Thursday 9 April 2009

Could the IMF run out of money?

Bailing Out the Bailers
Could the IMF run out of money?
By Karim Bardeesy Posted Wednesday, October 29, 2008 - 6:21pm

Who’s your bailout daddy? Well, if you’re Ukraine, Iceland, Hungary, Belarus, and Pakistan right now, it’s the International Monetary Fund. New loan commitments made by the IMF in the last two weeks already exceed $30 billion; requests for billions more could be forthcoming. Which raises a troubling question: Could the IMF run out of cash?

Unlikely, but the IMF may have seen its financial heyday. It was created during the 1944 Bretton Woods conference to help manage the international monetary system and accumulated healthy reserves of currency after World War II. It continues to be funded by “quotas” charged to each member country largely based on the size of its economy. The quotas are a one-time charge, though. If the IMF needs more money, it has to go back to its member countries, and they’re in tough shape right now. The most powerful among them—the United States and the European Union—are shoveling money out the door to deal with their own problems, creating new debt to buy bank shares.

That said, right now the fund is flush and the balance sheet is strong. It now has the equivalent of $201 billion available to be lent out. (It calls this its “one-year forward commitment capacity.”) Before the meltdown, there was “only” around $18 billion in debt outstanding, half from Turkey and the remainder from poorer African, Caribbean, and Central Asian countries.

There’s gold, too. The IMF owns, at last reckoning, more than $9 billion worth of the stuff (but an 85 percent supermajority of its membership is required to sell or buy any of it). The IMF can also borrow more money from wealthy member countries, with up to $53 billion extra available through two supplementary agreements if need be. And flailing countries can turn elsewhere for financing; the United States gave cash and loan guarantees worth $20 billion directly to Mexico in 1995.

In emergency situations, when a country is having trouble paying back loans that are due imminently, a SWAT team will go to the supplicating country to figure out what policies and how much short-term financing are needed. The IMF doesn’t quite carry the Domino’s half-hour guarantee, but it claims to be able to have a decision back to you in as little as 48 hours after its board receives a report on the situation. Only the hardiest currencies, like yen and U.S. dollars, are lent out (although a few Botswanan pulas might be out on offer).

The aid doesn’t come for free. There are loan repayments—the IMF actually takes a cut on every deal, lending out to needy countries at a higher interest rate than it pays back to “donor” countries. Plus, the IMF might insist that the receiving country commit to cutting domestic food subsidies or reduce its budget deficit—“structural adjustment” policies that formed part of the “Washington consensus” in the 1980s and 1990s and which still inspire anti-globalization types to pull out their black balaclavas. The IMF remembers the bitter taste those policies left with local populations and has pledged “fewer and more targeted” conditions this time around (and on Wednesday agreed to waive austerity measures in emerging economies). But if a country stalls in its reforms, the IMF can stop the flow of cash—a pretty big stick when, say, Turkey is sitting at its kitchen table with bills to pay.

While there may be a lot of money tucked away that countries can use to bail one another out, recent events have put the IMF in a tough spot, both financially and politically. Like any other multinational agency, the IMF is only as good as its member countries. If a big country, say, South Korea, feels the heat from international lenders, the IMF could be looking at a $50 billion or $100 billion request. After the Asian financial crises of the mid-1990s, the IMF’s forward commitment capacity fell as low as 20 billion “Special Drawing Rights” (an IMF unit then equivalent to around $27 billion); it tripled only after the IMF increased the quota it charged member countries by 45 percent. Will there be political will to supplement the IMF in the coming weeks? Or will a new fund, topped up by new currency reserves, be necessary, as Gordon Brown has mused? In the “New Bretton Woods” era, the IMF might not go under, but it may get left behind.

Explainer thanks Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor and former IMF chief economist Simon Johnson, co-founder of baselinescenario.com and Yoshiko Kamata and Bill Murray of the International Monetary Fund.

http://www.thebigmoney.com/articles/explainer/2008/10/29/bailing-out-bailers

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