little opportunity to buy back a commonstock position.*

There is a similarity between the experience of those adopting the formula-investing approach in the early 1950s and those who embraced the purely mechanical version of the Dow theory some 20 years earlier.

• In both cases the advent of popularity marked almost the exact moment when the system ceased to work well. 
• We have had a like discomfiting experience with our own “central value method” of determining indicated buying and selling levels of the Dow Jones Industrial Average. 
• The moral seems to be that any approach to moneymaking in the stock market which can be easily described and followed by a lot of people is by its terms too simple and too easy to last.† 
• Spinoza’s concluding remark applies to Wall Street as well as to philosophy: “All things excellent are as difficult as they are rare.”

* Many of these “formula planners” would have sold all their stocks at the  end of 1954, after the U.S. stock market rose 52.6%, the second-highest  yearly return then on record. Over the next five years, these market-timers would likely have stood on the sidelines as stocks doubled.

† Easy ways to make money in the stock market fade for two reasons: 

• the 
  natural tendency of trends to reverse over time, or “regress to the mean,” and,
• the rapid adoption of the stock-picking scheme by large numbers of people, who pile in and spoil all the fun of those who got there first. 

(Note that, in referring to his “discomfiting experience,” Graham is—as always— honest in admitting his own failures.) 

Ref:  Chap 8 Intelligent Investor by Benjamin Graham