Tuesday 25 June 2013

How low can the Aussie dollar go?

There are five key influences on the Australian dollar and each offers a clue as to how low the dollar might fall.
It’s now almost 30 years since the float of the Australian dollar and rarely has it been stronger than in the past few years.
Only now are investors, surprised at the rapidity of the recent drop, waking up to this fact. The economy is starting to feel it too, with Ford closing down local operations, local tourism struggling as Australians head overseas and now Holden giving an ultimatum to staff: accept pay cuts or risk losing your job.

Many people explain away this strength with the phrase ‘‘commodities boom’’, but it’s more complex than that.
There are five key influences on the Australian dollar and each in its own way offers a clue as to how low the dollar might fall.

1. Interest rates
If you can borrow at 0.25 per cent in Europe, the US or Japan and can invest it in Australian bonds, assets or bank accounts paying 3-4 per cent, plus capital gains, why wouldn’t you?

National Australia Bank recently estimated that the upward pressure on the local currency as a result of the US Federal Reserve’s zero interest rate and their quantitative easing program could be worth as much as 20 cents in the Aussie.
And of course, those global investors could look at the Reserve Bank and feel pretty safe that if it were to reduce rates, it would do so cautiously and gradually.

For the last few years, Australia has been a giant post box for international hot money. Right now, that reputation is under pressure.

2. Global and Australian growth
In addition to relatively high rates, global investors flocked to Australia after 2009 due to the resilience of the Australian economy, assisted by local and Chinese stimulus.

We didn’t have a housing crash and we didn’t follow the US and UK economies into deep recession, which is why we became a safe harbour.

3. The US dollar
The US dollar is the most under-appreciated driver of the Aussie dollar.

Traders and investors talk about growth, interest rates, the mining boom, the budget position and household debt, but on the other side of the AUD/USD currency pair the same questions are asked of the US as an input into the Aussie.
The perceived value of the US dollar is an important factor in the relative price of the Aussie and, after a long period of weakness, it’s likely to grow in strength.

4. Investor sentiment
When we see a convergence of major drivers like this, investor sentiment itself becomes a fourth driver. Here, we enter the currency expectations market.

Since 2009 large speculators – hedge funds and the like – have been supporters of the Aussie dollar for all but a brief period of market instability in the middle of last year when the euro teetered.

Generally, global speculators have been supporters of the Australian dollar since the global financial crisis. That is now on the verge of a reversal.

5. Technicals
The Aussie has had strong technical chart since the GFC: every new move led to a new high and every dip was followed by a rebound. Even as volatility reached extreme levels in the past few years, the chart for the Aussie remained indomitable. Its safe-harbour status was never breached in a technical sense. That encouraged speculators and investors to buy the dips whenever global trouble loomed.

That’s how we got to where we are. To see where we might go, let’s examine these five key drivers from the other angle.
Australian interest rates are falling much further than most forecasters anticipated. The main cause is that Chinese growth is slowing faster than many expected (although not us), pushing down the key export prices that drove Australia’s commodity boom. As a result, mining projects have been cancelled en masse. Yet the boom ran long enough for mining companies to believe it would last.

Even with the cancelled projects, lots of new supply is on the way, just as China slows. This will drive commodity prices down further still.

The likelihood is that Chinese and Australian growth, and Australian interest rates, will fall further. So although the carry trade into the dollar is still positive, with declining yields and an increased risk of capital loss, it now faces more headwinds.

To make matters more difficult for the Aussie, the US housing market is recovering. Although fiscal challenges loom and monetary policy is still very loose, markets are beginning to price in stabilisation to the former and a tightening in the latter.

In the passing beauty parade of foreign exchange, the US dollar is being viewed as the least ugly. As the US dollar index rises it is hitting a variety of asset classes, including gold and the Aussie dollar.

Sentiment among hedge funds and speculative traders – see recent comments by George Soros and Stanley Druckenmiller – has turned against our currency.

As recently as April this year, the Aussie was trading above $US1.05 before the recent fall took it to around $US0.92. That’s a fall of about 12 per cent.

So, how low can it go?
NAB recently suggested the $A could fall to 87 US cents by December 2014. But let’s remember that for all the extreme recent calls about the crash in the Aussie and the impending doom facing it, the reality is that it is simply back at the bottom of what might be considered a wide 10-15 cent range it has been in since breaking up through 94 US cents in mid-2010.

This sell-off is not all that shocking and the forecasters of doom forget this.

A fall below 94 cents would signal a different and lower scenario. Our assessment is that this is likely, especially if the economy weakens due to the withdrawal of mining investment, assuming consumption doesn’t fill the gap.

That may necessitate rate cuts to 2 per cent or just below.

Despite the recent highs, the Aussie dollar’s average remains steadfastly around 75 US cents. It may not revert to the mean but after 22 years without a recession, you wouldn’t want to bet on it.

What might happen if Australia did have a recession?
The answer was offered during the GFC low when global investors believed that was about to happen. Back then it fell to $US0.5960. There’s your answer.

To protect your portfolio against that possibility, and to hedge against falling interest rates, Intelligent Investor Share Advisor has recommended allocating a portion of your portfolio to overseas markets. Each of its model portfolios has an allocation to businesses that stand to benefit from a falling Aussie dollar.

This article contains general investment advice only (under AFSL 282288).
By Greg McKenna and David Llewellyn-Smith of MacroBusiness, in conjunction with Intelligent Investor Share Advisor, shares.intelligentinvestor.com.au.


Read more: http://www.smh.com.au/business/how-low-can-the-aussie-dollar-go-20130624-2osff.html#ixzz2XB3rOnK3

The Shanghai Composite Index dived 5.2 per cent as volumes spiked to the highest. 15 CSI300 components plunged by the maximum-allowed 10 per cent.

China shares suffered their worst daily loss in almost four years on Monday, taking Hong Kong markets lower, with financials hammered on fears that the central bank would keep money tight and economic growth could slow sharply.
Despite money market rates easing for a second-straight session on Monday, mainland investors remained jittery about monetary conditions and braced for disappointment when the People's Bank of China conducts a scheduled open market operation on Tuesday.

The CSI300 of the top Shanghai and Shenzhen listings plunged 6.2 per cent. The Shanghai Composite Index dived 5.2 per cent as volumes spiked to the highest in about a month. Monday's losses were their worst since August 31, 2009.
The Hang Seng Index slid 2.2 per cent to 19,814 points, closing below the 20,000-point mark for the first time since September 11. The China Enterprises Index of the leading Chinese listings in Hong Kong tumbled 3.2 per cent to its lowest since October 2011.

At $US10 billion, Hong Kong turnover was off Friday's three-month high, but was still some 20 per cent more than its average in the last 20 sessions. Short selling accounted for 13.6 per cent of total turnover, versus the 8 per cent historical average.

Late Monday morning, share-losses accelerated in rising volumes after the Chinese central bank described liquidity in the country's financial system as "reasonable", repeating what was said in a Sunday commentary in the official Xinhua news agency.

The commentary also said the latest spike in money market rates was a result of market distortions caused by widespread speculative trading and shadow financing. The central bank, in its quarterly report on Sunday, pledged to "fine tune" existing "prudent" monetary policy.

"I think the market is expecting 'fine-tuning' to mean a tightening of liquidity moving forward, especially after the way official media talked about shadow financing over the weekend," said Cao Xuefeng, Chengdu-based head of research at Huaxi Securities.

"People are quite jittery ahead of the first of two (PBOC) open-market operations for the week on Tuesday. In this market environment, it's tough to call a bottom, fears could spread about funding for companies," Cao added.

The weakness in the mainland markets also extended to the property and other growth-sensitive sectors. A Xinhua report that 30.9 billion yuan of shares could become tradeable further weighed on markets, a move that may potentially compete for already tight liquidity.

Among CSI300 component stocks, only four finished the day with gains. Poly Real Estate and Southwest Securities were among 15 CSI300 components that plunged by the maximum-allowed 10 per cent.

Warren Buffett-backed Chinese automaker BYD plunged 11 per cent in Hong Kong after CLSA analysts repeated their sell call. They see its share price down 80 per cent from Monday's close, believing its new F3 sedan has been launched too late.

Banks hammered
Monday's plunge came despite the overnight repo rate, a key measure of funding costs in China's interbank market, falling by more than two percentage points to 6.64 per cent on a weighted-average basis, its lowest since last Tuesday. It had peaked near 12 per cent last Thursday.

Among the biggest losers were smaller banks seen as more reliant on short-term interbank funding. The Shanghai financial sub-index skidded 7.3 per cent in its worst day since November 2008, during the financial crisis that started that year.

Shanghai-listed China Minsheng Bank and Industrial Bank, along with Shenzhen-listed Ping An Bank all plunged by 10 per cent. Minsheng's Hong Kong listing skidded 8 per cent in its worst day since October 2011.

Minsheng shares, some of the most popular in both markets earlier this year, are now down 40 percent from a peak in January. They are down 19.4 per cent on the year, compared to the 22 per cent slide for the H-share index.

Among the "Big Four" Chinese banks listed in Hong Kong, Agricultural Bank of China (AgBank) and Industrial Bank of China (ICBC) had the biggest percentage losses, 2.9 and 3 per cent, respectively.

Reuters


Read more: http://www.smh.com.au/business/markets/worst-day-in-four-years-for-china-shares-20130624-2osyz.html#ixzz2XB05LY8W



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Friday 21 June 2013

Graham and Dodd provide a template for investing

Zweig:
The first question I would like to ask you, Seth, concerns your work at Baupost. How have you followed Graham and Dodd, and how have you deviated from Graham and Dodd?

Klarman:

In the spirit of Graham and Dodd, our firm began with an orientation toward value investing. When I think of Graham and Dodd, however, it’s not just in terms of investing but also in terms of thinking about investing. In my mind,their work helps create a template for how to approach markets, how to think about volatility in markets as being in your favor rather than as a problem, and how to think about bargains and where they come from.  It is easy to be persuaded that buying bargains is better than buying over-priced instruments.The work of Graham and Dodd has really helped us think about the sourcing of opportunity as a major part of what we do—identifying where we are likely to find bargains. Time is scarce. We can’t look at everything.

Where we may have deviated a bit from Graham and Dodd is, first of all, investing in the instruments that didn’t exist when Graham and Dodd were publishing their work. Today, some of the biggest bargains are in the hairiest, strangest situations, such as financial distress and litigation, and so we drive our approach that way, into areas that Graham and Dodd probably couldn’t have imagined.  The world is different now than it was in the era of Graham and Dodd. In their time, business was probably less competitive. Consultants and“experts”  weren’t driving all businesses to focus on their business models and to maximize performance. The business climate is more volatile now. The chance that you buy very cheap and that it will revert to the mean, as Graham and Dodd might have expected, is probably lower today than in the past.  Also, the financial books of a company may not be as reliable as they once were. Don’t trust the numbers. Always look behind them. Graham and Dodd provide a template for investing, but not exactly a detailed road map.

Seth A. Klarman is president of The Baupost Group,LLC, Boston. Jason Zweig is a columnist for the Wall  Street Journal, New York City

Do you regard commodities as investments? If an asset’s value is totally dependent on the amount a future buyer might pay, then its purchase is speculation.

Zweig:
In your book, Margin of Safety, you said as a general rule that commodities, with the possible exception of gold, are not investments because they don’t produce cash flow. Do you regard commodities as investments in today’s market?

Klarman:

No, I don’t. In the book, I was mostly singling out fine-arts partnerships and rare stamps—addressing the commodities that were trendy then. Buying anything that is a collectible, has no cash flow, and is based only on a future sale to a greater fool, if you will—even if that purchaser is not a fool—is speculating. The “investment” might work—owing to a limited supply of Monets, for example—but a commodity doesn’t have the same characteristics as a security, characteristics that allow for analysis. Other than a recent sale or appreciation due to inflation, analyzing the current or future worth of a commodity is nearly impossible.The line I draw in the sand is that if an asset has cash flow or the likelihood of cash flow in the near term and is not purely dependent on what a future buyer might pay, then it’s an investment. If an asset’s value is totally dependent on the amount a future buyer might pay, then its purchase is speculation. The hardest commodity-like asset to categorize is land, an asset that is valuable to a future buyer because it will deliver cash flow, not because it will be sold to a future speculator.  Gold is unique because it has the age-old aspect of being viewed as a store of value. Nevertheless, it’s still a commodity and has no tangible value, and so I would say that gold is a speculation.  But because of my fear about the potential debasing of paper money and about paper money not being a store of value, I want some exposure to gold.



Zweig:
Benjamin Graham drew a sharp and classic distinction between investment and speculation. I believe his exact words were, “An investment operation is one which, upon thorough analysis, promises safety of principal and an adequate return. Operations not meeting these requirements are speculative.”  But Graham sometimes speculated over the course of his career. So, maybe regarding commodities as speculative doesn’t  preclude you from owning them, right?


Klarman:

I would say that a commodity’s speculative nature is not what precludes investment. When Graham was talking about safety of principal, he was not referring to currency.  He wasn’t really considering that the currency might be destroyed, but we know that can happen, and has happened, many times in the 20th century.  The investing game has historically been closer to checkers, but now it is more like chess—almost in three dimensions. The possibility that the dollars you make could be worth much less in the future leads an investor to think, How can I protect myself?  Should I be shorting the dollar against another currency, and if so, which one?

Our goal is to do everything to protect client purchasing power

Zweig:
How are you protecting your clients against unanticipated inflation and a decline in the dollar?

Klarman:

Our goal is not necessarily to make money so much as to do everything we can to protect client purchasing power and to offset, as much as possible, a large decline in market value in the event of another severe global financial crisis.We not only care about the intrinsic underlying value of our clients’ investments, but we also want to avoid the psychological problem of being down 30 or 40 percent and then being paralyzed.

At this juncture, there are just too many scenarios to enumerate. We have thought about scenarios in which the dollar remains the reserve currency and those in which it doesn’t; those in which gold goes berserk on the upside and those in which it stays flat and then falls, because gold is currently at a record high. All scenarios are worth contemplating. This type of analysis is really very much art and not science

Price is the essential determinant in every investment equation.

Zweig:
How does Baupost define a value company, and what is your average holding period?

Klarman:

With the exception of an arbitrage or a necessarily short-term investment, we enter every trade with the idea that we are going to hold to maturity in the case of a bond and for a really long time, potentially forever, in the case of a stock.  Again, if you don’t do that, you are speculating and not investing. We may, however, turn over positions more often.  If we buy a bond at 50 and think it’s worth par in three years but it goes to 90 the year we bought it, we will sell it because the upside/downside has totally changed. The remaining return is not attractive compared with the risk of continuing to hold.  In our view, there is no such thing as a value company. Price is the essential determinant in every investment equation. At some price, every company is a buy; at some price, every company is a hold; and at a still higher price, every company is a sell. We do not really recognize the concept of a value company.

Investors need to pick their poison.

Investors need to pick their poison:  Either make more money when times are good and have a really ugly year every so often, or protect on the downside and don't be at the party so long when things are good.

Seth Klarman:  At Baupost, we are all clearly in the same camp.  We have all our own money invested in the firm, and so we are very conservative.  We have picked our poison.  We would rather underperform in a huge bull market than get clobbered in a really bad bear market.


http://www.scribd.com/doc/37358611/Seth-Klarman-CFA-Presentation


Thursday 20 June 2013

Warren Buffett on Phil Fisher

http://investinginknowledge.com/info/2010/10/warren-buffett-on-phil-fisher/

Confessions of a bargain hunter (Seth Klarman)


June 23, 2012
By Nathan Bell
Read more: http://www.smh.com.au/money/confessions-of-a-bargain-hunter-20120622-20tap.html#ixzz1ypcBDriW
In the offices of an unmarked high-rise building in Boston sits Seth Klarman, surrounded by stacks of papers and books, which, by his own admission, are at risk of toppling over and crushing him at any instant.

Klarman is the founder and president of the phenomenally successful Baupost Group, a $29 billion ”deep value” hedge fund. It has produced 19 per cent annual returns, and every $10,000 given to Klarman at inception in 1982 is worth about $1.85 million today – and this was achieved while carrying extremely high levels of cash (more than 50 per cent at times) and using minimal leverage.

So how did he do it?

Know your seller
The financial markets are fiercely competitive, with millions of investors, traders and speculators around the world trying to outwit one another. Klarman concluded that since prices are set by the forces of supply and demand, rather than buy something and wait for someone to demand it at a higher price, why not wait for an irrational supplier to sell it to you for any price? Hence, Klarman looks for assets that people are being forced to sell or avoid, often as a result of fear or institutional constraints.

You can apply this principle by looking at heavily sold or avoided opportunities closer to home.

For example, stocks at the bottom of the S&P/ASX 200 are kicked out and replaced on a regular basis and, since index funds can hold stocks only over a certain size, newly removed stocks from the S&P/ASX 200 are sometimes driven down in price because of the selling pressure from such funds.
To make matters better, owing to regulation many super funds often cannot invest in smaller companies and such stocks are rarely followed by analysts. Servcorp resides on Intelligent Investor’s buy list and falls into this category.

Some institutions are also forced to ignore debt instruments unless they achieve a certain credit rating, even though they might offer an attractive risk-reward profile. You can take advantage of this by investing in income securities in a downturn, when large price falls create great opportunities such as those in 2009, for example, the Goodman PLUS, Dexus RENTS and Southern Cross SKIES hybrid securities.

Tax-loss selling (in Australia, this tends to occur in June, at the end of the financial year) can cause irrational mispricing in already beaten-down stocks. Cheap blue chips that could be this group next week include Computershare, QBE Insurance and Macquarie Group.

Competitive advantage
The difference between great investors and mediocre ones is only a few percentage points in terms of judging things correctly. Klarman realised he would have to bring something different to the game to win: a ”competitive advantage”.

”I will buy what other people are selling,” Klarman says. ”What is out of favour, what is loathed and despised, where there is financial distress, litigation – basically, where there is trouble.”

An inexperienced individual will have little success using such a tactic. After all, how many of us have four years to spend analysing Enron’s accounts? Instead, look for inefficiencies you can exploit.

Most market participants have a narrow, short-term view and are driven by fear and greed. So your edge is having a longer-term perspective and controlling your emotions. These two advantages will help you pile on the performance points over the professionals. Both have been invaluable to Klarman.

Cash is a weapon
Holding cash is perhaps Klarman’s most famed characteristic.

However, contrary to what you might expect, Klarman holds cash so it can be used in a concentrated manner when the right opportunity arises. This is because while value investing outperforms in the long run, Klarman quips that ”you have to be around for the long run … [you have to make sure] you don’t get out and you are a buyer”.

Despite the complexity of some of his investments, Klarman’s underlying approach is not complicated, although that is far from saying it is easy.

He says Baupost has outperformed ”by always buying at a significant discount to underlying business value, by replacing current holdings as better bargains come along, by selling when the market value comes to reflect its underlying value, and by holding cash … until other attractive investments become available”.

Nathan Bell is the research director at Intelligent Investor, intelligent investor.com.au. This article contains general investment advice only (under AFSL 282288).
Read more: http://www.smh.com.au/money/confessions-of-a-bargain-hunter-20120622-20tap.html#ixzz1ypcBDriW

http://investinginknowledge.com/

The Legacy of Benjamin Graham

The below video provides video footage from his Columbia College, Security Analysis course. Enjoy



@ 8 min Benjamin Graham vs Buffett

http://investinginknowledge.com/