Law of Success Definiteness of Purpose EXPLAINED Napoleon Hill (Rare Recording)

An alternative solution to your household needs :-)

Benjamin Graham Interview

Benjamin Graham Interview

A short transcript of an interview with the father of value investing taken way back in 1960.

Question - Can the average manager of institutional funds obtain better results than the Dow Jones Industrial Average or the S&P Index over the years?

Answer - No. In effect, that would mean that the stock market experts as a whole could beat themselves--a logical contradiction.

Question - Do you think, therefore, that the average institutional client should be content with the DJIA results or the equivalent?

Answer - Yes. Not only that, but I think they should require approximately such results over, say, a moving five-year average period as a condition for paying standard management fees to advisors and the like.

Question - What general rules would you offer the individual investor for his investment policy over the years?

Answer - Let me suggest three such rules:

Rule1: The individual investor should act consistently as an investor and not as a speculator. This means, in sum, that he should be able to justify every purchase he makes and each price he pays by impersonal, objective reasoning that satisfies him that he is getting more than his money's worth for his purchase--in other words, that he has a margin of safety, in value terms, to protect his commitment.

Rule 2: The investor should have a definite selling policy for all his common stock commitments, corresponding to his buying techniques. Typically, he should set a reasonable profit objective on each purchase--say 50 to 100 per cent--and a maximum holding period for this objective to be realized--say, two to three years. Purchases not realizing the gain objective at the end of the holding period should be sold out at the market.

Rule 3: Finally, the investor should always have a minimum percentage of his total portfolio in common stocks and a minimum percentage in bond equivalents. I recommend at least 25 per cent of the total at all times in each category. A good case can be made for a consistent 50-50 division here, with adjustments for changes in the market level


http://investorzclub.blogspot.in/2011/09/benjamin-graham-interview.html

Security Analysis by Benjamin Graham and David Dodd pdf

Security Analysis, the revolutionary book on fundamental analysis and investing, was first published in 1934, following unprecedented losses on Wall Street.

Benjamin Graham and David Dodd chided Wall Street for its myopic focus on a company's reported earnings per share (eps), and were particularly harsh on the favored "earnings trends." They encouraged investors to take an entirely different approach by estimating the rough value of the operating business that lay behind the security. They have given actual examples of the market's tendency to irrationally under-value certain out-of-favor stocks.

The book is must read for any Stock Market Investor, fundamental analyst or equity research professional.

Investment Policies (Based on Benjamin Graham)

Summary of Investment Policies

A. INVESTMENT FOR FIXED INCOME:
US Savings Bonds (FDs)

B. INVESTMENT FOR INCOME, MODERATE LONG-TERM APPRECIATION AND PROTECTION AGAINST INFLATION:
(1) INVESTMENT FUNDS bought at reasonable price.
(2) Diversified list of primary common stocks (BLUE CHIPS) bought at reasonable price. 

C. INVESTMENT CHIEFLY FOR PROFIT: 4 approaches are open to both the small and the large investors:
(1) Representative common stocks bought when the MARKET level is clearly LOW.
(2) GROWTH STOCKS, when these can be obtained at reasonable prices in relation to actual accomplishment – GROWTH INVESTING.
(3) Purchase of securities selling well BELOW INTRINSIC VALUE – VALUE INVESTING.
(4) Purchase of WELL-SECURED PRIVILEGED SENIOR ISSUES (bonds and preferred shares).
(5) SPECIAL SITUATIONS: Mergers, arbitrages, cash pay-outs.

D. SPECULATION:
(1) Buying stock in new or virtually new ventures (IPOs) .(2) TRADING in the market.
(3) Purchase of "GROWTH STOCKS" at GENEROUS PRICES.


_______________


For DEFENSIVE INVESTORS: Portfolio A & B
(Portfolio A: Cash, FDs, Bonds Portfolio B: Mutual funds, Blue chips)

For ENTERPRISING INVESTORS: Portfolio A & B & C
(Portfolio C: Buy in Low Market, Buy Growth stocks at fair value, Buy value stocks i.e. bargains, High grade bonds and preferred shares, Arbitrages)

For SPECULATORS: Portfolio D
(Should set aside a sum for this separate from their money in investing.)

________________
________________


Types of Investors

Graham felt that individual investors fell into two camps : "defensive" investorsand "aggressive" or "enterprising" investors.

These two groups are distinguished not by the amount of risk they are willing to take, but rather by the amount of "intelligent effort" they are "willing and able to bring to bear on the task."

Thus, for instance, he included in the defensive investor category professionals (his example--a doctor) unable to devote much time to the process and young investors (his example--a sharp young executive interested in finance) who are as-yet unfamiliar and inexperienced with investing.

Graham felt that the defensive investor should confine his holdings to the shares of important companies with a long record of profitable operations and that are in strong financial condition. By "important," he meant one of substantial size and with a leading position in the industry, ranking among the first quarter or first third in size within its industry group.

Aggressive investors, Graham felt, could expand their universe substantially,but purchases should be attractively priced as established by intelligent analysis. He also suggested that aggressive investors avoid new issues.


Click and read also:

****My Investment Philosophy, Strategy and various Valuation Methods

Are You an Intelligent Investor?

Knowing Yourself and Keep Investing Simple and Safe

Sorry, the links below are no longer available.

Use the link to directly download the ebook in PDF format

http://books.expect-us.net/dl/Graham%20&%20Dodd%20-%20Security%20Analysis%20(6th%20ed).pdf

http://myinvestingnotes.blogspot.com/2013/09/security-analysis-benjamin-graham-and.html

One up on Wall Street by Peter Lynch pdf

The New York Times best seller "one up on wall street by Peter Lynch" has more than one million copies sold through out the world. Peter Lynch, the world's greatest and the most successful fund manager, was undoubtedly the best stock picker of his time. Anise C. Wallace of The New York Times says "Mr. Lynch investment record puts him in a league by himself ".

Any investor should pay heed to what Mr. Lynch has to say and this book is full of advises by Mr. Lynch himself. He has shared loads of his own personal experiences of stock picking during his tenure at Fidelity Magellan Fund, which is truly a priceless treasure for any equity investor.

Use the following link to download this fabulous book in pdf format: One up on Wall Street by Peter Lynch

The Magic of Compounding

Warren Buffett Investing Secrets.

Warren Buffett Investing Secrets.pdf

Free e-book

The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People

TSM Global (At a Glance)

17.3.2012
TSM Global
Income Statement	9M	9M
	31.10.2011	31.10.2010	Absolute Chg	Change
Revenue	272.46	288.92	-16.46	-5.70%
Gross Profit			0.00	#DIV/0!
Operating Profit	31.194	45.847	-14.65	-31.96%
Financing costs	-0.273	-0.655	0.38	-58.32%
PBT	34.795	52.596	-17.80	-33.84%
PAT	26.279	41.7	-15.42	-36.98%
EPS (basic) sen	12.73	20.73	-8.00	-38.59%
Balance Sheet	31.10.2011	31.1.2011
NCA	91.007	75.462	15.55	20.60%
CA	250.299	176.154	74.15	42.09%
Total Assets	341.306	251.616	89.69	35.65%
Total Equity	284.042	300.543	-16.50	-5.49%
NCL	3.965	2.319	1.65	70.98%
CL	53.3	48.753	4.55	9.33%
Total Liabilities	57.265	51.072	6.19	12.13%
Total Eq + Liab	341.307	351.615	-10.31	-2.93%
Net assets per share	1.370	1.540	-0.17	-11.04%
Short term Investm	41.089	37.869
Cash & Eq	91.433	96.833	-5.40	-5.58%
LT Borrowings	0.316	0.516	-0.20	-38.76%
ST Borrowings	19.002	9.104	9.90	108.72%
Net Cash	113.204	125.082	-11.88	-9.50%
Inventories	54.093	42.26	11.83	28.00%
Trade receivables	63.685	64.693	-1.01	-1.56%
Trade payables	33.918	25.237	8.68	34.40%
Working capital	196.999	127.401	69.60	54.63%
Quick Ratio	3.68	2.75	0.93	34.04%
Current Ratio	4.70	3.61	1.08	29.97%
Cash flow statement	31.10.2011	31.1.2011
PBT	34.795	52.596	-17.80	-33.84%
OPBCWC	71.386	81.839	-10.45	-12.77%
Cash from Operations	87.630	49.731	37.90	76.21%
Net CFO	70.241	34.237	36.00	105.16%
CFI	-58.578	-11.998	-46.58	388.23%
CFF	-2.893	-36.286	33.39	-92.03%
Capex	-23.846	-16.860	-6.99	41.44%
FCF	46.395	17.377	29.02	166.99%
Dividends paid	-6.370	-3.132	-3.24	103.38%
DPS (sen)	5.01	2.46	2.55	103.38%
No of ord shares (m)	127.213	127.213	0.00	0.00%
Financial Ratios
Gross Profit Margin	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	#DIV/0!
Net Profit Margin	9.64%	14.43%	-4.79%	-33.17%
Asset Turnover *	1.06	1.53	-0.47	-30.48%
Financial Leverage	1.20	0.84	0.36	43.53%
*annualised
ROA	10.27%	22.10%	-11.83%	-53.54%
ROC	12.40%	19.55%	-7.15%	-36.56%
ROE	12.34%	18.50%	-6.16%	-33.32%
Valuation	6.3.2012	4.3.2011
Price	1.22	1.65	-0.43	-26.06%
Market cap (m)	155.20	209.90	-54.70	-26.06%
P/E**	5.91	5.03	0.87	17.33%
P/BV	0.55	0.70	-0.15	-21.77%
P/FCF	3.35	12.08	-8.73	-72.31%
P/Div	24.36	67.02	-42.65	-63.65%
DPO ratio	0.24	0.08	0.17	222.73%
EY**	16.93%	19.87%	-2.93%	-14.77%
FCF/P	29.89%	8.28%	21.62%	261.09%
DY	4.10%	1.49%	2.61%	175.07%
Cash per share RM	0.89	0.98	-9.34%	-9.50%
**9M Earnings

TOP GLOVE NET PROFIT SURGED BY 109%

Financial results for the second quarter ended February 29, 2012 (“2QFY12”)

Klang, Thursday, March 15, 2012 –Top Glove Corporation Bhd (Top Glove) today announced sales revenue of RM549.0 million and net profit of RM54.2 million in 2QFY12 for the financial year ending 31 August 2012.

Revenue for 2QFY12 recorded a growth of 13% to RM549.0 million from RM485.2 million in the corresponding quarter last financial year, and net profit surged 109% to RM54.2 million from RM25.9 million.

On a six month cumulative (September to February) comparison between 1HFY12 and 1HFY11, revenue rose 13% to RM1,103.8 million from RM976.7 million and net profit improved 39% to RM86.7 million from RM62.3 million. The improved performance was attributed to an increase in glove demand, improved operational efficiency and a downtrend in latex prices which reduced from an average of RM8.14/kg in 1HFY11 to RM7.58/kg in 1HFY12.

Top Glove’s Group Chairman, Tan Sri Lim Wee Chai commented “The stronger US dollar and lower latex prices gave us better net profit for 2QFY12. We have learnt from past experience on excessive increases in latex prices and shall remain cautious to continue with our planned strategy for a more balanced product mix of latex and nitrile gloves to cater to on-going customer preference.”

Rare Earth Issues

Points of Maximum Financial Risk and Financial Opportunity

 

Nestle - Projecting its future

Nestle					CAGR	CAGR
	15.3.12	31.12.10	31.12.06		2006-2010	2006-2011
	2011	2010	2006		4 Years	5 Years
Market Price $	56.3	43.34	24.8		17.82%	14.98%
Turnover $	4,700,994	4,026,319	3,275,541		7.49%	5.29%
Earnings (sen)	194.58	166.91	112.67		11.55%	10.32%
Div (sen)	180	165	100		12.47%	13.34%
P/E	28.9	26.0	22.0
EY	3.46%	3.85%	4.54%
DY	3.20%	3.81%	4.03%

Projections of Nestle using the following assumptions:
- EPS GR of 8% per year, that is, its earnings double in 9 years from 2011.
- At the end of the 9 year period in 2020, its intrinsic value was at PE of 22x.

	Projections			EPS GR 8%		Projections
	PE 22	15.3.12		CAGR		Using Historical Price
Year	2020	2011				2020
Market Price $	85.6152	56.3		4.77%		56.3
Turnover $		4700994
Earnings (sen)	389.16	194.58		8.01%		389.16
Div (sen)	360	180		8.01%		360
P/E	22.0	28.9				14.5
EY	4.55%	3.46%				6.91%
DY	4.20%	3.20%				6.39%

Using the above 2 CONSERVATIVE assumptions, you can expect a total return per year of about 9.6% if you were to invest into Nestle today.  This return is derived thus:  about 4.77% from capital appreciation and about  4.8% from dividends.

The more enterprising investor may wish to look for investments with a higher return of 15% or more.  Nevertheless, a return of 9.6% is good for many.

Please note that the projections are over a long period of 9 years.  Over the short term, the price of Nestle can be volatile too and your return may even be negative depending on the price you paid to own it.

Graham defined investment thus: An INVESTMENT OPERATION is one which, upon THOROUGH ANALYSIS, promises SAFETY OF PRINCIPAL and a SATISFACTORY RETURN. Operations NOT meeting these requirements are speculative. 

Nestle revisited

In the year 2001, the after tax EPS of Nestle was 87 sen. and its share price was trading between $19.30 to $21.20, with a P/E ranging from 22.2 to 24.4.

For someone who bought Nestle in 2001, where was the margin of safety of this company?

Margin of safety in a company comes from various sources.  Among these are the qualitative factors which are difficult to quantify mathematically.  Nestle has durable competitive advantage and economic moat.  The only assessment for the investor is to "guess intelligently" what its earnings growth will be over the next few years.  

Margin of safety concept can be applied in two ways.  One that is obvious is buying a company at a big discount to its intrinsic value.  Of course, intrinsic value is not easy to determine and does vary widely depending on the assumptions one makes in deriving this value.  Another method that is not obvious, is the margin of safety that exists too when the present price that you are paying is at a discount to its intrinsic value based on its growth projections, conservatively estimated.

Let's look at Nestle.  In 2001, you were paying 22.2 times for $1 of its after tax earnings.  Was this underpriced, fair price or overpriced relative to its intrinsic value, conservatively estimated based on its growth potential?  Growth projections are at best intelligent guesstimates.  Nestle was projected to grow its business profit at 8% per year at that time.  Therefore in 9 years from 2001, it was projected then to have an EPS of 2 x 87 sen = 174 sen.  

Assuming that Nestle in 2010 had the same PE of 22.2, its share price in 2010 should be 22.2 x 174 sen = $.38.63, or CAGR of 8%.  The average DY of Nestle was 4%.  Nestle paid out virtually all its earnings as dividends.  Therefore, its DY in 2001 based on historical cost was 4% but in 2010, its DY based on historical cost was 8% (dividend paid had also doubled).  This was an average dividend yield of about 6% per year for that period.  Should you have reinvested all the dividends back into Nestle, you would probably be able to compound your initial investment at more than 14% per year.

So, in 2001, Nestle's PE was 22.2x.  Yet, knowing its earning growth potential, conservatively estimated, there was margin of safety even buying at this price, with a reasonable degree of probability.  Using a conservative growth estimate in earnings of 8% per year, its earnings was projected to double in 2010.  Based on this EPS projection, its (future) intrinsic value would be higher and herein was the margin of safety demanded by the value investor.  

Such way of investing may not appeal to some investors.  It is too difficult for them to realise that growth creates value.  One should be happy to pay a higher PE to own a stock of higher quality, better earnings growth, lesser risk and greater certainty of a positive sustainable return.

Buying a wonderful company at a fair price has made those who know how, very rewarding and rich indeed.  There is no reason to change something that has worked consistently over 2 decades of investing.  

Nestle

Closing price on 14.3.2012
$56.30

How does an investor hope to profit from investing into a high quality growth company?

He can obtain his returns from:
1.  The dividends distributed by the company.
2.  The share price appreciation that reflects the better earnings of the company over time.
3.  Buying the share at a bargain to its fair or intrinsic price.

The long term investor will derive most of his gains from dividends and the share price appreciation of the above stock.

Let's assume that the investor was poor in his pricing of this stock and bought in 1996 at $24 per share (the highest price for that period), he would still has a lot of gains from the dividends and share appreciation of this stock when he holds this share to today.

If the investor was very good in his pricing of this stock and bought at the lowest price in 1998 at $13 per share, he would have a better return from the dividends and share appreciation of this stock when he holds this share to today.

The "worse" case scenario is not buying into this stock and holding cash, hoping to buy at very steep bargains that never arise.  The opportunity costs for holding cash instead of being invested into this stock over the short and long term can be very costly.

Warrants trading: What you need to know

Structured Warrants – Gearing & Greeks

In this article we will look at gearing factor and sensitivity coefficients – the Greeks which measure change in warrant value via change in other variables. 

Gearing & Effective Gearing: Structured warrants cost only a fraction of their underlying shares. They provide holders with greater exposure to price movements as they generally rise and fall more steeply in percentage terms. If a warrant is priced at RM0.30, and the underlying share is trading at RM1.50, the gearing is 5 times. The price of one warrant offers exposure to 5 shares. In bull markets, warrants will always be among the top risers and the opposite holds true in bear markets.

The definition of gearing is: 
Gearing = Share Price / Warrant Price (adjusted by exercise ratio) 

The following chart plots the relative price movements of a call and put warrant against corresponding movements in the underlying share price. Note the percentage change in the value of the underlying share compared with the value change in the call warrant and the put warrant. During a 3-month period, the underlying share price falls by 10% (at Point A) and increases by 8% (at Point B) - share price varies over an 18% range. In contrast, the call warrant fluctuates within a 75% range, while the put warrant fluctuates within an 80% range but in an opposite direction to the call. 
Gearing decreases as the share price increases. 

Delta & Gamma: Delta refers to the rate of change of warrant price for a given change in the underlying share price. For call warrants, the delta will fall between 0 and 1; for puts it will be between 0 and -1. At 0, the warrant is impartial to any moves on the underlying share. At 1, the warrant is expected to move sen-for-sen with the underlying share. Typically, at-the-money warrants will have a delta of 0.5. As the warrant moves in-the-money, the delta will approach 1. 

The most savvy of traders will aim for medium-delta warrants, in the range of 0.4 to 0.5. Any delta too low will denote an out-of-money warrant with strike too far away. 

The delta is a constantly changing number. The rate of change of delta is known as the gamma. One could visualise delta as the speed of the warrant, and gamma as the acceleration. The gamma simulates the changes on the warrant price for different underlying share price. Any move on the underlying share will move the delta higher, as with the gamma. 

Vega: Vega measures the sensitivity of warrant price to change in volatility. Vega is the highest for at-the-money warrants, and tends to be higher for longer-dated warrants. 

With several issuers issuing warrants on the same shares, the belief is that investors and traders should focus on the warrant with the lowest implied volatility. This is only true if the issuers will buy back their warrants at a proportionate volatility level. An example would be buying a warrant at an implied volatility of 45%, which the issuer buys back at 42% versus buying a warrant at a volatility of 40% that is bought back at a volatility of 30%. 

Theta: Also known as time decay, Theta is expressed in terms of sen or percentage per week (or per day closer to expiry). Eventually, the warrant will need to lose the time value entirely. But theta is not linear to time – it will get proportionately larger as it approaches expiry. 

Rho: Rho measures the sensitivity of warrant prices to changes in interest rates. However, the level of interest rates, as a variable, is likely to influence neither warrant pricing nor trading decision making process. 

Final Thoughts: The Greeks do not help answer which warrant to buy. However, they are reliable forecasting tools on the changes in warrant prices versus the underlying share price movements. 


Related:

Warrants trading: What you need to know  Parameters & Variables of Structured Warrants

http://bursaedge.blogspot.com/2012/02/warrants-education-2.html 

Business Valuation

Day One

Session One: 
• The Discounted Cash Flow Model
• Setting up the Model

Session Two : 
• The Big Picture of DCF Valuation
• Valuation Examples
• The Discount Rate Question

Session Three : 
• Open Q&A

Session Four : 
• Risk premiums and Betas
• The Cost of Debt
• Estimating Cash Flows

Session Five : 
• Estimating Growth Rates
• Estimating Growth Patterns
• The Terminal Value
• Closing Thoughts on DCF valuation

Session Six : 
• Open Q&A

Day Two

Session Seven : 
• Loose Ends in Valuation
-Cash, Cross holdings and other assets
-The Value of Control, Synergy and Transparency
-The Liquidity Discount
-Employee Stock Options

Session Eight : 
• The Allure of Relative Valuation
• Categorizing Multiples
• The Four Steps in Analyzing Multiples

Session Nine : 
• Open Q&A

Session Ten :
• Applying Multiples in Valuation
• Finding Comparable firms
• Controlling for differences
• Picking the Right Multiple

Session Elven :
• The Real Options Story
• The Option to Delay (and valuing patents and natural resource companies)
• The Option to Abandon
• The Option to Expand
• Equity in Troubled firms as options

Session Twelve : 
• Open Q&A

http://events.vccircle.com/events_details.php?event_id=72&ntype=1

China suffers biggest trade deficit in 20 years

Rachel Cooper
March 12, 2012 - 8:04AM

China has recorded its largest trade deficit in more than two decades as Europe's sovereign debt crisis subdued exports and oil imports rocketed.

The country's customs bureau said the shortfall was $US31.5 billion, thought to be its biggest since at least 1989. Imports rose 39.6 per cent from a year earlier, after a 15.3 per cent slump in January, while exports increased 18.4 per cent.

Analysts had expected a deficit as imports rebounded from temporary disruption after the unusually early Lunar New Year in January but they had predicted a greater rise in exports and a smaller increase in imports.

Efforts by Chinese companies to sell to the West have been hampered by the effects of the eurozone debt crisis and an anaemic economic recovery in the United States, although shipments to the US climbed 22.6 per cent from a year earlier to $US19.4b. Overseas sales to the European Union rose 2.2 per cent to $US19.4b after a 3.2 per cent drop in January.

Illustrating the increasing importance of trading with emerging markets, during the first two months of the year trade volumes with Russia jumped 31.9 per cent to $US13.51b.

Imports of copper last month were the second-highest on record, while net crude oil imports increased to a record to meet rising demand as farmers prepare for the planting season and the government adds to emergency stockpiles.

The figures came after statistics on Friday showed China's inflation rate slowing sharply in February and factory output growth also slipping. Data showed that inflation had fallen to 3.2 per cent last month, down from 4.5 per cent in January.

"Overall, economic conditions are getting weaker at a fast pace," said Zhiwei Zhang, a Nomura economist. "The slowdown is happening faster than the government expected."

There is speculation that China's moderating inflation and growth will lead the Government to loosen policy. Citigroup believes a cut in banks' reserve requirements may come as soon as this month.

"We would suggest that the inflation bubble in China last year is well and truly burst, and the policy easing can accelerate," said Gerard Lane, equity strategist at Shore Capital. "This would be beneficial for the likes of miners and other emerging market related stocks."

Song Yu, an economist at Goldman Sachs, suggested that the nation will still see a sizeable trade surplus for the full year as the deficit in early 2012 is largely seasonal.

Data in January and February was distorted by the timing of the New Year holiday, which fell in January this year and February last year.

The Daily Telegraph, London



Read more: http://www.smh.com.au/business/world-business/china-suffers-biggest-trade-deficit-in-20-years-20120312-1ut5z.html#ixzz1oqvZZGTL

Efficient Market Hypothesis: Fact Or Fiction? "Efficient" refers to informational efficiency only.

The efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) in all of its forms, whether strong, semi-strong, or weak, is normative, not positive, i.e., it is an assertion about the way markets should behave in an ideal, utopian world, not a statement about the way markets actually do work in the real, practical world. Simple observation shows that the EMH in all its forms is fallacious. Both Kindleberger and Mackay give historical examples of stock market irrationality and inefficiency.

The efficient markets hypothesis may have advanced many academic careers, but it has not demonstrably increased the wealth of any investor over what would have been created otherwise. The EMH and the related capital asset pricing model, as opposed to the operating enterprise valuation model, may be useful as a standard of market perfection in studies of the market as a whole, but not in the valuation or selection of common stocks for investment.

The term "efficient" in the efficient markets hypothesis refers to informational efficiency only. It does not include mechanical operational efficiency or necessarily societal welfare efficiency.

The EMH explicitly assumes that all market participants have access to the same information in either a strong, semi-strong, or weak sense of the hypothesis.

• This simplifying assumption is chosen because it is necessary for mathematical tractability and thus highly convenient. 
• What makes this assumption unacceptably implausible is the meaning of the term "information" which is often overlooked. 
• Data is not information. Rather, information is data that has been processed and interpreted with judgment based on intelligence, knowledge and experience. 
• Does anyone believe that all market participants are endowed equally, not with access to data, but with the same intelligence, knowledge and experience? 

Competitive, properly-regulated markets may approach the semblance of "data efficiency" in the relative sense of eliminating arbitrage opportunities subject to trading costs and taxes, but no market is efficient in any absolute sense of equating price at all times to intrinsic economic value. This margin between value and price is the major key to successful value investing.

Intrinsic economic valuation versus price bidding in the market.

There are over 5,000 stocks listed on the major U.S. stock exchanges.  Each common stock is continuously changing and never stays the same. Thus the number of stock "deals" is unlimited. 

• You do not have enough time to estimate the intrinsic economic value of every common stock for every moment of every trading session. 
• The competitive, open-outcry, price-auction markets continuously provide bid and ask price quotations. 

Pricing conventions are used to provide a semblance of rationality in lieu of valuation. These conventions include 

• price multiples such as the price/earnings, price/book value, price/dividends, price/cash flow, price/sales and other accounting ratios. 
• Stock pricing conventions vary in applicability and popularity.

Intrinsic economic valuation versus price bidding in the market. 


The stock market participants at the price-setting margin and occasionally the market as a whole are exceedingly irrational. The most important that concerns us is that, in stock market investing, no bidding system can ever replace human judgment and interpretation of the facts based on intelligence, knowledge, and experience.