Sunday, 22 November 2026

Chapter 6: Do Valuations Matter and Chapter 7: How to Value Companies

 


Chapter 6: Do Valuations Matter? — Detailed Main Points

  1. Topic five: Do valuations matter?

    • Eisman says he is often asked whether he is worried that the market looks expensive.

    • The question “Do valuations matter?” is asked constantly on business news shows.

    • People ask whether the stock market is expensive, or whether a particular stock is expensive or cheap.

  2. Valuations do matter—especially long term

    • His answer: “Of course they do, especially in the long term.”

    • But in any given period, valuation is not the only consideration.

    • Sometimes the issue of valuation gets dwarfed by other important issues.

  3. Good times vs. bad times

    • In good times, everybody focuses on stories.

    • In bad times, they focus on balance sheets.

    • In good times, people focus on earnings growth—that is the story.

    • As long as the story is intact, they don’t care all that much about valuation.

  4. Danger of shorting solely because a stock looks expensive

    • It is very dangerous to short a stock solely because you think it is expensive.

    • That can be a “death wish.”

  5. Internet bubble example, 1999–2000

    • Internet stocks soared.

    • People who were short them “got carried out.”

    • But what killed internet stocks was not valuation.

    • It was a recession that hurt their earnings.

    • Then the stocks went down.

  6. If he shorts an expensive stock, he needs a fundamental reason

    • If Eisman shorts an expensive stock, he does so because he thinks the fundamentals are going to deteriorate.

    • The expensive valuation just means that if he is right, the stock can go down a lot.

  7. Care about valuation, but sometimes the best stocks look expensive

    • You should care about valuation.

    • But sometimes the best stocks are the ones that look expensive.

  8. Nvidia example

    • Nvidia’s stock always looks expensive.

    • But in early 2023, the company showed that the AI revolution had begun.

    • It began reporting earnings that “just blew consensus estimates away.”

    • Estimates then soared.

    • Based on the new upwardly revised estimates, the stock had actually been fairly inexpensive prior to the rise in earnings.

  9. Practical lesson for good times

    • In good times, it is best not to get too hung up on the valuation of a company if the company has a great story and that story is intact.

  10. Transition to Topic six

    • Eisman then announces “Topic six, how to value companies.”

    • He says they are going to spend a lot of time there.

    • Before getting to how to value stocks, he will define some commonly used terms to get everyone on the same playing field.


Chapter 7: How to Value Companies — Detailed Main Points

1. Purpose of the chapter

  • Eisman says they will “spend a lot of time” on how to value companies.

  • Before discussing how to value stocks, he wants to define commonly used terms so everyone is on the same playing field.

2. Market capitalization (“market cap”)

  • Market cap is the value of the equity of a company.

  • Calculation: stock price × number of shares outstanding.

  • Example: Apple’s market cap is around $3 trillion.

3. Enterprise value (“EV”)

  • Enterprise value equals market cap plus the company’s debt.

  • It is a broader measure than market cap because it includes debt.

4. P/E ratio (price divided by earnings)

  • P/E is the price of the stock divided by earnings per share.

  • It is the most commonly used valuation metric.

  • Investors generally look at P/E on a forward-looking basis, usually one to two years out.

  • The market looks at consensus EPS estimates for 2025 and 2026, sometimes 2027, and divides that into the stock price.

5. Example: 2025 P/E multiples

Eisman gives 2025 P/E examples based on the stock price on June 18, 2025, divided by consensus 2025 earnings estimates:

  • Nvidia: 34x

  • Goldman Sachs: 14x

  • Procter & Gamble: 23x

  • Eli Lilly: 36x

  • Lennar: 11x

  • Exxon: 18x

  • Eaton: 28x

6. What differences in P/E tell us

  • Generally, growth stocks have higher valuations than cyclical stocks or slow-growth companies.

  • Nvidia is a premier tech growth stock; its P/E is high at 34x.

  • Although its current multiple is a bit lower than its peak multiple, showing the market is worried about how long the Nvidia story can last.

  • Goldman Sachs is a premier investment bank, but its earnings are highly cyclical and it has a levered balance sheet.

  • All else equal, companies with levered balance sheets trade at lower valuations.

  • Procter & Gamble is a premier safety stock with “steady Eddie” earnings, but its growth rate is low—yet it sells at a quite high P/E.

7. Sector allocation can distort valuations: Procter & Gamble example

  • Procter & Gamble’s consensus EPS growth for 2025 and 2026 is only 3% and 4%, respectively—not impressive.

  • Yet P&G has a multiple that looks like a growth-stock multiple.

  • Why? Many big investment funds like Fidelity and Mellon have strict guidelines.

  • One guideline is that they must invest a certain amount in each of the 11 sectors of the S&P 500.

  • Some funds must allocate to each sector exactly equal to that sector’s weighting in the S&P 500.

  • For example, info tech is 31% of the S&P 500; some funds must have exactly 31% in info tech but can pick stocks within that 31%.

  • Other funds may allow overweighting or underweighting of sectors, but only to a limited extent.

  • Most big funds must invest a certain amount in each sector even if they don’t really want to.

  • Imagine a growth-oriented fund manager who still has to invest in consumer staples, the category P&G is in.

  • Many will just buy a stock like P&G: it is a great company, growth is slow, but they don’t have to worry about it.

  • Because of these sector-allocation issues, P&G gets more investors than it probably should given its low growth rate—so its multiple is higher than you would think.

8. Other P/E examples

  • Lennar is a large home builder, but its P/E is really low because its earnings are highly cyclical and very sensitive to changes in interest rates.

  • Exxon is a premier diversified oil company. Its P/E tends to be volatile because earnings are highly dependent on oil prices; the P/E fluctuates with oil prices.

  • Eisman personally finds long-term investments in oil stocks difficult because their fundamentals depend on oil prices, which no one can predict.

  • Eaton is a premier industrial company and trades at a pretty high P/E because its businesses are at the forefront of the reindustrialization of the United States; its growth rate over the last few years has been quite high—high teens.

  • Eli Lilly has a very high P/E because it has an incredible drug pipeline, including the premier weight-reduction drug Mounjaro/Zepbound.

  • The market is so excited about this drug that it is not looking at the 2025 or 2026 P/E but much further out.

9. EV/EBITDA

  • Another valuation metric/tool is EV/EBITDA.

  • EBITDA = earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization.

  • EV/EBITDA = enterprise value divided by EBITDA.

  • EBITDA means pre-tax earnings plus interest expense, depreciation expense, and amortization expense.

  • EBITDA per share will always be higher than earnings per share.

  • To analyze valuation, you take enterprise value—market cap plus debt—and divide by EBITDA.

  • This is a substitute for P/E.

10. Origin of EBITDA: John Malone

  • The original concept of EBITDA was pioneered in the 1970s by investor John Malone.

  • Early in his career, Malone developed EBITDA as a way to evaluate the cash-generating ability of telecom companies in which he was a major investor.

  • He advocated its use over traditional metrics like earnings per share, which these companies had none of.

  • He argued EBITDA offered a more accurate reflection of financial performance for high-growth, capital-intensive businesses.

  • He did not want people to focus on EPS because his companies had no EPS—they were spending so much money building out telecom networks.

  • By focusing on EBITDA, he showcased a company’s capacity to generate cash flow while effectively utilizing leverage, debt, and reinvesting profits to minimize taxes—an approach that defined his investment philosophy.

11. EBITDA today and its critics

  • Today EBITDA is often used as a tool to value companies that have high revenue growth but no earnings.

  • EBITDA has many critics.

  • Charlie Munger, Warren Buffett’s partner, called it “bullshit”—Eisman says that is a direct quote.

  • Warren Buffett feels similarly.

  • Why? Because EBITDA excludes the cost of building the business.

  • If you are building out a capital-intensive business, excluding those capital costs gives, in Munger’s and Buffett’s view, a misguided picture of what it costs to operate the business.

  • Eisman has mixed feelings about EBITDA, but says his opinion is irrelevant because there are sectors that use this valuation metric and there is not much anyone can do about it.

12. Price to book value / price to tangible book value

  • Another common valuation method is price to book value per share, or sometimes price to tangible book value per share.

  • Book value is the amount of common equity a company has on its balance sheet divided by the number of shares outstanding.

  • Tangible book value is book value minus intangibles and minus goodwill.

  • Price to tangible book value is the metric most frequently used to value banks.

  • It is used because the value of a bank’s balance sheet is the most important question in valuing a bank.

  • During the financial crisis, we learned that banks had massive hidden losses on their balance sheets that showed up and almost destroyed the companies.

  • So being confident that a bank’s balance sheet is accurate and does not have hidden losses is a key factor in analyzing any bank.

13. Bank valuation example: JPMorgan vs. Citigroup

  • Today, JPMorgan’s price to tangible book value is around 2.4x.

  • Citigroup’s is around 0.7x.

  • Why the big difference?

  • JPMorgan has a much better set of businesses, with a return on equity in the high teens.

  • Citigroup’s return on equity is below 10%.

14. Discounted cash flow (DCF)

  • In theory, DCF is supposedly the best way to value a company—that is what financial analysis textbooks teach.

  • What it is: you model out a company’s cash flow over many, many years—even decades—and then use a discount rate or interest rate to discount that stream of cash flow back to a current valuation.

  • Eisman will not walk through an example because it would “put everybody to sleep.”

  • In theory, this is the best way to value companies, and he knows many analysts who spent hours creating and tinkering with decades-long cash flow models.

15. Eisman’s pragmatic objection to DCF

  • He has never liked this method, for pragmatic reasons.

  • He has been an analyst and modeled companies; he knows how hard it is to model out the future of any company.

  • If you were good and/or lucky, you could model out a company correctly for a few years, but not over decades, which is what DCF is all about.

  • He would rather spend time trying to figure out the fundamentals of a company than trying to guess what the company will make in 2060.

16. Summary of the main valuation methods

Eisman repeats the most significant methods:

  • P/E

  • EV/EBITDA

  • Price divided by tangible book value

  • Discounted cash flow

17. There is no one way to value stocks

  • He emphasizes that there is no one way to value stocks.

  • Even if in theory there is, in practice there is not.

  • What he is about to say is, as far as he can tell, not in any financial analysis textbook.

18. Textbooks vs. real-world sector “mafias”

  • Textbooks describe all the various valuation methods, probably with some others as well.

  • What textbooks don’t discuss: there are 11 sectors within the S&P 500, and each sector has multiple subsectors.

  • Example: the tech sector has chips, other hardware, software, and other stuff.

  • In his experience, each sector and subsector has a “mafia” composed of sell-side and buy-side analysts and some portfolio managers.

19. Eisman’s experience in the financial services “mafia”

  • He knows this from experience.

  • He started his career in the 1990s at Oppenheimer, a brokerage firm, publishing research on the financial services sector—that is the sell side.

  • In 2001, he left that job and worked as an analyst covering financial services for a hedge fund, where his research was not published and was used only by that hedge fund—that is the buy side.

  • He then moved to Frontpoint, where he was portfolio manager of a hedge fund specializing in financial stocks—again the buy side.

  • As a result, he has been part of the financial services mafia for ages.

  • The mafia are the sector experts.

  • Through dialogue between these sector experts, over time a consensus emerges on two crucial issues:

    1. What data points matter in thinking about fundamentals.

    2. How to value the companies in the sector or subsector—do you use P/E, EV/EBITDA, or something else?

  • Once the valuation debate is settled, it becomes consensus.

  • That consensus on valuation can last a long time.

  • It doesn’t matter whether you agree or disagree—that is the method that is used.

  • Sometimes it can change, but it takes a lot to change it.

20. How the 11 S&P sectors are valued: overview

Eisman gives a quick overview:

  • Communications: P/E and EV/EBITDA.

  • Consumer discretionary: mostly P/E.

  • Consumer staples: P/E.

  • Energy: depends on the subsector; can be P/E. For oil companies, people try to estimate the value of the oil or gas in the ground the company owns. To do this, they might use a conservative and consistent oil price, not the current oil price, because the current price might be inflated or depressed.

  • Financials: P/E and price to tangible book value—but this only applies to traditional financials.

  • Payments (e.g., Visa, Mastercard): generally a P/E sector.

  • Asset managers and alternative asset managers: also P/E.

  • Why traditional financials are valued on price to tangible book: because they are very balance-sheet dependent. The other subsectors are not balance-sheet dependent at all.

  • Healthcare: P/E and sometimes EV/EBITDA. For pharmaceuticals and biotech, people try to guess the future profitability of the company’s drug pipeline.

  • Industrials: P/E and EV/EBITDA.

  • Info tech: P/E, EV/EBITDA, and sometimes DCF for companies that are rapidly growing but have no earnings.

  • Materials: P/E.

  • Real estate: different—FFO and AFFO.

    • The real estate sector employs a modified version of EBITDA called FFO and AFFO.

    • FFO = funds from operations.

    • AFFO = adjusted FFO.

    • Both are forms of cash flow.

    • FFO is calculated by adding back to pre-tax earnings: depreciation, amortization, and losses on property sales; then subtracting gains on property sales and interest income.

    • AFFO adds back capital expenditures but deducts maintenance capex.

    • Eisman says it’s complicated and maybe they will do a future podcast on it.

    • AFFO is generally the metric most people use to value REITs.

  • Utilities: generally P/E and dividend levels.

21. Can a sector change how it values stocks?

  • Generally, the way a sector values its stocks lasts a long time.

  • But it can change—something traumatic has to happen.

  • Example: the sector collapsing.

  • Then everyone does some soul-searching and sometimes concludes a new valuation method is needed.

22. Example: banks changed from price to book to price to tangible book

  • Prior to the financial crisis, the most common method of bank valuation was price to book value.

  • But people like Eisman pointed out that because of the massive bank M&A waves of the 1990s, the balance sheets of many banks were filled with goodwill and other intangibles.

  • Those intangibles were included in book value.

  • People who agreed with him argued that price to tangible book value was a better metric because it excluded all of that “junk.”

  • That debate lasted a long time.

  • But after the financial crisis, the tangible book value people won.

  • Today, only tangible book value, not book value, is used to determine bank valuation.

This response is AI-

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