Wednesday, 29 February 2012

'I've bought more shares in Lloyds and RBS'

'I've bought more shares in Lloyds and RBS'
Leading UK fund manager Richard Buxton on why he favours financials.

Richard Buxton, fund manager at Schroders
Richard Buxton, fund manager at Schroders 
This June, Richard Buxton will have been managing the £2.5bn Schroder UK Alpha Plus fund for 10 years.
Launched to combat "sideways" markets, Mr Buxton's fund has met its mandate handsomely. If you had invested three years ago you would have doubled your money. We get his views below.

You said you 'couldn't wait' for 2011 to be over. What is your current market outlook?

If the market is particularly stressed, as it was in the second half of last year, any cyclical or long-term holding tends to go down.
The turnover on our fund is extremely low – we are looking at least a three to five-year view for all our holdings – and as a result we had a bad year. Clearly the moves by the European Central Bank in December have been a bit of a game-changer. We were concerned that a major European bank, or two, could end up in severe difficulties. It is no surprise given how depressed sentiment was at the tail end of last year that the removal of that risk has led to happier markets.
We have not repositioned the fund after a bad 2011, but we did add to the badly performing positions – Lloyds and Royal Bank of Scotland, for example. This year, the mood music has changed – we have had a better start. We knew there would eventually be stimulus, I just couldn't believe how long it took the ECB to do what they needed to do.

How long will this positivity continue?

We think it will be better this year, but it's still a mixed picture. There is recovery and dividend growth but we're not out of the woods yet; there are still issues to face and much scope for policy error. After the financial crisis we are in an environment where there are shorter economic cycles. We are going to have to live with shorter mini-cycles, but I think that is all part of the post-crisis recovery. It may well last another three to seven years.

Which sectors will thrive in this environment?

Sectors where valuations are weakest, because there is the greatest uncertainty and maximum fear. Ten years ago, big tobacco companies were risky. But they've had a fabulous decade of re-rating, going from pariahs to being well-loved. Today, few people invest in banks because of uncertainty around them, so they are trading at half book value. But on a five to 10-year view, they may actually do very well.

How do you respond to the accusation that all UK equity funds are the same?

Rest assured, my fund looks very different from others. It is a concentrated portfolio that is not built in relation to the index: I don't hold big companies just because they are big.
We set it up almost 10 years ago with the view that the index was going nowhere, so you did not want to invest in index trackers or actively managed closely correlated funds.
There are fewer winners in this environment, but if you can identify them you can do well.

What has changed since you started in the City 26 years ago?

I joined in the middle of a 20-year bull market. Back then, making money was a lot easier. It is harder now. I can see huge value but I can equally see reasons why it will take a while for that value to be realised. You can still find fabulous companies capable of achieving year-on-year growth or value companies that have been poorly managed and new management has gone in. But you have to be patient.

What has been your best investment decision?

I only invest in my own fund, so I don't have separate personal stock holdings. I have been very proud of [technology stock] Autonomy. It was hugely controversial, with many non-believers, but we continued to ride the volatility and were vindicated last year with the £7.1bn takeover by Hewlett Packard.

And your worst?

As a house, Schroders is very balance sheet-focused so we haven't generally suffered because of a stock having too much leverage.
For that reason we are big shareholders in Home Retail, which owns Argos and Homebase, and which has had a dreadful performance. But we know it is a survivor. It is not going the way of HMV and Woolworths. So we're sticking with it.


http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/investing/9110405/Ive-bought-more-shares-in-Lloyds-and-RBS.html

Tuesday, 28 February 2012

Hong Leong Bank (At a Glance)



Announcement
Date
Financial
Yr. End
QtrPeriod EndRevenue
RM '000
Profit/Lost
RM'000
EPSAmended
27-Feb-1230-Jun-12231-Dec-111,003,356381,37124.22-
29-Nov-1130-Jun-12130-Sep-11916,730407,11027.98-
26-Aug-1130-Jun-11430-Jun-11820,792296,60020.42-
10-May-1130-Jun-11331-Mar-11577,914289,69619.95-


Announcement
Date
Financial
Yr. End
QtrPeriod EndRevenue
RM '000
Profit/Lost
RM'000
EPSAmended
27-Feb-1130-Jun-11231-Dec-10603,964291.43220.07-
29-Nov-1030-Jun-11130-Sep-10539.787257.20017.72-
26-Aug-1030-Jun-10430-Jun-10520,252302,94220.90-
10-May-1030-Jun-10331-Mar-10508.046227.95515.73-


ttm-EPS  92.57 sen
LFY ending 30.6.2011:  Dividend 24 sen  DPO  0.31

Price  RM 11.82
ttm-PE  12.8x  Thumbs Up
DY 2.03%

Net assets per share
31.12.2011   6.05
31.12.2010   5.13

Dividend 1H
1H 2011  11.00 sen  Thumbs Up
1H 2010    9.00 sen

PAT 1H
1H 2011  788.481m  (50.08 sen /share)  Thumbs Up
1H 2010  548.632m  (37.78 sen /share)



Stock Performance Chart for Hong Leong Bank Berhad

Business Description:
Hong Leong Bank Berhad operates in the Bank holding companies sector. Hong Leong Bank Berhad (HLB) is a Malaysia-based company. The Company is engaged in commercial banking business and in the provision of related services. The Company provides services in personal financial services, business banking and trade finance, treasury, branch and transaction banking, wealth management, investment banking, private banking and Islamic financial services. The Company's business segments include Group Consumer Banking, Group Business Banking, Global Markets, Investment Banking, Overseas Associate and Overseas Joint Controlled Entity. Group Consumer Banking focuses on servicing individual customers and small businesses. Group Business Banking focuses mainly on corporate customers. Global Markets refers to the Group's treasury and capital market operations. On 6 May 2011, the Company acquired EON Capital Berhad, and EON Bank Berhad and its subsidiaries, including EONCAP Islamic Bank Bhd and MIMB Investment Bank Bhd and its subsidiaries became part of the Company.



------------

Past Financial Year Historical data
Financial Year Ended 30/06/2011

Total Assets
30.6.2011  87,650.089m
30.6.2010  77,777.858m

Total Equity
30.6.2011  6,567.126m
30.6.2010  5,903.363m

Revenue
30.6.2011  2,542.457m
30.6.2010  2,085.079m

PAT
30.6.2011  1,134.928m
30.6.2010  1,009.132m


Net assets per share
30.6.2011  5.1300
30.6.2010  4.4900

EPS

30.6.2011  78.12 sen
30.6.2010  69.61 sen




Dividends per share
30.6.2011  24.00 sen
30.6.2012  24.00 sen


FY Ending 30.6.2011

Net Profit Margin  44.6%
Asset Turnover  0.029x
Financial Leverage  13.35x

ROA  1.2934%  Thumbs Up
ROE   17.27%   Thumbs Up
DPO   0.31






Cocoaland (At a Glance)









Announcement
Date
Financial
Yr. End
QtrPeriod EndRevenue
RM '000
Profit/Lost
RM'000
EPSAmended
27-Feb-1231-Dec-11431-Dec-1151,4018,7175.08-
22-Nov-1131-Dec-11330-Sep-1139,9212,8851.68-
25-Aug-1131-Dec-11230-Jun-1143,6744,2312.47-
23-May-1131-Dec-11131-Mar-1138,9983,3591.96-

Announcement
Date
Financial
Yr. End
QtrPeriod EndRevenue
RM '000
Profit/Lost
RM'000
EPSAmended
27-Feb-1131-Dec-10431-Dec-1038,4454,2861.90-
22-Nov-1031-Dec-10330-Sep-1037,2904370.34-
25-Aug-1031-Dec-10230-Jun-1031,3171,0140.79-
23-May-1031-Dec-10131-Mar-1035,2074,0823.40-



ttm-EPS
2011  11.19 sen
2012    7.39 sen
YoY change +51.4%

Dividend
2011   5.50 sen
2010   4.40 sen
YoY change +25%

Net assets per share
2011  RM  1.100
2010  RM  1.030
YoY change +7.8%

Total Revenue 173.994m
PAT  19.192m
Total Assets  219.050m
Total Equity  188.670m

Cash & Equivalents  42.986m
LT Borrowings   0
ST Borrowings  0

CA  118.006m
CL  30.307m

Inventories  25.336m
Trade receivables  40.904m
Trade Payables 22.768m

OPBWCC  27.438m
Net CFO  9.349m
Capex (PPE)  (30.739m)

Ordinary Shares of RM 0.50 each
2011  171.600m
2010  132.891m


Valuations

Price  RM 2.39 per share
Market capitalisation  410.1m

ttm-PE  21.4x
DPO  0.49
DY  2.3%


Net Profit Margin  11%
Asset Turnover  0.794x
Financial Leverage  1.16x

ROA 8.7%
ROCE  8.3%
ROE  10.1%



Review of Performance 
In the financial period under review, the Group posted a 22% year-on-year revenue growth from RM142.3 million to RM174.0 million; this was mainly due to increased selling price and trading volume of our Fruit Gummy and Beverage production lines.  However, during the year, the Malaysian Ringgit has also been steadily strengthening against the US dollar. Consequently the impact of increased selling price on revenue growth was partially negated by the stronger Malaysian Ringgit.

The Group achieved profit before taxation of RM21.7 million, an increase of RM13.4 million or 161% from the previous corresponding period. This improvement in profit was attributable to the increase of sales revenue and production efficiency, especially from the Beverage section, which the Group incurred substantial startup cost during last financial year, higher fixed deposit interest received coupled with lower operating cost during the current period.





Stock Performance Chart for Cocoaland Holdings Bhd


Business Description:
Cocoaland Holdings Bhd operates in the Candy & other confectionery products sector. Cocoaland Holdings Berhad (Cocoaland) is an investment holding company. 

The Company operates in the business of manufacturing and trading of processed and preserved foods and other related foodstuffs. The Company's products include candy, canister, cookies, drinks, gummy, hamper, juice, pudding and jelly, snack and wafer. 

Cocoaland's subsidiaries include 
  • Cocoaland Industry Sdn Bhd, which is engaged in manufacturing and trading of processed and preserved foods and fruits of all kinds; 
  • L.B. Food Sdn Bhd, which is engaged in the wholesale and retail of processed and preserved foods; 
  • B Plus Q Sdn Bhd, a manufacturer of fruit juice and foodstuffs; 
  • Greenhome Marketing Sdn. Bhd., which is engaged in the marketing, trading and distributing of all kinds of beverages and foodstuff; 
  • Lot 100 Food Co. Ltd., which is engaged in the wholesaling, import and export of gummy products and other product, and 
  • M.I.T.E. Food Enterprise Sdn Bhd, which is engaged in trading and distribution of foodstuffs. 

Monday, 27 February 2012

Tongher (At a Glance)

TONGHER





Announcement
Date
Financial
Yr. End
QtrPeriod EndRevenue
RM '000
Profit/Lost
RM'000
EPSAmended
27-Feb-1231-Dec-11431-Dec-11143,7738,7296.61-
29-Nov-1131-Dec-11330-Sep-11148,3756,0743.19-
22-Aug-1131-Dec-11230-Jun-11165,58715,2239.00-
30-May-1131-Dec-11131-Mar-11143,31213,0258.00-


Announcement
Date
Financial
Yr. End
QtrPeriod EndRevenue
RM '000
Profit/Lost
RM'000
EPSAmended
27-Feb-1131-Dec-10431-Dec-10125,6376,9155.43-















ttm-EPS
2011  29.04 sen
2010  19.93 sen
YoY EPS GR 45.7%

Dividends
2011  8.00 sen
2010  5.00 sen

Net Asset per Share
2011  RM  2.52
2010  RM  2.31


Price RM 2.14
ttm-PE   7.4x
EY  13.6%
DPO 0.275
DY  3.74%

Net Profit Margin  7.9%
Asset Turnover  1.09x
Financial Leverage  1.37x

ROA  8.61x
ROE  11.8%






Stock Performance Chart for Tong Herr Resources Berhad

Sunday, 26 February 2012

The Approach Warren Buffett uses in deciding whether or not to invest in a company


BRINGING IT ALL TOGETHER

The remarks of Warren Buffet and analysis by Buffett authors suggest that, at the very least, Warren Buffett looks at the following aspects of a corporation and its operations. They can be put in the form of questions that any sensible investor should ask before considering a stock investment.

BASIC QUESTIONS TO ASK

1. Does the company sell brand name products that are likely to endure?
2. Is the business of the company easily understood?
3. Does the company invest in and operate businesses within its area of expertise?
4. Does the company have the ability to maintain or increase profitability by raising prices?
5. Is the company, looking at both long-term debt, and the current position, conservatively financed?
6. Does the company show consistently high returns on equity and capital?
7. Have the earnings per share and sales per share of the company shown consistent growth above market averages over a period of at least five years?
8. Hs the company been buying back its shares, and if so, has it bought them responsibly?
9. Has management wisely used retained earnings to increase the rate of return to shareholders?
10. Is the company likely to require large capital sums to ensure continuing profitability?

This would only be the first stage of the process. The next, and most important question, is determining the price that an investor such as Warren Buffet would pay for the stock, allowing for the margin of safety.

CASE STUDIES

These examples will take you through the method of company analysis advanced on this website, which we believe to be similar to the approach Warren Buffett uses in deciding whether or not to invest in a company.


COCA COLA - CASE STUDY

In answering the question for ourselves whether Coca Cola is a company worth consideration as an investment, at the right price, we have used summary and other figures available from Value Line.

QUESTION 1: DOES THE COMPANY SELL BRAND NAME PRODUCTS THAT ARE LIKELY TO ENDURE?


The answer to this seems quite simple. The major product of the company has been around for many years, is sold worldwide and is considered the best-known brand name in the world. More importantly, its customers would not do without it, and have demonstrated a loyalty that makes it unlikely it would change to other products. It also has other well-known brands on its books – Sprite, Fanta, Evian, Minute Maid, PowerAde.

2. IS THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY EASILY UNDERSTOOD?


We think so. Its core operation is the production and distribution, both for itself and under franchise, of non-alcoholic beverages and associated products.

3. DOES THE COMPANY INVEST IN AND OPERATE BUSINESSES WITHIN ITS AREA OF EXPERTISE?


We would think so. Consideration of the Value Line information suggests that the company restricts itself to its core operations. We do not see it dabbling in areas outside its expertise.

4. DOES THE COMPANY HAVE THE ABILITY TO MAINTAIN OR INCREASE PROFITABILITY BY RAISING PRICES?


The real question here is whether, if Coke were to lift its prices by a margin that would allow it to keep pace with inflation, sales would suffer. This is unlikely.

5. IS THE COMPANY, LOOKING AT BOTH LONG-TERM DEBT, AND THE CURRENT POSITION, CONSERVATIVELY FINANCED?


a) Long term debt to profitability
The long-term debt of this company in 2002 was 2700 million dollars. The profit for that year was 4134 million dollars. At this rate, Coke could wipe out its long-term debt in .65 of a year, just over six months.
b) Current ratio
In 2002, Coke had current assets of 7352 million dollars and current liabilities of 7341 million dollars, a ratio of debt to assets of .99. This is lower than would be the desired ratio for industrial companies, but having regard to the nature of the business, and the ready cash flow, is acceptable.
c) Long term debt to equity
In 2002 the long-term debt was 2700 million dollars and shareholders equity was 11800 million dollars a comfortable ratio of .22.

6. DOES THE COMPANY SHOW CONSISTENTLY HIGH RETURNS ON EQUITY AND CAPITAL?


The company has shown an average rate of return on equity over the past five years of 37.08%. In the same period, it showed an average return on capital of 33.6% .The figures are consistent.
YearROEROC
199842.039.1
199934.031.5
200039.436.4
200135.031.9
200235.029.1
Average37.0833.6


7. HAVE THE EARNINGS PER SHARE AND SALES PER SHARE OF THE COMPANY SHOWN CONSISTENT GROWTH ABOVE MARKET AVERAGES OVER A PERIOD OF AT LEAST FIVE YEARS?


The figures for this period are as follows.
YearEPS+ or - %SPS+ or - %
19971.647.64
19981.42-13.47.63-.13
19991.30-8.458.01+4.98
20001.48+13.858.23+2.74
20011.60+8.117.06-14.2
20021.66+3.757.92+12.18

Looking at a five-year rolling period, we can calculate, using a hand-held Texas Instruments BA-35 Solar Calculator, the increase in earnings and sales over the rolling five-year period 1998-2002. For earnings, this is 16.9 %, for sales only 3.8%. The compound rate of return for earnings is 3.185, for sales, .75%.
This is not a strong rise in earnings or sales, and the question would be whether this is as a result of a slow-down in the US and world economies over this period or whether there is some more structural reason.

8. HS THE COMPANY BEEN BUYING BACK ITS SHARES, AND IF SO, HAS IT BOUGHT THEM RESPONSIBLY?


In 1998, the company had common shares outstanding of 2465.5 million. In 2002, the figure was 2471 million. The shares on issue are basically unchanged.

9. HAS MANAGEMENT WISELY USED RETAINED EARNINGS TO INCREASE THE RATE OF RETURN TO SHAREHOLDERS?


The company has the following earnings per share and dividend per share record over a five-year period.
YearEPSDPS
19981.42.60
19991.30.64
20001.48.68
20011.60.72
20021.66.80
Total7.463.44

The company has therefore retained earnings totalling $4.02. In 1998, the shares reached a low of $53.6. In 2002, the shares reached a high of $57.9. An investor who bought at the lowest price in 1998 and still had them at the highest price in 2002 would have been showing a profit of $4.30. Thus the shares would have just slotted into Warren Buffett’s requirement for showing an increase in market value of a dollar for every dollar retained.

Using the approach of Mary Buffett and David Clark, we could calculate the percentage increase in earnings per share resulting from the retained profits. EPS in 1998 were 1.42, and in 2002 were 1.66, an increase of .24. Thus, from the total earnings retained of $4.02, earnings have increased by a total of .22, a percentage increase of 5.97%: not high.


10. IS THE COMPANY LIKELY TO REQUIRE LARGE CAPITAL SUMS TO ENSURE CONTINUING PROFITABILITY?


Value Line suggests that in the two years following 2002, the company would be spending about .40 a share on capital items. The long-term average is .31, unadjusted for inflation. These figures seem to be in line with historical expenditures.


This case study is a demonstration only and is not intended to influence or persuade visitors to this site to make any investment decisions; they should make their own decisions, based on their own research, personal and financial circumstances, and after consultation with their own financial or investment advisers.





BOEING (BA) - CASE STUDY

In answering the question for ourselves whether Boeing is a company worth consideration as an investment, at the right price, we have used summary and other figures available from Value Line.

QUESTION 1: DOES THE COMPANY SELL BRAND NAME PRODUCTS THAT ARE LIKELY TO ENDURE?


The answer to this seems quite simple. The major product of the company has been around for many years, is sold worldwide, and is recognised as a brand name by airlines and air passengers. In recent years, other passenger brand names such as Airbus have added competition. The choice of which airplane an airline buys is a matter of preference, rather than compulsion, and will depend upon factors such as price, safety, back up and design.

The brand name is good, but so is the competition.

2. IS THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY EASILY UNDERSTOOD?


We think so. Its core operation is the design and manufacture of airplanes.

3. DOES THE COMPANY INVEST IN AND OPERATE BUSINESSES WITHIN ITS AREA OF EXPERTISE?


We would think so. Consideration of the Value Line information suggests that the company restricts itself to its core operations. We do not see it dabbling in areas outside its expertise.

4. DOES THE COMPANY HAVE THE ABILITY TO MAINTAIN OR INCREASE PROFITABILITY BY RAISING PRICES?


This will totally depend upon the condition of the airline industry and the extent of the competition at any given time. The near certainty that people will continue to fly in ever-increasing numbers is dampened by the possibility of any one of a number of things that could reduce passenger flights – terrorism, crashes, other and more serious SARS type disease outbreaks.

5. IS THE COMPANY, LOOKING AT BOTH LONG-TERM DEBT, AND THE CURRENT POSITION, CONSERVATIVELY FINANCED?


a) Long term debt to profitability
The long-term debt of this company in 2002 was 12589 million dollars. The profit for that year was 2275 million dollars. At this rate, Boeing could wipe out its long-term debt in 5.53 years. This is a long period.
b) Current ratio
In 2002, Boeing had current assets of 16855 million dollars and current liabilities of 19810 million dollars, a ratio of debt to assets of .85. This is lower than would be the desired ratio for industrial companies.
c) Long term debt to equity
In 2002 the long-term debt was 12589 million dollars and shareholders equity was 7696 million dollars a very high ratio of debt to equity of 1.64. Benjamin Graham thought that an industrial company should not have a ratio in excess of 1.

6. DOES THE COMPANY SHOW CONSISTENTLY HIGH RETURNS ON EQUITY AND CAPITAL?

The company has shown an average rate of return on equity over the past five years of 20.12%. In the same period, it showed an average return on capital of 12.02% .The figures indicate that use of debt financing has helped to increase the company returns on equity.
YearROEROC
19989.17.4
199917.712.9
200022.814.7
200121.412.2
200229.612.9
Average20.1212.02

7. HAVE THE EARNINGS PER SHARE AND SALES PER SHARE OF THE COMPANY SHOWN CONSISTENT GROWTH ABOVE MARKET AVERAGES OVER A PERIOD OF AT LEAST FIVE YEARS?

The figures for this period are as follows.
YearEPS+ or - %SPS+ or - %
1997.6347.05
19981.1582.5459.8727.25
19992.1990.4366.6011.24
20002.8429.661.36-7.87
20012.79-1.7672.9418.87
20022.821.0767.61-7.30

Looking at a five-year rolling period, we can calculate, using a hand-held Texas Instruments BA-35 Solar Calculator, the increase in earnings and sales over the rolling five-year period 1998-2002. For earnings, this is very high; EPS has risen from $1.15 to $2.82, a total percentage rise of 145.21 %. Sales have risen per share from $59.87 to $67.61, a total rise of only 12.92%. The compound rate of return for earnings is 19.65%, for sales, 2.46%.

The disparity between earnings growth and sales growth suggests that the company has, for whatever reasons, managed to increase profitability well in excess of the rise in sales. Any person considering investment in this company would try and find out why.

8. HS THE COMPANY BEEN BUYING BACK ITS SHARES, AND IF SO, HAS IT BOUGHT THEM RESPONSIBLY?


In 1998, the company had common shares outstanding of 937.6 million. In 2002, the figure was 799.6 million. The number of shares on issue has been substantially reduced, suggesting a share buy back that may be one reason for increased earnings per share ratios.

9. HAS MANAGEMENT WISELY USED RETAINED EARNINGS TO INCREASE THE RATE OF RETURN TO SHAREHOLDERS?


The company has the following earnings per share and dividend per share record over a five-year period.
YearEPSDPS
19981.15.56
19992.19.56
20002.84.59
20012.79.68
20022.82.68
Total11.793.07

The company has therefore retained earnings totalling $8.72. In 1998, the shares reached a low of $29. In 2002, the shares reached a high of $51.10. An investor who bought at the lowest price in 1998 and still had them at the highest price in 2002 would have been showing a profit of $22.10. Thus the shares would have easily slotted into Warren Buffett’s requirement for showing an increase in market value of a dollar for every dollar retained.

Of course, and this shows Mr Market as a real factor, an investor who bought at the 1998 high price of $56.30, and sold at the 2002 low price of $28.50 would be showing a substantial loss on the investment.

Using the approach of Mary Buffett and David Clark,in The New Buffettology,  we could calculate the percentage increase in earnings per share resulting from the retained profits. EPS in 1998 were 1.15, and in 2002 were 2.82, an increase of 1.67. Thus, from the total earnings retained of $8.72, earnings have increased by a total of $1.67, a percentage increase of 19.15%: above market rates of return.

10. IS THE COMPANY LIKELY TO REQUIRE LARGE CAPITAL SUMS TO ENSURE CONTINUING PROFITABILITY?


Value Line suggests that in the two years following 2002, the company would be spending about $1.00 a share on capital items. The long-term average is $1.33, unadjusted for inflation. These figures seem to be a little less than historical expenditures.



This case study is a demonstration only and is not intended to influence or persuade visitors to this site to make any investment decisions; they should make their own decisions, based on their own research, personal and financial circumstances, and after consultation with their own financial or investment advisers.



http://www.buffettsecrets.com/bringing-it-all-together.htm

HOW WARREN BUFFET DETERMINES A FAIR PRICE



The real secret of Warren Buffett is the methods that he uses, some of which are known from his remarks, and some of which are not, that allow him to predict cash flows with some probability.

Various books about Warren Buffett give their explanations as to how he calculates the price that he is prepared to pay for a share with the desired margin of safety.

  • Mary Buffett and David Clarke pose a series of tests, based on past growth rates, returns on equity, book value and government bond price averages.
  • Robert G Hagstrom Jnr in The Warren Buffet Way gives explanatory tables of past Berkshire Hathaway purchases using a DCF model and owner earnings.

Ultimately, the investor must decide upon their own methods of arriving at the intrinsic value of a share and the margin of error that they want for themselves.

INTRINSIC VALUE: THE RIGHT PRICE TO PAY


INTRINSIC VALUE

Both Warren Buffett and Benjamin Graham talk about the intrinsic value of a business, or a share in it.  That is, to buy a business, or a share in it, at a fair price. 

But, having regard to the possibility of error in calculating intrinsic value, the careful of investor should provide a margin of error by only buying the business, or shares, at a substantial discount to the intrinsic value.

Buffett is said to look for a 25 per cent discount, but who really knows?


DEFINING INTRINSIC VALUE

Buffett’s concept, in looking at intrinsic value, is that it values what can be taken out of the business. 

He has quoted investment guru John Burr Williams who defined value like this:
‘The value of any stock, bond or business today is determined by the cash inflows and outflows – discounted at an appropriate interest rate – that can be expected to occur during the remaining life of the asset.’ – The Theory of Investment Value.

The difference for Buffett in calculating the value of bonds and shares is that the investor knows the eventual price of the bond when it matures but has to guess the price of the share at some future date.

WHAT WARREN BUFFETT SAYS ABOUT PREDICTING FUTURE CASH FLOWS


DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW (DCF)

This method of valuation is often referred to as the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) valuation method, but, as Buffett has said in relation to shares, it is not easy to predict future cash flows and this is why he sticks to investment in companies that are consistent, well managed, and simple to understand. 

A company that is hard to understand or that changes frequently does not allow for easy prediction of future earnings and outgoings.

WHAT WARREN BUFFETT SAYS ABOUT PREDICTING FUTURE CASH FLOWS

In 1992, Warren Buffett said that:
‘Leaving question of price aside, the best business to own is one that over an extended period can employ large amounts of capital at very high rates of return. The worst company to own is one that must, or will, do the opposite – that is, consistently employ ever-greater amounts of capital at very low rates of return.
It is well worth reading Buffet’s analogy relating DCF to a university education in his 1994 Letter to Shareholders.

So, it would seem that the intrinsic value of a share in a company relates to the DCF that can be expected from the investment. 

There are formulas for working out discounted cash flows and they can be complex but they give a result.


EXPLANATIONS OF DCF

The best explanation that we have read of DCF is by Lawrence A Cunningham in his outstanding book How to think like Benjamin Graham and invest like Warren Buffett.
A good online explanation is available here.


PATIENCE



The other thing that Warren Buffett counsels, when deciding on investment purchases, is patience. 

He has said that he is prepared to wait forever to buy a stock at the right price.

WHAT WARREN BUFFETT SAYS ABOUT DIVERSIFICATION


There is a seeming disparity of views between Graham and Buffett on diversification. 
  • Benjamin Graham was a firm believer, even in relation to stock purchases at bargain prices, in spreading the risk over a number of share investments. 
  • Warren Buffett, on the other hand, appears to take a different view: concentrate on just a few stocks.

WHAT WARREN BUFFETT SAYS ABOUT DIVERSIFICATION

In 1992, Buffett said that his investment strategy did not rely upon spreading his risk over a large number of stocks; he preferred to have his investments in a limited number of companies.
‘Many pundits would therefore say the [this] strategy must be riskier than that employed by more conventional investors. We disagree. We believe that a policy of portfolio concentration may well decrease risk if it raises, as it should, both the intensity with which an investor thinks about a business and the comfort-level he must feel with its economic characteristics before buying into it.’


NO REAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BENJAMIN GRAHAM AND WARREN BUFFETT

The differences between Graham and Buffett on stock diversification are perhaps not as wide as they might seem. 
  • Graham spoke of diversification primarily in relation to second grade stocks and 
  • it is arguable that the Buffett approach to stock selection results in the purchase of quality stocks only.


BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY HOLDINGS

In addition, consideration of Berkshire Hathaway holdings in 2002 suggests that although Buffett may not necessarily believe in diversification in the number of companies that it owns, its investments certainly cross a broad spectrum of industry areas. They include:
  • Manufacturing and distribution – underwear, children’s clothing, farm equipment, shoes, razor blades, soft drinks;
  • Retail – furniture, kitchenware
  • Insurance
  • Financial and accounting products and services
  • Flight operations
  • Gas pipelines
  • Real estate brokerage
  • Construction related industries
  • Media

What Warren Buffett Looks for in Company Management


WHAT WARREN BUFFETT LOOKS FOR IN COMPANY MANAGEMENT

Warren Buffett has identified aspects of management that he looks for in companies in which he invests. They include:
  • Buy back of shares where the buy back is in the company’s interests, for example where the company has surplus funds and the shares can be bought back at less than intrinsic value
  • Capability in allocation of capital
  • Managers who stick to doing what the company does best; ‘the best business returns are usually achieved by companies that are doing something quite similar today to what they were doing five or ten years ago.’
  • Ability and readiness to tackle tough problems as they arise
  • The use of retained profits to increase company profitability at beyond market rates
  • A conservative approach to debt and liquidity


WHAT BUFFETT DOES NOT LIKE IN COMPANY MANAGEMENT

Warren Buffett has, throughout his career of public announcements, identified some things that he does not like in company managers:
  • Managers who pursue company acquisitions for reasons other than the good of the company – ego trips, the ‘institutional imperative’ of keeping up with other company acquirers, bad judges (they buy a toad and think that it will turn into a princess when they kiss it); as he famously said in 1981, ‘[M]any managerial [princes] remain serenely confident about the future potency of their kisses – even after their corporate backyards are knee-deep in unresponsive toads’.
  • Managers who pursue growth for growth’s sake, irrespective of the value of that growth to the company
  • Managers who expend too much of the company’s worth by issuing valuable shares to buy overvalued assets or who use debt to do so.
  • Managers who enrich themselves at company expense by with extravagant salaries and the abuse of share option arrangements