Thursday 12 January 2012

What's the best way to invest $1million? Peter Lynch

By Peter Lynch   


What's the best way to invest $1million?

Tip one: Don't buy stocks on tips alone. 

If your only reason for picking a stock is that an expert likes it, then what you really need is paid professional help. Mutual funds are a great idea (I ran one once) for folks who want this sort of assistance at a reasonable price. Still, I'm not convinced that having 4,000 equity funds in this country is an entirely positive development. True, most of the cash flooding into these funds comes from retirement and pension contributions, where people can't pick their own stocks. But some of it also has to be pouring in from former stock pickers who failed to invest wisely on their own account and have given up trying. 

One of the oldest sayings on Wall Street is "Let your winners run, and cut your losers." 

When people find a profitable activity -- collecting stamps or rugs, buying old houses and fixing them up -- they tend to keep doing it. Had more individuals succeeded at individual investing, my guess is they'd still be doing it. We wouldn't see so many converts to managed investment care, especially not in the greatest bull market in U.S. history. Halley's comet may return times before we get another market like this. If I'm right, then large numbers of investors must have lost money outright or badly trailed a market that's up eightfold since 1982. How did so many do so poorly? Maybe they traded a new stock every week. Maybe they bought stocks in companies they knew little about, companies with shaky prospects and bad balance sheets. Maybe they didn't follow these companies closely enough to get out when the news got worse. Maybe they    stuck with their losers through thin and thinner, without checking the story. Maybe they bought stock options. Whatever the case, they failed at navigating their own course.

Amateurs can beat the Streat because, well, they're amateurs.

At the risk of repeating myself, I'm convinced that this type of failure is unnecessary -- that amateurs can not only succeed on their own but beat the Street by (a) taking advantage of the fact that they are amateurs and (b) taking advantage of their personal edge. Almost everyone has an edge. It's just a matter of identifying it.

While a fund manager is more or less forced into owning a long list of stocks, an individual has the luxury of owning just a few. That means you can afford to be choosy and invest only in outfits that you understand and that have a superior product or franchise with clear opportunities for expansion. You can wait until the company repeats its successful formula in several places or markets (same-store sales on the rise, earnings on the rise) before you buy the first share.

If you put together a portfolio of five to ten of these high achievers, there's a decent chance one of them will turn out to be a 10-, a 20-, or even a 50-bagger, where you can make 10, 20, or 50 times your investment. With your stake divided among a handful of issues, all it takes is a couple of gains of this magnitude in a lifetime to produce superior returns.

One of the oldest sayings on Wall Street is "Let your winners run, and cut your losers." It's easy to make a mistake and do the opposite, pulling out the flowers and watering the weeds. Warren Buffett quoted me on this point in one of his famous annual reports (as thrilling to me as getting invited to the White House). If you're lucky enough to have one golden egg in your portfolio, it may not matter if you have a couple of rotten ones in there with it. Let's say you have a portfolio of six stocks. Two of them are average, two of them are below average, and one is a real loser. But you also have one stellar performer. Your [Image]Coca-Cola, your [Image]Gillette. A stock that reminds you why you invested in the first place. In other words, you don't have to be right all the time to do well in stocks. If you find one great growth company and own it long enough to let the profits run, the gains should more than offset mediocre results from other stocks in your portfolio.

Look around you for good stocks. Down the road, you won't regret it.

A lot of people mistakenly think they must search far and wide to find a company with this sort of potential. In fact, many such companies are hard to ignore. They show up down the block or inside the house. They stare us in the face.

This is where it helps to have identified your personal investor's edge. What is it that you know a lot about? Maybe your edge comes from your profession or a hobby. Maybe it comes just from being a parent. An entire generation of Americans grew up on [Image]Gerber's baby food, and Gerber's stock was a 100-bagger. If you put your money where your baby's mouth was, you turned $10,000 into $1 million. Fifty-baggers like [Image]Home Depot, [Image]Wal-Mart, and Dunkin' Donuts were obvious success stories to large crowds of do-it-yourselfers, shoppers, and policemen. Mention any of these at a party, though, and you're likely to get the predictable reaction: "Chances like that don't come along anymore."

Ah, but they do. Take Microsoft -- I wish I had.

You didn't need a Ph.D. to figure out that Microsoft was going to be powerful.
I avoided buying technology stocks if I didn't understand the technology, but I've begun to rethink that rule. You didn't need a Ph.D. in programming to recognize the way computers were becoming a bigger and bigger part of our lives, or to figure out that Microsoft owned the rights to MS-DOS, the operating system used in a vast majority of the world's PCs.

It's hard to believe the almighty Microsoft has been a public company for only 11 years. If you bought it during the initial public offering, at 78 cents a share (adjusted for splits), you've made 100 times your money. But Apple was the dominant company at the time, so maybe you waited until 1988, when Microsoft had had a chance to prove itself.

By then, you would have realized that [Image]IBM and all its clones were using Microsoft's operating system, MS-DOS. IBM and the clones could fight it out for market share, but Microsoft would prosper regardless of who won. This is the old combat theory of investing: When there's a war going on, don't buy the companies that are doing the fighting; buy the companies that sell the bullets. In this case, Microsoft was selling the bullets. The stock has risen 25-fold since 1988.

The next time Microsoft might have got your attention was 1992, when Windows 3.1 made its debut. Three million copies were sold in six weeks. If you bought the stock on the strength of that product, you've quadrupled your money to date. Then, at the end of 1995, Windows 95 was released, with more than 7 million copies sold in three months and 40 million copies as of this writing. If you bought the stock on the Windows 95 debut, you've doubled your money.

If you missed the boat on Microsoft, there are still other technology stocks you can buy into.

Many parents with children in college or high school (I'm one of them) have had to step around the wiring crews as they installed the newfangled campuswide computer networks. Much of this work is being done by Cisco Systems, a company that recently wired two campuses my daughters have attended. Cisco is another opportunity a lot of people had a chance to notice. Its earnings have been growing at a rapid rate, and the stock is a 100-bagger already. No matter who ends up winning the battle of the Internet, Cisco is selling its bullets to various combatants.

Computer buyers who can't tell a microchip from a potato chip still could have spotted the intel inside label on every machine being carried out of the computer stores. Not surprisingly, [Image]Intel has been a 25-bagger to date: The company makes the dominant product in the industry.

Early on, it was obvious Intel had a huge lead on its competitors. The Pentium scare of 1994 gave you a chance to pick up a bargain. If you bought at the low in 1994, you've more than quintupled your investment, and if you bought at the high, you've more than quadrupled it.

Physicians, nurses, candy stripers, patients with heart problems -- a huge potential audience could have noticed the brisk business done by medical-device manufacturers Medtronics, a 20-bagger, and Saint Jude Medical, a 30-bagger.

There are ways you can keep yourself from gaining on the good growth companies.
There are two ways investors can fake themselves out of the big returns that come from great growth companies.

The first is waiting to buy the stock when it looks cheap. Throughout its 27-year rise from a split-adjusted 1.6 cents to $23, Wal-Mart never looked cheap compared with the overall market. Its price-to-earnings ratio rarely dropped below 20, but Wal-Mart's earnings were growing at 25 to 30 percent a year. A key point to remember is that a p/e of 20 is not too much to pay for a company that's growing at 25 percent. Any business that can manage to keep up a 20 to 25 percent growth rate for 20 years will reward shareholders with a massive return even if the stock market overall is lower after 20 years.

The second mistake is underestimating how long a great growth company can keep up the pace. In the 1970s I got interested in [Image]McDonald's. A chorus of colleagues said golden arches were everywhere and McDonald's had seen its best days. I checked for myself and found that even in California, where McDonald's originated, there were fewer McDonald's outlets than there were branches of the Bank of America. McDonald's has been a 50-bagger since.

These "nowhere to grow" stories come up quite often and should be viewed skeptically. Don't believe them until you check for yourself. Look carefully at where the company does business and at how much growing room is left. I can't predict the future of Cisco Systems, but it doesn't suffer from a lack of potential customers: Only 10 to 20 percent of the schools have been wired into networks, and don't forget about office buildings, hospitals, and government agencies nationwide. [Image]Petsmart is hardly at the end of its rope -- its 320 stores are in only 34 states.

Whether or not a company has growing room may have nothing to do with its age. A good example is [Image]Consolidated Products, the parent of the Steak & Shake chain that's been flipping burgers since 1934. Steak & Shake has 210 outlets in only 12 states; 78 of the outlets are in St. Louis and Indianapolis. Obviously, the company has a lot of expansion ahead of it. With 160 continuous quarters of increased earnings over 40 years, Consolidated has been a steady grower and a terrific investment, even in a lousy market for fast food in general.

Sometimes depressed industries can produce high returns.

The best companies often thrive even as their competitors struggle to survive. Until recently, the airline sector has been a terrible place to put money, but if you had invested $1,000 in [Image]Southwest Airlines in 1973, you would have had $460,000 after 20 years. Big Steel has disappointed investors for years, but [Image]Nucor has generated terrific returns. [Image]Circuit City has done well as other electronics retailers have suffered. While the Baby Bells have toddled, a new competitor, [Image]WorldCom, has been a 20-bagger in seven years.

Depressed industries, such as broadcasting and cable television, telecommunications, retail, and restaurants, are likely places to start a research list of potential bargains. If business improves from lousy to mediocre, investors are often rewarded, and they're rewarded again when mediocre turns to good and good turns to excellent. Oil drillers are in the middle of such a recovery, with some stocks delivering tenfold returns in the past 18 months. Yet it took a decade of lousy before they even got to mediocre. Readers of my column in Worth learned of the potential in this long-suffering sector in February 1995.

Retail and restaurants haven't been performing well -- but they're two of Lynch's favorite areas.
Retail and restaurants are two of the worst-performing industries in recent memory, and both are among my favorite research areas. I've taken a beating in a number of retail stocks (some of which I still like and have continued to buy), but the general decline hasn't stopped Staples, [Image]Borders, Petsmart, [Image]Finish Line, and [Image]Pier 1 Imports from rewarding shareholders. Two of my daughters and my wife, Carolyn, have continued to shop at Pier 1, reminding me of its popularity. The stock has doubled in the past 18 months.

A glut in casual-dining outlets didn't hurt [Image]Outback Steakhouse, and a surplus of pizza parlors didn't bother [Image]Papa John's, whose stock was a double last year. [Image]CKE Restaurants -- whose operations include the Carl's Jr. restaurants -- has been a profitable turnaround play in California.

You can even find bargain stocks in this market that have been overlooked.

So far, we've been talking about growth companies on the move, but even in this so-called extravagant market, there are plenty of bargains among the laggards. Of the nearly 4,000 IPOs in the past five years, several hundred have missed the rally on Wall Street. From the class of 1995, 37 percent, or 202 companies, are selling below their IPO price. From the class of 1996, 33 percent, or 285, now trade below their offering price. So much for the average investor's never having a chance to profit from an offering. In more than half the cases, you can wait a few months and buy these stocks cheaper than the institutions that were cut in on the original deals.

As the Dow has hit new records week after week, many small companies have been ignored. In 1995 and 1996, the Standard & Poor's 500 Stock Index was up 69 percent, but the Russell 2000 index of smaller issues was up only 44 percent. And while the Nasdaq market rose 25 percent in 1996, a lot of this gain can be attributed to just three stocks: Intel, Microsoft, and Oracle. Half the stocks on the Nasdaq were up less than 6.9 percent during 1996.

That's not to say owning these laggards will protect you if the bottom drops out of the market. If that happens, the stocks that didn't go up will go down just as hard and fast as the stocks that did. I learned that lesson in the 1971Ð73 bear market. Before the selling was over, companies that looked cheap by any measure got much cheaper. McDonald's dropped from $15 a share to $4. I thought Kaiser Industries was a steal at $13, but it also fell to $4. At that point, this asset-rich conglomerate, with holdings in aluminum, steel, real estate, cement, fiberglass, and broadcasting, was trading at a market value equal to the price of four airplanes.

Wondering when you should exit the market? Use Lynch's rule of thumb.

Should we all exit the market to avoid the correction? Some people did that when the Dow hit 3000, 4000, 5000, and 6000. A confirmed stock picker sticks with stocks until he or she can't find a single issue worth buying. The only time I took a big position in bonds was in 1982, when inflation was running at double digits and long-term U.S. Treasurys were yielding 13 to 14 percent. I didn't buy bonds for defensive purposes. I bought them because 13 to 14 percent was a better return than the 10 to 11 percent stocks have returned historically. I have since followed this rule: When yields on long-term government bonds exceed the dividend yield on the S&P 500 by 6 percent or more, sell stocks and buy bonds. As I write this, the yield on the S&P is about 2 percent and long-term government bonds pay 6.8 percent, so we're only 1.2 percent away from the danger zone. Stay tuned.

So, what advice would I give to someone with $1 million to invest? The same I'd give to any investor: Find your edge and put it to work by adhering to the following rules:
With every stock you own, keep track of its story in a logbook. Note any new developments and pay close attention to earnings. Is this a growth play, a cyclical play, or a value play? Stocks do well for a reason and do poorly for a reason. Make sure you know the reasons.

Stocks do well for a reason, and poorly for a reason.

  1. *Pay attention to facts, not forecasts.
  2. *Ask yourself: What will I make if I'm right, and what could I lose if I'm wrong? Look for a risk-reward ratio of three to one or better.
  3. *Before you invest, check the balance sheet to see if the company is financially sound.
  4. *Don't buy options, and don't invest on margin. With options, time works against you, and if you're on margin, a drop in the market can wipe you out.
  5. *When several insiders are buying the company's stock at the same time, it's a positive.
  6. *Average investors should be able to monitor five to ten companies at a time, but nobody is forcing you to own any of them. If you like seven, buy seven. If you like three, buy three. If you like zero, buy zero.
  7. *Be patient. The stocks that have been most rewarding to me have made their greatest gains in the third or fourth year I owned them. A few took ten years.
  8. *Enter early -- but not too early. I often think of investing in growth companies in terms of baseball. Try to join the game in the third inning, because a company has proved itself by then. If you buy before the lineup is announced, you're taking an unnecessary risk. There's plenty of time (10 to 15 years in some cases) between the third and the seventh innings, which is where the 10- to 50-baggers are made. If you buy in the late innings, you may be too late.
  9. *Don't buy "cheap" stocks just because they're cheap. Buy them because the fundamentals are improving.
  10. *Buy small companies after they've had a chance to prove they can make a profit.
  11. *Long shots usually backfire or become "no shots."
  12. *If you buy a stock for the dividend, make sure the company can comfortably afford to pay the dividend out of its earnings, even in an economic slump.
  13. *Investigate ten companies and you're likely to find one with bright prospects that aren't reflected in the price. Investigate 50 and you're likely to find 5.

Wednesday 11 January 2012

An investor in a company has 3 sources of potential returns: Value versus Growth Investing

An investor in a company has 3 sources of potential returns:
1. dividends,
2. exploiting the disparity between stock price and intrinsic value, and
3. long-term growth in intrinsic value.

Benjamin Graham said that the stock market is a voting machine in the short run and a weighing machine in the long run.

Implicit in this statement is the idea that the price of the stock and the intrinsic value of the company will tend to coincide over the long term.


Value Investing


An investor in a value (no growth) company has 2 sources of potential returns:
1. dividends,
2. exploiting the disparity between stock price and intrinsic value.

However, it is possible that the stock price may remain well below the intrinsic value for a long period.

If a major component of the expected return from a stock is the narrowing of the disparity between the stock price and the intrinsic value, a lengthy delay in closing that disparity would diminish the return from that stock.



Growth Investing

An investor in a growth company has 3 sources of potential returns:
1. dividends,
2. exploiting the disparity between stock price and intrinsic value, and
3. long-term growth in intrinsic value.

Far too often, growth companies choose not to pay a current dividend. This practice reflects management's opinion that retained earnings are better invested in growing the business.

For those fortunate growth companies that can concurrently grow and generate free cash flow, a dividend can be an important source of return for investors.

Eventually, all growth companies become mature. If the management has developed the business properly so that the company has a significant and sustainable free cash flow, a substantial dividend payout can, in come cases, exceed the original purchase price of the stock.

A careful investor in growth companies should always seek to exploit any disparities between stock price and intrinsic value, especially at the time of purchase. 




Growth Investing versus Value Investing


"Its better to buy a wonderful company at fair price than a fair company at wonderful price."

While a value company investor must pay below intrinsic value in order to achieve a reasonable return, a growth company investor must seek to purchase the stock at a price of fair value or less.

If you buy stock in a growth company with an intrinsic value of $10 a share and the intrinsic value grows by 15% per year, in 5 years the stock will be worth $20; in 10 years, it will be worth $40; and in 15 years, it will be worth $80 in intrinsic value.

Even at a 10 percent annual growth rate, after 7 years, the company's intrinsic value would have grown from $10 per share to $20. After 14 years, it would have grown to $40; and after 21 years, it would have grown to $80.

Tuesday 10 January 2012

Avoiding "BAD" Growth

Investing in growth companies would be a lot easier if all business growth were created equal, but, unfortunately, it is not.

Investors must be wary of "bad" growth.  By bad growth, we mean growth in a business that is likely to produce an unattractive return on the capital invested to generate that growth.

For instance, although all the major airlines were able to achieve substantial growth of their business, Southwest Airlines was the only carrier that was able to generate a level of retun on invested capital that justified the rapid reinvestment in the business. 

Bad growth often stems from a "growth for growth's sake" mentality that results in costly acquired growth or misguided attempts to diversify the business. 

Investors shold be wary of growth initiatives that depend on the integration of sizable acquired businesses or that stray from a company's core mission.

Saturday 7 January 2012

Speculative-Growth Stocks - Conclusion: Numbers Matter

Some investors like to have a gut feeling about the business they are buying.

In the speculative-growth market, unfortunately, that's often difficult.  

Many of these companies are bringing new concepts to market, and in the case of Internet companies, they're doing it in a new and evolving medium.

Experience can be a poor judge of their viability.

Five years ago in 1994, it would have been hard to believe that an Internet company (Internet?  What's that?) would have a market capitalization of more than $100 billion by the end of 1999.

And that may be a good lesson for investing in the speculative-growth market:  Trust the numbers, not your gut.

Sure, Yahoo is a risk.  The Internet is still evolving, and could look very different a few years from now.

But a disciplined analysis of its financial statements indicates that Yahoo is making increasingly efficient use of its assets, generating consistent sales growth, increasing net margins, and delivering cash from operations.

That's what we want from a speculative-growth stock.


Comment:  The Internet bubble burst in 2000.  To make profit in your investments, valuations and earnings were as important then as now.


Speculative-Growth Stocks - Is it Fairly Valued?

Valuation is tough for speculative-growth companies, and it's especially tough for an Internet company like Yahoo.

Many of these companies have no earnings, and even when they do, ordinary valuation methods such as price/earnings rations tend to go out the window.

One popular way to value Internet companies is to look at the price/sales ratio and compare them with similar companies.

At the end of 1999, Yahoo traded for more than 200 times sales.  That's more expensive than any of the other major Internet stocks, such as dBay EBAY (120 times sales), America Online AOL (30 times sales), or Amazon (22 times sales).

Even among the notoriously pricey Internet stocks, Yahoo is expensive - but you could make a case that its huge audience and consistent profitability make it worth a premium.


Comment:  The Internet bubble soon burst in 2000.

Speculative-Growth Stocks - How Has the Stock Performed?

Since it started trading in 1996, Yahoo's stock has shot into the stratosphere along with many other Internet stocks in 1999.

It returned over 500% in both 1997 and 1998, and more than 200% in 1999.

Such performance is certainly impressive, but will be hard to maintain.

Speculative growth stocks in general, and Internet stocks in particular, are fragile.  They can crumble on a whisper of bad news and rally on an encouraging rumour, so be prepared for plenty of volatility.

There's not much you can do about that; to get those highs, you have to risk the lows.


Speculative-Growth Stocks - What Has Growth Done to the Balance Sheet?

Like most speculative-growth companies, Yahoo in 1999 doesn't generate enough cash internally to pay for an aggressive expansion.

It must look outside for capital - either by borrowing or by issuing stock in the equity markets.

Given the market's ravenous appetite for Internet stocks over the late 90s, Yahoo has understandably financed most of its expansion with equity.

It had its initial public offering in 1996, and since then it has issued stock to pay for its many acquisitions.

It has little long-term debt, which means it doesn't have to worry about interest payments.

Overall, its balance sheet looks very healthy.

In contrast, Amazon.com AMZN, another highly successful Internet company, has borrowed over $2 billion and is highly leveraged in 1999.

Speculative-Growth Stocks - Is the Business Generating Cash?

A company can make a profit without generating any cash.

  • It might, for example, plow every penny that rolls through the door into inventory.  
  • Or, it may slash prices in order to log sales.  Receivables will rise, but the sales won't bring in any cash.

Neither of these decisions is necessarily bad, but each raises the risk that a company will face a financial crunch.  The inventories won't sell, or a company will fail to collect on its receivables.

That;s why its often a good idea to look at cash flow in addition to earnings.

To find a company's cash flow from operations, go to its Financials Report pages.

For Yahoo, we find that its operating cash flow improved from $ -15 million in 1997 to $216 million in 1999.  That means that the company has generated even more cash than its net income indicates - generally a good sign.

If we take cash flow from operations and subtract capital spending (money spent on property, plant, and equipment), the result is free cash flow, or the cash left over after investing in the growth of the business.

Yahoo's business doesn't require a lot of capital to grow, so its capital spending has been modest.  It's free cash flow was a healthy $59 million in 1998 and $167 million 1999.  Yahoo is generating plenty of cash in those years.


Anwar says will end racial discrimination if elected PM


By Shazwan Mustafa Kamal

January 07, 2012
PETALING JAYA, Jan 7 — Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim pledged last night he would rid the country of the “culture” of racial discrimination if he is elected prime minister, affirming that Pakatan Rakyat would uphold the rights of all races.
The PKR de facto leader said he would abolish the PTPTN undergraduate loan system, and not burden the poor with such mechanisms.

Anwar speaking at the ceramah in Subang Jaya on January 6, 2012. — Picture by Choo Choy May
“We will assist and help all races, that is our difference compared to Umno,” he proclaimed to a 2,000-strong crowd at a ceramah in Subang Jaya.
Anwar pointed out that upholding Islam did not give any Muslim the right to insult or bully non-Muslims, and that this act was against Malay cultural norms.
He recalled a time when a Chinese student (whom he named as Sui Lin) came to him to ask for financial aid to further her studies, and that her family could not afford to pay the university fees.
“This will be my stand. God willing when I get to Putrajaya I will make sure Sui Lin is protected as my daughter is.
“It is conscience, we need to have conscience,” Anwar said.
The 64-year-old grandfather charged that Barisan Nasional’s failure to govern the country has led to rampant corruption.
“The problem is that our system defends the corrupted,” said Anwar, specifically focusing on the scandal surrounding ....


Read more here:

Financial Ratio Tutorial

Financial Ratio Tutorial
By Richard Loth (Contact | Biography)

When it comes to investing, analyzing financial statement information (also known as quantitative analysis), is one of, if not the most important element in the fundamental analysis process. At the same time, the massive amount of numbers in a company's financial statements can be bewildering and intimidating to many investors. However, through financial ratio analysis, you will be able to work with these numbers in an organized fashion.

The objective of this tutorial is to provide you with a guide to sources of financial statement data, to highlight and define the most relevant ratios, to show you how to compute them and to explain their meaning as investment evaluators.

In this regard, we draw your attention to the complete set of financials for Zimmer Holdings, Inc. (ZMH), a publicly listed company on the NYSE that designs, manufactures and markets orthopedic and related surgical products, and fracture-management devices worldwide. We've provided these statements in order to be able to make specific reference to the account captions and numbers in Zimmer's financials in order to illustrate how to compute all the ratios.

Among the dozens of financial ratios available, we've chosen 30 measurements that are the most relevant to the investing process and organized them into six main categories as per the following list:



  • 1) Liquidity Measurement Ratios



  • 2) Profitability Indicator Ratios



  • 3) Debt Ratios



  • 4) Operating Performance Ratios



  • 5) Cash Flow Indicator Ratios



  • 6) Investment Valuation Ratios



  • Read more: http://www.investopedia.com/university/ratios/#ixzz1iiTyzb3S



    Also read:

    7 Courses Finance Students Should Take

    http://myinvestingnotes.blogspot.com/2011/12/7-courses-finance-students-should-take.html

    Efficient Market Hypothesis: Fact Or Fiction?


    Published in Investing on 5 January 2012


    Our economics series looks at the question of whether we really can beat the market.
    How many times have you heard a would-be private investor saying something like: "You can't beat the game, because the big institutions always get the information ahead of you and get in first"?
    If you believe that, you might be a proponent of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, which says that because the financial world is efficient in terms of information, it is impossible to consistently beat the market based on what you know when you choose where to put your money.
    The idea was first developed by the economist Eugene Fama in the 1960s, following on from his observations that the day-to-day movements of the stock market resemble a random walk as much as anything else. And for a while, it came to be pretty much accepted as fact.
    On the face of it, it does seem reasonable. Given that everyone has access to the same information, and there is a truly free price-setting equilibrium in which the balance of supply and demand is the determining factor in setting share prices (as it pretty much is with any free-traded commodity), surely the price will reflect all of the information available at the time, and you can't beat the market.

    Fine in the short term

    In the short term, the idea seems pretty much spot-on. New results are released and they look good, and you try to get in 'ahead of the market' to profit from them? Well, no matter how quick you are, it's too late and the price has already jumped. That's really no surprise, because the sellers of the shares have the same new information too, and the equilibrium point between supply and demand will instantly change.
    But in the longer term, the Efficient Market Hypothesis is widely considered to be flawed. In fact, if you believed it held true over serious investing timescales, you probably wouldn't be reading this -- you'd have all your investing cash in a tracker fund and you'd be spending your spare time doing something else. (And that's actually not a bad idea at all, but it's perhaps something for another day).
    There is plenty of empirical evidence that the market is what Paul Samuelson described as "micro-efficient" but "macro-inefficient", such that it holds true for individual prices over the short term but fails to explain longer-term whole-market movements.

    Long term? Hmm!

    And there are others, including the noted contrarian investor David Dreman, who argue that this "micro efficiency" is no efficiency at all, claiming instead that short-term response to news is not what investors should be interested in, but the longer-term picture for a company. It's pretty clear which side of that argument Foolish investors will come down on.
    So why doesn't it work in the long run, and how is it possible to beat the market even in the presence of the ubiquity of news and an instantly adjusting price mechanism? Well, the major flaw is that the theory assumes that all participants in the market will act rationally, and that the price of a share will always reflect a truly objective assessment of its real value. Or at least that the balance of opinion at any one time will even out to provide an aggregate rational valuation.
    It doesn't take a trained economist to realise what nonsense that can be. Any armchair observer who watched supposedly rational investors push internet shares up to insane valuations during the tech share boom around the year 2000 saw just how the madness of crowds can easily overcome calm rationality.
    And the same is true of the recent credit crunch, when panicking investors climbed aboard the 'sell, sell, sell' bandwagon, pushing prices for many a good company down to seriously undervalued levels. What happens is that human emotion just about always outstrips rationality -- good things are seen as much better than they really are, and bad things much worse.

    Irrational expectations

    And it's not just these periods of insanity, either. There is, for example, strong evidence that shares with a low price-to-earnings ratio, low price-to-cash-flow ratio and so on, tend to outperform the market in the long run. And high-expectation growth shares are regularly afforded irrationally high valuations, and end up reverting to the norm and failing to outperform in the long term.
    So what does that all say about the Efficient Market Hypothesis? Well, it certainly contributes to understanding how markets work, but we also need to include emotion, cognitive bias, short-term horizons and all sorts of other human failings in the overall equation.
    And that means we can beat the market average in the long term, if we stick to objective valuation measures, don't let short-term excitements and panics sway us, and rein in our usual human over-optimism and over-pessimism.

    6 Reasons You're A Bad Investor


    BY  James Early
    Published in Investing on 5 January 2012

    These mental traps may be killing your portfolio.
    Made a New Year's resolution? You won't keep it.
    Or at least there's a 78% chance you won't, according to a study reported in The Guardian a few years back.
    But you knew the odds were against you, as years of failure have taught most of us already. Yet we continue to make resolutions... and continue to fail by allowing our brains to work against us. Fortunately, for you, people fail just as often -- if not more so -- with their investing.
    This gives you a great opportunity to help improve your profits in the market: by noticing and controlling the psychological failings in your own investing. Indeed, these mental traps may be killing your portfolio!

    1. Framing errors

    "Which do you enjoy more: peas or carrots?" assumes that you enjoy either peas or carrots. You probably do, but together, our mental questions and perspectives often limit our thinking.
    Erroneously comparing shares of different risks -- such as comparing the upside of a penny share to a stalwart such as National Grid (LSE: NG) -- and evaluating shares on short-term criteria (if you're a long-term investor) are classic mistakes. Fight it by taking the broadest, most rational view of your agenda, and question all your assumptions.

    2. Confirmation bias

    Isn't it splendid to see a positive article on a share we already own? It makes us feel quite smart. We all revel in support for our own ideas, and prefer to conveniently forget about conflicting evidence.
    Indeed, before the financial crash, many of us remained tethered to old views about bank shares, despite the changing facts. Even HSBC (LSE: HSBA) -- one of the better banks -- saw its shares more than halve. The remedy is to forcibly seek out contrary views.

    3. Consistency bias

    You've convinced your wife that a share is a good buy. You've told your neighbours, and your workmates know as well. If you're like me, you've written about it on the internet, too. And then you find a bit of incriminating evidence that you missed. What do you do?
    Rationally, we all know what's best -- but if we're honest, we have to acknowledge the strong pull to appear consistent. In life, how many times do thought leaders in a field actually admit to a mistaken idea? As with oppressive dictatorships, it's usually only by the previous generation dying off that change really happens.
    Consistency bias is incredibly powerful and, incidentally, I'm sticking to what I've said on the topic, no matter what.

    4. Recency bias

    Your football team has lost two consecutive matches. Heads need to roll. Because recent events generate stronger, more 'real' feelings to us, we weight them more in our mind, even if they don't deserve it.
    Momentum investors thrive on recency bias, but fundamental sorts -- and if you're reading this, odds are, you're probably a fundamental investor -- would do well to turn the volume down on the latest news. The media doesn't make it easy, though.

    5. Herd instinct

    We're drawn to the 'safety' in numbers, even if that safety doesn't exist. Ditto for City analysts, who often find it safest to predict roughly the same thing everyone else is predicting, with a few tweaks made for the sake of appearance. We at The Motley Fool aim to help you here, as we tend to be a bit quirky for City work in the first place.

    6. Survivorship bias

    For every long-term corporate winner -- be it a utility such as Vodafone (LSE: VOD) or something more industrial such as BHP Billiton (LSE: BLT) -- often hundreds of losers have fought and lost the battle for dominance.
    We don't hear much about the losers, but focusing on the winners gives us a false picture of the competitive fire through which they, and their many fallen peers, almost certainly passed en route.

    Cognitive biases

    These are just a sample of the psychological traps we can fall into, and I'd invite you to Google 'cognitive biases' for many more. You'll notice a common theme: they're mental shortcuts -- heuristics, as we say -- that actually serve the caveman rather well. Less so the investing man.
    And probably the forgetful New Year's man as well.
    Trying to sidestep these mental biases is less sexy than chasing the next big penny share. It's a methodical, slow and boring process, which rarely shows an immediate benefit. Yet in my view, slow and steady is what successful fundamental investing tends to look like. 



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    http://www.fool.co.uk/news/investing/2012/01/05/6-reasons-youre-a-bad-investor.aspx?source=ufwflwlnk0000001

    How Long Is A Piece of Value?


    How long do you wait for a value share to out? There's no easy answer.
    You hear the term "value trap" used about a share offering ostensible value but which never seems to rise in order to realise what the investor perceives as its undervalue. I don't much like this expression because it suggests that the share will never out, and I'd guess it is probably used by disillusioned investors who have held for some time and are fed up with waiting.
    I think most, if not all, value players -- certainly including myself -- have experienced this disillusionment. I'm not referring to a situation where the fundies have deteriorated so the value has actually been outed, though on the downside. That would be a clear sell to a value investor, even if a loss was the outcome.
    I'm talking about a situation that continues to offer value in the investor's view, yet other investors, the market if you like, continue to disagree and stubbornly refuse to price up the share. It may have net cash, be on a low P/E, a high yield, trade below tangible book and any combination of these and other classic value criteria. And yet this goes on for years and you are scoring little or no profit or maybe losing.

    To dump or not to dump?

    To dump or not to dump? That is the question. Okay, if it has a decent yield, at least you are compensated to some extent for holding over a long period, which is one reason why I like a good yield in my particular version of the value game, the other being that yield is also a value indicator. But we're not here for the income, this is a capital gains approach and therefore thought should be given to what to do with a long-held play that just hasn't done the business despite all the indicators suggesting that it ought to have.
    The basic faith of the value player is that, sooner or later, value must out -- it just must because it is seen as an anomaly that will be arbed out by the market eventually. But I don't see any way to estimate when "eventually" will occur. In an extreme case, it may not be even within the investor's practical investing lifetime -- especially if, like me now, they were grave dodgers when they first bought the share.
    I have read at least one value writer who advocates selling a play that hasn't performed within a given period. I forget the exact details but let's say it's five years. If, after that time, it hasn't done it for you, then even if it continues to offer value, his view was that you should sell because it has become a value trap.

    Better out than in?

    But consider this. After those five years, a new value player arrives on the scene and discovers your share which, remember, still has attractive fundies. Because she is new to the share, she has no reason to share your disillusionment and on the contrary will be enthused by it.
    So who is right? The weary old value player who has seen no action over five years and is seriously on the verge of dumping it, or the new value player who spies a potentially lucrative opportunity? If we assume they both have similar skills at spotting plays using the same criteria, they can't both be right.
    The answer has to be that the new investor's opinion is the right one and that in consequence the existing holder should stay in. Tomorrow might be the day it outs. Or it might go another five years of nowhere, that's the risk both the existing and the new player takes.
    This then begs the question whether the fact that a value share has done nothing for many years increases or decreases its attractions, or is irrelevant. Several arguments could be made either way. For example, the fact of not having outed for a long time could mean that it is now nearer doing so. But it could also mean  that not enough investors care about it, so that it may go on for a further lengthy period out in the cold. The best answer in my view is that it's irrelevant.
    The bottom line for me is that there is not really such a thing as a value trap, they are probably just value shares that haven't yet outed and we cannot know when that may occur. I accept that it is certainly exceedingly frustrating to hold a play for years and to see it doing nothing despite continuing good fundies. I've been there myself many times.
    This creates a great temptation to dump it, but to counter that, imagine you are a new value investor coming at it without the knowledge of its past price action. You'd buy, so why sell?
    And that's why I have always said that enormous patience is required for the strategy.