All revenue growth starts with an idea. The idea could be for a new product or a new service. Or it can be an addition to a product or a service that already exists. Or it can be an idea that begins as almost idle speculation - "I wonder what would happen if...."
Employees, from the rawest recruits to crusty veterans of the business, have ideas, and many of them have the potential to help the enterprise. The leadership challenge is to have a social process that helps draw them out. After all, those ideas don't do your company any good if people won't voice them.
The social engine can help, of course. The interactions among the various departments - marketing and R&D, for example, or customer services and sales - will spark more ideas worth pursuing.
Your organization doesn't need to wait for the proverbial light-bulb to go on in order to come up with new ideas. Innovation can be operationalized. You can develop a process that you can follow to surface ideas and then, develop as many growth ideas as possible.
Unlike cost-cutting, growing revenues requires innovation. Many people think only geniuses can innovate. And, indeed, genius is always welcom. However, innovation is a social process and everyone can participate. Once the process is firmly integrated into the way the company does business every day, you will find more and more geniuses coming out of the woodwork.
Silicon Valley is filled with geniuses. But if you look at the successful entrepreneurs who work there, you will discover a curious thing. The vast majority of them worked - often for a long time - at established firms before going off on their own. Part of the attraction, of course, in starting their own companies was the freedom and equity ownership that come along as part of the deal. But another reason for leaving had to do with the fact that their old companies just could not accommodate them and what they wanted to do. Had their former employers handled the social innovation process better, a certain percentage of those entrepreneurs would have stayed and probably contributed in a big way to the growth of their former company.
How can you turn innovation into profitable growth?
Tuesday, 9 June 2009
Growth fuels the organization to even greater growth
The situations of Bill Carter and Susan illustrate both the business and personal consequences of being part of a business that is growing - or one that is not.
With growth, the organization expands and people can build a career and a future. Growth enables a business to get the best people and retain them. People who see personal growth opportunities have more energy, better morale, and enhanced self-confidence. Growing companies expand into new markets and market segments, new regions, and even new countries. Not only does all that create wonderful opportunities for talented people, but also the growth taps into all the latent psychological energy that is buried inside the employees, and the release of all that previously contained power fuels the organization to even greater growth.
The contrast to a company that isn't growing is stark. First, there is limited room for advancement. Susan could take a step down to join a growing company, convinced - rightly so, as it turned out - that she still would end up climbing further and faster up the corporate ladder at a firm tha was increasing the top line and not shrinking. Bill Carter has no such options. Susan is excited to go to work. By contrast, as Bill is learning, it's frustrating to be employed by a company that seems to be going downhill. There is no excitement as you walk through the halls. No emotional energy. Your entire workday is spent feeling as if you are moving underwater.
When there is no growth, a negative psychology permeates the organization. The best people spend a significant part of their time looking for a job, and they leave once they find one. Those that remain make macabre jokes about what form the next round of corporate cost-cutting will take and devote a large part of their days to infighting to make sure that theirs will not be the next head to roll when the cost cutting ax falls again, as it inevitably will.
If you are not in a growth situation, you are in a limiting situation.
With growth, the organization expands and people can build a career and a future. Growth enables a business to get the best people and retain them. People who see personal growth opportunities have more energy, better morale, and enhanced self-confidence. Growing companies expand into new markets and market segments, new regions, and even new countries. Not only does all that create wonderful opportunities for talented people, but also the growth taps into all the latent psychological energy that is buried inside the employees, and the release of all that previously contained power fuels the organization to even greater growth.
The contrast to a company that isn't growing is stark. First, there is limited room for advancement. Susan could take a step down to join a growing company, convinced - rightly so, as it turned out - that she still would end up climbing further and faster up the corporate ladder at a firm tha was increasing the top line and not shrinking. Bill Carter has no such options. Susan is excited to go to work. By contrast, as Bill is learning, it's frustrating to be employed by a company that seems to be going downhill. There is no excitement as you walk through the halls. No emotional energy. Your entire workday is spent feeling as if you are moving underwater.
When there is no growth, a negative psychology permeates the organization. The best people spend a significant part of their time looking for a job, and they leave once they find one. Those that remain make macabre jokes about what form the next round of corporate cost-cutting will take and devote a large part of their days to infighting to make sure that theirs will not be the next head to roll when the cost cutting ax falls again, as it inevitably will.
If you are not in a growth situation, you are in a limiting situation.
Are you part of a growth business?
Here are some questions that can help you diagnose whether or not you are part of a growth business. Are you ready to start Monday morning?
1. What percentage of time and emotional energy does the management team routinely devote to revenue growth?
2. Are there just exhortations and talk about growth, or are there actually a lot of meetings and brainstorming sessions about how growth is going to happen? How good is the follow-through?
3. Do managers talk about growth only in terms of home runs? Do there understand the importance of singles and doubles for long-term sustained organic growth?
4. How much of each management team member's time is devoted to making effective visits with customers? Do they do more than listen and, probe for information and then try to "connect the dots"?
5. Does the management team come in contact with the final user of your product?
6. Are people in the business clear about what the specific future sources of revenue growth will be? Do they know who is accountable?
7. Would you characterise your company or business unit's culture as cost-cutting or growth oriented? If the answer is one or the other, you need to start doing both. Do people in leadership positions have the skill, orientation, and determination to grow revenues?
8. Does the company practice revenue productivity, that is, does it think through whether there are ways to more effectively use current resources to generate higher revenues?
9. How well and how regularly does your sales force - and others in the organization - extract intelligence from customers and other players in the marketplace? How well is this information communicated and acted on by other parts of your organization, such as product development?
10. How good are the upstream marketing skills - that is, the ability to segment markets and identify consumer attributes - in your business?
11. Is the head of marketing in your business an upstream marketing expert?
12. How good is the relationship and information flow between upstream marketing and product development? Between upstream marketing and R&D?
13. Do you have an explicit growth budget in your organization's traditional budget document? How well is the growth budget connected with revenue growth beyond the current fiscal year? Are there funds allocated in the growth budget for medium- and long-term revenue growth?
14. How skilled are the people in your business in creating value propositions for each major customer segment of your business? How effective is your organization in using cross-selling to accelerate revenue growth?
15. How often and how effectively is information shared simultaneously among people who make decisions about resource trade-offs?
16. How good is the flow of ideas in your business?
17. How good is the process of selecting ideas that will be funded as growth projects?
18. How well defined are the steps of the nurturing process in getting revenue growth projects ready for launch? How effective is the process?
By answering these questions, you can confirm if your company is growing, not growing or is in decline.
1. What percentage of time and emotional energy does the management team routinely devote to revenue growth?
2. Are there just exhortations and talk about growth, or are there actually a lot of meetings and brainstorming sessions about how growth is going to happen? How good is the follow-through?
3. Do managers talk about growth only in terms of home runs? Do there understand the importance of singles and doubles for long-term sustained organic growth?
4. How much of each management team member's time is devoted to making effective visits with customers? Do they do more than listen and, probe for information and then try to "connect the dots"?
5. Does the management team come in contact with the final user of your product?
6. Are people in the business clear about what the specific future sources of revenue growth will be? Do they know who is accountable?
7. Would you characterise your company or business unit's culture as cost-cutting or growth oriented? If the answer is one or the other, you need to start doing both. Do people in leadership positions have the skill, orientation, and determination to grow revenues?
8. Does the company practice revenue productivity, that is, does it think through whether there are ways to more effectively use current resources to generate higher revenues?
9. How well and how regularly does your sales force - and others in the organization - extract intelligence from customers and other players in the marketplace? How well is this information communicated and acted on by other parts of your organization, such as product development?
10. How good are the upstream marketing skills - that is, the ability to segment markets and identify consumer attributes - in your business?
11. Is the head of marketing in your business an upstream marketing expert?
12. How good is the relationship and information flow between upstream marketing and product development? Between upstream marketing and R&D?
13. Do you have an explicit growth budget in your organization's traditional budget document? How well is the growth budget connected with revenue growth beyond the current fiscal year? Are there funds allocated in the growth budget for medium- and long-term revenue growth?
14. How skilled are the people in your business in creating value propositions for each major customer segment of your business? How effective is your organization in using cross-selling to accelerate revenue growth?
15. How often and how effectively is information shared simultaneously among people who make decisions about resource trade-offs?
16. How good is the flow of ideas in your business?
17. How good is the process of selecting ideas that will be funded as growth projects?
18. How well defined are the steps of the nurturing process in getting revenue growth projects ready for launch? How effective is the process?
By answering these questions, you can confirm if your company is growing, not growing or is in decline.
Start by compiling a list of simple things you could do Monday morning that would lead to "singles and doubles" - steady increases in sales.
Instead of bemoaning the fate of your company, draw upon your inner psychological reserves.
Be determined to lead and adopt a whole attitude and presence that would be 180 degrees from what it had been in recent weeks.
Profitable growth can be everyone's business.Profitable Growth
"In our unstable world of today, achieving sustainable and profitable revenue growth is not easy. How can you improve bottom line and energy, personal growth for the people involved, and creating value for your company?"
"Growth is a constantly achievable result for an organization that is properly focused and empowered. The CEO's job is to provide the organization with the vision and confidence to deliver it."
"CEOs require a fresh reconceptualization of what sustainable growth looks like in today's hyper-competitive world and a practical 'how to' program for achieving it."
"Every day is Monday morning for profitable growth. Monday morning starts today."
"In maximising long-term shareholder return, consistent earnings and dividend growth, as well as revenue growth, are mandated by investors. If earning growth is simply based on improving expense productivity, investors question and discount the sustainability of future earnings growth. Investors demand and reward profitable revenue growth. There are many competitive advantages that can be achieved with good growth."
"Reorient your thinking about growth to small day-to-day changes. Focusing on collaboration with customers is critical to growth. Also, important to have a practical implementation guide."
"Growth is achievable. It is in the consistency of day-to-day execution that you build the backbone of a great company. How much control you have over the growth of your business? "
"Profitable growth is now attainable for everyone who follows certain practical advice. Leaders of organization should make profitable, organic, and sustainable growth, become everyone's business. ..... a prerequisite to building shareholder value."
"The importance of execution is at the forefront of growth. Insight and knowledge of how to execute, based on management principles for profitable growth, is invaluable for the business community. "
"In an industry where 3 to 5 % growth is top quartile, we are always looking for creative ways to get the most from our existing assets, while also looking for the next big growth area. By identifying a number of internal and external obstacles to growth and then showing managers at all levels how to overcome these obstacles and create profitable growth in their businesses. The importance of hitting "singles and doubles", creating a continuous improvement mind-set throughout your organization, and maintaining a disciplined and accountable approach to growth. "
"A growth agenda is on the top of every CEO's mind. Using simple but on-the-mark tools for building a company-wide 'growth culture' are invaluable."
Ref: Profitable Growth is Everyone's Business by Ram Charan
"Growth is a constantly achievable result for an organization that is properly focused and empowered. The CEO's job is to provide the organization with the vision and confidence to deliver it."
"CEOs require a fresh reconceptualization of what sustainable growth looks like in today's hyper-competitive world and a practical 'how to' program for achieving it."
"Every day is Monday morning for profitable growth. Monday morning starts today."
"In maximising long-term shareholder return, consistent earnings and dividend growth, as well as revenue growth, are mandated by investors. If earning growth is simply based on improving expense productivity, investors question and discount the sustainability of future earnings growth. Investors demand and reward profitable revenue growth. There are many competitive advantages that can be achieved with good growth."
"Reorient your thinking about growth to small day-to-day changes. Focusing on collaboration with customers is critical to growth. Also, important to have a practical implementation guide."
"Growth is achievable. It is in the consistency of day-to-day execution that you build the backbone of a great company. How much control you have over the growth of your business? "
"Profitable growth is now attainable for everyone who follows certain practical advice. Leaders of organization should make profitable, organic, and sustainable growth, become everyone's business. ..... a prerequisite to building shareholder value."
"The importance of execution is at the forefront of growth. Insight and knowledge of how to execute, based on management principles for profitable growth, is invaluable for the business community. "
"In an industry where 3 to 5 % growth is top quartile, we are always looking for creative ways to get the most from our existing assets, while also looking for the next big growth area. By identifying a number of internal and external obstacles to growth and then showing managers at all levels how to overcome these obstacles and create profitable growth in their businesses. The importance of hitting "singles and doubles", creating a continuous improvement mind-set throughout your organization, and maintaining a disciplined and accountable approach to growth. "
"A growth agenda is on the top of every CEO's mind. Using simple but on-the-mark tools for building a company-wide 'growth culture' are invaluable."
Ref: Profitable Growth is Everyone's Business by Ram Charan
Monday, 8 June 2009
Operating Profit before Working Capital changes vs. Operating Cash Flow
Proton's Cash Flow Details
National car maker Proton Holdings Bhd should provide more details in its quarterly cash flow statement instead of just a summary.
Although the condensed statement did show the amount of cash flow generated from operations (operating cash flow), it didn't present the "operating profit before working capital changes", or spell out in detail how the operating cash flow was derived.
There is a huge difference between operating profit before working capital changes and operating cash flow.
Operating profit before working capital changes: This indicates the very basic operating cash flow scenario of a company, with the assumption that payments to suppliers are made on time while collection from client for the sale of goods is also received punctually.
A negative operating profit before working capital chagnes spells trouble for the viability of a company's operations. It means the company has to pour in cash to sustain its operations instead of generating cash from the operations.
The non-disclosure of operating profit before working capital changes denies investors an important piece of information. This is because companies could bump up their operating cash flow by adjusting their working capital, by delaying payment to suppliers or expediting the receipt of cash from customers.
These may blur investors' judgment about the basic health of the business or when they seek to compare the actual operating situation with the previous corresponding period.
Cash flow is the lifeblood of a busines, which is especially important in tough times. In order to give the public a better picture of its operating condition, Proton should present its quarterly cash flow statement in detail.
The Edge Malaysia June 8, 2009
National car maker Proton Holdings Bhd should provide more details in its quarterly cash flow statement instead of just a summary.
Although the condensed statement did show the amount of cash flow generated from operations (operating cash flow), it didn't present the "operating profit before working capital changes", or spell out in detail how the operating cash flow was derived.
There is a huge difference between operating profit before working capital changes and operating cash flow.
Operating profit before working capital changes: This indicates the very basic operating cash flow scenario of a company, with the assumption that payments to suppliers are made on time while collection from client for the sale of goods is also received punctually.
A negative operating profit before working capital chagnes spells trouble for the viability of a company's operations. It means the company has to pour in cash to sustain its operations instead of generating cash from the operations.
The non-disclosure of operating profit before working capital changes denies investors an important piece of information. This is because companies could bump up their operating cash flow by adjusting their working capital, by delaying payment to suppliers or expediting the receipt of cash from customers.
These may blur investors' judgment about the basic health of the business or when they seek to compare the actual operating situation with the previous corresponding period.
Cash flow is the lifeblood of a busines, which is especially important in tough times. In order to give the public a better picture of its operating condition, Proton should present its quarterly cash flow statement in detail.
The Edge Malaysia June 8, 2009
Growth or value investing in these times?
Growth or value investing in these times?
Written by Celine Tan
Tuesday, 02 June 2009 18:00
In the investment world, there are two broad investment styles -- value and growth investing. With stock prices around the globe experiencing major corrections in the past 18 months, should you be applying the value investing strategy?
Value investors seek stocks that they believe has been undervalued by the market. Some undervalued investments, which suffered acute fall in prices, are the result of overreaction to negative developments and this does not correspond with the investments’ long-term fundamentals, says Sharifatul Hanizah Said Ali, managing director of RHB Investment Management Sdn Bhd. “In such a scenario, value investors are likely to profit when the value of the assets, in which they invested at deflated prices, recovers.”
However, in the event that the investment suffers a drastic change in fundamentals -- from bad to worse, it will remain cheap for a long time. “Therefore, it’s crucial for one to be aware of the nature of your investment. This is even more so when it comes to value investing as some of these investments are under-researched and information may not be easily accessible,” says Sharifatul. Another common risk in value securities is liquidity risk, she adds.
Meanwhile, growth investors invest in companies that have a high-growth story, even if the price appears expensive. “While most growth investments yield decent returns [usually in line with the broad market], value investments can potentially yield exponential returns in the right market cycle [like small-cap stocks rally],” says Sharifatul.
You need to make a judgment call in determining the approach to your investment. “If you are of the opinion that the market recovery will be protracted and eventually spill over to the entire market, then it may be worth investing in value investments. Otherwise, it’s more advisable to invest in growth investments as they should move ahead of value investment,” says Sharifatul. “In essence, we prefer equity growth investments that are undervalued. We are also of the view that values are emerging among blue chips and fundamentally strong companies with good track records, prudent management and strong brand names. These established corporates would be the driver of growth and lead the economic recovery.”
Regardless of your approach, in deciding the intrinsic value of an investment, you are making certain assumptions, for instance, the expected revenue and earnings, says Chen Fan Fai, chief investment officer of Kenanga Asset Management Sdn Bhd. “If your assumptions are wrong, your valuation will be totally out – and this is where the risk lies.”
However, unit trust fund investors should not make the mistake of assuming that unit trust funds that have fallen in price appear to provide value. “In essence, a unit trust is a portfolio of assets. You cannot simplistically say that this unit trust fund, which has fallen from RM1 to 50 sen, is a good buy, compared with the one that has dropped from RM1 to 90 sen [both funds having the same investment mandates],” says Teoh Kok Lin, managing director of Singular Asset Management Sdn Bhd.
Alternatively, one can scrutinise the individual holdings of the stocks or bonds in the unit trust portfolio to gauge its value, says Sharifatul. “Assuming if the stocks are largely undervalued stocks and trade at steep discounts to their fair values, it is likely that the fund trades at a discount too or adopts a value investing strategy.”
http://www.theedgemalaysia.com/personal-finance/15495-growth-or-value-investing-in-these-times.html
Written by Celine Tan
Tuesday, 02 June 2009 18:00
In the investment world, there are two broad investment styles -- value and growth investing. With stock prices around the globe experiencing major corrections in the past 18 months, should you be applying the value investing strategy?
Value investors seek stocks that they believe has been undervalued by the market. Some undervalued investments, which suffered acute fall in prices, are the result of overreaction to negative developments and this does not correspond with the investments’ long-term fundamentals, says Sharifatul Hanizah Said Ali, managing director of RHB Investment Management Sdn Bhd. “In such a scenario, value investors are likely to profit when the value of the assets, in which they invested at deflated prices, recovers.”
However, in the event that the investment suffers a drastic change in fundamentals -- from bad to worse, it will remain cheap for a long time. “Therefore, it’s crucial for one to be aware of the nature of your investment. This is even more so when it comes to value investing as some of these investments are under-researched and information may not be easily accessible,” says Sharifatul. Another common risk in value securities is liquidity risk, she adds.
Meanwhile, growth investors invest in companies that have a high-growth story, even if the price appears expensive. “While most growth investments yield decent returns [usually in line with the broad market], value investments can potentially yield exponential returns in the right market cycle [like small-cap stocks rally],” says Sharifatul.
You need to make a judgment call in determining the approach to your investment. “If you are of the opinion that the market recovery will be protracted and eventually spill over to the entire market, then it may be worth investing in value investments. Otherwise, it’s more advisable to invest in growth investments as they should move ahead of value investment,” says Sharifatul. “In essence, we prefer equity growth investments that are undervalued. We are also of the view that values are emerging among blue chips and fundamentally strong companies with good track records, prudent management and strong brand names. These established corporates would be the driver of growth and lead the economic recovery.”
Regardless of your approach, in deciding the intrinsic value of an investment, you are making certain assumptions, for instance, the expected revenue and earnings, says Chen Fan Fai, chief investment officer of Kenanga Asset Management Sdn Bhd. “If your assumptions are wrong, your valuation will be totally out – and this is where the risk lies.”
However, unit trust fund investors should not make the mistake of assuming that unit trust funds that have fallen in price appear to provide value. “In essence, a unit trust is a portfolio of assets. You cannot simplistically say that this unit trust fund, which has fallen from RM1 to 50 sen, is a good buy, compared with the one that has dropped from RM1 to 90 sen [both funds having the same investment mandates],” says Teoh Kok Lin, managing director of Singular Asset Management Sdn Bhd.
Alternatively, one can scrutinise the individual holdings of the stocks or bonds in the unit trust portfolio to gauge its value, says Sharifatul. “Assuming if the stocks are largely undervalued stocks and trade at steep discounts to their fair values, it is likely that the fund trades at a discount too or adopts a value investing strategy.”
http://www.theedgemalaysia.com/personal-finance/15495-growth-or-value-investing-in-these-times.html
Ensuring that successful growth continues or is rekindled
All growth efforts eventually slow. But neither your business nor your career has to decline in tandem with them as long as you stay alert to the dynamics that are in play and cultivate the ability to adapt.
These steps can help ensure that successful growth continues, or is rekindled:
1. Review current business activities: this may involve analysing strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT), as well as assessing the business's relative market share.
Answer the following questions:
2 Decide the best method of achieving growth: discuss the options with senior managers and shareholders, refining potential opportunities and deciding how to approach problems.
3. Plan for growth: decide what action is needed to achieve growth. This will involve leadership qualities to communicate and mobilise resources.
4. Act decisively and consistently: once the course has been set it needs to be rigorously followed. One of the greatest obstacles to growth is inertia, often in the form of attachment to heritage and past activities. However, Sir John Harvey Jones, one of the UK's most successful businessmen, emphasised the point that any business is only as good as its next three months' order book.
These steps can help ensure that successful growth continues, or is rekindled:
1. Review current business activities: this may involve analysing strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT), as well as assessing the business's relative market share.
Answer the following questions:
- Where are the most profitable parts of the business?
- What are the prospects in the short-, medium-, and long-term for those products and markets?
- How precarious is the business - for example, does it rely on too few products, customers, or distribution channels?
- How clearly focused is the business - is it over-burdened with too many products, markets, and initiatives, or is it running on empty with too few opportunities?
- What is likely to be the best method of expansion - is it affordable (not just in terms of money)?
- What are the advantages and disadvantages of expanding?
2 Decide the best method of achieving growth: discuss the options with senior managers and shareholders, refining potential opportunities and deciding how to approach problems.
3. Plan for growth: decide what action is needed to achieve growth. This will involve leadership qualities to communicate and mobilise resources.
4. Act decisively and consistently: once the course has been set it needs to be rigorously followed. One of the greatest obstacles to growth is inertia, often in the form of attachment to heritage and past activities. However, Sir John Harvey Jones, one of the UK's most successful businessmen, emphasised the point that any business is only as good as its next three months' order book.
- Pay attention to the details of any strategy for growth. Understand how the changes affect people.
- Decisive action is vital, but this needs to include an understanding of how to maintain people's commitment and motivation. If people feel threatened, or insecure, then however sensible the strategy for growth and the plan for implementation it simply will not be achieved.
- It is vital to treat people with respect. It is also worth communicating what is happening to people so that they understand their role and how they can contribute.
- Also, monitor the situation; time lags need to be understood and planned for, and the strategy needs to be supported in the long term.
Taking Growth for Granted
Growth can never be taken for granted. There is no such thing as a growth industry - growth is a matter of being perceptive enough to spot where future growth may lie.
History is filled with companies that fall undetected into decay because:
- they assume that the growth in their particular market will continue for as long as the population grows in size and wealth
- they believe that a product cannot be surpassed
- they tend to put faith in the ability of improved production techniques to deliver lower costs and, therefore, higher profits.
See's Candies for sale
One day, Buffett got a call from Bill Ramsey, Blue Chip's president, saying that a local Los Angeles company, See's Candies, was for sale.
"See's has a name that nobody can get near in California," Munger told Buffett. "We can get it at a reasonable price. It's impossible to compete with that brand without spending all kinds of money." Ed Anderson thought it was expensive, but Munger was overflowing with enthusiasm. He and Buffett went through the plant, and Munger said, "What a fantastic business. And the manager, Chuck Huggins - boy, is he smart, and we can keep him on!"
See's had a tentative deal on the table already and wanted $30 million for assets worth $5 million. The difference was See's brand, reputation, and trademarks - and most of all, its customer goodwill.
Buffett and Charlie Munger decided that See's was like a bond - worth paying $25 million for. If the company had paid out its earnings as "interest," the interest would average about 9%. That was not enough - owning a business was riskier than owning a bond, and the "interest rate" was not guaranteed. But the earnings were growing, on average 12% a year. So See's was like a bond whose interest payments grew. Furthermore:
"We thought it had uncapped pricing power. See's was selling candy for about the price of Russell Stover at the time, and the big question in my mind was, if you got another 15c a pound, that was 2.5 million dollars on top of 4 million dollars of earnings. So you really were buying something that perhaps would earn 6.5 or 7 million dollars at the time, if just priced a little more aggressively."
At the price offered, $25 million, the $4 million it was earnings pretax would give Buffett and Munger payback of 9% after-tax on their investment from the first day they bought it - not factoring in future growth. Adding in the $2 to $3 million of price increases they thought See's could institute, the return on their capital would rise to 14%: a decent level of profitability on an investment, although it wasn't a sure thing. The key was whether the earnings would continue to grow. Buffett and Munger came close to walking. The pickings had been so easy until now, and they had such an ingrained habit of underbidding, that it was like swallowing live guppies for them to pay the asking price.
"You guys are crazy." Munger's employee Ira Marshall said, "There are some things you should pay up for - human quality, business quality, and so forth. You're underestimating quality."
"Warren and I listened to the criticism," says Munger. "We changed our mind. In the end, they came to the exact dollar limit of what we were willing to pay."
Price paid: $25 million
Earnings: $4 million pre-tax
Initial return: 9% after tax
Earnings growth rate: 12% per year
If earnings increased to: $6 - $7 million
Return on their capital: 14%
Ref: Page 345 The Snowball, Warren Buffett and the Business of Life, by Alice Schroeder
"See's has a name that nobody can get near in California," Munger told Buffett. "We can get it at a reasonable price. It's impossible to compete with that brand without spending all kinds of money." Ed Anderson thought it was expensive, but Munger was overflowing with enthusiasm. He and Buffett went through the plant, and Munger said, "What a fantastic business. And the manager, Chuck Huggins - boy, is he smart, and we can keep him on!"
See's had a tentative deal on the table already and wanted $30 million for assets worth $5 million. The difference was See's brand, reputation, and trademarks - and most of all, its customer goodwill.
Buffett and Charlie Munger decided that See's was like a bond - worth paying $25 million for. If the company had paid out its earnings as "interest," the interest would average about 9%. That was not enough - owning a business was riskier than owning a bond, and the "interest rate" was not guaranteed. But the earnings were growing, on average 12% a year. So See's was like a bond whose interest payments grew. Furthermore:
"We thought it had uncapped pricing power. See's was selling candy for about the price of Russell Stover at the time, and the big question in my mind was, if you got another 15c a pound, that was 2.5 million dollars on top of 4 million dollars of earnings. So you really were buying something that perhaps would earn 6.5 or 7 million dollars at the time, if just priced a little more aggressively."
At the price offered, $25 million, the $4 million it was earnings pretax would give Buffett and Munger payback of 9% after-tax on their investment from the first day they bought it - not factoring in future growth. Adding in the $2 to $3 million of price increases they thought See's could institute, the return on their capital would rise to 14%: a decent level of profitability on an investment, although it wasn't a sure thing. The key was whether the earnings would continue to grow. Buffett and Munger came close to walking. The pickings had been so easy until now, and they had such an ingrained habit of underbidding, that it was like swallowing live guppies for them to pay the asking price.
"You guys are crazy." Munger's employee Ira Marshall said, "There are some things you should pay up for - human quality, business quality, and so forth. You're underestimating quality."
"Warren and I listened to the criticism," says Munger. "We changed our mind. In the end, they came to the exact dollar limit of what we were willing to pay."
Price paid: $25 million
Earnings: $4 million pre-tax
Initial return: 9% after tax
Earnings growth rate: 12% per year
If earnings increased to: $6 - $7 million
Return on their capital: 14%
Ref: Page 345 The Snowball, Warren Buffett and the Business of Life, by Alice Schroeder
Sunday, 7 June 2009
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 9)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 9)
Warner-Lambert Company: This is a pharmaceutical, consumer health care, and gum and mint company. It has such brand-name products as Listerine, Bromo-Seltzer, Halls cough tablets, Rolaids antacids, Schick and Wilkinson Sword razors and blades. its gums and mints division owns Dentyne, Trident, Freshen-up, Bubblicious, Mondo, Cinn-a-Burst, Clorets, and Certs. Its over-the-counter drugs are protected by patents. The ROE is consitently above 30% and per share earnings have been growing at 11% annually for the last 10 years. During the 1990 bubble it traded at a PE of between 30 and 45. If you can get it for a PE of below 17, the economics really work. In the early nineties, when it looked as if the federal government was going to start regulating drug prices, rumour had it that Buffett was buying into this company at a PE of 13. He then sold out because he couldn't establish the large positions that would give him greater weight in dealing with management. In 2000 the company merged into Pfizer.
ROE: > 30% (for last 10 years)
Per share earning annual growth rate: 11% (for the last 10 years)
PE in 1990 bubble: 30 - 45
Price bought: PE of 13 (in early 90s, when fed was going to start regulating prices)
Washington Post: The Washington Post was Buffett's first taste of owning a monopoly newspaper and the incredible profits that it can earn. This one had a majority owner who kept a close eye on things, namely Katharine Graham. She and Buffett hit it off big after he bought into the paper in 1973. He coached her on the virtues of share repurchases and how not to venture into areas of business outside the company's circle of competence. A quick learner, she caused the stock to rise from the $5.60 a share Buffett paid for it in 1973 to more than $500 a share today. The ROE for this company fluctuates between 13% and 19%. Its per share earnings have been growing at approximately 9% annually. In addition to the newspaper, the Washington Post Company owns Newsweek magazine, six TV stations and numerous cable TV systems in eighteen states. It is doubtful that the company will do anything stupid that would create a buying opportunity, so you are going to have to wait for a recession in advertising rates or a general stock market decline to buy. Since the long-term picture of the company looks sound, any price under $400 a share should be a good buy, and any price under $300 a share is a screaming bargain. Buffett bought the Washington Post during the 1973-74 crash for $5.69 a share against earnings of $0.76 a share, which equates to a PE of 7.5. During the 1972 and 1999 bubbles it traded at a PE of 24. Katharine has passed on, but her life's work, the Post, remains a fantastic business.
Price bought: $5.69 a share (at PE of 7.5, during the 1973 - 74 crash)
Earnings: $0.76 a share
ROE: 13% - 19% (for last 10 years)
Per share earnings annual growth rate: 9%
Price in 2001: $500 a share
Wells Fargo: This is the bank of banks and it is growing by leaps and bounds. Buffett bought into it during a banking recession in which just about every major bank in the nation took a bath over bad real estate loans. The stock market, being shortsighted, exited stage right and drove the bank's stock down to $15.75 a share. Buffett, exploiter of short-term folly that he is, jumped on this one with $497.8 million to buy 28.8 million shares at an average price of approximately $17. It has recently traded at $49 a share. In 1999, at the top of the real estate boom, Buffett exited stage left and started selling his shares. Here we have Buffett buying in during a recession and selling out during a boom. Banks go through this boom-and-bust real estate cycle every 10 to 15 years. The shortsighted stock market panics when things go bust and sends bank socks into the ground. When things boom again, the short-sighted stock market sends bank stocks skyward. Anyway you look at it, it's a nice ride. You can do what Buffett does and buy the strongest of the litter.
Price bought: average price $17 (during a banking recession that drove the bank's stock down to $15.75)
Price sold: during the top of the real estate boom in 1999
Wyeth: This drug company is a leading manufacturer of patented prescription drugs, but it also owns some wonderful over-the-counter brand names such as Advil, Anacin, Robitussin, and Chap Stick. The ROE for the last 10 years has always been over 30%. Per share earnings growth has been at 7.9%. At the right price, it's a great buy, and worth holding on to for the long term. People have a habit of getting sick, and that's not going to change anytime soon. Your big buying opportunities will be bear markets and panic sell-offs during bull markets.
ROE: 30% (over the last 10 years)
Per share earnings annual growth rate: 7.9%
Price bought: At the right price; best buy during bear markets and panic sell-off during bull markets.
Price sold: Worth holding on to for the long term.
Related topics:
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 1)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 2)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 3)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 4)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 5)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 6)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 7)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 8)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 9)
Warner-Lambert Company: This is a pharmaceutical, consumer health care, and gum and mint company. It has such brand-name products as Listerine, Bromo-Seltzer, Halls cough tablets, Rolaids antacids, Schick and Wilkinson Sword razors and blades. its gums and mints division owns Dentyne, Trident, Freshen-up, Bubblicious, Mondo, Cinn-a-Burst, Clorets, and Certs. Its over-the-counter drugs are protected by patents. The ROE is consitently above 30% and per share earnings have been growing at 11% annually for the last 10 years. During the 1990 bubble it traded at a PE of between 30 and 45. If you can get it for a PE of below 17, the economics really work. In the early nineties, when it looked as if the federal government was going to start regulating drug prices, rumour had it that Buffett was buying into this company at a PE of 13. He then sold out because he couldn't establish the large positions that would give him greater weight in dealing with management. In 2000 the company merged into Pfizer.
ROE: > 30% (for last 10 years)
Per share earning annual growth rate: 11% (for the last 10 years)
PE in 1990 bubble: 30 - 45
Price bought: PE of 13 (in early 90s, when fed was going to start regulating prices)
Washington Post: The Washington Post was Buffett's first taste of owning a monopoly newspaper and the incredible profits that it can earn. This one had a majority owner who kept a close eye on things, namely Katharine Graham. She and Buffett hit it off big after he bought into the paper in 1973. He coached her on the virtues of share repurchases and how not to venture into areas of business outside the company's circle of competence. A quick learner, she caused the stock to rise from the $5.60 a share Buffett paid for it in 1973 to more than $500 a share today. The ROE for this company fluctuates between 13% and 19%. Its per share earnings have been growing at approximately 9% annually. In addition to the newspaper, the Washington Post Company owns Newsweek magazine, six TV stations and numerous cable TV systems in eighteen states. It is doubtful that the company will do anything stupid that would create a buying opportunity, so you are going to have to wait for a recession in advertising rates or a general stock market decline to buy. Since the long-term picture of the company looks sound, any price under $400 a share should be a good buy, and any price under $300 a share is a screaming bargain. Buffett bought the Washington Post during the 1973-74 crash for $5.69 a share against earnings of $0.76 a share, which equates to a PE of 7.5. During the 1972 and 1999 bubbles it traded at a PE of 24. Katharine has passed on, but her life's work, the Post, remains a fantastic business.
Price bought: $5.69 a share (at PE of 7.5, during the 1973 - 74 crash)
Earnings: $0.76 a share
ROE: 13% - 19% (for last 10 years)
Per share earnings annual growth rate: 9%
Price in 2001: $500 a share
Wells Fargo: This is the bank of banks and it is growing by leaps and bounds. Buffett bought into it during a banking recession in which just about every major bank in the nation took a bath over bad real estate loans. The stock market, being shortsighted, exited stage right and drove the bank's stock down to $15.75 a share. Buffett, exploiter of short-term folly that he is, jumped on this one with $497.8 million to buy 28.8 million shares at an average price of approximately $17. It has recently traded at $49 a share. In 1999, at the top of the real estate boom, Buffett exited stage left and started selling his shares. Here we have Buffett buying in during a recession and selling out during a boom. Banks go through this boom-and-bust real estate cycle every 10 to 15 years. The shortsighted stock market panics when things go bust and sends bank socks into the ground. When things boom again, the short-sighted stock market sends bank stocks skyward. Anyway you look at it, it's a nice ride. You can do what Buffett does and buy the strongest of the litter.
Price bought: average price $17 (during a banking recession that drove the bank's stock down to $15.75)
Price sold: during the top of the real estate boom in 1999
Wyeth: This drug company is a leading manufacturer of patented prescription drugs, but it also owns some wonderful over-the-counter brand names such as Advil, Anacin, Robitussin, and Chap Stick. The ROE for the last 10 years has always been over 30%. Per share earnings growth has been at 7.9%. At the right price, it's a great buy, and worth holding on to for the long term. People have a habit of getting sick, and that's not going to change anytime soon. Your big buying opportunities will be bear markets and panic sell-offs during bull markets.
ROE: 30% (over the last 10 years)
Per share earnings annual growth rate: 7.9%
Price bought: At the right price; best buy during bear markets and panic sell-off during bull markets.
Price sold: Worth holding on to for the long term.
Related topics:
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 1)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 2)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 3)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 4)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 5)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 6)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 7)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 8)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 9)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 8)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 8)
Pepsico inc.: Before Warren started drinking three or four Cherry Cokes a day, he was a Pepsi man. PepsiCo is a fantastic company with an annual ROE for the last 10 years of over 20% and per share earnings growing annually at 8%. This is a Buffett Foundation holdings. Look to buy it in a recession, or during a panic sell-off.
ROE: 20% (the last 10 years)
Per share earnings annual growth rate: 8%
Times Mirror: In 1980, the Fed pushed interest rates up to the 14% level, which killed stock prices. Buffett put on his selective contrarian hat and went shopping. One of his purchases was Times Mirrow, owner of the Los Angeles Times, for an amazing $14 a share against per share earnings of $2.04, which equates to a P/E of 6.8 and an initial return of 15%. By 1985 it was trading at $53 a share, giving Buffett a 30% compounding annual rate of return. During the 1999 bubble it traded at 21 x earnings. You can't trade this one anymore - in March 2000 Tribune Company saw the great opportunity here and bought the company.
Price bought: $14 a share (in 1980, PE 6.8x)
Earnings: $2.04 a share
Initial return: 15%
Price in 1985: $53 a share giving a CAGR of 30%
PE in 1999 (bubble): 21x
Torchmark Corp: This is an insurance and financial services company. It consistently earns a ROE in excess of 19%. Its per share earnings have been growing at an annual rate of 10.9% for the last 10 years. Buffett has been buying this one for years, most recently in February 2000 right after the 1999 bubble. You could have bought it then at $20 a share with earnings of $2.82 a share, which equates to an initial return of 14%. As of May 2001, it traded at $37.50 per share.
ROE: 19% (the last 10 years)
Per share earnings annual growth rate: 10.9% (the last 10 years)
Price bought: $20 a share (in February 2000, after the 1999 bubble)
Earnings: $2.82 a share
Initial returns: 14%
Price in May 2001: $37.50
Wal-Mart Stores: With over 2,400 stores, Wal-Mart has the power to outbuy the competition. This means it can give its customers a better buy on just about anything. Thus every price-conscious consumer shops there. More shoppers mean more volume, which means more money. How much? Wal-Mart's annual ROE for the last 10 years has always been over 20%. Its per share earnings have been growing at an annual rate of 24%. It is, after all, the world's largest retailer. It got that way by going into small towns and driving the competition out of business, thus establishing a monopoly. Its distribution network is so sophisticated that it has created a barrier to entry that protects the company from competition. Berkshire reported that it owned 4.39 million shares of Wal-Mart as of 1997.
ROE: > 20% over the last 10 years.
Per share earnings annual growth rate: 24%
Related topics:
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 1)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 2)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 3)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 4)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 5)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 6)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 7)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 8)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 9)
Pepsico inc.: Before Warren started drinking three or four Cherry Cokes a day, he was a Pepsi man. PepsiCo is a fantastic company with an annual ROE for the last 10 years of over 20% and per share earnings growing annually at 8%. This is a Buffett Foundation holdings. Look to buy it in a recession, or during a panic sell-off.
ROE: 20% (the last 10 years)
Per share earnings annual growth rate: 8%
Times Mirror: In 1980, the Fed pushed interest rates up to the 14% level, which killed stock prices. Buffett put on his selective contrarian hat and went shopping. One of his purchases was Times Mirrow, owner of the Los Angeles Times, for an amazing $14 a share against per share earnings of $2.04, which equates to a P/E of 6.8 and an initial return of 15%. By 1985 it was trading at $53 a share, giving Buffett a 30% compounding annual rate of return. During the 1999 bubble it traded at 21 x earnings. You can't trade this one anymore - in March 2000 Tribune Company saw the great opportunity here and bought the company.
Price bought: $14 a share (in 1980, PE 6.8x)
Earnings: $2.04 a share
Initial return: 15%
Price in 1985: $53 a share giving a CAGR of 30%
PE in 1999 (bubble): 21x
Torchmark Corp: This is an insurance and financial services company. It consistently earns a ROE in excess of 19%. Its per share earnings have been growing at an annual rate of 10.9% for the last 10 years. Buffett has been buying this one for years, most recently in February 2000 right after the 1999 bubble. You could have bought it then at $20 a share with earnings of $2.82 a share, which equates to an initial return of 14%. As of May 2001, it traded at $37.50 per share.
ROE: 19% (the last 10 years)
Per share earnings annual growth rate: 10.9% (the last 10 years)
Price bought: $20 a share (in February 2000, after the 1999 bubble)
Earnings: $2.82 a share
Initial returns: 14%
Price in May 2001: $37.50
Wal-Mart Stores: With over 2,400 stores, Wal-Mart has the power to outbuy the competition. This means it can give its customers a better buy on just about anything. Thus every price-conscious consumer shops there. More shoppers mean more volume, which means more money. How much? Wal-Mart's annual ROE for the last 10 years has always been over 20%. Its per share earnings have been growing at an annual rate of 24%. It is, after all, the world's largest retailer. It got that way by going into small towns and driving the competition out of business, thus establishing a monopoly. Its distribution network is so sophisticated that it has created a barrier to entry that protects the company from competition. Berkshire reported that it owned 4.39 million shares of Wal-Mart as of 1997.
ROE: > 20% over the last 10 years.
Per share earnings annual growth rate: 24%
Related topics:
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 1)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 2)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 3)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 4)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 5)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 6)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 7)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 8)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 9)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 7)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 7)
Media General Inc.: Media General is a major newspaper publisher and owner of TV and cable systems. Warren was buying it in 1978 and 1979 for $16 a share, with per share earnings of $3.42 a share, which equates to an initial return of 21%. Again, the Fed's raising interest rates helped make this low price possible. No hard information on when he sold it, but we believe it was 1985, for around $70 a share.
Price bought: $16 a share (in 1978 and 1979)
Earnings: $3.42 a share
Initial return: 21%
Price sold: $70 a share (in 1985)
Mercury General Corp: Mercury is the largest agency writer of passenger auto insurance in California, and California has a lot of cars. It gets great ROE. Buy this one when it is trading close to or below book value, which you could have done in 1988, 1990, 1991, 1992, and 2000. This is a Buffett Foundation holding.
New York Times: The company owns the New York Times, Boston Globe, fifteen smaller dailies, and half the International Herald Tribune. It also owns eight TV and two radio stations. This is a Buffett Foundation holding. In the early nineties the numbers were lousy, but they are starting to look better.
Ogilvy & Mather Int'l. Inc.: This stock is no longer publicly traded. Buffett bought 31% of Ogilvy, the fifth-largest ad agency in America, after the 1973 - 74 stock market crash for approximately $4 a share against earnings of $0.76 a share. No record of when he sold it. By 1978 it was trading at $14 a share, which would have given him an annual compounding rate of return of 30%. By 1985 it was trading at $46 a share, which equates to an annual compounding rate of return of 24%.
Price bought: $4 a share (after 1973-74 stock market crash)
Earnings: $0.76 a share
Price at 1978: $14 a share, giving a CAGR of 30%
Price at 1985: $46 a share, giving a CAGR of 24%
Related topics:
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 1)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 2)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 3)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 4)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 5)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 6)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 7)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 8)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 9)
Media General Inc.: Media General is a major newspaper publisher and owner of TV and cable systems. Warren was buying it in 1978 and 1979 for $16 a share, with per share earnings of $3.42 a share, which equates to an initial return of 21%. Again, the Fed's raising interest rates helped make this low price possible. No hard information on when he sold it, but we believe it was 1985, for around $70 a share.
Price bought: $16 a share (in 1978 and 1979)
Earnings: $3.42 a share
Initial return: 21%
Price sold: $70 a share (in 1985)
Mercury General Corp: Mercury is the largest agency writer of passenger auto insurance in California, and California has a lot of cars. It gets great ROE. Buy this one when it is trading close to or below book value, which you could have done in 1988, 1990, 1991, 1992, and 2000. This is a Buffett Foundation holding.
New York Times: The company owns the New York Times, Boston Globe, fifteen smaller dailies, and half the International Herald Tribune. It also owns eight TV and two radio stations. This is a Buffett Foundation holding. In the early nineties the numbers were lousy, but they are starting to look better.
Ogilvy & Mather Int'l. Inc.: This stock is no longer publicly traded. Buffett bought 31% of Ogilvy, the fifth-largest ad agency in America, after the 1973 - 74 stock market crash for approximately $4 a share against earnings of $0.76 a share. No record of when he sold it. By 1978 it was trading at $14 a share, which would have given him an annual compounding rate of return of 30%. By 1985 it was trading at $46 a share, which equates to an annual compounding rate of return of 24%.
Price bought: $4 a share (after 1973-74 stock market crash)
Earnings: $0.76 a share
Price at 1978: $14 a share, giving a CAGR of 30%
Price at 1985: $46 a share, giving a CAGR of 24%
Related topics:
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 1)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 2)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 3)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 4)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 5)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 6)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 7)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 8)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 9)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 6)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 6)
Hershey Foods: Buffett is rumored to have purchased Hershey Foods on several occasions, but we have no confirmed purchase to sink our teeth into. He has used it as an example in discussing the concept of a durable competitive advantage. Its been making chocolate forever and is the largest producer in America. The majority of the voting stock fo the company is held in trust for the benefit of the Milton Hershey School for Orphans. The company's founder, Milton Hershey, left the majority of his wealth to benefit the children who had made him rich. What this means to you the investor is that there is one large shareholder - the trust for the orphanage - which can wield an incredible amount of weight. The company gets high ROE and ROTC. Its per share earnings have been growing at an annual rate of 9.9% for the last 10 years. It traded at a PE of 33 during the bubble, which is too steep for this business. Try to get it at a PE below 15, which you could ahve done up until 1996. Even if you have a sweet tooth, wait for a recession or panic sell-off to take a bite.
ROE: high
ROTC: high
Per share earnings annual growth rate: 9.9% (the last 10 years)
Price bought: Wait for a recession or panic sell-off to buy
Interpublic Group of Companies: In 1974, Interpublic was the largest company in the international advertising business. Now it is number three. Advertising agencies, according to Buffett, earn a royalty on the growth of other businesses. When manufacturers want to take their products to market, they have to advertise, so they use an agency.
Agencies produce and place ads in the media and are paid a percentage of what the advertiser spends for these services. Agencies are almost inflation-proof. Inflation causes advertisers to spend more for the same amount of work, and the more advertisers spend, the more the agencies make. Agencies are service businesses so they spend only modesly on capital equipment, which means that profits don't go toward replacing worn-out plant and equipment. Plus, only 4% of U.S. advertisers change agencies every year! In other words, those big accounts stay in place. Many of the large agencies that dominated the marketplace years ago still dominate it today. Seven of the top ten are in their fifth or sixth generration of management. The key here is that there is no limit on how big they can grow. As long as businesses grow and the media continue to be where manufacturers take their products to market, advertising agencies will continue to grow as well.
The numbers on Interpublic are great. For the last 10 years it has earned an annual ROE of 16% or better, with the last 3 years at over 20%. Per share earnings for the last 10 years have been growing at an annual rate of 13.8%. Buffett used the 1973-74 recession to buy 17% of Interpublic, which traded as low as $3 a share, against earnings of $0.81. He paid a total $4,531,000 for 592,650 shares, for an averge price of $7.65 per share. We don't know when he sold his interest in this company. We do know that if he had held his position, he would have 74.6 million shares, adjusted for stock splits, worth approximately $2.8 billion. This equates to a compounding annual rate of return of approximately 27% for the 27-year period. If you're patient, you can get a great price on this one. During the 1999 bubble, it traded at a PE of 33 - too high for even this wonderful business. In the midnineties, you could have bought it for 14 x earnings.
Price bought: average price $7.65 (bought in 1973-74 recession, was traded as low as $3 a share)
Earnings: $0.81 a share
ROE: > 16% (over the last 10 years, with last 3 years, ROE greater than 20%)
Per share earnings annual growth rate: 13.8% (over last 10 years)
Kaiser Aluminium & Chemical Corp: This is one of the few investment mistakes that Buffett made in his early days. He bought based on earnings in good "businesslike" fashion, but the earnings soon vanished as they often do in a price-competitive business. He lost money on this one.
McDonald's Corp: McDonald's made the hamburger into a brand-name product with some 28 thousand restaurants - no easy feat. Over the last 10 years the company has had a yearly ROE between 16% and 20%, which is delicious. And its per share earnings have been growing at an annual rate of 12%. It's a great company, and at the right price it is a great investment. Buffett acquired 60 million shares in 1994 and 1995 for $1.2 billion, which equates to $20 a share. He was then rumoured to be selling them in 1997 to 1999 for between $30 and $45 a share as he sold into the bubble. This turned out to be a wise decision. At the right price, Buffett will once agains be buying McDonald's shares, and so would you.
Price bought: average $20 a share (in 1994 and 1995)
ROE: 16%-20% (over the last 10 years)
Per share earnings annual growth rate: 12% (the last 10 years)
Price sold: $30 - $45 a share ( in 1997 to 1999, sold into the bubble)
Related topics:
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 1)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 2)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 3)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 4)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 5)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 6)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 7)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 8)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 9)
Hershey Foods: Buffett is rumored to have purchased Hershey Foods on several occasions, but we have no confirmed purchase to sink our teeth into. He has used it as an example in discussing the concept of a durable competitive advantage. Its been making chocolate forever and is the largest producer in America. The majority of the voting stock fo the company is held in trust for the benefit of the Milton Hershey School for Orphans. The company's founder, Milton Hershey, left the majority of his wealth to benefit the children who had made him rich. What this means to you the investor is that there is one large shareholder - the trust for the orphanage - which can wield an incredible amount of weight. The company gets high ROE and ROTC. Its per share earnings have been growing at an annual rate of 9.9% for the last 10 years. It traded at a PE of 33 during the bubble, which is too steep for this business. Try to get it at a PE below 15, which you could ahve done up until 1996. Even if you have a sweet tooth, wait for a recession or panic sell-off to take a bite.
ROE: high
ROTC: high
Per share earnings annual growth rate: 9.9% (the last 10 years)
Price bought: Wait for a recession or panic sell-off to buy
Interpublic Group of Companies: In 1974, Interpublic was the largest company in the international advertising business. Now it is number three. Advertising agencies, according to Buffett, earn a royalty on the growth of other businesses. When manufacturers want to take their products to market, they have to advertise, so they use an agency.
Agencies produce and place ads in the media and are paid a percentage of what the advertiser spends for these services. Agencies are almost inflation-proof. Inflation causes advertisers to spend more for the same amount of work, and the more advertisers spend, the more the agencies make. Agencies are service businesses so they spend only modesly on capital equipment, which means that profits don't go toward replacing worn-out plant and equipment. Plus, only 4% of U.S. advertisers change agencies every year! In other words, those big accounts stay in place. Many of the large agencies that dominated the marketplace years ago still dominate it today. Seven of the top ten are in their fifth or sixth generration of management. The key here is that there is no limit on how big they can grow. As long as businesses grow and the media continue to be where manufacturers take their products to market, advertising agencies will continue to grow as well.
The numbers on Interpublic are great. For the last 10 years it has earned an annual ROE of 16% or better, with the last 3 years at over 20%. Per share earnings for the last 10 years have been growing at an annual rate of 13.8%. Buffett used the 1973-74 recession to buy 17% of Interpublic, which traded as low as $3 a share, against earnings of $0.81. He paid a total $4,531,000 for 592,650 shares, for an averge price of $7.65 per share. We don't know when he sold his interest in this company. We do know that if he had held his position, he would have 74.6 million shares, adjusted for stock splits, worth approximately $2.8 billion. This equates to a compounding annual rate of return of approximately 27% for the 27-year period. If you're patient, you can get a great price on this one. During the 1999 bubble, it traded at a PE of 33 - too high for even this wonderful business. In the midnineties, you could have bought it for 14 x earnings.
Price bought: average price $7.65 (bought in 1973-74 recession, was traded as low as $3 a share)
Earnings: $0.81 a share
ROE: > 16% (over the last 10 years, with last 3 years, ROE greater than 20%)
Per share earnings annual growth rate: 13.8% (over last 10 years)
Kaiser Aluminium & Chemical Corp: This is one of the few investment mistakes that Buffett made in his early days. He bought based on earnings in good "businesslike" fashion, but the earnings soon vanished as they often do in a price-competitive business. He lost money on this one.
McDonald's Corp: McDonald's made the hamburger into a brand-name product with some 28 thousand restaurants - no easy feat. Over the last 10 years the company has had a yearly ROE between 16% and 20%, which is delicious. And its per share earnings have been growing at an annual rate of 12%. It's a great company, and at the right price it is a great investment. Buffett acquired 60 million shares in 1994 and 1995 for $1.2 billion, which equates to $20 a share. He was then rumoured to be selling them in 1997 to 1999 for between $30 and $45 a share as he sold into the bubble. This turned out to be a wise decision. At the right price, Buffett will once agains be buying McDonald's shares, and so would you.
Price bought: average $20 a share (in 1994 and 1995)
ROE: 16%-20% (over the last 10 years)
Per share earnings annual growth rate: 12% (the last 10 years)
Price sold: $30 - $45 a share ( in 1997 to 1999, sold into the bubble)
Related topics:
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 1)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 2)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 3)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 4)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 5)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 6)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 7)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 8)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 9)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 5)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 5)
Geico: This was acquired by Berkshire. Buffett's initial big investment was made as the company was on the verge of insolvency. Buffett decided to ride to the rescue, believing that the company's durable competitive advantage was still intact. He was right and watched his $45 million investment grow over the next 15 years to more than $2.3 billion. That equates to a compounding annual rate of return of 29.9% - the stuff investment legends are made of.
Price bought: $45 million
Price 15 years later: $2.3 billion
CAGR: 29.9%
General Electric: Originally GE had a lockdownon the electrification of the planet. For most people electricity is a fact of life, but a mere one hundred years ago it wasn't. One company provided the knowledge and equipment to wire the planet, and that company was GE. And it made a fortune. Today GE is one of the largest and most diversified industrial giants on earth. With this position, it has the financial power to play in any game it wants.
Buffett has long admired this company - it is a Buffett Foundation holding - but has never been able to buy a big piece at a price he thinks is attractive. The ROE for the last 10 years has fluctuated between 18% and 23% (which is great) and ROTC between 16% and 25%. The per share earnings have been growing at an annual compounding rate of 11.8%, which is also electrifying. GE carries only $400 million in long-term debt against $10 billion in earnings. You need a real good recession to buy this one at a fair price. During the 1999 bubble it traded at a PE of 36, which is no bargain. Take a strong look anytime the PE drops below 15, where it traded in the 80s and early 90s.
ROE: 18% - 23%
ROTC: 16% - 25%
Per share earnings annual growth rate: 11.8%
Long-term Debt: $400 million
Earnings: $10 billion
PE: 36 (during the bubble in 1999) Buy at PE below 15
General Foods Corp: In 1979, Buffett began buying up the stock of a food company called General Foods, paying an average price of $37 a share for approximately 4 million shares. Buffett saw strong earnings, $5.12 a share, which had been growing at an average annual rate of 8.7%.
This gave him an initial return of 13.8%, which he could argue was going to grow at 8.7% a year. Then, in 1985, the Philip Morris Company saw the value of General Foods' many brand-name products, which created a strong and expanding earnings base, and bought all of Buffet's General Foods stock for $120 a share in a tender offer for the entire company. This gave Buffett a pretax annual compounding return on his investment of approximately 21%. That's right, a pretax annual compounding return of 21%. A nice number in anybody's book.
Price bought: $37 a share (1979)
Earnings: $5.12 a share
Per share earnings annual growth rate: 8.7%
Initial return: 13.8%
Price sold: $120 (1985, tender offer by Philip Morris Company)
CAGR: 21% (pretax return)
Gillette: Razor blades and batteries wear out quickly, and people have to buy more of them if they want to be clean shaven or to keep their portable electrical devices humming. Gillette knows how to make money. This is a Berkshire holding. For the last 10 years the ROE has been above 30% and the ROTC above 20%. Per share earnings over the last 10 years have grown at an annual rate of 14%. During the 1999 bubble it traded at a PE of 40, which is way too high for this company. If you can get it at a PE below 15, you can make some money.
ROE: > 30 % (the last 10 years)
ROTC: > 20% (the last 10 years)
Per share earnings annual growth rate: 14% (the last 10 years)
PE: 40 (during the 1999 bubble). Fair price PE < 15
Related topics:
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 1)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 2)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 3)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 4)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 5)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 6)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 7)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 8)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 9)
Geico: This was acquired by Berkshire. Buffett's initial big investment was made as the company was on the verge of insolvency. Buffett decided to ride to the rescue, believing that the company's durable competitive advantage was still intact. He was right and watched his $45 million investment grow over the next 15 years to more than $2.3 billion. That equates to a compounding annual rate of return of 29.9% - the stuff investment legends are made of.
Price bought: $45 million
Price 15 years later: $2.3 billion
CAGR: 29.9%
General Electric: Originally GE had a lockdownon the electrification of the planet. For most people electricity is a fact of life, but a mere one hundred years ago it wasn't. One company provided the knowledge and equipment to wire the planet, and that company was GE. And it made a fortune. Today GE is one of the largest and most diversified industrial giants on earth. With this position, it has the financial power to play in any game it wants.
Buffett has long admired this company - it is a Buffett Foundation holding - but has never been able to buy a big piece at a price he thinks is attractive. The ROE for the last 10 years has fluctuated between 18% and 23% (which is great) and ROTC between 16% and 25%. The per share earnings have been growing at an annual compounding rate of 11.8%, which is also electrifying. GE carries only $400 million in long-term debt against $10 billion in earnings. You need a real good recession to buy this one at a fair price. During the 1999 bubble it traded at a PE of 36, which is no bargain. Take a strong look anytime the PE drops below 15, where it traded in the 80s and early 90s.
ROE: 18% - 23%
ROTC: 16% - 25%
Per share earnings annual growth rate: 11.8%
Long-term Debt: $400 million
Earnings: $10 billion
PE: 36 (during the bubble in 1999) Buy at PE below 15
General Foods Corp: In 1979, Buffett began buying up the stock of a food company called General Foods, paying an average price of $37 a share for approximately 4 million shares. Buffett saw strong earnings, $5.12 a share, which had been growing at an average annual rate of 8.7%.
This gave him an initial return of 13.8%, which he could argue was going to grow at 8.7% a year. Then, in 1985, the Philip Morris Company saw the value of General Foods' many brand-name products, which created a strong and expanding earnings base, and bought all of Buffet's General Foods stock for $120 a share in a tender offer for the entire company. This gave Buffett a pretax annual compounding return on his investment of approximately 21%. That's right, a pretax annual compounding return of 21%. A nice number in anybody's book.
Price bought: $37 a share (1979)
Earnings: $5.12 a share
Per share earnings annual growth rate: 8.7%
Initial return: 13.8%
Price sold: $120 (1985, tender offer by Philip Morris Company)
CAGR: 21% (pretax return)
Gillette: Razor blades and batteries wear out quickly, and people have to buy more of them if they want to be clean shaven or to keep their portable electrical devices humming. Gillette knows how to make money. This is a Berkshire holding. For the last 10 years the ROE has been above 30% and the ROTC above 20%. Per share earnings over the last 10 years have grown at an annual rate of 14%. During the 1999 bubble it traded at a PE of 40, which is way too high for this company. If you can get it at a PE below 15, you can make some money.
ROE: > 30 % (the last 10 years)
ROTC: > 20% (the last 10 years)
Per share earnings annual growth rate: 14% (the last 10 years)
PE: 40 (during the 1999 bubble). Fair price PE < 15
Related topics:
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 1)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 2)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 3)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 4)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 5)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 6)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 7)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 8)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 9)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 4)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 4)
Freddie Mac: This is a wonderful company that buys residential mortgages from banks and mortgage brokers and securitizes them before selling them to investors. At one time, Buffett owned a ton of this stock, but he had sold it because the nature of the company changed. It got more risky and Buffett hates risk.
F.W. Woolworth Company: This was once one of the largest retail chains in America. Buffett bought it in 1979 for $20 a share against earnings of $6.02 a share, which equates to an initial return of 30%. It had a book value of $41 a share. By 1985 it was at $50 a share, which equates to an annual rate of return of 20%. (Woolworth is no longer a business concern at present.)
Price bought: $20 a share (in 1979)
Earnings: $6.02 a share
Initial return: 30%
Book value: $41 a share
Price in 1985: $50 a share
Gallaher Group Plc: This company owns Gallaher Tobacco Limited, the market leader in the United Kingdom. It makes Benson & Hedges cigarettes. Gallaher Tobacco sold its American tobacco operations in 1994 and said good-bye to all that bad press and possible expense associated with cancer lawsuits. Cigarette products have great profit margins, which mean big bucks. Gallaher owns other things as well, but it is tobacco that reaps the bountiful harvest. The tobacco operations are a classic durable-competitive-advantage business. English tobacco companies don't face the kind of lawsuits American ones do, so the downside risk is smaller. This stock shows up as a Buffett Foundation holding, though when it was purchased and for how much we can't say.
Gannett Company: Warren Buffett's 1994 purchase of shares in Gannett, the largest newspaper publisher in the United States with 99 other newspapers, was made during an advertising recession for $24 a share, or 15x earnings. During the 1999 bubble it traded at 24 x earnings. He could have sold it in 2002 for $76 a share, which would have given him an annual rate of return of 15.2%. Not too shabby.
Price bought: $24 a share (15 x earnings, in 1994 during an advertising recession)
Price in 2002: $76 a share
Related topics:
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 1)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 2)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 3)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 4)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 5)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 6)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 7)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 8)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 9)
Freddie Mac: This is a wonderful company that buys residential mortgages from banks and mortgage brokers and securitizes them before selling them to investors. At one time, Buffett owned a ton of this stock, but he had sold it because the nature of the company changed. It got more risky and Buffett hates risk.
F.W. Woolworth Company: This was once one of the largest retail chains in America. Buffett bought it in 1979 for $20 a share against earnings of $6.02 a share, which equates to an initial return of 30%. It had a book value of $41 a share. By 1985 it was at $50 a share, which equates to an annual rate of return of 20%. (Woolworth is no longer a business concern at present.)
Price bought: $20 a share (in 1979)
Earnings: $6.02 a share
Initial return: 30%
Book value: $41 a share
Price in 1985: $50 a share
Gallaher Group Plc: This company owns Gallaher Tobacco Limited, the market leader in the United Kingdom. It makes Benson & Hedges cigarettes. Gallaher Tobacco sold its American tobacco operations in 1994 and said good-bye to all that bad press and possible expense associated with cancer lawsuits. Cigarette products have great profit margins, which mean big bucks. Gallaher owns other things as well, but it is tobacco that reaps the bountiful harvest. The tobacco operations are a classic durable-competitive-advantage business. English tobacco companies don't face the kind of lawsuits American ones do, so the downside risk is smaller. This stock shows up as a Buffett Foundation holding, though when it was purchased and for how much we can't say.
Gannett Company: Warren Buffett's 1994 purchase of shares in Gannett, the largest newspaper publisher in the United States with 99 other newspapers, was made during an advertising recession for $24 a share, or 15x earnings. During the 1999 bubble it traded at 24 x earnings. He could have sold it in 2002 for $76 a share, which would have given him an annual rate of return of 15.2%. Not too shabby.
Price bought: $24 a share (15 x earnings, in 1994 during an advertising recession)
Price in 2002: $76 a share
Related topics:
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 1)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 2)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 3)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 4)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 5)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 6)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 7)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 8)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 9)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 3)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 3)
Coca-Cola Co.: Coca-Cola has the mother lode of durable competitive advantages. Coke is the world's top soft-drink company. It sells more than 230 brands of beverages, including coffees, juices, and teas. It commands 50% of the global soft-drink market and 2% of the world's daily fluid consumption. This is one of the biggest bets that Buffett ever made, and it's also one of his most profitable. Buy this one during a recession and panic sell-off. Under no circumstances should you ever pay more than 30 times earnings for it. Expect Buffett to be buying more anytime it drops to a PE below 25.
Price bought: During a recession and panic sell-off
Cox Communications: Provides cable TV service to 6 million customers and digital TV to 350,000 subscribers. Media conglomerate Cox Enterprises contorls 68% of Cox Communications' stock. It also offers Internet access and local and long-distance phone service. It is the monopoly cable TV provider in most of the markets it services. Think of it as 6.3 million people who are addicted to channel surfing sending it checks each month. Cox's net profit margin was 23% in 2000. Compare that to Ford Motors's net profit margin of 1% and you can see why Buffett loves the cable TV business and abhors the automobile business. This is a Buffett Foundation holding.
The Walt Disney Company: Buffett first bought into Walt Disney Company in 1966, when it was selling for $53 a share, which meant that the market was valuing the entire business for $80 million, less than Snow White and the other cartoons were worth. Included in the deal you also got Disneyland. Buffett bought $5 million worth and sold it a year later for $6 million.
Price bought: Bought $5 million at $53 a share (1966, when Disney was undervalued)
Price sold: Sold for $6 million (1967)
(If this 5% stake were kept, it is now worth $1 billion)
He says that if he had kept that 5% stake it would now be worth more than $1 billion (which equates to a 19% compounding annual rate of return for the 30-year period). Lessons like this taught Buffett that holding companies with a durable competitive advantage for the long term was the easiest way to become superrich. He later acquired 21.5 million shares of Disney when it acquired Capital Cities in 1995. At the top of the bullmarket between 1998 and 2000, he was rumored to be selling Disney directly in the market, and also, he sold it indirectly in the General Reinsurance deal.
Price bought: Acquired in 1995 when Disney acquired Capital Cities.
Price sold: Rumored to be selling at the top of bullmarket (1998 - 2000)
Disney is the second-largest media conglomerate in the world. It owns the ABC television network, TV stations, radio stations, theme park, movie studios, and of course, the monarch of the Magic Kingdom - Mickey Mouse. Wait for a recession to buy this one and then hold on for the ride of your life.
Exxon Corporation: In the early eighties the Fed jacked up interest rates to kill inflation. It also killed the economy and the stock market. Lots of stocks were selling cheap ut Buffett placed his bet on Exxon, the largest and best run of the oil companies, on the theory that no matter what happened to the economy, individuals and businesses would keep guzzling oil. The high interest rates kept Exxon's stock down to $44 a share, against earnings of $6.77, which equates to an initial return of 15.2%. It has been growing its per share earnings at an annual rate of 6.7% and had been buying back its own shares. Buffett paid approximately 6.5 times earnings. By 1987 it was trading at $87 a share, which would have given him an annual compounding rate of return of approximately 25%.
Price bought: $44 a share (at 6.5x earnings, in early 80s)
Earnings: $6.77 a share
Initial return: 15.2%
Per share earnings annual growth rate: 6.7%
Price at 1987: $87 a share
Related topics:
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 1)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 2)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 3)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 4)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 5)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 6)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 7)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 8)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 9)
Coca-Cola Co.: Coca-Cola has the mother lode of durable competitive advantages. Coke is the world's top soft-drink company. It sells more than 230 brands of beverages, including coffees, juices, and teas. It commands 50% of the global soft-drink market and 2% of the world's daily fluid consumption. This is one of the biggest bets that Buffett ever made, and it's also one of his most profitable. Buy this one during a recession and panic sell-off. Under no circumstances should you ever pay more than 30 times earnings for it. Expect Buffett to be buying more anytime it drops to a PE below 25.
Price bought: During a recession and panic sell-off
Cox Communications: Provides cable TV service to 6 million customers and digital TV to 350,000 subscribers. Media conglomerate Cox Enterprises contorls 68% of Cox Communications' stock. It also offers Internet access and local and long-distance phone service. It is the monopoly cable TV provider in most of the markets it services. Think of it as 6.3 million people who are addicted to channel surfing sending it checks each month. Cox's net profit margin was 23% in 2000. Compare that to Ford Motors's net profit margin of 1% and you can see why Buffett loves the cable TV business and abhors the automobile business. This is a Buffett Foundation holding.
The Walt Disney Company: Buffett first bought into Walt Disney Company in 1966, when it was selling for $53 a share, which meant that the market was valuing the entire business for $80 million, less than Snow White and the other cartoons were worth. Included in the deal you also got Disneyland. Buffett bought $5 million worth and sold it a year later for $6 million.
Price bought: Bought $5 million at $53 a share (1966, when Disney was undervalued)
Price sold: Sold for $6 million (1967)
(If this 5% stake were kept, it is now worth $1 billion)
He says that if he had kept that 5% stake it would now be worth more than $1 billion (which equates to a 19% compounding annual rate of return for the 30-year period). Lessons like this taught Buffett that holding companies with a durable competitive advantage for the long term was the easiest way to become superrich. He later acquired 21.5 million shares of Disney when it acquired Capital Cities in 1995. At the top of the bullmarket between 1998 and 2000, he was rumored to be selling Disney directly in the market, and also, he sold it indirectly in the General Reinsurance deal.
Price bought: Acquired in 1995 when Disney acquired Capital Cities.
Price sold: Rumored to be selling at the top of bullmarket (1998 - 2000)
Disney is the second-largest media conglomerate in the world. It owns the ABC television network, TV stations, radio stations, theme park, movie studios, and of course, the monarch of the Magic Kingdom - Mickey Mouse. Wait for a recession to buy this one and then hold on for the ride of your life.
Exxon Corporation: In the early eighties the Fed jacked up interest rates to kill inflation. It also killed the economy and the stock market. Lots of stocks were selling cheap ut Buffett placed his bet on Exxon, the largest and best run of the oil companies, on the theory that no matter what happened to the economy, individuals and businesses would keep guzzling oil. The high interest rates kept Exxon's stock down to $44 a share, against earnings of $6.77, which equates to an initial return of 15.2%. It has been growing its per share earnings at an annual rate of 6.7% and had been buying back its own shares. Buffett paid approximately 6.5 times earnings. By 1987 it was trading at $87 a share, which would have given him an annual compounding rate of return of approximately 25%.
Price bought: $44 a share (at 6.5x earnings, in early 80s)
Earnings: $6.77 a share
Initial return: 15.2%
Per share earnings annual growth rate: 6.7%
Price at 1987: $87 a share
Related topics:
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 1)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 2)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 3)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 4)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 5)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 6)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 7)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 8)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 9)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 2)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 2)
Bristol-Myers Squibb: This company sold about $22 billion in proprietary medical products, ethical pharmaceuticals and health and beauty products in 2000. It has been in business since 1887, and unless people are going to stop getting sick, it is going to be in business for a long time to come. We believe Buffett was buying it in 1993, on the threat of government regulation, for around $13 a share, with earnings of $1.10 a share and historical returns on equity and capital of over 30%. So far Buffett has earned a 23% average annual return on this investment.
Price bought: $13 a share (in 1993, on threat of government regulation)
Earnings: $1.10 a share
Historical ROE and ROTC: >30%
Campbell Soup: Campbell's has 70% of the condensed-soup market. It also owns Franco-American, V8, Swanson, Pepperidge Farm, Vlasic, Mrs. Paul's, Prego, and dozens of other brand names that you might find in your grocery basket. The durability of this company's competitive advantage is amazing. Winter comes along and people start buying soups. Look for recessions, panic sell-offs, a warm winter, which can hurt soup sales, or just a business screwup to make the stock attractively priced. This company shows up in the Buffett Foundation holdings. Soup is good food and so is the stock at the right price.
Price bought: Stock became attractively priced during recessions, panic sell-offs, a warm winter (all these hurt soup sales) or business screwup.
Capital Cities Communications: This acquired ABC, when was then acquired by Disney: Buffett loves owning television stations because they make a lot of money and are cheap to run - you buy a transmitter, put up an antenna, plug it into the wall, and you're in business. Network affiliated TV stations make money because they are key advertising bridges that businesses have to use to reach potential consumers. Capital Cities owned a bunch of television stations and cable TV networks and was incredibly well run. Buffett owned the company in the late seventies and then sold it in the early eighties, which he admitted was a mistake.
Price bought: in late 70s
Price sold: in early 80s (Buffett admitted selling this was a mistake)
When it acquired ABC, back in 1986, it needed an equity infusion, so the CEO asked Buffett whether he wanted in. Buffett made an offer and the company said yes. He bought $515 million worth, paying $17.25 a share and then sold out (in a cash-and-stock deal) when Disney acquired Capital Cities in 1995 for $127 a share. That equates to a 24% compounded annual return on his 1986 investment. Another lesson in the long-term-hold department.
Price bought: $17.25 a share (1986, Capital Cities required equity infusion)
Price sold: $127 a share (1995, acquired by Disney)
Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Company: This is the largest supplier of iron ore products to North American steel companies. It owns and operates 5 iron ore mines with several large steelmakers. The company has been around since 1840. What makes it interesting is that during a recession in the steel business it simply closes down the mines until demand returns. Buffett first bought shares in this company during the 1984 steel industry recession and sold it after the industry recovered.
Price bought: Acquired in 1984 during the steel industry recession
Price sold: When steel industry recovered after the 1984 steel industry recession.
The most recent buying opportunity with this company occurred in 2001 when an overabundance of iron ore met a recession in the steel industry, which killed iron ore prices and sent the stock tumbling from a high of $50 to a low of $14. The company's durable competitive advantage is that it is tied in with the steel companies and can stop production and cut expenses without damaging its competitive advantage. You buy this one in a recession and sell when it's over.
Price bought: $14 Buy during a recession. ( Down from $50 due to recession in the steel industry)
Price sold: Sell when when steel recession is over.
Related topics:
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 1)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 2)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 3)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 4)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 5)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 6)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 7)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 8)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 9)
Bristol-Myers Squibb: This company sold about $22 billion in proprietary medical products, ethical pharmaceuticals and health and beauty products in 2000. It has been in business since 1887, and unless people are going to stop getting sick, it is going to be in business for a long time to come. We believe Buffett was buying it in 1993, on the threat of government regulation, for around $13 a share, with earnings of $1.10 a share and historical returns on equity and capital of over 30%. So far Buffett has earned a 23% average annual return on this investment.
Price bought: $13 a share (in 1993, on threat of government regulation)
Earnings: $1.10 a share
Historical ROE and ROTC: >30%
Campbell Soup: Campbell's has 70% of the condensed-soup market. It also owns Franco-American, V8, Swanson, Pepperidge Farm, Vlasic, Mrs. Paul's, Prego, and dozens of other brand names that you might find in your grocery basket. The durability of this company's competitive advantage is amazing. Winter comes along and people start buying soups. Look for recessions, panic sell-offs, a warm winter, which can hurt soup sales, or just a business screwup to make the stock attractively priced. This company shows up in the Buffett Foundation holdings. Soup is good food and so is the stock at the right price.
Price bought: Stock became attractively priced during recessions, panic sell-offs, a warm winter (all these hurt soup sales) or business screwup.
Capital Cities Communications: This acquired ABC, when was then acquired by Disney: Buffett loves owning television stations because they make a lot of money and are cheap to run - you buy a transmitter, put up an antenna, plug it into the wall, and you're in business. Network affiliated TV stations make money because they are key advertising bridges that businesses have to use to reach potential consumers. Capital Cities owned a bunch of television stations and cable TV networks and was incredibly well run. Buffett owned the company in the late seventies and then sold it in the early eighties, which he admitted was a mistake.
Price bought: in late 70s
Price sold: in early 80s (Buffett admitted selling this was a mistake)
When it acquired ABC, back in 1986, it needed an equity infusion, so the CEO asked Buffett whether he wanted in. Buffett made an offer and the company said yes. He bought $515 million worth, paying $17.25 a share and then sold out (in a cash-and-stock deal) when Disney acquired Capital Cities in 1995 for $127 a share. That equates to a 24% compounded annual return on his 1986 investment. Another lesson in the long-term-hold department.
Price bought: $17.25 a share (1986, Capital Cities required equity infusion)
Price sold: $127 a share (1995, acquired by Disney)
Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Company: This is the largest supplier of iron ore products to North American steel companies. It owns and operates 5 iron ore mines with several large steelmakers. The company has been around since 1840. What makes it interesting is that during a recession in the steel business it simply closes down the mines until demand returns. Buffett first bought shares in this company during the 1984 steel industry recession and sold it after the industry recovered.
Price bought: Acquired in 1984 during the steel industry recession
Price sold: When steel industry recovered after the 1984 steel industry recession.
The most recent buying opportunity with this company occurred in 2001 when an overabundance of iron ore met a recession in the steel industry, which killed iron ore prices and sent the stock tumbling from a high of $50 to a low of $14. The company's durable competitive advantage is that it is tied in with the steel companies and can stop production and cut expenses without damaging its competitive advantage. You buy this one in a recession and sell when it's over.
Price bought: $14 Buy during a recession. ( Down from $50 due to recession in the steel industry)
Price sold: Sell when when steel recession is over.
Related topics:
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 1)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 2)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 3)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 4)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 5)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 6)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 7)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 8)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 9)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 1)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 1)
These are companies Warren Buffett invested either personally, through his foundation, or through Berkshire Hathaway. Be aware that simply because Warren Buffett has made investments in these companies or they met his selective criteria doesn't mean he would buy them today. He bought when the price was right. Remember: You want to identify the company with a durable competitive advantage and then let the price of its shares determine when you pull the trigger. The right price may come tomorrow or it may come five years from now.
Also keep in mind that at times Mr. Market is wildly enthusiastic about some of these businesses and prices them high. On other days he will be very pessimistic about their prospects and price them low. You are interested in the days that Mr. Market is pessismistic, not the others.
Amerada Hess: This is an oil company. Buffett made this investment based on asset evaluation. He multiplied the price of oil by the number of barrels it had in the ground and found that it was selling at a significant discount. He paid $26 a share and we believe he sold it a year later at approximately $50 a share. Not too shabby.
Price paid: $26 a share (Price selling at a significant discount based on asset evaluation.)
Price sold: $50 a share (Sold a year later)
American Broadcasting Companies: ABC is a television network that in the early seventies had one of the most durable competitive advantages around. We believe Buffett started buying it during an advertising recession in 1978 for approximately $24 a share and sold it in 1980 for approximately $40 a share. After it merged with Capital Cities in 1984, it merged with Disney.
Price paid: $24 a share in 1978 (during an advertising recession)
Price sold: $40 a share in 1980
American Express: This is a major financial services company that just about does it all. But its strength is travel-industry-related services for businesses, and at this, it's king. Its credit card business is a kind of toll bridge that makes money every time someone uses an American Express card. Buffett first invested in the company in the sixties during the salad-oil scandal that destroyed its equity base but not its core business. Buffett sold out after the company recovered.
Price bought: In 1960s during the salad-oil scandal when its equity base destroyed.
Price sold: After the company recovered.
In the early nineties AmEx started to have problems. From September 1991 to September 1994 the company lost approximately 2.2 million individual card users and saw its share of the total credit card market drop from 22.5% in 1990 to 16.3% in 1995. This was caused in part by AmEx's push to become a one-stop shop for all your financial needs. In diversifying into different financial products, it lost focus on its credit card operations - the bread and butter of its business. Keep in mind that businesses with a durable competitive advantage are sometimes managed by teams that ignore the wonderful underlying parts of the business that made the company great in the first place. In AmEx's case, Harvey Golub rode to the rescue as the company's new CEO. Buffett jumped on Golub's wagon and began buying the stock. Remember, you invest not only in the company, but also in the people who run it. Buffett made his 1994 purchase right before the spin-off of Lehman Brothers (an investment bank). AmEx gave its shareholders one-fifth of a share in Lehman for every share of AmEx they owned. The one-fifth Lehman was worth approximately $4. Buffett paid $26 a share for the AmEx and then got $4 a share in Lehman stock via the spin-off. Today his AmEx stock is worth approximately $166 a share, which equates to a 30% compounded annual rate of return. When it comes to the American Express card, Warren is happy that people don't leave home without it.
Price bought: $26 a share (In 1994, when AmEx was having problems.)
Price subsequently: $166 a share (30% compounded annual rate of return)
Anheuser-Busch: This is the world's largest brewing company. It has what Buffett calls a durable competitive advantage: You order your beer by brand name, and brand names it has aplenty: Budweiser, Bud Light, Busch, Michelob, Red Wolf lager, ZiegenBock Amber, and O'Doul's. It gets great returns on equity and total capital and has strong earnings growth. You need a recession or panic sell-off to get a buying opportunity on this one. Anheuser-Busch is a Buffett Foundation holding.
Price bought: You need a recession or panic sell-off to get a buying opportunity on this one.
Great ROE, ROTC and strong earnings growth.
Related topics:
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 1)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 2)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 3)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 4)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 5)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 6)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 7)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 8)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 9)
These are companies Warren Buffett invested either personally, through his foundation, or through Berkshire Hathaway. Be aware that simply because Warren Buffett has made investments in these companies or they met his selective criteria doesn't mean he would buy them today. He bought when the price was right. Remember: You want to identify the company with a durable competitive advantage and then let the price of its shares determine when you pull the trigger. The right price may come tomorrow or it may come five years from now.
Also keep in mind that at times Mr. Market is wildly enthusiastic about some of these businesses and prices them high. On other days he will be very pessimistic about their prospects and price them low. You are interested in the days that Mr. Market is pessismistic, not the others.
Amerada Hess: This is an oil company. Buffett made this investment based on asset evaluation. He multiplied the price of oil by the number of barrels it had in the ground and found that it was selling at a significant discount. He paid $26 a share and we believe he sold it a year later at approximately $50 a share. Not too shabby.
Price paid: $26 a share (Price selling at a significant discount based on asset evaluation.)
Price sold: $50 a share (Sold a year later)
American Broadcasting Companies: ABC is a television network that in the early seventies had one of the most durable competitive advantages around. We believe Buffett started buying it during an advertising recession in 1978 for approximately $24 a share and sold it in 1980 for approximately $40 a share. After it merged with Capital Cities in 1984, it merged with Disney.
Price paid: $24 a share in 1978 (during an advertising recession)
Price sold: $40 a share in 1980
American Express: This is a major financial services company that just about does it all. But its strength is travel-industry-related services for businesses, and at this, it's king. Its credit card business is a kind of toll bridge that makes money every time someone uses an American Express card. Buffett first invested in the company in the sixties during the salad-oil scandal that destroyed its equity base but not its core business. Buffett sold out after the company recovered.
Price bought: In 1960s during the salad-oil scandal when its equity base destroyed.
Price sold: After the company recovered.
In the early nineties AmEx started to have problems. From September 1991 to September 1994 the company lost approximately 2.2 million individual card users and saw its share of the total credit card market drop from 22.5% in 1990 to 16.3% in 1995. This was caused in part by AmEx's push to become a one-stop shop for all your financial needs. In diversifying into different financial products, it lost focus on its credit card operations - the bread and butter of its business. Keep in mind that businesses with a durable competitive advantage are sometimes managed by teams that ignore the wonderful underlying parts of the business that made the company great in the first place. In AmEx's case, Harvey Golub rode to the rescue as the company's new CEO. Buffett jumped on Golub's wagon and began buying the stock. Remember, you invest not only in the company, but also in the people who run it. Buffett made his 1994 purchase right before the spin-off of Lehman Brothers (an investment bank). AmEx gave its shareholders one-fifth of a share in Lehman for every share of AmEx they owned. The one-fifth Lehman was worth approximately $4. Buffett paid $26 a share for the AmEx and then got $4 a share in Lehman stock via the spin-off. Today his AmEx stock is worth approximately $166 a share, which equates to a 30% compounded annual rate of return. When it comes to the American Express card, Warren is happy that people don't leave home without it.
Price bought: $26 a share (In 1994, when AmEx was having problems.)
Price subsequently: $166 a share (30% compounded annual rate of return)
Anheuser-Busch: This is the world's largest brewing company. It has what Buffett calls a durable competitive advantage: You order your beer by brand name, and brand names it has aplenty: Budweiser, Bud Light, Busch, Michelob, Red Wolf lager, ZiegenBock Amber, and O'Doul's. It gets great returns on equity and total capital and has strong earnings growth. You need a recession or panic sell-off to get a buying opportunity on this one. Anheuser-Busch is a Buffett Foundation holding.
Price bought: You need a recession or panic sell-off to get a buying opportunity on this one.
Great ROE, ROTC and strong earnings growth.
Related topics:
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 1)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 2)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 3)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 4)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 5)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 6)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 7)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 8)
Warren Buffett's Historical Investments (Part 9)
Companies Warren Buffett invested between 1998 and 2001 (Part 5)
Companies Warren Buffett invested between 1998 and 2001 (Part 5)
Mueller Industries: This is a Berkshire holding. Buffett is believed to have started buying Mueller Industries, the leading low-cost producer of copper plumbing fittings, tubes, and related products, during the October 2000 sell-off that knocked Mueller down from $32 a share to $21 against solid earnings of $2.16 a share. The company has been in business since 1917 (talk about durable) and has a low-cost infrastructure that allows it to stomp the competition. As of May 2001, Mueller is trading at $34 a share, giving Buffett a superfast 62% return on Berkshire's money. Buffett loves those fall sell-offs.
Price paid: $21 a share (Down from $32)
Earnings: $2.16 a share
Initial return: 10.3%
Per share earnings annual growth rate: -
Nike: Nike is the world's number one shoe company and has more than 40% of the U.S. sports shoe market. This shows up in Berkshire's portfolio, but we don't have any hard information on Buffett's purchase price. We believe he was buying Nike in 1998 and 2000 when it trading below $30 a share. Buying opportunities include a recession in the shoe business, a general recession, and a correction or panic sell-off.
Price paid: <$30 a share Earnings: - a share Initial return: - % Per share earnings annual growth rate: - % USG Corp: USG is the low-cost producer of wallboard and the number one maker of gypsum wallboard in the world. This is a classic bad-news play. As we write, the price of wallboard is falling and the company is facing asbestos litigation, which has dropped the stock's price from $45 a share to $10. Buffett is buying like crazy. So far he has acquired a 15% stake in the company. In June 2001, the company filed for bankruptcy, but many analysts thought this filing would actually help stabilize current operations. The verdict is still out on this one.
Price paid: $10 a share (Down from $45)
Earnings: $ - a share
Initial return: - %
Per share earnings annual growth rate: - %
Yum Brands: This owns three major fast-food brand names: KFC, Pizza Hut, Taco Bell. This is a Berkshire holding. We believe Berkshire begain its purchases in 2000 after the market crash at approximately $24 a share against earnings of $3.65 a share, which equates to an initial return of 15%. As of March 2002, the stock traded at $55 a share.
Price paid: $24 a share
Earnings: $3.65 a share
Initial return: 15 %
Per share earnings annual growth rate: - %
Related articles:
Companies Warren Buffett invested between 1998 and 2001 (Part 1)
Companies Warren Buffett invested between 1998 and 2001 (Part 2)
Companies Warren Buffett invested between 1998 and 2001 (Part 3)
Companies Warren Buffett invested between 1998 and 2001 (Part 4)
Companies Warren Buffett invested between 1998 and 2001 (Part 5)
Mueller Industries: This is a Berkshire holding. Buffett is believed to have started buying Mueller Industries, the leading low-cost producer of copper plumbing fittings, tubes, and related products, during the October 2000 sell-off that knocked Mueller down from $32 a share to $21 against solid earnings of $2.16 a share. The company has been in business since 1917 (talk about durable) and has a low-cost infrastructure that allows it to stomp the competition. As of May 2001, Mueller is trading at $34 a share, giving Buffett a superfast 62% return on Berkshire's money. Buffett loves those fall sell-offs.
Price paid: $21 a share (Down from $32)
Earnings: $2.16 a share
Initial return: 10.3%
Per share earnings annual growth rate: -
Nike: Nike is the world's number one shoe company and has more than 40% of the U.S. sports shoe market. This shows up in Berkshire's portfolio, but we don't have any hard information on Buffett's purchase price. We believe he was buying Nike in 1998 and 2000 when it trading below $30 a share. Buying opportunities include a recession in the shoe business, a general recession, and a correction or panic sell-off.
Price paid: <$30 a share Earnings: - a share Initial return: - % Per share earnings annual growth rate: - % USG Corp: USG is the low-cost producer of wallboard and the number one maker of gypsum wallboard in the world. This is a classic bad-news play. As we write, the price of wallboard is falling and the company is facing asbestos litigation, which has dropped the stock's price from $45 a share to $10. Buffett is buying like crazy. So far he has acquired a 15% stake in the company. In June 2001, the company filed for bankruptcy, but many analysts thought this filing would actually help stabilize current operations. The verdict is still out on this one.
Price paid: $10 a share (Down from $45)
Earnings: $ - a share
Initial return: - %
Per share earnings annual growth rate: - %
Yum Brands: This owns three major fast-food brand names: KFC, Pizza Hut, Taco Bell. This is a Berkshire holding. We believe Berkshire begain its purchases in 2000 after the market crash at approximately $24 a share against earnings of $3.65 a share, which equates to an initial return of 15%. As of March 2002, the stock traded at $55 a share.
Price paid: $24 a share
Earnings: $3.65 a share
Initial return: 15 %
Per share earnings annual growth rate: - %
Related articles:
Companies Warren Buffett invested between 1998 and 2001 (Part 1)
Companies Warren Buffett invested between 1998 and 2001 (Part 2)
Companies Warren Buffett invested between 1998 and 2001 (Part 3)
Companies Warren Buffett invested between 1998 and 2001 (Part 4)
Companies Warren Buffett invested between 1998 and 2001 (Part 5)
Companies Warren Buffett invested between 1998 and 2001 (Part 4)
Companies Warren Buffett invested between 1998 and 2001 (Part 4)
Johns Manville: This was a great company in great financial shape until it sold a ton of products loaded with asbestos that made people deathly ill. These people sued Johns Manville by the tens of thousands, pushing it into bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court put 78% of the ownership of the company into a trust in settlement of the lawsuits. Even though the company was making a great deal of money selling nonasbestos products and the stock was publicly traded, investors weren't very interested. Tech stocks were the ticket of the day, not stodgy old insulation companies.
In 2000, Berkshire purchased Johns Manville, the nations's largest manufacturer of insulation products, commercial and industrial roofing, filtration systems, and fiber mats. It paid $1.8 billion for the entire company against pretax earnings of $343.75 million. That equates to a 19% initial pretax return on Berkshire's money. From 1990 to 2000, John Manville grew its per share earnings at an annual rate of 9.5%, which is better than inflation. Buffett could argue that Berkshire bought a bond with an initial pretax return of 19% that would grow at an annual rate of 9.5%.
Price paid: $1.8 billion for entire company
Earnings: $343.75 (pre-tax earnings)
Initial return: 19%
Per share earnings annual growth rate: 9.5%
Justin Industries: Justin Industries makes Acme Bricks and brand-name western boots like Tony Lama. Buffett bought the entire company for $570 million against pretax earnings of approximately $51 million, which equates to a pretax return of approximately 8.9%. Earnings have been growing at 16% a year for the last 10 years. Buffett could argue that he just bought a bond that paid a pretax return of 8.9% that would increase at 16% a year. It beats the static 6% pretax return that treasuries were paying.
Price paid: $570 million for entire company
Earnings: $51 million (pretax earning)
Initial return: 8.9%
Per share earnings annual growth rate: 16%
La-Z-Boy Inc: La-Z-Boy is the number one manufacturer of upholstered furniture in the United States and the number one seller of recliners in the world. This is a Berkshire holding. We believe Buffett started buying La-Z-Boy after the market crashed in February 2000 for $14 a share, on earnings of $1.46 a share. As of June, 2001, it trades at $19 a share. It has been growing per share earnings at 15.7% a year. Expect Buffett to continue buying if he can get it cheap.
Price paid: $14 a share
Earnings: $1.46 a share
Initial return: 10.4%
Per share earnings annual growth rate: 15.7%
Liz Claiborne: This is America's number one seller of clothes and accessories for the career woman. Its clothes are sold in department stores and in its 275 retail outlets. It also makes Donna Karan jeans and Lucky Brand dungarees. It's been in business for more than 20 years. The durable competitive advantage is its brand name, which it stitches to clothing made cheaply in another part of the world.
In 1998, as momentum investors fled low-tech businesses for high-tech businesses, Liz Claiborne saw its stock tumble from a high of $53 a share to a low of $27. Buffett stepped into the market, buying nearly 9% of the company. In 1998, Liz Claiborne earned $2.57 a share against an asking price of $27, which equates to an initial return of 9.5%. By 2000 it was earning $3.43 a share, which equates to a 12.7% return on his initial investment. The longer you stay, the better it gets.
Price paid: $27 a share (Down from high of $53)
Earnings: $2.57 a share
Initial return: 9.5%
Per share earnings annual growth rate: 12.7%
Related articles:
Companies Warren Buffett invested between 1998 and 2001 (Part 1)
Companies Warren Buffett invested between 1998 and 2001 (Part 2)
Companies Warren Buffett invested between 1998 and 2001 (Part 3)
Companies Warren Buffett invested between 1998 and 2001 (Part 4)
Companies Warren Buffett invested between 1998 and 2001 (Part 5)
Johns Manville: This was a great company in great financial shape until it sold a ton of products loaded with asbestos that made people deathly ill. These people sued Johns Manville by the tens of thousands, pushing it into bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court put 78% of the ownership of the company into a trust in settlement of the lawsuits. Even though the company was making a great deal of money selling nonasbestos products and the stock was publicly traded, investors weren't very interested. Tech stocks were the ticket of the day, not stodgy old insulation companies.
In 2000, Berkshire purchased Johns Manville, the nations's largest manufacturer of insulation products, commercial and industrial roofing, filtration systems, and fiber mats. It paid $1.8 billion for the entire company against pretax earnings of $343.75 million. That equates to a 19% initial pretax return on Berkshire's money. From 1990 to 2000, John Manville grew its per share earnings at an annual rate of 9.5%, which is better than inflation. Buffett could argue that Berkshire bought a bond with an initial pretax return of 19% that would grow at an annual rate of 9.5%.
Price paid: $1.8 billion for entire company
Earnings: $343.75 (pre-tax earnings)
Initial return: 19%
Per share earnings annual growth rate: 9.5%
Justin Industries: Justin Industries makes Acme Bricks and brand-name western boots like Tony Lama. Buffett bought the entire company for $570 million against pretax earnings of approximately $51 million, which equates to a pretax return of approximately 8.9%. Earnings have been growing at 16% a year for the last 10 years. Buffett could argue that he just bought a bond that paid a pretax return of 8.9% that would increase at 16% a year. It beats the static 6% pretax return that treasuries were paying.
Price paid: $570 million for entire company
Earnings: $51 million (pretax earning)
Initial return: 8.9%
Per share earnings annual growth rate: 16%
La-Z-Boy Inc: La-Z-Boy is the number one manufacturer of upholstered furniture in the United States and the number one seller of recliners in the world. This is a Berkshire holding. We believe Buffett started buying La-Z-Boy after the market crashed in February 2000 for $14 a share, on earnings of $1.46 a share. As of June, 2001, it trades at $19 a share. It has been growing per share earnings at 15.7% a year. Expect Buffett to continue buying if he can get it cheap.
Price paid: $14 a share
Earnings: $1.46 a share
Initial return: 10.4%
Per share earnings annual growth rate: 15.7%
Liz Claiborne: This is America's number one seller of clothes and accessories for the career woman. Its clothes are sold in department stores and in its 275 retail outlets. It also makes Donna Karan jeans and Lucky Brand dungarees. It's been in business for more than 20 years. The durable competitive advantage is its brand name, which it stitches to clothing made cheaply in another part of the world.
In 1998, as momentum investors fled low-tech businesses for high-tech businesses, Liz Claiborne saw its stock tumble from a high of $53 a share to a low of $27. Buffett stepped into the market, buying nearly 9% of the company. In 1998, Liz Claiborne earned $2.57 a share against an asking price of $27, which equates to an initial return of 9.5%. By 2000 it was earning $3.43 a share, which equates to a 12.7% return on his initial investment. The longer you stay, the better it gets.
Price paid: $27 a share (Down from high of $53)
Earnings: $2.57 a share
Initial return: 9.5%
Per share earnings annual growth rate: 12.7%
Related articles:
Companies Warren Buffett invested between 1998 and 2001 (Part 1)
Companies Warren Buffett invested between 1998 and 2001 (Part 2)
Companies Warren Buffett invested between 1998 and 2001 (Part 3)
Companies Warren Buffett invested between 1998 and 2001 (Part 4)
Companies Warren Buffett invested between 1998 and 2001 (Part 5)
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