Wednesday 3 November 2010

HAI-O



Date announced 29/09/2010
Quarter 31/07/2010 Qtr 1
FYE 30/4/2011

STOCK HAI-O
C0DE  7668 

Price $ 3.08 Curr. PE (ttm-Eps) 11.85 Curr. DY 3.86%
LFY Div 11.88 DPO ratio 38%
ROE 24.5% PBT Margin 19.7% PAT Margin 14.3%

Rec. qRev 54751 q-q % chg -45% y-y% chq -63%
Rec qPbt 10785 q-q % chg -32% y-y% chq -59%
Rec. qEps 3.91 q-q % chg 31% y-y% chq -58%
ttm-Eps 26.00 q-q % chg -17% y-y% chq -8%

Using VERY CONSERVATIVE ESTIMATES:
EPS GR 1% Avg.H PE 10.00 Avg. L PE 5.00
Forecast High Pr 2.73 Forecast Low Pr 1.30 Recent Severe Low Pr 2.85
Current price is at Upper 1/3 of valuation zone.

RISK: Upside -24% Downside 124%
One Year Appreciation Potential -2% Avg. yield 3%
Avg. Total Annual Potential Return (over next 5 years) 1%

CPE/SPE 1.58 P/NTA 2.91 NTA 1.06 SPE 7.50 Rational Pr 1.95


Decision:
Already Owned: Buy Hold Sell Filed Review (future acq): Filed Discard: Filed
Guide: Valuation zones Lower 1/3 Buy Mid. 1/3 Maybe Upper 1/3 Sell

Aim:
To Buy a bargain: Buy at Lower 1/3 of Valuation Zone
To Minimise risk of Loss: Buy when risk is low i.e UPSIDE GAIN > 75% OR DOWNSIDE RISK <25%
To Double every 5 years: Seek for POTENTIAL RETURN of > 15%/yr.
To Prevent Loss: Sell immediately when fundamentals deteriorate
To Maximise Gain & Reduce Loss: Sell when CPE/SPE > 1.5, when in Upper 1/3 of Valuation Zone & Returns < 15%/yr

UMW



Date announced 20/08/2010
Quarter 30/06/2010 Qtr 2
FYE 31/12/2010

STOCK UMW
C0DE  4588

Price $ 6.83 Curr. PE (ttm-Eps) 13.38 Curr. DY 2.93%
LFY Div 20.00 DPO ratio 59%
ROE 14.1% PBT Margin 13.5% PAT Margin 6.5%

Rec. qRev 3282075 q-q % chg 8% y-y% chq 27%
Rec qPbt 442266 q-q % chg 45% y-y% chq 138%
Rec. qEps 18.74 q-q % chg 59% y-y% chq 159%
ttm-Eps 51.04 q-q % chg 29% y-y% chq 34%

Using VERY CONSERVATIVE ESTIMATES:
EPS GR 5%
Avg.H PE 12.00
Avg. L PE 8.00
Forecast High Pr 7.82
Forecast Low Pr 5.50
Recent Severe Low Pr 5.50
Current price is at Middle 1/3 of valuation zone.

RISK: Upside 43% Downside 57%
One Year Appreciation Potential 3%; Avg. yield 6%
Avg.Total Annual Potential Return (over next 5 years) 9%

CPE/SPE 1.34
P/NTA 1.89
NTA 3.62
SPE 10.00
Rational Pr 5.10



Decision:
Already Owned: Buy Hold Sell Filed Review (future acq): Filed Discard: Filed
Guide: Valuation zones Lower 1/3 Buy Mid. 1/3 Maybe Upper 1/3 Sell

Aim:
To Buy a bargain: Buy at Lower 1/3 of Valuation Zone
To Minimise risk of Loss: Buy when risk is low i.e UPSIDE GAIN > 75% OR DOWNSIDE RISK <25%
To Double every 5 years: Seek for POTENTIAL RETURN of > 15%/yr.
To Prevent Loss: Sell immediately when fundamentals deteriorate
To Maximise Gain & Reduce Loss: Sell when CPE/SPE > 1.5, when in Upper 1/3 of Valuation Zone & Returns < 15%/yr

Coastal


Date announced 24/08/2010
Quarter 30/06/2010 Qtr 2
FYE 31/12/2010

STOCK COASTAL
C0DE  5071 
Price $ 2.42 Curr. PE (ttm-Eps) 4.52 Curr. DY 1.24%

Rec. qRev 138619 q-q % chg -2% y-y% chq 46%
Rec qPbt 48583 q-q % chg 13% y-y% chq 44%
Rec. qEps 13.32 q-q % chg 11% y-y% chq 43%
ttm-Eps 53.55 q-q % chg 8% y-y% chq 65%

Using VERY CONSERVATIVE ESTIMATES:
EPS GR 5% Avg.H PE 5.00 Avg. L PE 4.00
Forecast High Pr 3.42 Forecast Low Pr 1.56 Recent Severe Low Pr 1.56
Current price is at Middle 1/3 of valuation zone.

RISK: Upside 54% Downside 46%
One Year Appreciation Potential 8% Avg. yield 2%
Avg. Total Annual Potential Return (over next 5 years):     10%

CPE/SPE 1.00
P/NTA 1.64
NTA 1.47
SPE 4.50
Rational Pr 2.41

Decision:
Already Owned: Buy Hold Sell Filed; Review (future acq): Filed; Discard: Filed
Guide: Valuation zones Lower 1/3 Buy; Mid. 1/3 Maybe; Upper 1/3 Sell.

Aim:
To Buy a bargain: Buy at Lower 1/3 of Valuation Zone
To Minimise risk of Loss: Buy when risk is low i.e UPSIDE GAIN > 75% OR DOWNSIDE RISK <25%
To Double every 5 years: Seek for POTENTIAL RETURN of > 15%/yr.
To Prevent Loss: Sell immediately when fundamentals deteriorate
To Maximise Gain & Reduce Loss: Sell when CPE/SPE > 1.5, when in Upper 1/3 of Valuation Zone & Returns < 15%/yr

LATEXX



Date announced 6/8/2010
Quarter 30/6/2010 Qtr 2
FYE 21/12/2010

STOCK LATEXX
C0DE 7064

Price $ 3.11
Curr. PE (ttm-Eps) 8.38
Curr. DY 0.64%

Rec. qRev 134483 q-q % chg 7% y-y% chq 81%
Rec qPbt 24115 q-q % chg 4% y-y% chq 111%
Rec. qEps 10.39 q-q % chg -1% y-y% chq 77%
ttm-Eps 37.10 q-q % chg 14% y-y% chq 113%

Using VERY CONSERVATIVE ESTIMATES:
EPS GR 5%
Avg.H PE 8.00
Avg. L PE 6.00

Forecast High Pr 3.79
Forecast Low Pr 2.37
Recent Severe Low Pr 2.37
Current price is at Middle 1/3 of valuation zone.

RISK: Upside 48% Downside 52%
One Year Appreciation Potential 4% Avg. yield 1% Avg.
Total Annual Potential Return (over next 5 years):     5%

CPE/SPE 1.20
P/NTA 2.99
NTA 1.04
SPE 7.00
Rational Pr 2.60


Decision: 
Already Owned: Buy Hold Sell Filed
Review (future acq):  Filed
Discard: Filed
Guide: Valuation zones Lower 1/3 Buy; Mid. 1/3 Maybe; Upper 1/3 Sell.

Aim:
To Buy a bargain: Buy at Lower 1/3 of Valuation Zone
To Minimise risk of Loss: Buy when risk is low i.e UPSIDE GAIN > 75% OR DOWNSIDE RISK <25%
To Double every 5 years: Seek for POTENTIAL RETURN of > 15%/yr.
To Prevent Loss:   Sell immediately when fundamentals deteriorate
To Maximise Gain & Reduce Loss:    Sell when CPE/SPE > 1.5, when in Upper 1/3 of Valuation Zone & Returns < 15%/yr

Tuesday 2 November 2010

BUFFETT’S COMPANY ANALYSIS TEMPLATE.

BUFFETT’S COMPANY ANALYSIS TEMPLATE.

Below is a Summary of what Warren Buffett targets in a company’s three Financial Statements and his use of his Equity Bond Theory in order to evaluate a company and to determine a preferable purchase price.

In my opinion, one could regard all these requirements as a form of COMPANY ANALYSIS TEMPLATE with which an Industrial type company should comply in order to satisfy Buffett’s Investment Criteria, which should, in turn, lead to a profitable long-term investment.

_______________________________________________________________

INCOME STATEMENT.

GROSS PROFIT :- Gross Profit = Cost of Sales/Revenue >40%

SG&A EXPENSES :- SG&A < 30% x Gross Profit 

R&D EXPENSES :- Little or Nil 

DEPRECIATION :- Depreciation < 10% x Gross Profit

INTEREST EXPENSE :- Interest Expense < 15% x Operating Income (i.e. EBIT)

PRETAX INCOME :- VERY IMPORTANT NUMBER, especially for previous 12 months

NET EARNINGS :- Net Earnings > 20% x Total Revenue

EARNINGS PER SHARE :- 10 Year Trend showing Consistency & Upward Trend

_______________________________________________________________

BALANCE SHEET.

ASSETS.

CASH & SHORT TERM INVESTMENTS :- Ongoing increase from Business Operations NOT from One-Time events

INVENTORY :- Corresponding Rise in both Inventory & Net Earnings

CURRENT RATIO :- Current Assets/Current Liabilities < 1, due to Strong Earning Power

PROPERTY, PLANT & EQUIPMENT :- Low as possible

LONG TERM INVESTMENTS :- Large as possible. Should be Quality Investments, preferably in other DCA companies

RETURN ON ASSETS (ROA) :- High BUT with Large Total Assets to reduce Vulnerability

LIABILITIES.

SHORT TERM DEBT :- Avoid bigger borrowers of Short Term money rather than Long term money 

LONG TERM DEBT DUE :- Little or Nil

LONG TERM DEBT :- Long Term Debt < 3 x Annual Net Earnings

DEBT/SHAREHOLDER’S EQUITY :- Debt/S.H.Equity < 0.8 where S.H.Equity INCLUDES Value of Treasury Stock

PREFERRED STOCK :- Nil RETAINED EARNINGS :- Annual Increase > 7%

TREASURY STOCK :- Should appear and be regularly purchased

RETURN ON SHAREHOLDER’S EQUITY (ROE) :- Net Income/S.H.Equity > 25%

_______________________________________________________________

CASH FLOW STATEMENT.

INVESTING OPERATIONS :- Based on +/-10 Year Period, Capital Expenditure/Net Earnings < 50% For DCA company this ratio is consistently < 25%.

FINANCING ACTIVITIES :- “Issuance (Retirement) of Stock, Net” to be a regular NEGATIVE Value. This indicates a NET Buying Back of its own Shares compared to a NET Issuance of its Shares. _______________________________________________________________

BUFFET’S EQUITY BOND. THE THEORY.

Companies with DURABLE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE (DCA) can be seen as an EQUITY BOND with a COUPON.

Equity Bond = Share Price Bond

Coupon = Pretax Earnings/Share

DETERMINE SHARE PRICE.

 Stock Market will price a DCA company’s Equity Bond at a level that approximately reflects the Value of its Earnings RELATIVE to the Yield on LONG TERM CORPORATE BONDS (LTCB)

Equity Bond = Share Price = Coupon Rate/Long Term Corporate Bond Rate (LTCBR)

Coupon Rate/LTCBR = Pretax Earnings/LTCBR

WHEN TO BUY.

 (1) Buy during Bear Markets or when share prices are depressed due to no fault of the company

 (2) Buy when Share Price < Pretax Earnings per Share/LTCBR by a reasonable discount

WHEN TO SELL.

 (1) Sell when presented with a BETTER company at a BETTER Price

 (2) Sell when a current DCA company is losing its Durable Competitive Advantage

 (3) Sell during Bull Markets or when prices are at unrealistically HIGH levels

 (4) Sell when P/E ratios > 40+, especially if the stock’s price far EXCEEDS THE LONG-TERM ECONOMIC REALITIES OF THE BUSINESS

http://siliconinvestor.advfn.com/readmsg.aspx?msgid=26423391

My day as a fund manager wannabe



What do the people you entrust your savings do all day? Our reporter joins the First State team in Edinburgh to find out what they get up to.

Personal finance reporter Emma Wall
Personal finance reporter Emma Wall
In the grand surroundings of St Andrew Square, Edinburgh, lies First State Investments. Famed for its long and successful track record in emerging markets equities and star managers such as Angus Tulloch and Martin Lau, you could forgive the preconception that behind the big glass door would be deluxe leather chairs, corner offices and traders barking orders into phones. I spent a day there to experience a fund manager's life at first hand.

8AM

At a time when most people are just leaving for work, a dozen members of First State's global emerging markets (GEM) and Asia Pacific investment teams are gathering round a table, preparing for a cross-continent meeting.
We are crowded into what resembles a sixth-form common room, with photos of employees' weddings and nights out pinned to a board on the wall. At the foot of the table is a large television screen, where we are to expect images of similar scenes to appear, beamed from First State's Singapore and Hong Kong offices.
This is one of three meetings a week in which managers, directors and analysts meet to discuss companies in the region that may qualify for one or more of the GEM and Asia Pacific funds.
"If you took minutes of these meetings, you'd realise that we never draw any conclusions," said one of the team. "We often disagree about a company and one of us may choose to hold it in their fund while the other managers think it's a bad idea. There is not a house view."
After a few technical difficulties – "it was decided a while ago that Asia would call us, rather than us calling them, as we can't master the technology" – the meeting is up and running, chaired by Singapore-based Alistair Thompson, deputy head of Asia Pacific excluding Japan equities.
Themes discussed include infrastructure, currencies, interest rates and inflation – in Britain, Australia and Asia – as well as the hot topic of the moment, gold, and whether its price could double.
The group also reviews the big buyers and sellers of stocks – trades over $1m – that the funds hold and what this could mean for the funds' performance.
Banter is rife. Team members seem to revel in antagonising one another or demanding reasons for their stock positions, and there is little indication of hierarchy.
The First State approach to investing is to be accountable to investors rather than a benchmark. Managing partner Stuart Paul said investors knew their approach was as much about capital preservation as making returns. "You can outperform a benchmark but still lose money," he said. "That's not something we're interested in. Sometimes we might not make as much as an upmarket, but in 2000 when the MSCI emerging markets index lost 25pc, we only lost 9.5pc."

10AM

"We think it's in the interest of the client not to be too clever," said Mr Tulloch, explaining the absolute return style of investing his team champions.
Institutional investors make up just over half of First State's global emerging markets and Asia Pac Oeic (open-ended investment company) business. The team is required to keep in regular contact with its large clients, and so next on the agenda is a call to a European public pension scheme.
Mr Tulloch described how investors' location governed their interests, with Britain having a bias towards Asia Pacific and old Commonwealth allies, US investors preferring global emerging markets and in particular South America, and the Baltic region interested in Russia. This particular client has been invested since 2004 and is updated every quarter on the fund's performance, outlook and portfolio changes.
Staff changes within First State are explained, as are big buys and sells and any mistakes managers may have made. The client questions the impact of Chinese inflation on the fund and interest rates as well as property market speculation. Technological developments in 3G mobiles, the Thai elections and food prices are also on the agenda.
While this meeting is going on, other team members make research calls to Asia – these have to be in the morning because of the time difference. The team travels to meet remote companies, and is out of the country for about eight weeks a year. On top of this, members spend two months a year in either the Hong Kong or Singapore offices.
The house prefers not to have single-country funds, hence the Greater China fund is also invested in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore.
Alan Nesbit, deputy head of global emerging markets, said they preferred not to match the index weightings, as that made you focus on the past. "If you follow the index, you are constantly looking in the rear view mirror," he said. "The biggest emerging market changes – not that long ago it was Mexico."

12.30PM

Over a team lunch – a rare treat, I am told – we discuss the First State philosophy further. Millar Mathieson, senior analyst and portfolio manager, explained how even though Mr Tulloch was the boss, they felt just as comfortable questioning his investment decisions as those of the junior members of the team.
"There is no hierarchy like that – as you saw this morning," one said. "One of us can disagree with another, and just because Angus or Stuart believe something doesn't mean we have to toe their line."

2.30PM

In the afternoon there is an office visit from a Malaysian manufacturer with links to the medical industry, who is pitching for First State to invest. The manufacturer brought material samples along so that the team could touch and feel them; they have fun passing the products around. The company is assessed not just on profits and financial performance but also on the company's culture and ethics – whether they source raw materials sustainably and the ecological impact of production and waste disposal.

4PM

Most of the team's time is spent researching companies and prospective investments. Even if a company is not suitable for investment now, it is monitored for potential in the future.
Jonathan Asante, the head of global emerging markets, said that when the team met companies they were often told they asked different questions from other investment houses. He said: "We are concerned about the companies' culture; whether they are trustworthy, honest and good to their shareholders. We don't want to see a spreadsheet and a business model, anyone can mock those up."
The biggest companies in emerging markets are often state owned, so First State spends some time educating companies about the value of small shareholders.
Since 2004 First State has been limiting new investment into the Asia Pacific fund and has actively discouraged new investors from the Latin America fund.
The team is finding that prices are high at the moment and the best companies come at a premium. "We have written to clients saying it is difficult at the moment – don't invest any more. Sit tight," Mr Asante said. "You can always find rubbish that's cheap, but we're not interested in rubbish."

4.30PM

I head for the exit, while Mr Tulloch and his colleagues continue to chew over the endless facts, figures and research notes that pass their desks. They tell me they rarely leave before 7pm.



http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/investing/8097596/My-day-as-a-fund-manager-wannabe.html

Tongher



Date announced 17/08/2010
Quarter 30/06/2010 Qtr 2
FYE 31/12/2010

STOCK TONGHER
C0DE  5010 

Price $ 1.91
Curr. PE (ttm-Eps) 12.41
Curr. DY 2.62%

Rec. qRev 63560 q-q % chg 8% y-y% chq 42%
Rec qPbt 10015 q-q % chg 76% y-y% chq 2529%
Rec. qEps 4.98 q-q % chg 69% y-y% chq -832%
ttm-Eps 15.39 q-q % chg 58% y-y% chq -2%

Using VERY CONSERVATIVE ESTIMATES:
EPS GR 4%
Avg.H PE 10.00
Avg. L PE 4.00

Current price is at Upper 1/3 of valuation zone.
RISK: Upside -17% Downside 117%
One Year Appreciation Potential 0% Avg. yield 3% Avg.
Total Annual Potential Return (over next 5 years):    3%

CPE/SPE 1.77
P/NTA 0.86
NTA 2.23
SPE 7.00
Rational Pr 1.08


Decision:
Already Owned: Buy Hold Sell Filed
Review (future acq) Filed
Discard Filed
Guide: Valuation zones Lower 1/3 Buy Mid. 1/3 Maybe Upper 1/3 Sell

Aim:
To Buy a bargain. Buy at Lower 1/3 of Valuation Zone
To Minimise risk of Loss. Buy when risk is low i.e UPSIDE GAIN > 75% OR DOWNSIDE RISK <25%
To Double every 5 years. Seek for POTENTIAL RETURN of > 15%.
To Prevent Loss Sell immediately when fundamentals deteriorate
To Maximise Gain & Reduce Loss Sell when CPE/SPE > 1.5, when in Upper 1/3 of Valuation Zone & Returns < 15%/yr


How to value a cyclical stock, like Tongher?

A reasonable method is using the asset valuation method.  Tongher is trading below its NTA.

It is more challenging to use earnings to value cyclical stocks.  Tongher's earnings are affected by the business cycle of its sector.  I have averaged all the existing ttm-EPS figures that I have over the last 26 quarters and this gives an average ttm-EPS of 27.3 sen.  Before the recent global crisis, Tongher was earning about 15 sen per quarter.  It's latest quarter's EPS was 4.98 sen.

Using a conservative estimated ttm-EPS 30.0 sen and the signature PE of 7, I derive a rational value for Tongher of 2.10.  As this value will be on the low side due to the very conservative assumptions made in its derivation, at its current price of 1.91, Tongher is undervalued.


Date announced 17/08/2010
Quarter 30/06/2010 Qtr 2
FYE 31/12/2010

STOCK TONGHER
C0DE  5010 

Price $ 1.91
Curr. PE (ttm-Eps) 6.37
Curr. DY 2.62%

Valuation using Estimated ttm-EPS
ttm-Eps 30.00 sen

Using VERY CONSERVATIVE ESTIMATES:
EPS GR 4%
Avg.H PE 10.00
Avg. L PE 4.00

Current price is at Lower 1/3 of valuation zone.
RISK: Upside 87% Downside 13%
One Year Appreciation Potential 18% Avg. yield 6%
Avg. Total Annual Potential Return (over next 5 years):     24%

CPE/SPE 0.91
P/NTA 0.86
NTA 2.23
SPE 7.00
Rational Pr 2.10

Dutch Lady



Date announced 18/08/2010
Quarter 30/6/2010 Qtr 2
FYE 31/12/2010

STOCK DLADY
C0DE 3026

Price $ 18
Curr. PE (ttm-Eps) 15.16
Curr. DY 3.65%

Rec. qRev 188919 q-q % chg 9% y-y% chq 7%
Rec qPbt 25546 q-q % chg -10% y-y% chq 28%
Rec. qEps 29.56 q-q % chg -9% y-y% chq 23%
ttm-Eps 118.74 q-q % chg 5% y-y% chq 46%

Using VERY CONSERVATIVE ESTIMATES:
EPS GR 5%
Avg.H PE 14.32
Avg. L PE 12.30

Current price is at Middle 1/3 of valuation zone.
RISK: Upside 38% Downside 62%
One Year Appreciation Potential 4% Avg. yield 6%
Avg. Total Annual Potential Return (over next 5 years):  10%

CPE/SPE 1.14
P/NTA 5.86
SPE 13.31
Rational Pr 15.80


Decision: 
Already Owned: Buy Hold Sell Filed
Review (future acq): Filed
Discard: Filed
Guide: Valuation zones: Lower 1/3 Buy; Mid. 1/3 Maybe; Upper 1/3 Sell.

Aim:
To Buy a bargain: Buy at Lower 1/3 of Valuation Zone
To Minimise risk of Loss: Buy when risk is low i.e UPSIDE GAIN > 75% OR DOWNSIDE RISK <25%
To Double every 5 years: Seek for POTENTIAL RETURN of > 15%.
To Prevent Loss: Sell immediately when fundamentals deteriorate
To Maximise Gain: Sell and Replace when CPE/SPE > 1.5, when in Upper 1/3 of Valuation Zone & Returns < 15%/yr

Public Bank Berhad



Date Announced 18/10/2010
Quarter 30/09/2010 Qtr 3
FYE 31/12/2010

STOCK PBBANK
C0DE  1295 

Price $ 12.88
Curr. PE (ttm-Eps) 15.58
Curr. DY 4.27%

Rec. qRev 2877383 q-q % chg 7% y-y% chq 18%
Rec qPbt 1051377 q-q % chg 7% y-y% chq 23%
Rec. qEps 22.35 q-q % chg 7% y-y% chq 21%
ttm-Eps 82.66 q-q % chg 5% y-y% chq 13%

Using VERY CONSERVATIVE ESTIMATES:
EPS GR 5%
Avg.H PE 14.00
Avg. L PE 12.00

Current price is at Middle 1/3 of valuation zone.
RISK: Upside 54% Downside 46%
One Year Appreciation Potential 3% Avg. yield 6% Avg.
Total Annual Potential Return over next 5 years 9%

CPE/SPE 1.20
P/NTA 3.70
SPE 13
Rational Pr 10.75


Decision: 
Already Owned: Buy Hold Sell Filed
Review (future acq):  Filed
Discard:  Filed
Guide: Valuation zones Lower 1/3 Buy; Mid. 1/3 Maybe; Upper 1/3 Sell.

Aim:
To Buy a bargain: Buy at Lower 1/3 of Valuation Zone
To Minimise risk of Loss: Buy when risk is low i.e UPSIDE GAIN > 75% OR DOWNSIDE RISK <25%
To Double every 5 years:  Seek for POTENTIAL RETURN of > 15%/yr
To Prevent Loss:  Sell immediately when fundamentals deteriorate
To Maximise Gain & Reduce Loss:    Sell and Replace when CPE/SPE > 1.5, when in Upper 1/3 of Valuation Zone & Returns < 15%/yr

Guinness



Date Announced 4th Aug 2010
Quarter 30/06/2010 Qtr 4
FYE 30/06/2010

STOCK  GUINESS 
C0DE  3255

Price $ 8.68
Curr. PE (ttm-Eps) 17.17
Curr. DY 5.18%

Rec. qRev 308713 q-q % chg -17% y-y% chq 12%
Rec qPbt 48010 q-q % chg -23% y-y% chq 26%
Rec. qEps 11.81 q-q % chg -23% y-y% chq 30%
ttm-Eps 50.54 q-q % chg 6% y-y% chq 8%

Using VERY CONSERVATIVE ESTIMATES:
EPS GR 5%
Avg.H PE 14.00
Avg. L PE 12.00

Current price is at Upper 1/3 of valuation zone.
RISK: Upside 16% Downside 84%
One Year Appreciation Potential 1% Avg. yield 7%
Avg. Total Annual Potential Return over next 5 years 7%

CPE/SPE 1.32
P/NTA 5.56
Sig. PE 13
Rational Pr 6.57


Decision: 
Already Owned:  Buy Hold Sell Filed
Review (future acq):  Filed
Discard:  Filed
Guide: Valuation zones:   Lower 1/3 Buy Mid. 1/3 Maybe Upper 1/3 Sell

Aim: 
To Buy a bargain:. Buy at Lower 1/3 of Valuation Zone
To Minimise risk of Loss:  Buy when risk is low i.e UPSIDE GAIN > 75% OR DOWNSIDE RISK <25%
To Double every 5 years:   Seek for ANNUAL POTENTIAL RETURN of > 15%.
To Prevent Loss:   Sell immediately when fundamentals deteriorate
To Maximise Gain:    Sell and Replace when CPE/SPE > 1.5, when in Upper 1/3 of Valuation Zone & Returns < 15%/yr

Monday 1 November 2010

Nestle’s 3Q net profit up 42%



Nestle’s 3Q net profit up 42%
Tags: Nestle (M) Bhd | third quarter

Written by Financial Daily
Friday, 29 October 2010 11:30


KUALA LUMPUR: Nestle (M) Bhd’s net profit for the third quarter ended Sept 30, rose 41.9% year-on-year (y-o-y) to RM113.19 million or 48.3 sen a share while revenue gained 11.8% to RM991.08 million.

For the cumulative nine-month period, net profit totalled RM352.14 million or 150.2 sen a share and revenue was at RM3.06 billion, a y-o-y gain of 32.6% and 9.6%, respectively.

Nestle attributed the strong 3Q performance to satisfactory growth in most of its product categories, especially for Nestle liquid drinks and chilled dairy, which achieved double-digit growth.

Meanwhile, capitalising on the investments made in major production lines for coffee and coffee creamers in the past two years, Nestle said its export business also registered strong double-digit growth for 3Q.

It said, although its gross profit margin deteriorated by 110bps y-o-y as a consequence of input cost pressures and product sales mix, this effect was mitigated by less marketing and promotional activities during 3Q and the timing of some fixed overhead expenses, hence enabling profit margin before tax to still improve by 140 bps from the previous year’s 3Q.

For the remaining three months, Nestle said it would leverage on positive economic trends to continue growing both its top and bottom line. It will also increase its marketing investment to expand its market share.


This article appeared in The Edge Financial Daily, October 29, 2010.

----


STOCK NESTLE
C0DE 4707

Price $ 43.8
Curr. PE (ttm-Eps) 23.43
Curr. DY 3.42%

Rec. qRev 991076 q-q % chg -6%  y-y% chq 12%
Rec qPbt 132652 q-q % chg 13% y-y% chq 25%
Rec. qEps   48.27 q-q % chg 13%  y-y% chq 42%
ttm-Eps 186.94 q-q % chg  8%  y-y% chq 28%

Using VERY CONSERVATIVE ESTIMATES:
EPS GR 6%
Avg.H PE   22.00
Avg. L PE 19.00

Current price is at  Middle 1/3 of valuation zone.  
RISK: Upside 56% Downside 44%
One Year Appreciation Potential 5%   Avg. yield  6%
Avg. Total Annual Potential Return over next 5 years 11%

CPE/SPE 1.14
P/NTA 18.10
Sig. PE 20.5
Rationale Pr  38.32


Petronas Dagangan



STOCK PETDAG
C0DE  5681 

Price $ 11.9
Curr. PE (ttm-Eps) 15.82
Curr. DY 5.04%

Date  24/08/2010
Qtr Ending  30/06/2010
Qtr 1  FYE  31/03/2011

Rec. qRev 5456472 q-q % chg 1% y-y% chq 14%
Rec qPbt 277223 q-q % chg 20% y-y% chq -2%
Rec. qEps 20.10 q-q % chg 24% y-y% chq -3%
ttm-Eps 75.20 q-q % chg -1% y-y% chq 35%

Using VERY CONSERVATIVE ESTIMATES:
EPS GR 4%
Avg.H PE 12.00
Avg. L PE 10.00

Current price is at Upper 1/3 of valuation zone.
RISK: Upside -45% Downside 145%
One Year Appreciation Potential -2% Avg. yield 6% Avg.
Total Annual Potential Return over next 5 years 5%

CPE/SPE 1.44
P/NTA 2.48
Sig. PE 11
Rational Pr 8.27

LPI



STOCK LPI
C0DE  8621 

Price $ 11.5
Curr. PE (ttm-Eps) 18.51
Curr. DY 3.67%

Rec. qRev 216952 q-q % chg 15% y-y% chq 5%
Rec. qPbt 47445 q-q % chg 32% y-y% chq 11%
Rec. qEps 16.85 q-q % chg 40% y-y% chq 13%
ttm-Eps 62.13 q-q % chg 3% y-y% chq 11%

Using VERY CONSERVATIVE ESTIMATES:
EPS GR 4%
Avg.H PE 17.00
Avg. L PE 13.00

Current price is at Middle 1/3 of valuation zone.

RISK: Upside 37% Downside 63%
One Year Appreciation Potential 2%  Avg. yield 5%
Avg. Total Annual Potential Return over next 5 years 7%

CPE/SPE 1.23
P/NTA 2.31
SPE 15
Rational Pr 9.32


(CPE = Current PE, SPE = Signature PE)

Warren Buffett's Priceless Investment Advice

It is great when you can find high quality stocks offered at bargain prices.  However, most of the time, you will find that they are selling at fair prices. 

It is only during certain periods in the market when these high quality stocks are again offered at bargain prices.  These bargains are often not large, as those holding these stocks are often smart, long term investors who know the 'intrinsic' value of their shares.

Well, if you have to invest regularly, you can either wait for a 'right' time when stocks are offered at relative bargain prices.  Alternatively, you can actually acquire these stocks 'almost immediately' and 'regularly' as many are trading at their fair prices.

Here is a strategy you may wish to adopt profitably into your investing strategies.  

"It's far better to buy a wonderful company at a fair price than a fair company at a wonderful price."

If investing in wonderful companies at fair prices is good enough for Warren Buffett -- arguably the finest investor on the planet -- it should be good enough for the rest of us.

The devil is in the details

Buying great companies at reasonable prices can deliver solid returns for long-term investors. The challenge, of course, is identifying great companies -- and determining what constitutes a reasonable price.

Buffett recommends that investors look for companies that deliver outstanding returns on capital and produce substantial cash profits. He also suggests that you look for companies with a huge economic moat to protect them from competitors. You can identify companies with moats by looking for strong brands that stand alongside consistent or improving profit margins and returns on capital.

How do you determine the right buy price for shares in such companies? Buffett advises that you wait patiently for opportunities to purchase stocks at a significant discount to their intrinsic values -- as calculated by taking the present value of all future cash flows. Ultimately, he believes that "value will in time always be reflected in market price." When the market finally recognizes the true worth of your undervalued shares, you begin to earn solid returns.

Bursa raps and fines Liqua, six former directors

"Harapkan pagar, pagar makan padi."

Saturday October 30, 2010

Bursa raps and fines Liqua, six former directors

PETALING JAYA: Liqua Health Corp Bhd and six former directors were publicly reprimanded yesterday and fined a total of RM1.63mil by Bursa Malaysia Securities for failing to discharge their duties.

In addition, Liqua’s former managing director Goh Bak Ming and former executive director See Keng Leong were required to pay back Liqua a total sum of RM15.67mil, which equalled the amount the company had paid to Wynsum Healthy Living Sdn Bhd for the sale and distribution of certain health products. A total sum of RM13.2mil obtained from banking facilities were paid to Wynsum.

“Notwithstanding the payments made to Wynsum, the products were never delivered,” according to a Liqua statement.

Bursa Securities said it had found that the former directors of Liqua failed to ensure the payments made to Wynsum and the corporate guarantees issued to secure the financing “were fair, and reasonable,” as well as “not to the detriment of Liqua and its shareholders.”

Goh was slapped with a RM1mil fine, while See RM500,000. The other four directors Dr Fei Chong Ming, Ng Weng Cheong, Leow Yan Seong@ Liew Pin and Rohaya Hashim were fined RM10,000 each.

Sunday 31 October 2010

The concept of Rational Value of a Portfolio (Ellis Traub)

Re: Toolkit 5 and rational Value
Financial Literacy for Youth
Thu, 30 Dec 2004 18:34:18 -0800 (PST)

Diane:

At 08:57 PM 12/30/2004, you wrote:

The Portfolio Report Card Overview section of Toolkit 5 has a new concept,
called rational value. I'm trying to understand how the the number is
calculated.

----

You should be able to arrive at it by dividing the current price of
each stock by its relative value and multiplying that result by the
number of shares.

The concept behind this value is that each company has a fairly
constant PE (we like to call it the "signature PE") at which it has
sold. This is its historical average and represents a price (expressed
as a multiple of earnings) that has proven to be reasonable. The PE
is a rate investors are willing to pay for a dollar's worth of earnings
(much like the price or rate for a pound of coffee or gallon of gas).

When the PE is above that signature PE, it's selling at a higher rate
than "normal" and, conversely, when it sells below that value, it's
selling at a lower than "normal" rate.

The "Rational Price" (current price divided by the Relative Value)
is the price at which the stock would be selling were it to have
a Relative Value of 100%. In other words, it's the "normal" price
for the stock based on history. The "Rational Value" is the value
of your holdings if people were to be paying that "rational" price
for the stock.

The value is in setting a realistic value on your portfolio so that
you can see if, in the present market, your portfolio and its
holdings are above or below what it "should" be if people were
paying that rational price. It's supposed to keep you feet on the
ground in a bubble and your head in the clouds in a bust.

Ellis Traub






Terminology:


Signature PE =  The fairly constant PE at which the stock has sold.


Relative (PE) Value = Current PE / Signature PE


Rational Price of Stock 
= Price at which the Stock would be selling were it to have a Relative Value of 100%
= Current Price of Stock / Relative Value


Rational Value of a Stock in a Portfolio 
= Rational Price of Stock X Number of Shares
= [(Current Price of Stock / Relative Value) X Number of Shares]


Rational Value of a Portfolio 
= Sum of the Rational Values of Each Stock in the Portfolio
= Rational Value of Stock A + Rational Value of Stock B + Rational Value of Stock C + ......


http://www.mail-archive.com/i-club-list@lists.better-investing.org/msg04788.html


Relative Values and Rational Prices of Selected Stocks in KLSE.

https://spreadsheets.google.com/pub?key=0AuRRzs61sKqRdEdTREYtNTVQYnZtS1hfMDlSQjc3elE&output=html

Five reasons why my way works

http://www.financialiteracy.us/wordpress/2010/10/05/five-reasons-why-my-way-works/

My mission, when I started this blog, was to persuade my readers that “investing,” is not what the securities industry has spent gazillions convincing everyone it is: betting on the stock market, which is risky and unpredictable. Rather, “investing” is a simple means of earning money with your money. It can make you wealthy and is virtually risk-free. 


Here are five reasons why “our” way works, and “their” way doesn’t.

  1. “We” seek to be part-owners of companies that have a proven track record of making money for their owners. “They” buy stocks because their stories sound good.
  2. “We” judge the quality of the companies we invest in by examining their fundamentals—their “lifeblood” and “vital signs.” “They” use technical analysis to decide when to buy and sell—a popular attempt to predict the unpredictable, with no record of consistent success.
  3. “We” know, from history, what multiple of profits would be reasonable to pay for shares of such companies. “They” ignore such fundamentals and can only guess at reasonable purchase price.
  4. “We” rely upon an increase in the actual value of our holdings over time to justify selling at a profit. “They” must rely on luck or someone else’s ignorance to profit from the transaction.
  5. “We” value our portfolios according to their potential—their rational value—because we own shares in companies whose operations continue profitably, regardless of the fluctuations of the stock market. “They” value shares according to their “market value”—whatever they’re selling for at the moment—because “they” don’t have a means of setting an absolute value for those shares.

The only thing “they” have going for them is excitement. There’s nothing like the rush that comes with risk! Especially when you bet your life’s savings on something as uncertain as the stock market.

Asset Allocation: Is it Necessary or Effective?

October 29th, 2009




 Asset allocation is a device used by investors and financial planners to populate a portfolio with an appropriate mix of investment vehicles selected from a smorgasbord of stocks, bonds, and occasionally other investments, each deemed to carry with it a uniquely predictable degree of risk.
Its goal is to optimize the return on the portfolio while taking into account  that investor’s tolerance for risk. And,  risk aversion is analyzed using such factors as the point the client has reached in her life cycle, her current and future responsibilities, her earning capacity—as well as the nuances of his or her character and personality.
The assumption is that there is an inverse relationship between  risk and return; and, the more aggressive the portfolio—one invested primarily in common stocks—the more risky it is.
Few amateur investors have the experience or know-how to apply asset allocation without the help of a professional. And, considering the view that most amateurs have of “investing,” the expense of such a professional might easily be justified. But….
I agree with Peter Lynch’s view that one should invest as if she were going to live forever. In my view, the most aggressive portfolio should be expected to generate no higher a return than the potential growth rate of a basket of well managed companies’ earnings—between 10% and 15% a year. And that there’s simply no need to dilute the return of a portfolio with any investment vehicles that would return less than that. I believe that’s all the “asset allocation” anyone needs!
The secret is to recognize that there is virtually no risk when you select those companies for their ability to grow their earnings consistently and adequately; and when you understand that the oscillations of the stock market—and the prices of the shares of the companies you own—have nothing whatever to do with the operation of those companies and the generation of profits for their owners. And, as an owner, you’re in it for those profits



http://www.financialiteracy.us/wordpress/2009/10/29/asset-allocation-is-it-necessary-or-effective/

Friday 29 October 2010

Pimco likens US to 'Ponzi' scheme: Quantitative Easing in the trillions is not a bondholder's friend; it is in fact inflationary.

US authorities are operating a "brazen" Ponzi scheme in government debt by buying trillions of dollars of bonds to stimulate the economy, according to Bill Gross, managing director of Pimco, the world's biggest bond house.

Pimco likens US to 'Ponzi' scheme
Mr Gross said more QE is a huge gamble, but necessary because the US is "in a 'liquidity trap'
In a bid to restart the stalling recovery, the US Federal Reserve is next week expected to unveil a second round of quantitative easing (QE) of as much as $500bn, on top of the $1.2 trillion already completed.
In typically robust comments, Mr Gross said the Fed had run out of other options but warned that more QE would in the long-term mean "picking the creditor's pocket via inflation and negative real interest rates".
"[Cheque] writing in the trillions is not a bondholder's friend; it is in fact inflationary, and, if truth be told, somewhat of a Ponzi scheme," he wrote on his investment outlook, arguing that creditors have always expected to be paid out of future growth.
"Now, with growth in doubt, it seems the Fed has taken Ponzi one step further," he said. "The Fed has joined the party itself. Has there ever been a Ponzi scheme so brazen? There has not."
More QE is a huge gamble, he said, but necessary because the US is "in a 'liquidity trap', where interest rates or QE may not stimulate borrowing or lending because consumer demand is just not there."
Mr Gross is best-known in the UK for saying gilts were "resting on a bed of nitroglycerine" as a result of the nation's high debt levels. Pimco has since reversed its position on the UK and advised clients to gamble on a British recovery.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/8090902/Pimco-likens-US-to-Ponzi-scheme.html