Wednesday 26 September 2012

Hartalega versus Top Glove

Comparing Hartalega and Top Glove performance over 2 years from 2009 to 2011

Hartalega Period (Yrs) 2
Mar-09 Mar-11 Change CAGR
millions millions
Equity 254.2 494.44 94.51% 39.47%
LT Assets 246.4 348.86 41.58% 18.99%
Current Assets 128.36 286 122.81% 49.27%
LT Liabilities 67.5 61.29 -9.20% -4.71%
Current Liabilities 52.76 78.78 49.32% 22.20%
Sales 443.2 734.92 65.82% 28.77%
Earnings 84.51 190.3 125.18% 50.06%
Interest expense 2.43 2.47 1.65% 0.82%
D/E 0.23 0.08
ROA 22.55% 29.98%
ROE  33.25% 38.49%
Market cap 1512.26 2908.38 92.32% 38.68%
P/E 17.89 15.28
Earnings Yield 5.59% 6.54%
P/BV 5.95 5.88
DPO ratio (historical) 30.37%
Dividend Yield range High Low
4.60% 2.60%
Capital changes  -
Top Glove Period (Yrs) 2
Aug-09 Aug-11 Change CAGR
millions millions
Equity 824.51 1121.8 36.06% 16.64%
LT Assets 620.91 816.11 31.44% 14.65%
Current Assets 511.5 593.69 16.07% 7.74%
LT Liabilities 42.37 47.24 11.49% 5.59%
Current Liabilities 244.06 216.18 -11.42% -5.88%
Sales 1529.08 2053.92 34.32% 15.90%
Earnings 169.13 113.09 -33.13% -18.23%
Interest expense 8.53 0.24 -97.19% -83.23%
D/E 0.02 0
ROA 14.94% 8.02%
ROE  20.51% 10.08%
Market cap 2118.81 2672.54 26.13% 12.31%
P/E 12.53 23.63
Earnings Yield 7.98% 4.23%
P/BV 2.57 2.38
DPO ratio (historical) 42.08%
Dividend Yield range High Low
3.60% 2.00%
Capital changes  -



Stock Performance Chart for Hartalega Holdings Bhd

Stock Performance Chart for Top Glove Corporation Berhad

The Second Secret of Small-Cap Investing: Invest for the Long Term (but Monitor in the Short Term)


Successful stock investors know that a long-term approach often pays off by allowing individuals to ride out a company’s temporary setbacks and realize gains over a period of five years or a decade or even longer. In addition, minimizing transaction costs and short-term capital gains taxes can add to the overall rates of return.
With small-cap stocks, however, some tweaking to the buy-and-hold strategy used in a large-cap stock portfolio may be necessary. Because smaller companies are less established, there is often a higher degree of risk and volatility involved in holding these kinds of stocks. That’s not to say that a buy-and-hold approach can’t work, though, but just a reminder that “buy and hold” does not mean “buy and forget.” With small-cap stocks it can be prudent to maintain a somewhat higher level of vigilance on their activities, watching for signs of trouble and selling promptly when real problems affect a company.
When problems do arise, the market is often less forgiving of small companies when they hit roadblocks. Even when management eventually steers these companies back in the right direction,investors may stay away until they are receive excessive degrees of reassurance, keeping stock prices depressed all the while.
It’s never good to be swayed into action by irrational market moves, however, and patience is frequently required to become a successful stock investor. Smaller companies often don’t have the broad institutional interest required to support share price growth. As a result, stock prices may only grow moderately until a tipping point is reached, at which the market seems to wakes up to the potential of a company. Investors who have already discovered the stock will then be nicely rewarded.

Life Cycle of A Successful Company

The First Secret of Small-Cap Investing: DEMAND PROOF OF MANAGERIAL EXCELLENCE

Great businesses are made, not born. And the secret to making a great business is having solid leadership in place — a management team that can drive a company on the route to sustainable excellence.
As with any stock investment, it’s imperative to establish that a small company’s leaders are more than competent — they have the skill and expertise to deliver profits to shareholders. Although there are many ways to determine whether a company’s management team is up to the task, a few factors rise to the top.
First, a company should have an operating history of at least three years. For companies that have recently gone public, this period could include years before its initial offering. There should have been no jarring changes of management during the company’s recent past as well. A company’s management can’t be evaluated without evidence, so the team responsible for the success of the venture to date must still be in place in order to make judgments.
Second, a company must be profitable to be considered for investment. The promise of future profits is not sufficient. Nor is it enough for a company to have recently turned the corner and posted positive earnings for the first time in its history. If a company has been able to deliver several recent years of profitability, management has passed the most important test of its skills.
But it’s not enough that a business’s management is merely competent. Our third suggestion is that stock investors strive for excellence — seek companies that meet or surpass the performance measures of their peers and competitors.
Fourth, the strength and consistency of historical growth is certainly area where investors can discern the hand of management in building a business poised for long-term future success.
Fifth, the trend and level of a company‘s pretax profit margins is perhaps the single most important comparative factor. Successful, quality companies can be identified by the margins they eke out on each dollar of revenue. Higher margins than competitors are almost always a sign of management expertise. Relatively stable annual margins are demanded of all companies. Growing margins are a positive.
To be sure, smaller companies may be in the phase of building their business, investing now to support greater success in the future, so the analysis of margins when compared with more established competitors should keep this possibility in mind.
A company’s return on equity should be reviewed carefully, but this measure not be less useful as a quality consideration for newer-stage businesses. Smaller companies can earn higher returns on initial equity, but these levels are not sustainable. Caution must again be exercised when comparing small businesses with established enterprises. Finally, any company included in a growth stock portfolio must have identifiable drivers of future growth. Tailwinds should be stronger than headwinds. No business can coast to success on the coattails of its past success, so management must be able to present a viable vision for how it intends to grow the business in the years ahead.

Tuesday 25 September 2012

Malaysian Plantations Market Capitalization

Market Capitalization Period (Yr) 4
Mar-08 Mar-12 Change CAGR
RM (million) (million)
Batu Kawan  4490.3 8239.47 83.5% 16.4%
Boustead 3176.65 5636.46 77.4% 15.4%
Chin Teck 666.95 827.75 24.1% 5.5%
Far East Hold 844.31 1060.43 25.6% 5.9%
GENP 6082.19 7284.92 19.8% 4.6%
Glenealy  546.82 827.15 51.3% 10.9%
Hap Seng Plant 2272 2440 7.4% 1.8%
IJM Plantations 1942.52 2709.8 39.5% 8.7%
IOI 44617.65 35907.77 -19.5% -5.3%
Kim Loong 708.17 829.35 17.1% 4.0%
KLK 17613.83 25961.72 47.4% 10.2%
Kulim 2180.19 5583.1 156.1% 26.5%
Kwantas 1271.65 748.03 -41.2% -12.4%
SOP 1140.86 3018.77 164.6% 27.5%
THPlant 615.74 1480.7 140.5% 24.5%
TWSPlant 1852.04 3000.3 62.0% 12.8%
TSH 1176.59 2082.34 77.0% 15.3%
Unico 892.15 1055.38 18.3% 4.3%
UMCCA 1031.84 1545.61 49.8% 10.6%
UTDPLT 2893.06 5124.26 77.1% 15.4%


Sorted by Market Cap of Mar 2012 (from largest to smallest)

Market Capitalisation Period (Yr) 4
Mar-08 Mar-12 Change CAGR
RM (million) (million)
IOI 44617.65 35907.77 -19.5% -5.3%
KLK 17613.83 25961.72 47.4% 10.2%
Batu Kawan  4490.3 8239.47 83.5% 16.4%
GENP 6082.19 7284.92 19.8% 4.6%
Boustead 3176.65 5636.46 77.4% 15.4%
Kulim 2180.19 5583.1 156.1% 26.5%
UTDPLT 2893.06 5124.26 77.1% 15.4%
SOP 1140.86 3018.77 164.6% 27.5%
TWSPlant 1852.04 3000.3 62.0% 12.8%
IJM Plantations 1942.52 2709.8 39.5% 8.7%
Hap Seng Plant 2272 2440 7.4% 1.8%
TSH 1176.59 2082.34 77.0% 15.3%
UMCCA 1031.84 1545.61 49.8% 10.6%
THPlant 615.74 1480.7 140.5% 24.5%
Far East Hold 844.31 1060.43 25.6% 5.9%
Unico 892.15 1055.38 18.3% 4.3%
Kim Loong 708.17 829.35 17.1% 4.0%
Chin Teck 666.95 827.75 24.1% 5.5%
Glenealy  546.82 827.15 51.3% 10.9%
Kwantas 1271.65 748.03 -41.2% -12.4%


Sorted by biggest change in Market Capitalization over the last 4 years (from biggest to smallest)

Market Capitalisation Period (Yr) 4
Mar-08 Mar-12 Change CAGR
RM (million) (million)
SOP 1140.86 3018.77 164.6% 27.5%
Kulim 2180.19 5583.1 156.1% 26.5%
THPlant 615.74 1480.7 140.5% 24.5%
Batu Kawan  4490.3 8239.47 83.5% 16.4%
Boustead 3176.65 5636.46 77.4% 15.4%
UTDPLT 2893.06 5124.26 77.1% 15.4%
TSH 1176.59 2082.34 77.0% 15.3%
TWSPlant 1852.04 3000.3 62.0% 12.8%
Glenealy  546.82 827.15 51.3% 10.9%
UMCCA 1031.84 1545.61 49.8% 10.6%
KLK 17613.83 25961.72 47.4% 10.2%
IJM Plantations 1942.52 2709.8 39.5% 8.7%
Far East Hold 844.31 1060.43 25.6% 5.9%
Chin Teck 666.95 827.75 24.1% 5.5%
GENP 6082.19 7284.92 19.8% 4.6%
Unico 892.15 1055.38 18.3% 4.3%
Kim Loong 708.17 829.35 17.1% 4.0%
Hap Seng Plant 2272 2440 7.4% 1.8%
IOI 44617.65 35907.77 -19.5% -5.3%
Kwantas 1271.65 748.03 -41.2% -12.4%



Market Capitalization from 1996 to 2012

Market Capitalisation
Dec-96 Mar-08 Mar-12
RM (million) (million)
Batu Kawan  1544.29 4490.3 8239.47
Boustead 3176.65 5636.46
Chin Teck 484.49 666.95 827.75
Far East Hold 216.16 844.31 1060.43
GENP 1645.77 6082.19 7284.92
Glenealy  546.82 827.15
Hap Seng Plant 2272 2440
IJM Plantations 1942.52 2709.8
IOI 1063.46 44617.65 35907.77
Kim Loong 708.17 829.35
KLK 4561.93 17613.83 25961.72
Kulim 1077.38 2180.19 5583.1
Kwantas 416 1271.65 748.03
SOP 508.08 1140.86 3018.77
THPlant 230.97 615.74 1480.7
TSH 1176.59 2082.34
TWSPlant 1852.04 3000.3
UMCCA 209.38 1031.84 1545.61
Unico 892.15 1055.38
UTDPLT 803 2893.06 5124.26


Market Capitalization Growth rate from 1996 to 2012
Market Capitalisation Period (Yr) 15
Dec-96 Mar-12 Change CAGR
RM (million) (million)







iCap Closed End Fund



iCap Period (Yrs) 6
May-06 May-12 Change CAGR
millions millions
Equity 138.64 400 188.34% 19.30%
LT Assets 78.13 262.658 236.18% 22.39%
C. Assets 61.49 137.364 123.39% 14.33%
LT Liabilities 0 0 #DIV/0! #DIV/0!
C. Liabilities 0.97 0.263 -72.89% -19.55%
Sales 1.02 4.586 349.61% 28.47%
Earnings -1.22 1.709 -240.08% #NUM!
Interest exp. 0 0 #DIV/0! #DIV/0!
Market cap 138.6 315 127.27% 14.66%
D/E ratio 0 0 #DIV/0!
ROE -0.88% 0.43% -148.58%
P/E -113.61 184.32
P/BV 1.00 0.79
Dividends
DPO ratio 0.00%
DY range 0














Closed-ended funds: Why a discount, anyway?

Most closed-ended funds sell at a discount.

A recent sampling showed that more than 2/3rds of equity funds trade at a discount, and more than 90% of international equity funds trade at a discount. Many discounts are modest (5 to 10%), but many are 30% or more.

There is much research and speculation about why discounts happen. The debate isn't nearly as important as understanding a few of the most common reasons.

When selecting a closed-ended fund, investors must determine the reasonthe fund is trading at a discount and whether the discount is significant enought to be attractive. A discount may be justified by

  • uncertainty,
  • popularity or perceptions of the fund, and
  • the underlying asset base.

All 3 factors can work to cause a fund based on securities in Russia or Turkey, for example, to sell at a discount.

Likewise, during the heyday of the Asian Tigers, many funds based in Asia sold at a premium. The reason? Popularity and the perception of future growth and gains.

Billion Ringgit Club: Taking PPB’s gems beyond Wilmar’s shadow






Written by Cindy Yeap of theedgemalaysia.com
Tuesday, 25 September 2012

When “Sugar King” Tan Sri Robert Kuok decided in 2007 to spin off PPB GROUP BHD []’s oil palm PLANTATION []s and edible oils business to hold a sizeable stake in Wilmar International Ltd, led by his nephew Kuok Khoon Hong, he probably did not expect the Singapore-listed Wilmar to dictate PPB’s earnings and share price as it does today.

After all, Wilmar only began to make up more than two-thirds of PPB’s earnings two years later following the surprise sale of PPB’s sugar business the Malaysian government in January 2010.

Whatever the circumstances, analysts are finding it tough to make a case to call PPB a “buy” on its own merit today due to the volatility seen in the share price and profit of its 18.32% owned associate Wilmar.


“With over 70% of its earnings coming from Wilmar, you’re basically taking a view on Wilmar rather than PPB,” said one senior analyst.

While some of PPB’s own portfolio of businesses such as the Massimo bread business, are showing decent growth, the analyst points out earnings from PPB’s PROPERTIES [] and wastewater management businesses can also be volatile, while the flour milling and livestock farming business face thin margins and tepid utilisation rates. Even PPB’s film exhibition and distribution business under Golden Screen Cinemas (GSC) continues to face competition from smaller players and piracy.

“The only positive is that the group has been in the commodities and consumer businesses for a long time and if anyone can ride through the volatility, it would be them,” the analyst added. “Anyone who buys them has to take a long-term view.”

PPB’s new managing director Lim Soon Huat, 47, admits there is little PPB can immediately do to outrun Wilmar’s shadow.

Lim has been managing director for only two months, but he has been with the Kuok Group in Singapore, Thailand, Hong Kong and China for over 15 years and had been on PPB’s board as non-executive director since May 2008. Lim helped oversee the Kuok Group’s investments and operations in Indonesia, which include flour milling, sugar cane plantations, sugar milling and hotels,” PPB’s latest annual report read.

It remains to be seen if Lim’s appointment signals increasing investments by PPB in the archipelago where Wilmar has easily 20% of the branded cooking oil business.

“I’ll definitely be spending more time [in Kuala Lumpur] now,” Lim told The Edge Financial Daily on
sidelines of a recent briefing.

Both Wilmar and PPB’s stock prices skidded to their lowest in over three years after Wilmar announced its second back-to-back quarterly loss for its oilseeds trading business in the second quarter ended June 30 — the second such occurrence the past eight quarters since the second half of 2010.

As a result, profit contributions from Wilmar plunged 52% to RM209 million in the first half of 2012,
causing PPB’s group earnings to dip 46% year-on-year to RM302 million.

Both stocks rebounded last week after news got out that Wilmar made its first-ever share buyback on Sept 13, paying S$3 (RM7.50) apiece or S$22.19 million to purchase 7.39 million shares or 0.115% of its share base from the market.

As for PPB, Bursa Malaysia filings showed the Employees Provident Fund (EPF) among recent buyers of PPB shares as its stock plunged. The EPF had 9.92% of PPB as at Sept 6, up from 9.65% in late February.

For his part, Lim said PPB does not expect significant changes in contribution mix from its six business segments in the near term but promised PPB is working hard to grow its core businesses.


Of the RM104 million profit from PPB’s own businesses in the first half of 2012, some 63.5% were from grains trading and flour milling. Film exhibition and distribution contributed 18.8% to group earnings; properties 12.53%; consumer products 8.37%, waste management 4.88%, while the livestock business was loss-making.

He also gave little hints on whether PPB would consider spinning off GSC to get PPB back on the syariah-compliant investment list, and declined to outline a specific dividend policy for PPB apart from a commitment to return excesses to shareholders after considering its capital needs.

Some RM467 million has been earmarked to expand its flour, cinema and property businesses over the next two years, some 73% of which is to expand its flour businesses in China, Vietnam and Indonesia.

It is worth noting, though, that PPB and Wilmar were bound even more tightly together in December 2010 after PPB sold a 20% stake in its flour milling arm FFM Bhd to Wilmar. In return, FFM bought a 20%
stake in Wilmar’s flour milling businesses in China where flour mills are built to make other products like instant noodles as well.

Wilmar, which has some 50% of China’s branded cooking oil business, is keen to leverage its distribution strength to market other consumer products. On Sept 24, for instance, Wilmar announced a joint venture with New York-listed Kellogg Co, which owns the Kellogg’s and Pringles brands, to manufacture and distribute cereal and snacks in China.

The Kuok Group had just over 50% of PPB and about 32.35% of Wilmar as at May this year, including the 18.32% held by PPB. While Lim said PPB has no immediate intention of raising its interest in Wilmar, Singapore takeover rules allow the Kuok Group to buy up to 2% of Wilmar shares every six months without triggering a buyout. Singapore’s mandatory offer threshold is 30% and not 33%, as in Malaysia.

Some market watchers expect more of Robert Kuok’s agriculture and consumer-related businesses to eventually find their way into Wilmar’s fold, pointing out that PPB and Wilmar are already working together to expand the flour businesses in the region.

Analysts, however, are looking out for signs of a turnaround at Wilmar.

If Wilmar succeeds in beating expectations, PPB — which is among 144 companies that qualified as members of The Edge Billion Ringgit Club (BRC) for 2012 — would stand to gain.

This article is appeared in The Edge Financial Daily on 25 September, 2012.

Even Lousy Investing Beats Not Investing

By Chuck Saletta September 18, 2012

It wasn't that long ago that we suffered through a period of time in the stockmarket that has come to be known as "The Lost Decade." The 10-year period between the start of January 2000 and the end of December 2009 was one of the worst for stock market performance, ever.
Yet even during those dark times, one very straightforward strategy would have allowed you to just about break even -- or perhaps even make a few bucks along the way. All you would have had to do is dollar-cost average into the low-cost market-tracking SPDR S&P 500 (NYSE: SPY  ) ETF and reinvest the dividends you received. That's one of the simplest ways to invest, and that strategy -- or one essentially equivalent to it -- is very often available in 401(k)s and other retirement accounts.
Although those returns were lousy, both in absolute terms and when compared to the market's long-run average, there's one strategy that it certainly beat: not investing at all.
The act that matters most
When all is said and done, doing what it takes to invest in the first place matters at least as much as the actual returns you get on your invested cash. There are several reasons for this. Perhaps the most obvious is that if you never put any money away at all, no rate of compounding will get that goose egg to ever be anything but a goose egg.
But on another, more subtle level, the act of investing itself matters because making the commitment to do it well requires the rest of your financial house to be in order. You need to be in control of your debts and have enough cash coming in not only to pay your bills, but also to put some away for your future. In essence, investing takes discipline -- the exact same type of discipline that will help you manage whatever sized nest egg you do manage to amass over your investing career.
Your potential $1 million payout from "lousy" investing
A typical working career may last in the neighborhood of 45 years. Having and keeping a consistent investing plan throughout that journey may seem like a daunting task, especially if we suffer through many more of those "Lost Decades." Still, as the table below shows, the reward at the end of the 45-year process may well be over $1 million, even while earning consistently lousy 2% annualized returns:
Monthly Investment
-1% Annual Returns
0% Annual Returns
1% Annual Returns
2% Annual Returns
$0$0$0$0$0
$100$43,499$54,000$68,162$87,466
$200$86,998$108,000$136,324$174,931
$300$130,497$162,000$204,487$262,397
$400$173,996$216,000$272,649$349,863
$500$217,495$270,000$340,811$437,328
$750$326,242$405,000$511,216$655,993
$1,000$434,990$540,000$681,622$874,657
$1,250$543,737$675,000$852,027$1,093,321
$1,416$615,945$764,640$965,177$1,238,514
Source: Author's calculations.
Granted, to reach the bottom line of that table, you'd have to contribute the maximum allowable $17,000 to your 401(k) throughout your career. Still, the $1 million nest egg at the end is an incredibly impressive result for only managing 2% annualized returns. No matter how challenging it may seem to sock away more than $1,400 a month, note what happens on that top line. If you don't invest at all, when it comes time to retire, you won't have anynest egg to tide you through your not-so-golden years.
The joys of lousy investing
Once you realize how important making the commitment to invest is, getting past the fear of investing poorly is much easier. You can much more objectively look at every investment you have made as either a place to earn or a place to learn. For instance, I view my investment in industrial and financial titan General Electric (NYSE: GE  ) as one of the best investments I've ever made. It was a good investment because of what I've learned from it, in spite of the lousy returns I've received along the way.
Indeed, the principles I learned from that GE investment -- looking for a strong balance sheet and a well-covered and rising dividend -- have yielded far more successful investments than failures over the years. When coupled with the third key lesson from that investment -- prudent diversification -- the experience formed the foundation of an investing strategy that looks capable of withstanding the test of time. Not bad for an investment with objectively lousy returns.
Often, investing does work out
Of course, not all investments turn out poorly, and in fact some wind up doing quite well. Over the course of an entire career, the combination of lousy and great investments in the context of an overall solid strategy could very likely exceed that 2% annual return level. But if you're planning for lousy returns and wind up with better ones, you'll end at a much better place. Yet no matter what your ultimate returns, it's having the foundation and the dedication to invest that matters most.