Value Investors are absolute-performance oriented and are willing to hold cash when no bargains are available

Value investors, by contrast, are absolute-performance oriented; they are interested in returns only insofar as they relate to the achievement of their own investment goals, not how they compare with the way the overall market or other investors are faring. Good absolute performance is obtained by purchasing undervalued securities while selling holdings that be come more fully valued. For most investors absolute returns are the only ones that really matter; you cannot, after all, spend relative performance.

Absolute-performance-oriented investors usually take a longer-term perspective than relative-performance-oriented investors. A relative-performance-oriented investor is generally unwilling or unable to tolerate long periods of underperformance and therefore invests in whatever is currently popular. To do otherwise would jeopardize near-term results. Relative-performance-oriented investors may actually shun situations that clearly offer attractive absolute returns over the long run if making them would risk near-term underperformance. By contrast, absolute-performance-oriented investors are likely to prefer out-of-favor holdings that may take longer to come to fruition but also carry less risk of loss.

One significant difference between an absolute- and relative-performance orientation is evident in the different strategies for investing available cash. Relative-performance-oriented investors will typically choose to be fully invested at all times, since cash balances would likely cause them to lag behind a rising market.  Since the goal is at least to match and optimally be at the market, any cash that is not promptly spent on specific investments must nevertheless be invested in a market-related index.

Absolute-performance-oriented investors, by contrast, are willing to hold cash reserves when no bargains are available.

• Cash is liquid and provides a modest , sometimes attractive nominal return, usually above the rate of inflation. 
• The liquidity of cash affords flexibility, for it can quickly be channeled into other investment outlets with minimal transaction costs. 
• Finally, unlike any other holding, cash doe s not involve any risk of incurring opportunity cost (losses from the inability to take advantage of future bargains) since it does not drop in value during market declines.

Three central elements to a value-investment philosophy.

There are three central elements to a value-investment philosophy.

• First, value investing is a bottom-up strategy entailing the identification of specific undervalued investment opportunities.
• Second, value investing is absolute-performance,  not relative performance oriented. 
• Finally, value investing is a risk-averse approach; attention is paid as much to what can go wrong (risk) as to what can go right (return)

It is hard to prove an overly optimistic investor wrong in the short run

To some extent value, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder; virtually any security may appear to be a bargain to someone. It is hard to prove an overly optimistic investor wrong in the short run since value is not precisely measurable and since stocks can remain overvalued for a long time. Accordingly, the buyer of virtually any security can claim to be a value investor at least for a while.

Ironically, many true value investors fell into disfavor during the late 1980s. As they avoided participating in the fully valued and overvalued securities that the value pretenders claimed to be bargains, many of them temporarily underperformed the results achieved by the value pretenders . The mos t conservative were actually criticized for their "excessive" caution, prudence that proved well founded in 1990.

Even today many of the value pretenders have not been defrocked of their value-investor mantle. There were many articles in financial periodicals chronicling the poor investment results posted by many so-called value investors in 1990. The top of the list, needless to say, was dominated by va lue pretenders

Whitney Houston dead at age 48

Fantasia Barrino - Summertime

Avoiding loss should be the primary goal of every investor

Warren Buffett likes to say that the first rule of investing is "Don't lose money," and the second rule is, "Never forget the first rule." I too believe that avoiding loss should be the primary goal of every investor. This does not mean that investors should never incur the risk of any loss at all. Rather "don't lose money" means that over several years an investment portfolio should not be exposed to appreciable loss of principal.

While no one wishes to incur losses, you couldn't prove it from an examination of the behavior of most investors and speculators. The speculative urge that lies within most of us is strong; the prospect of a free lunch can be compelling, especially when others have already seemingly partaken. It can be hard to concentrate on potential losses while others are greedily reaching for gains and your broker is on the phone offering shares in the latest "hot" initial public offering. Yet the avoidance of loss is the surest way to ensure a profitable outcome.

A loss-avoidance strategy is at odds with recent conventional market wisdom. Today many people believe that risk comes, not from owning stocks, but from not owning them. Stocks as a group, this line of thinking goes, will outperform bonds or cash equivalents over time, just as they have in the past. Indexing is one manifestation of this view. The tendency of most institutional investors to be fully invested at all times is another.

There is an element of truth to this notion; stocks do figure to outperform bonds and cash over the years. Being junior in a company's capital structure and lacking contractual cash flows and maturity dates, equities are inherently riskier than debt instruments. In a corporate liquidation, for example, the equity only receives the residual after all liabilities are satisfied.  To persuade investors to venture into equities rather than safer debt instruments, they must be enticed by the prospect of higher returns. However, the actual risk of a particular investment cannot be determined from historical data. It depends on the price paid. If enough investors believe the argument that equities will offer the best long-term returns, they may pour money into stocks, bidding prices up to levels at which they no longer offer the superior returns. The risk of loss stemming from equity's place in the capital structure is exacerbated by paying a higher price.

Waiting for the Right Pitch

For a value investor a pitch must not only be in the strike zone, it must be in his "sweet spot."  Results will be best when the investor is not pressured to invest prematurely.  There may be times when the investor does not lift the bat from his shoulder, the cheapest security in an overvalued market may still be overvalued.  You wouldn't want to settle for an investment offering a safe 10 percent return if you thought it very likely that another offering an equally safe 15 percent return would soon materialize.

An investment must be purchased at a discount from underlying worth.  This makes it a good absolute value.  Being a good absolute value alone, however, is not sufficient for investors must choose only the best absolute values among those that are currently available.  A stock trading at one-half of the underlying value may be attractive, but another trading at one-fourth of its worth is the better bargain.  This dual discipline compounds the difficulty of the investment task for value investors compared with most others.

Value investors continually compare potential new investments with their current holdings in order to ensure that they own only the most undervalued opportunities available.  Investors should never be afraid to reexamine current holdings as new opportunities appear, even if that means realizing losses on the sale of current holdings.  In other words, no investment should be considered sacred when a better one comes along.

Sometimes dozens of good pitches are thrown consecutively to a value investor. In panicky markets, for example, the number of undervalued securities increases and the degree of undervaluation also grows. In buoyant markets, by contrast, both the number of undervalued securities and their degree of undervaluation declines. When attractive opportunities are plentiful, value investors are able to sift carefully through all the bargains for the ones they find most attractive. When attractive opportunities are scarce, however, investors mus t exhibit great self-discipline in order to maintain the integrity of the valuation process and limit the price paid. Above all, investors must always avoid swinging at bad pitches.

Be willing to hold cash reserves when no bargains are available

Absolute-performance-oriented investors, by contrast, are willing to hold cash reserves when no bargains are available.

Cash is liquid and provides a modest, sometimes attractive nominal return, usually above the rate of inflation.

The liquidity of cash affords flexibility, for it can quickly be channelled into other investment outlets with minimal transaction costs. 

Finally, unlike any other holding, cash does not involve any risk of incurring opportunity cost (losses from the inability to take advantage of future bargains) since it does not drop in value during market declines

Value Investment Philosophy

Value investing is the discipline of buying securities at a significant discount from their current underlying values and holding them until more of their value is realized. The element of a bargain is the key to the process. In the language of value investors, this is referred to as buying a dollar for fifty cents. Value investing combines the conservative analysis of underlying value with the requisite discipline and patience to buy only when a sufficient discount from that value is available. The number of available bargains varies, and the gap between the price and value of any given security can be very narrow or extremely wide. Sometimes a value investor will review in depth a great many potential investments without finding a single one that is sufficiently attractive. Such persistence is necessary, however, since value is often well hidden.


The disciplined pursuit of bargains makes value investing very much a risk-averse approach. The greatest challenge for value investors is maintaining the required discipline. Being a value investor usually means standing apart from the crowd, challenging conventional wisdom, and opposing the prevailing investment winds . It can be a very lonely undertaking. A value investor may experience poor, even horrendous , performance compared with that of other investors or the market as a whole during prolonged periods of market overvaluation. Yet over the long run the value approach works so successfully that few, if any, advocates of the philosophy ever abandon it.

A notable feature of value investing is its strong performance in periods of overall market decline.

Whenever the financial markets fail to fully incorporate fundamental values into securities prices, an investor's margin of safety is high.

• Stock and bond prices may anticipate continued poor business results, yet securities priced to reflect those depressed fundamentals may have little room to fall further. 
• Moreover, securities priced as if nothing could go right stand to benefit from a change in perception. If investors refocused on the strengths rather than on the difficulties, higher security prices would result. 
• When fundamentals do improve, investors could benefit both from better results and from an increased multiple applied to them.

Example:


In early 1987 the shares of Telefonos de Mexico, S.A., sold for prices as low as ten cents. The company was not doing badly, and analysts were forecasting for the shares annual earnings of fifteen cents and a book value of approximately seventy-five cents in 1988. Investors seemed to focus only on the continual dilution of the stock, stemming from quarterly 6.25 percent stock dividends and from the issuance of shares to new telephone subscribers, ostensibly to fund the required capital outlays to install their phones. The market ignored virtually every criterion of value, pricing the shares at extremely low multiples of earnings and cash flow while completely disregarding book value.

In early 1991 Telefonos's share price rose to over $3.25. The shares, out of favor several years earlier, became an institutional favorite. True, some improvement in operating results did contribute to this enormous price appreciation, but the primary explanation was an increase in the multiple investors were willing to pay. The higher multiple reflected a change in investor psychology more than any fundamental developments at the company.




Ref:  Margin of Safety by Seth Klarman

Should investors worry about the possibility that business value may decline? Absolutely.

The possibility of sustained decreases in business value is a dagger at the heart of value investing (and is not a barrel of laughs for other investment approaches either). Value investors place great faith in the principle of assessing value and then buying at a discount. If value is subject to considerable erosion, then how large a discount is sufficient?

Should investors worry about the possibility that business value may decline? Absolutely. Should they do anything about it? There are three responses that might be effective.

• First, since investors cannot predict when values will rise or fall, valuation should always be performed conservatively, giving considerable weight to worst-case liquidation value as well as to other methods. 
• Second, investors fearing deflation could demand a greater than usual discount between price and underlying value in order to make new investments or to hold current positions. This means that normally selective investors would probably let even more pitches than usual go by. 
• Finally, the prospect of asset deflation places a heightened importance on the time frame of investments and on the presence of a catalyst for the realization of underlying value. In a deflationary environment, if you cannot tell whether or when you will realize underlying value, you may not want to get involved at all. If underlying value is realized in the near-term directly for the benefit of shareholders, however, the longer-term forces that could cause value to diminish become moot.

Ref:  Margin of Safety by Seth Klarman

Investments that involve risk are superior only if the return more than fully compensates for the risk

Rather than targeting a desired rate of return, even an eminently reasonable one, investors should target risk. Treasury bills are the closest thing to a riskless investment; hence the interest rate on Treasury bills is considered the risk-free rate.  Since investors always have the option of holding all of their money in T-bills, investments that involve risk should only be made if they hold the promise of considerably higher returns than those available without risk. This does not express an investment preference for T-bills; to the contrary, you would rather be fully invested in superior alternatives. But alternatives with some risk attached are superior only if the return more than fully compensates for the risk.

Most investment approaches do not focus on loss avoidance or on an assessment of the real risks of an investment compared with its return. Only one that I know does: value' investing.

Risk avoidance is the single most important element of an investment program

Another common belief is that risk avoidance is incompatible with investment success. This view holds that high return is attainable only by incurring high risk and that long-term investment success is attainable only by seeking out and bearing, rather than avoiding, risk. Why do I believe, conversely, that risk avoidance is the single most important element of an investment program? 

If you had $1,000, would you be willing to wager it, double or nothing, on a fair coin toss? Probably not.  Would you risk your entire net worth on such a gamble? Of course not. Would you risk the loss of, say, 30 percent of your net worth for an equivalent gain? Not many people would because the loss of a substantial amount of money could impair their standard of living while a comparable gain might not improve it commensurately. If you are one of the vast majority of investors who are risk averse, then loss avoidance must be the cornerstone of your investment philosophy.

Greedy, short-term-oriented investors may lose sight of a sound mathematical reason for avoiding loss: the effects of compounding even moderate returns over many years are compelling, if not downright mind boggling.

Perseverance at even relatively modest rates of return is of the utmost importance in compounding
your net worth. A corollary to the importance of compounding is that it is very difficult to recover from even one large loss, which could literally destroy all at once the beneficial effects of many years of investment success. In other words, an investor is more likely to do well by achieving consistently good returns with limited downside risk than by achieving volatile and sometimes even spectacular gains but with considerable risk of principal An investor who earns 16 percent annual returns over a decade, for example, will, perhaps surprisingly, end up with more money than an investor who earns 20 percent a year for nine years and then loses 15 percent the tenth year.

Lessons from the junk bonds debacles of the 1980s and their collapse in 1990

Contrary to the promises of underwriters, junk bonds were a poor investment. They offered too little return for their substantial risk. To meet contractual interest and principal obligations, the number of things that needed to go right for issuers was high while the margin for error was low. Although the potential return was several hundred basis points annually in excess of U.S. Treasury securities, the risk involved the possible loss of one's entire investment.

Motivated by self-interest and greed, respectively, underwriters and buyers of junk bonds rationalized their actions. They accepted claims of a low default rate, and they used cash flow, as measured by EBITDA, as the principal determinant of underlying value. They even argued that a well-diversified portfolio of junk bonds was safe.

As this market collapsed in 1990, junk bonds were transformed into the financial equivalent of roach motels; investors could get in, but they couldn't get out. Bullish assumptions were replaced by bearish ones. Investor focus shifted from what might go right to what could go wrong, and prices plummeted.

Why should the history of the junk-bond market in the 1980s interest investors today? If you personally avoided investing in newly issued junk bonds, what difference should it make to you if other investors lost money? The answer is that junk bonds had a pernicious effect on other sectors of the financial markets and on the behavior of most financial-market participants. The overpricing of junk bonds allowed many takeovers to take place at inflated valuations. The excess profits enjoyed by the shareholders of the acquired companies were about equal to the losses eventually experienced by the buyers of this junk. Cash received by equity investors from junk-bond-financed acquisitions returned to the stock market, bidding up the prices of shares in still independent companies. The market prices of securities involved in arbitrage transactions, exchange offers, and corporate reorganizations were all influenced by the excessive valuations made possible by the junk-bond market. As a result, even those who avoided owning junk bonds found it difficult to escape their influence completely.  We may confidently expect that there will be new investment fads in the future. They too will expand beyond the rational limitations of the innovation. As surely as this will happen, it is equally certain that no bells will toll to announce the excess. Investors who study the junk-bond debacle may be able to identify these new fads for what they are and avoid them. And as we shall see in the chapters that follow, avoiding losses is the most important prerequisite to investment success.

Ref: Margin of Safety by Seth Klarman

Collateralized Bond Obligations - a pile of junk is still junk no matter how you stack it.

Collateralized Junk-Bond Obligations

One of the last junk-bond-market innovations was the collateralized bond obligation (CBO). CBOs are diversified investment pools of junk bonds that issue their own securities with the underlying junk bonds as collateral. Several tranches of securities with different seniorities are usually created, each with risk and return characteristics that differ from those of the underlying junk bonds themselves.

What attracted underwriters as well as investors to junkbond CBOs was that the rating agencies, in a very accommodating decision, gave the senior tranche, usually about 75 percent of the total issue, an investment-grade rating. This means that an issuer could assemble a portfolio of junk bonds yielding 14 percent and sell to investors a senior tranche of securities backed by those bonds at a yield of, say, 10 percent, with proceeds equal to perhaps 75 percent of the cost of the portfolio. The issuer could then sell riskier junior tranches by offering much higher yields to investors.

The existence of CBOs was predicated on the receipt of this investment-grade credit rating on the senior tranche. Greedy institutional buyers of the senior tranche earned a handful of basis points above the yield available on other investment grade securities. As usual these yield pigs sacrificed credit quality for additional current return. The rating agencies performed studies showing that the investment-grade rating was warranted.  Predictably these studies used a historical default-rate analysis and neglected to consider the implications of either a prolonged economic downturn or a credit crunch that might virtually eliminate refinancings. Under such circumstances, a great many junk bonds would default; even the senior tranche of a CBO could experience significant capital losses. In other words, a pile of junk is still junk no matter how you stack it.

Window Dressing

Window dressing is the practice of making a portfolio look good for quarterly reporting purposes.

Some managers will deliberately buy shares of the current quarter's best market performers and sell shares of significant under-performers in order to dress up the portfolio's appearance in the quarterly report to clients.  They also may sell positions with significant unrealized losses so that clients will not be reminded of major mistakes month after month.

Such behavior is clearly uneconomic as well as intellectually insulting to clients; it also exacerbates price movements in either direction.  Even so, as depressed issues drop further in price, attractive opportunities may be created for value investors.

Seth Klarman and Margin of Safety

Seth Klarman

Brief Biography

Seth Klarman is a leading value investor. Mr. Klarman is the President of The Baupost Group, a Boston-based private investment partnership which manages over $7bn in assets on behalf of private families and institutions. Founded in 1983, the firm has achieved investment returns of 20% compounded annually. The firm invests in equities, distressed debt, private equity and real estate. Mr. Klarman is notable for his willingness to hold significant amounts of cash in his investment portfolios, sometimes in excess of 50% of the total. In 1991, Mr, Klarman authored Margin of Safety, Risk Averse Investing Strategies for the Thoughtful Investor, which since has become a value investing classic. Now out of print, Margin of Safety has sold on Amazon for $1,200 and eBay for $2,000. Before founding Baupost, Mr. Klarman previously worked for Max Heine and Michael Price of Mutual Shares. Mr. Klarman is a graduate of Cornell University and Harvard Business School.

http://valuestockplus.wordpress.com/seth-klarman/

Click here for a pdf copy of this book.
http://www.my10000dollars.com/MS.pdf

Analysts: Poor Q1 catalyst for F&N re-rating

Thursday February 9, 2012

Analysts: Poor Q1 catalyst for F&N re-rating
By LIZ LEE
lizlee@thestar.com.my



PETALING JAYA: Fraser & Neave Holdings Bhd's (F&N) poor first quarter results could cause a re-rating of the blue chip company but analysts see its current position as a temporary recovery phase before it bounces back to solid earnings.

For the first quarter ended Dec 31, 2011, the company recorded a 61% drop in net profit to RM41.75mil from RM107.08mil in the last corresponding quarter, a situation CIMB Research sees as a re-rating catalyst.

The two main factors pulling F&N's earnings down included the disengagement from its Coca-Cola business and operating losses caused by the Thailand floods last year. Coca-Cola contributed 30% to F&N's earnings.

The results were below CIMB Research's expectation at 14% of it's full-year forecast. The research house said a 20% to 25% achievement would be considered “within expectation”.

An analyst with a bank-backed brokerage said that he would be negative on the counter for the next one to two quarters, and had given a “sell” call.

“Their Thai dairy plant will begin operation in phases in March and it would take two to three months to ramp up production. I expect the sales volume to be on the lower side until May or June,” he said.

“The company is making the effort to plug its financial leakages with new soft drinks but at the expense of its margin as it spent a lot on advertising and promotion,” he said. F&N made a 9% increase in soft drinks revenue during the first quarter.

He noted that while F&N might have ways to support its operations over the longer term through the mixed development of its land in Section 13, Petaling Jaya, the outlook was not rosy in the near term.

The land, where the old factory used to be, is slated for development in 2013.


http://biz.thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2012/2/9/business/10699680&sec=business

Introduction to StockTouch

http://stocktouchapp.com/

Apple Selects StockTouch as Top Finance iPad App for 2011

7 Important Stock Investing Advice from Warren Buffett!

Summarized Overview

In this article, you’ll find information on the stock investing ideas that Warren Buffet wants all stock investors to know, strategy he uses to maximize return, price of stocks that he willing to pay, key financial ratio that is so important to him, type of managers he loves, and kind of management he trusts.

7 Stock Investing Advices for Beginners

This stock market investing advice will help you on how to pick stocks Warren Buffet way.

Stock Investing Advices #1: Simple Business Model

You must understand the business itself or at least like and use it. Warren Buffett likes to patronize/use Nike, Coke and Gillette products and he is a believer of his investments. Have time to read and study the business model and the financial reports that takes only 2-3 hours per day. Invest as if you will buy the business.

Do you know why this is so important?

When come to investing, predicting what will happen tomorrow is something that you can’t live without. Forecasting what the future will be is the only way you can estimate how much return you’ll be getting later on. So, if you really understand the business inside out, you can project how the company performs 30 years down the road; take into consideration the national economy, competition from others and change in customers’ lifestyle.

Most companies here in Philippines have investor relation’s page in their websites where you can browse their financial reports.

Stock Investing Advices #2: Wide Economic Moat

In simple terms, it must dominate its market and can somehow dictate its product’s prices. Warren Buffet himself avoids regulated industries, commodity businesses as well as capital intensive industries. Look out Nike, it has its own market around the world and it can dictate its own product prices regardless of its competition because people buy Nike for its brand. Further, company should finance its capital from operating cash flow and not depending on borrowings. That is why, Warren Buffet love ‘franchise’, for example, Furniture Mart (the lowest cost in the industry), The Washington Post (market dominance and leader), Coke (strong brand name) and Candies (premium priced and high quality products that serve niche market).

How about Jollibee or Meralco here in our country?

Stock Investing Advices #3: Sustainable Growth

Serving the existing niche market is not enough. Instead, Warren Buffet wants the company to grow continuously and exponentially. Therefore, he looks for managements that have the ability to widen their economic moat consistently over the past years. Their businesses must be positioned where the demand able to grow continuously; Gillette is his best example. In the same time, always be ready for any possible trouble to the business, and most importantly back up your investment plan!

Have you heard of the recent plans of San Miguel Corporation and Metro Pacific Investment Corporation?

Stock Investing Advices #4: Excellent Capital Management

The Management should utilize the available resources for the highest return to the company and to its shareholders. Shareholders should be benefited for their investments thru dividends. Management carries the trust of the shareholders, thus, they should act and think as owners too. Moreover, it is better if the management holds a huge number of stocks too, since they will act as true owners and will not think short term but instead, will make sure that the company earns in the next 20 years or more!

Stock Investing Advices #5: Effective Management Team

Invest in company that has honest and capable managers. They should be so capable that Warren Buffet himself admires the way the managers do things. In Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting year 2000, he once said, “we want managers who tell the truth and tell themselves the truth, which is more important”. He loves cost conscious and frugal type of managers who are honest and integrity as well.

Stock Investing Advices #6: Superior ROE

The general rule that it is above 15! Why ROE, and not the other financial ratios? Well,return on equity indicates how effective the management team converts the reinvested money into cash. The higher the return, the more profitably the company can reinvest its earnings. The faster the company able to turn the reinvested earnings into profits, the faster its value increases from one year to another. And mind you, it is a big challenge to the management to consistently create value for every penny they spend. To prove this, not many stocks that has 15 per cent ROE consistently for the past 20 or 30 years, worldwide.

Stock Investing Advices #7: Buy at Discount Price

After the process of selection, now is the time to buy them! But of course make sure it is below the intrinsic value and you must have the margin safety of 80% discount from the calculated intrinsic value. Warren Buffet has to make sure he buys the stock at the lowest price possible. Have you heard the recent investment of Mr. Buffett on IBM and in these times of Euro and US Debt Crisis? In the same time, he has to be real that not to set very low price till he misses the golden opportunity. Even if the stocks are so profitable but the price is too high, he will just passes the opportunity to somebody else.

If you want to be as successful as Warren Buffet in stock investing, study each point thoroughly. Ignoring either one advice is enough to make you broke in stock market; simply because, in stock investing, due diligence counts.

Intentionally not following the advice proves that you are not ready for investing;perhaps you are just looking for fast cash.



http://www.investorluranski.com/2011/11/7-important-stock-investing-advices.html#more

Warren Buffett - An Outstanding Allocator of Capital

Warren Buffett

Warren Buffett was born in 1930 in Omaha, Nebraska. 

He took his first degree at the University of Nebraska and then completed a Master's degree in economics at Columbia Business School in 1951. He was supervised and mentored at Columbia by stock-investing guru Benjamin Graham, author of Security Analysis. 

Buffett received the only mark of A+ Benjamin Graham ever awarded in his security analysis class. From this it's clear that Buffett had an extraordinary ability in stock analysis from the very beginning of his career. 

Making Money

Warren Buffett grew obsessed with numbers and money from an unusually early age. It wasn't an obsession founded upon the lifestyle or the wordly goods money could buy. It was a collecters' obsession. Some boys in the 1930s and 1940s collected stamps. Some collected bird's eggs. Warren Buffett collected money. 

He started at the age of five, selling gum and lemonade in the street and he later set up a business, renting pinball machines to local barbers. By his mid-teens, he had made enough money from these earlier efforts and paper rounds to buy land - which he rented to farmers. 

Making More Money

Investing In Stocks

Warren Buffett bought his first shares at the age of eleven - his father was a stockbroker - and stock trading gave the young Buffett a natural outlet for his twin obsessions with numbers and money. 

After completing his master's degree, Buffett worked as a salesman in his father's brokerage. Between 1954 and 1956 Buffett worked for his old mentor, Benjamin Graham, then returned to Omaha, ready to begin his own investing business. 

Making Even More Money

Investing Other People's Money In Stocks

Warren Buffett's progress towards almost unimaginable wealth accelerated in 1957 when he pursuaded friends and family to invest $105,000 in his limited partnership. Then he began the process he is famous for, the process of annually compounding the money he manages extraordinary rapidly.




http://www.warren-buffett.net/

The Risk of Investing in Warrants

A warrant is an investment tool which provides opportunity for investors to diversify their investment. It is popular among retail investors, mainly due to its low cost investment and potential high return characteristics. This makes it even accessible to small investors who are without much additional capital.

However, many investors are investing into warrant without fully understanding the fundamental mechanics of how warrant works and the risk inherent in it. At the end of this article, you will be able to understand the basics of warrants and its implications on your investment decisions.

Types of warrants

A warrant gives you, as the buyer, the right but not the obligation, to buy or sell a specific number of the mother share or underlying shares at a specified price within a specific period. The holder of a warrant or call warrant will not have any voting or dividend rights as that enjoyed by shareholders. One of the main benefits of investing in a warrant is cost leveraging. When you invest in a warrant, you stand to gain from the exposure of the share price movement at only a fraction of its cost.

There are two types of warrants: call warrant and put warrant.

 

A call warrant is one that is most common in our local stock exchange and is almost similar to an option. A warrant is issued by the company of its underlying stock, while an option is a financial instrument of the stock exchange. Warrants are usually issued by companies as part of new issue offering to attract investors into buying the new security. A warrant is also considered a type of equity derivative as it derives its value from its underlying security.

Exercise price (strike price)

The price at which you can buy call warrant is called the exercise price and this is determined at point of issue. The exercise price is the point of reference for you to determine whether your warrant is Out-of-the-Money (OTM), In-the-Money (ITM) or At-the-Money (ATM).

Gearing effect

One of the reasons why warrant attracts investors is mainly because it costs only a fraction of the price of the underlying stock while offering relatively good return, either positive or negative.

Let’s take an example of ABC shares that are currently priced on the market at RM2.00 per share. Investor A puts in RM2,000 to purchase 1,000 shares. Investor B on the other hand, decides to invest the same capital of RM2,000 in warrants that was going for RM0.50 per warrant. With the same amount of investment, Investor B is in possession of 4,000 shares.

If ABC gains RM0.30 per share from RM2.00, to close at RM2.30, the percentage gain would be 15%. However, with a RM0.30 gain in the warrant, from RM0.50 to RM0.80, the percentage gain would be 60%.

This is the leveraging effect of warrant. However, the possibility of huge gain also comes hand in hand with huge loss. During the life time of a warrant, it is also common that the price of warrant moves in parallel with the price of the underlying stock. Due to the leveraging effect, a small decline in the price of the underlying stock will result in a significant drop in the price of its warrant.

Using the example above, assuming the price of the underlying stock reduce from RM2.00 to RM1.80, the percentage drop is 10%, but, with the same amount of RM0.30 reduction in the warrant, it will cause the warrant to drop to RM0.20, which is a 60% drop in value.

Time to maturity

All warrants have a limited life span. In the event that the price of the underlying stock remains below the exercise price at the time the warrant matures, an OTM warrant will be of no value and the investor will lose his investment.

Risk control

Having such a high risk nature, investors who are interested in warrants must fully understand their own risk tolerance level. Too much exposure in warrant may subject their investment portfolio to excessive risk. Many investors tend to purchase warrants that are highly active in the market without much knowledge of what they are buying. As warrants are also popular among short-term speculators, an actively traded warrant may not be suitable for investors who intend to hold the warrant for a longer term. The amount could be provided by short-term traders who are speculating and attempting to earn short-term profit. Therefore, it is important for investors to pay attention to the type of market participants that are interested in the warrant.

Buying ITM warrants may offer less profit but lower risk compared to the OTM warrants. When a warrant is deeply OTM, it is less sensitive to the price movement of its underlying stock, which means even if the price of the stock increases, the price of its warrant may not have significant movement, as what we would expect out of a warrant that is near or in-the-money. Worst still, if the term of warrant is near to its maturity; its time value will decline drastically.

As in any other investment, investors should make sure that they fully understand the characteristics of warrant before they decide to invest in any of it.

© Securities Industry Development Corporation. For more information on wise investing, log on to Malaysian Investor (www.min.com.my)

http://www.min.com.my/en/component/content/article/320-risk-of-investing-in-warrants.html?start=1

CFA Level 1 Course

Table of Contents

 Section 1 to 5

  1. Ethics and Standards

  2. Quantitative Methods

  3. Microeconomics

  4. Macroeconomics

  5. Global Economic Analysis

 Section 6 to 10

 Section 11 to 15

 Section 16 to 17

Read more: http://www.investopedia.com/exam-guide/cfa-level-1/portfolio-management/portfolio-management-theories.asp#ixzz1liMGuwDH