Bullbear Buffett

Thursday, 30 August 2012

Tenaga - Return on Retained Earnings

Tenaga

Year	DPS		EPS		Retained EPS
2002	4.7		22		17.3
2003	5.5		21.6		16.1
2004	8.4		28.2		19.8
2005	7.4		22.6		15.2
2006	8.5		34.9		26.4
2007	21.2		66		44.8
2008	11.9		47.2		35.3
2009	10.6		39.8		29.2
2010	12.5		46.8		34.3
2011	3.4		12.7		9.3
2012	10	E	60	E	50
Total	104.1		401.8		297.7

From 2002 to 2012
EPS increase (sen)			38.0
DPO			26%
Return on retained earnings			13%

(Figures are in sens)

TM (Telekom Malaysia) - Return on Retained Earnings

TM (Telekom Malaysia)

Year		DPS		EPS	Retained EPS
2002		2.4		5.8	3.4
2003		1.6		9.4	7.8
2004		5.4		7	1.6
2005		6.6		3	-3.6
2006		6.5		11.4	4.9
2007		9		12.8	3.8
2008		10.6		5.2	-5.4
2009		16.6		15.8	-0.8
2010		18.1		14	-4.1
2011		18.9		33.3	14.4

Total		95.7		117.7	22

From	2002	to	2011
EPS increase (sen)				27.5
DPO				81%
Return on retained earnings				125%

(Figures are in sens)

Pantech - Return on Retained Earnings

Pantech

Year	DPS	EPS	Retained EPS
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007	0.7	5.5	4.8
2008	1.6	6.8	5.2
2009	2.3	13	10.7
2010	4.2	10.5	6.3
2011	2.8	6.2	3.4

Total	11.6	42	30.4

2007-2011
EPS increase (sen)		0.7
DPO		28%
Return on retained earnings		2%

(Figures are in sens)

Parkson - Return on Retained Earnings

Parkson

Year	DPS	EPS	Retained EPS
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008	14.7	25	10.3
2009	5	25.1	20.1
2010	16	28.8	12.8
2011	15	31.9	16.9

Total	50.7	110.8	60.1

2008-2011
EPS increase (sen)		6.9
DPO		46%
Return on retained earnings		11%

(Figures are in sens)

Genting Bhd - Return on Retained Earnings

Genting Bhd

Year	DPS	EPS		Retained EPS
2002	2.8	20.7		17.9
2003	3	20.3		17.3
2004	3.2	26.3		23.1
2005	3.7	28.3		24.6
2006	4.5	36.1		31.6
2007	26.8	43.1		16.3
2008	5.4	46		40.6
2009	5.3	31.5		26.2
2010	5.6	80.5		74.9
2011	6	63.7	P	57.7

Total	66.3	396.5		330.2

2002-2011
EPS increase (sen)		43.0
DPO		17%
Return on retained earnings		13%

(Figures are in sens)

KPJ - Return on Retained Earnings

KPJ

Year	DPS	EPS		Retained EPS
2002	2.2	2.5		0.3
2003	1.6	4.6		3
2004	1.4	5		3.6
2005	1.6	5.5		3.9
2006	2.5	5.6		3.1
2007	5.5	11.5		6
2008	4	12.4		8.4
2009	5.2	17.6		12.4
2010	4.9	21.2		16.3
2011	11.2	22.5	P	11.3

Total	40.1	108.4		68.3

2002-2011
EPS increase (sen)		20.0
DPO		37%
Return on retained earnings		29%

(Figures are in sens)

APM - Return on Retained Earnings

APM

Year	DPS	EPS		Retained EPS
2002	11.2	35.5		24.3
2003	9.2	24.2		15
2004	7.9	29.1		21.2
2005	12.2	34.8		22.6
2006	9.4	27.5		18.1
2007	10.8	26.7		15.9
2008	11.8	25.4		13.6
2009	11.3	36		24.7
2010	13.5	60.1		46.6
2011	16.5	59.5	P	43

Total	113.8	358.8		245

2002-2011
EPS increase (sen)		24.0
DPO		32%
Return on retained earnings		10%

(Figures are in sens)

United Plantations - Return on Retained Earnings

United Plantations

Year	DPS	EPS		Retained EPS
2002	21.1	37.2		16.1
2003	19.8	45.4		25.6
2004	21.6	57.9		36.3
2005	21.6	63.9		42.3
2006	26.8	72.1		45.3
2007	25.8	86.2		60.4
2008	29.8	151		121.2
2009	37.5	129		91.5
2010	63.8	133		69.2
2011	71.2	182	P	110.8

Total	339	957.7		618.7

2002-2011
EPS increase (sen)		144.8
DPO		35%
Return on retained earnings		23%

(Figures are in sens)

KLK - Return on Retained Earnings

Kuala Lumpur Kepong

Year	DPS	EPS	Retained EPS
2002	7.2	24.5	17.3
2003	9.6	33.7	24.1
2004	13.1	39.7	26.6
2005	15.5	36.1	20.6
2006	21.1	33.7	12.6
2007	26.8	57.7	30.9
2008	40.7	103	62.3
2009	53.8	60.6	6.8
2010	45	85.8	40.8
2011	60	127	67

Total	292.8	601.8	309

2002-2011
EPS increase (sen)		102.5
DPO		49%
Return on retained earnings		33%

(Figures are in sens)

Boustead - Return on Retained Earnings

Boustead

Year	DPS	EPS	Retained EPS
2002	3.2	11.1	7.9
2003	3.7	16.7	13
2004	8	22	14
2005	9.3	14.4	5.1
2006	9.3	7.8	-1.5
2007	10.9	49.1	38.2
2008	18	59.7	41.7
2009	18.2	26.7	8.5
2010	20.8	38.3	17.5
2011	35.9	34.2	-1.7

Total	137.3	280	142.7

2002-2011
EPS increase (sen)		23.1
DPO		49%
Return on retained earnings		16%

(Figures are in sens)

Petronas Gas

Petronas Gas

Year	DPS	EPS	Retained EPS

2003	30	33.2	3.2
2004	18.6	32.4	13.8
2005	30.8	41.6	10.8
2006	35.8	49.1	13.3
2007	38.3	63	24.7
2008	42.5	55.2	12.7
2009	48.7	48.7	0
2010	50	47	-3
2011	50	72	22

Total	344.7	442.2	97.5

2003-2011
EPS increase (sen)		38.8
DPO		78%
Return on retained earnings		40%

(Figures are in sens)

Poh Kong - Return on Retained Earnings

Poh Kong

Year	DPS	EPS	Retained EPS


2004	1	8.5	7.5
2005	1.2	2.9	1.7
2006	1.2	5.3	4.1
2007	1.3	4.5	3.2
2008	1.4	7	5.6
2009	1.4	6.9	5.5
2010	1.4	8	6.6
2011	1.4	10	8.6

Total	10.3	53.1	42.8

2003-2011
EPS increase (sen)		1.5
DPO		19%
Return on retained earnings		4%

(Figures are in sens)

Tongher - Return on Retained Earnings

Tong Herr

Year	DPS	EPS	Retained EPS
2002	5.3	9.8	4.5
2003	5.3	16.2	10.9
2004	14	35.4	21.4
2005	12.1	23.4	11.3
2006	13	43.7	30.7
2007	10.2	51	40.8
2008	13.9	14.4	0.5
2009	5	6.6	1.6
2010	5	14.4	9.4
2011	6	29	23

Total	89.8	243.9	154.1

2002-2011
EPS increase (sen)		19.2
DPO		37%
Return on retained earnings		12%

(All figures are in sens)

TSM Global - Return on Retained Earnings

TSM Global (formerly Juan Kuang)

(Figures are in sens)


Year	DPS	EPS	Retained EPS
2002	0	-1.3	-1.3
2003	0	-12.9	-12.9
2004	0	-4.7	-4.7
2005	0	14.6	14.6
2006	0	11.5	11.5
2007	0	10.9	10.9
2008	2.5	18.6	16.1
2009	2.5	20	17.5
2010	2.5	22.3	19.8
2011	5	24.9	19.9

Total	12.5	103.9	91.4

2002-2011
DPO		12%
EPS increase (sen)		26.2
Return on retained earnings		29%

Top Glove - Return on Retained Earnings

Top Glove

(Figures are in sens)


Year	DPS	EPS	Retained EPS
2002	0.6	3.5	2.9
2003	1.8	4.9	3.1
2004	2.4	7.6	5.2
2005	2.7	11	8.3
2006	3	14.6	11.6
2007	4.6	17.3	12.7
2008	5.5	18.7	13.2
2009	11	28.5	17.5
2010	16	42.4	26.4
2011	11	19.4	8.4

Total	58.6	167.9	109.3

2002-2011
DPO		35%
EPS increase (sen)		15.9
Return on retained earnings		15%

Maybank - Return on Retained Earnings

Maybank

(Figures are in sens)

Year	DPS	EPS	Retained EPS

2003	31.4	39.4	8
2004	30.6	47.7	17.1
2005	53.7	47.6	-6.1
2006	43.3	52.2	8.9
2007	41.3	57.8	16.5
2008	32.1	58.3	26.2
2009	6	33.5	27.5
2010	41.3	53.9	12.6
2011	45	59.5	14.5

Total	324.7	449.9	125.2

2003-2011
DPO		72%
EPS increase (sen)		20.1
Return on retained earnings		16%

LPI - Return on Retained Earnings

LPI

(Figures are in sens)

Year	DPS	EPS	Retained EPS
2002	9	14.4	5.4
2003	9	17.6	8.6
2004	10.8	25.8	15
2005	34.6	32.3	-2.3
2006	32.4	33.8	1.4
2007	48.2	38	-10.2
2008	48.8	45.1	-3.7
2009	40.5	54.5	14
2010	26.5	62.3	35.8
2011	70	70.13	0.13

Total	329.8	393.93	64.13

2002-2011
DPO		84%
EPS increase (sen)		55.7
Return on retained earnings		87%

Public Bank - Return on Retained Earnings

Public Bank

(Figures are in sens)

Year	DPS	EPS	Retained EPS
2002	9.5	25.5	16
2003	9.9	30	20.1
2004	42.8	36.2	-6.6
2005	48.3	40.7	-7.6
2006	37.9	47.8	9.9
2007	45.5	60.7	15.2
2008	56.7	69.5	12.8
2009	40.1	71.9	31.8
2010	37.2	87	49.8
2011	46.8	99.5	52.7

Total	374.7	568.8	194.1

2002-2011
DPO		66%
EPS increase (sen)		74.0
Return on retained earnings		38%

Padini - Return on Retained Earnings

Padini

(Figures are in sens)

Year	DPS	EPS	Retained EPS
2002	0.2	1	0.8
2003	0.5	1.6	1.1
2004	0.6	1	0.4
2005	1.1	2.6	1.5
2006	1.4	4.4	3
2007	2.2	4.8	2.6
2008	2.7	6.3	3.6
2009	2.7	7.5	4.8
2010	3	9.3	6.3
2011	4	11.5	7.5

Total	18.4	50	31.6

2002-2011
DPO		37%
EPS increase		10.50
Return on retained earnings		33%

Wednesday, 29 August 2012

Nestle - Return on Retained Earnings

Nestle

(Figures are in sens)

Year	DPS	EPS	Retained EPS
2002	98.5	63.2	-35.3
2003	70.2	81.5	11.3
2004	75.2	94	18.8
2005	80.2	114	33.8
2006	95	113	18
2007	100	124.5	24.5
2008	190	145.4	-44.6
2009	130	150	20
2010	150	166.9	16.9
2011	170	194.6	24.6

Total	1159.1	1247.1	88

2002-2011
DPO		0.93
EPS increase		131.40
Return on retained earnings		149%

My 18 points guide to Successfully compounding your money in Stocks

Be a good stock picker.
Think as a business owner.
Always look at value rather than the price. Do the homework.
Buy and hold is alright for selected stocks.
Compounding is your friend, get this to work its magic.
Mr. Market is there to be taken advantage of. Do not be the sucker instead. BFS;STS.
Always buy a lot when the price is low.
Never buy when the stock is overpriced.
It is alright to buy when the selected stock is at a fair price.
Phasing in or dollar cost averaging is safe for such stocks during a downtrend, unless the price is still obviously too high.
Do not time the market for such or any stocks.
By keeping to the above strategy, the returns will be delivered through the growth of the company's business.
So, when do you sell the stock? Almost never, as long as the fundamentals remain sound and the future prospects intact.
The downside risk is protected through only buying when the price is low or fairly priced.
Tactical dynamic asset allocation or rebalancing based on valuation can be employed but this sounds easier than is practical, except in extreme market situations.
Sell urgently when the company business fundamental has deteriorated irreversibly.
You may also wish to sell should the growth of the company has obviously slowed and you can reinvest into another company with greater growth potential of similar quality. However, unlike point 16, you can do so leisurely.
In conclusion, a critical key to successful investing is in your stock picking ability.

http://myinvestingnotes.blogspot.com/2012/07/my-18-points-guide-to-successfully.html

11 Lessons From Peter Lynch

Peter Lynch taught me:

1. Behind every stock is a company. Find out what it’s doing.
2. Never invest in any idea you can’t illustrate with a crayon.
3. Over the short term, there may be no correlation between the success of a company’s operations and the success of its stock. Over the long term, there’s a 100% correlation.
4. Buying stocks without studying the companies is the same as playing poker – and never looking at your cards.
5. Time is on your side when you own shares of superior companies.
6. Owning stock is like having children. Don’t get involved with more than you can handle.
7. When the insiders are buying, it’s a good sign.
8. Unless you’re a short seller, it never pays to be pessimistic.
9. A stock market decline is as predictable as a January blizzard in Colorado. If you’re prepared, it can’t hurt you.
10. Everyone has the brainpower to make money in stocks. Not everyone has the stomach.
11. Nobody can predict interest rates, the future direction of the economy, or the stock market. Dismiss all such forecasts and concentrate on what’s actually happening to the companies in which you’ve invested.

Lynch’s advice had a profound effect on my stock market approach. He taught me that investment success isn’t the result of developing the right macro-economic view or deciding when to jump in or out of the market. Success is about researching companies to identify those that are likely to report positive surprises.

Capital Expenditure

A great company with a Durable Competitive Advantage will have a ratio of Capital Expenditures to Net Income of less than 25%. Less is better.

Capital Expenditures are expenses on:
- fixed assets such as equipment, property, or industrial buildings
- fixing problems with an asset
- preparing an asset to be used in business
- restoring property
- starting new businesses

A good company will have a ratio of Capital Expenditures to Net Income of less than 50%.

A great company with a Durable Competitive Advantage will have a ratio of less than 25%.

Less is better.

Benjamin Graham's 113 Wise Words

The true investor scarcely ever is forced to sell his shares, and at all times he is free to disregard the current price quotation. He need pay attention to it and act upon it only to the extent that it suits his book, and no more. Thus the investor who permits himself to be stampeded or unduly worried by unjustified market declines in his holdings is perversely transforming his basic advantage into a basic disadvantage. That man would be better off if his stocks had no market quotation at all, for he would then be spared the mental anguish caused him by other persons' mistakes of judgement."

Philip Fisher's Wise Words

"The refusal to sell at a loss, while completely natural and normal, is probably one of the most dangerous in which we can indulge ourselves in the entire investment process.

More money has probably been lost by investors holding a stock they really did not want until they could 'at least come out even' than from any other single reason. If to these actual losses are added the profits that might have been made through the proper reinvestment of these funds if such reinvestment had been made when the mistake was first realized, the cost of self-indulgence becomes truly tremendous."

(Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits)

The Ultimate Hold-versus-Sell Test

Here is the overriding primary test, followed by observations on why it is so critically important:

Knowing all that you now know and expect about the company and its stock (not what you originally believed or hoped at time of purchase), and assuming that you had available capital, and assuming that it would not cause a portfolio imbalance to do so, would you buy this stock today, at today's price?

No equivocation. Yes or no?

Answers such as maybe or probably are not acceptable since they are ways of dodging the issue. No investor probably buys a stock; they either place an order or do not.

Here is the implication of your answer to that critical test: if you did not answer with a clear affirmative, you should sell; only if you said a strong yes, are you justified to hold.

Some thoughts on Analysing Stocks (KISS)

Ideally a stock you plan to purchase should have all of the following charateristics:

• A rising trend of earnings dividends and book value per share.
• A balance sheet with less debt than other companies in its particular industry.
• A P/E ratio no higher than average.
• A dividend yield that suits your particular needs.
• A below-average dividend pay-out ratio.
• A history of earnings and dividends not pockmarked by erratic ups and downs.
• Companies whose ROE is 15 or better.
• A ratio of price to cash flow (P/CF) that is not too high when compared to other stocks in the same industry.

Margin of Safety Concept: Stocks should be bought like groceries, not like perfume

The high CAGR in the early years of the investing period, due to buying at a discount, tended to decline and approach that of the intrinsic EPS GR of the companies over a longer investment time-frame.

Chapter 20 - “Margin of Safety” as the Central Concept of Investment

A single quote by Graham on page 516 struck me:

Observation over many years has taught us that the chief losses to investors come from the purchase of low-quality securities at times of favorable business conditions.

Basically, Graham is saying that most stock investors lose money because they invest in companies that seem good at a particular point in time, but are lacking the fundamentals of a long-lasting stable company.

This seems obvious on the surface, but it’s actually a great argument for thinking more carefully about your individual stock investments. If most of your losses come from buying companies that seem healthy but really aren’t, isn’t that a profound argument for carefully studying any company you might invest in?