Careful Investors look for Signs of Quality Management

One of the main factors determining the success of a corporation is the competence of management.

Buy into companies with "good management."


But in practice, how do you know?

• Ideally you begin by meeting management.  However, the door is open to very few and the ability to assess it is just as limited.
• The practical approach is to begin by looking at the record.

Practical Approach:  Looking at the Record

If a company's earnings are increasing, this is one piece of evidence pointing to good management.

• However, the results must be measured against others in the same industry.  
• Otherwise, a management which swims with a favourable tide may get more credit than it deserves.  

Often a superior management fighting bad conditions is unjustly criticized.


Type of Management Counts

Is the company in question headed by an old-fashioned entrepreneur who has made management a one-man show?

Or does it have good management in echelon depth which can survive the retirement or death of its chief executive?


Officers' shareholdings

One aspect of management worth noting is the extent to which the officers own their own shares.

Broadly speaking, it is advantageous for the officers to have a stake in ownership.

It makes a difference whether they own the stock

• because they want it or 
• because they are stuck with it.

You should consider whether they

• acquired it through inheritance, 
• bought it on option, or 
• bought it in the open market.  

Likewise, where possible, consider the purchase date and price paid.



Close Watch Pays Off

One of the many ways of making money in securities, is through a close watch on management.

Watch and understand the changes where companies have been in difficulty, their stocks depressed and general dissatisfaction expressed and where a new management comes in and invariably begins by sweeping out the accounting cobwebs.

• Everything is marked down or written off so that the new management is not held accountable for the mistakes of the old.  
• Very often dividends which were imprudently paid are cut or passed.  
• Thus an investor at this juncture often gets in at the bottom or the beginning of a new cycle.
• A recent example:  TESCO London.

Conclusion:

Attempting to evaluate management, even though you cannot get all the answers, is worth all the effort it entails.



Related post:

Management Compensation
https://myinvestingnotes.blogspot.com/2010/04/buffett-1994-in-setting-compensation-we.html

How to judge the Evaluate of Management?

https://blog.elearnmarkets.com/how-to-evaluate-management-of-a-company/

How then do you assess management quality?

Those in management should have integrity, intelligence and also must be hardworking.  Most importantly, they should have integrity.  Search and look for integrity in the managers; without this, their intelligence and hardworking will work against the interest of the shareholders.

In present day perspective, the shareholders and the management interests are linked or in conflict mainly in two principal areas of:

(1)  competence of management and,
(2)  policies of management toward stockholders - notably in the matter ofdividends.

What are your views of companies hoarding cash aplenty when perhaps, the better decision is to distribute the cash to the shareholders in dividends or share buy-backs?

Quality first, Price second

Philip Fisher: Quality first, Price second

Fisher formulated a clear and sensible investing strategy (which I'll get to in a second), wrote one of the best investment books of all time, Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits, and made a good deal of money for himself and his clients.

His son wrote that Phil's best advice was 
-to "always think long term," 
-to "buy what you understand," and 
-to own "not too many stocks." 

Charles Munger, who is Buffett's partner, praised Fisher at the 1993 annual meeting of their company, Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (BRK/A): "Phil Fisher believed in concentrating in about 10 good investments and was happy with a limited number.  That is very much in our playbook. And he believed in knowing a lot about the things he did invest in. And that's in our playbook, too. And the reason why it's in our playbook is that to some extent, we learned it from him."

In addition to the warning against over-diversification — or what Peter Lynch, the great Fidelity Magellan fund manager, calls "de-worse-ification" — the book makes three important points:

(1)  First, don't worry too much about price.  (Quality first, Price second)
-  "Even in these earlier times [he's talking here about 1913], finding the really outstanding companies and staying with them through all the fluctuations of a gyrating market proved far more profitable to far more people than did the more colorful practice of trying to buy them cheap and sell them dear."
-  In fretting about whether a stock is cheap or expensive, many investors miss out on owning great companies. My own rule is: quality first, price second.
(2)  Second, Fisher says that investors must ask, "Does the company have a management of unquestionable integrity?" 

(3)  Finally, Fisher offered the best advice ever on selling stocks. "It is only occasionally," he wrote, "that there is any reason for selling at all."

Yes, but what are those occasions? They come down to this: Sell if a company hasdeteriorated in some important way. And I don't mean price! 

Fisher's view, instead, is to look to the business — the company itself, not the stock. 

"When companies deteriorate, they usually do so for one of two reasons: 
- Either there has been a deterioration of management, or 
- the company no longer has the prospect of increasing the markets for its product in the way it formerly did."

A stock-price decline can be a key signal: "Pay attention! Something may be wrong!" But the decline alone would not prompt me to sell. Nor would a rise in price. 

Time to sell? If you did, you missed another doubling.

"How long should you hold a stock? As long as the good things that attracted you to the company are still there."

****What differentiates winners from losers in a stock market: Qualitative Variables

What differentiates winners from losers in a stock market? Some may religiously follow the recommendations of a ‘hit’ stock broker. And some may even dig a bit deeper to know about the stock and the company they plan to invest in by going through the earnings and valuations multiples. But the real winners could still be a league ahead of such investors. That’s because they keep an eye on the qualitative variables. Let’s look at them: 

People 

This is the most important variable. You should know both the promoters and the professional managers who run the company. If the business is managed by a first-generation entrepreneur, check if the promoter is professionally and technically qualified to run the business. Of course, this is not a necessary condition and one has to exercise judgment. If the management consists of professionals, look at their employment history to understand their track record. For instance, before setting up HDFC Bank’s operations in 1994, Aditya Puri was a successful country head of Citibank in Malaysia. 

The management thinking can be best understood by reading the management discussion and analysis mentioned in the annual report. One can start with reading three year’s annual reports. This will allow you to compare the management analysis from past reports with what really transpired in the following year. The next important thing that will help you is the corporate governance details in the annual report. 

“Management’s intentions towards the minority shareholders must be carefully understood,” advises Kunj Bansal, chief investment officer of Sanlam SMC India. If the business has just been sold, the promoters collecting a non-compete fee does not bode well for smaller shareholders. Some investors find buy back programmes done at suppressed stock prices and unrelated diversifications detrimental to the minority shareholders. 

Management actions in the past while handling surplus cash can be good signalling device. One quantitative element that comes handy is the quantum of management compensation. One can look at payout to the management as a percentage of the net profit and decide if the management is fair. 

Related party transactions 

Good companies do business with related parties at fair market prices. The same is disclosed in the annual report for the benefit of the shareholders. Few related party transactions, along with high transparency, is an indicator of a good business. Promoters’ presence in the same business through a privately-held entity is a clear dampener as the investor in the publicly-listed entity runs the risk of promoter placing the ‘cream business’ in the privately-held entity. 

Business model 

Simply put, it means where and how the company earns its bread and butter. You have to figure out what products the company produces or markets. Five Ws — who, when, where, what, why — will help you understand the raw materials that go in, the time and skill set required, the risks faced by the company and probably all those variables that can influence your returns as a shareholder. During tech boom of 2000, investors poured in their hard earned money into hundreds of dotcom companies. 


http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/personal-finance/savings-centre/analysis/What-differentiates-winners-from-losers-in-a-stock-market/articleshow/6404286.cms




Related:  
Read how a company used its large cash reserve:
Review of Fima Corp's Earnings
http://whereiszemoola.blogspot.com/2010/08/review-of-fima-corps-earnings.html

Evaluating Company Management in Fundamental Analysis

Evaluating Company Management in Fundamental Analysis
BY STOCK RESEARCH PRO • APRIL 21ST, 2009

When evaluating a stock, many investors will look at the strength and effectiveness of company management as part of the due diligence process. The corporate scandals of recent years have reminded all of us of the importance of having a high-quality management team in place. The role of the management team, as far as investors are concerned, is to create value for the shareholders. While most investors see the significance of strong management, assessing the competence of an executive team can be difficult.

The Role of Company Management
A strong management team is critical to the success of any company. These are the people who develop the ongoing vision of the company and make strategic decisions to support that vision. While it can be said that every employee brings value, it is the management team that “steers the ship” through competitive, economic and the other pressures associated with running a company. In measuring the effectiveness of the management team the investor is able to determine how well the company is performing relative to its industry competitors and the market as a whole.

Assessing Management Performance
Some of the metrics a fundamental investor might use in measuring the effectiveness of company management might include:
Return on Assets: The ROA provides an indication of company profitability in relation to its total assets. Part of effective company management is the efficient leverage of company assets to produce earnings.

A Return on Assets Calculator

Return on Equity: The ROE measures net income as a percentage of shareholders equity. For shareholders, the ROE provides a means of measuring company profitability against how much they have invested. The ROE is best used to compare the profitability of the company (and company management, by extension) with other companies in the industry.

A Return on Equity Calculator

Return on Investment: The ROI measures the effective use of debt for the benefit of the company. Skillful use of debt resources by company management can play a significant role in the growth and prosperity of the company.


http://www.stockresearchpro.com/evaluating-company-management-in-fundamental-analysis

Bullbear Stock Investing Notes
http://myinvestingnotes.blogspot.com/

When making decisions, managers should focus on increasing the long term value of the firm

http://aswathdamodaran.blogspot.com/2009/07/behavioral-corporate-finance-1.html

Buffett (2002): Three suggestions to help an investor avoid firms with management of dubious intentions.

After enthralling readers with a wonderful treatise on how good corporate governance need to be practiced at firms in his 2002 letter to shareholders, Warren Buffett rounded off the discussion with three suggestions that could go a long way in helping an investor avoid firms with management of dubious intentions. What are these suggestions and what do they imply? Let us find out.

The 3 that count

The master says,  "First, beware of companies displaying weak accounting.There is seldom just one cockroach in the kitchen." If a company still does not expense options, or if its pension assumptions are fanciful, watch out. When managements take the low road in aspects that are visible, it is likely they are following a similar path behind the scenes.

On the second suggestion he says, "Unintelligible footnotes usually indicate untrustworthy management. If you can't understand a footnote or other managerial explanation, its usually because the CEO doesn't want you to."

And so far the final suggestion is concerned, he concludes, "Be suspicious of companies that trumpet earnings projections and growth expectations. Businesses seldom operate in a tranquil, no-surprise environment, and earnings simply don't advance smoothly (except, of course, in the offering books of investment bankers)."

Attention to detail

From the above suggestions, it is clear that the master is taking the age-old adage,  'Action speak louder than words', rather seriously. And why not! Since it is virtually impossible for a small investor to get access to top management on a regular basis, it becomes important that in order to unravel the latter's conduct of business; its actions need to be scrutinized closely. And what better way to do that than to go through the various filings of the company (annual reports and quarterly results) and get a first hand feel of what the management is saying and what it is doing with the company's accounts. Honest management usually does not play around with words and tries to present a realistic picture of the company. It is the one with dubious intentions that would try to insert complex footnotes and make fanciful assumptions about the company's future.

We would like to draw curtains on the master's 2002 letter to shareholders by putting up the following quote that dispels the myth that manager ought to know the future and hence predict it with great accuracy. Nothing could be further from the truth.

CEOs don't have a crystal ball

The master has said, "Charlie and I not only don't know today what our businesses will earn next year; we don't even know what they will earn next quarter. We are suspicious of those CEOs who regularly claim they do know the future and we become downright incredulous if they consistently reach their declared targets. Managers that always promise to 'make the numbers' will at some point be tempted to make up the numbers."

Hence, next time you come across a management that continues to give profit guidance year after year and even meets them, it is time for some alarm bells.

http://www.equitymaster.com/p-detail.asp?date=8/20/2008&story=2

Cooking the Books: Investors, be warned.

This discussion should make you better able to see the clues of fraud and remind you to be vigilant.

Managers most often cook the books for personal financial gain - to justify a bonus, to keep stock prices high and options valuable or to hide a business's poor performance.  Companies most likely to cook their books have weak internal controls and have a management of questionable character facing extreme pressure to perform.

All fast-growing companies must eventually slow down.  Managers may be tempted to use accounting gimmicks to give the appearances of continued growth.  Managers at weak companies may want to mask how bad things really are.  Managers may want that last bonus before bailing out.  Maybe there are unpleasant loan covenants that would be triggered but can be avoided by cooking the books.  A company can just be sloppy and have poor internal controls.

One key to watch for is management changing from a conservative accounting policy to a less-conservative one, for example, changing from LIFO to FIFO methods of inventory valuation or from expensing to capitalizing certain marketing expenses, easing of revenue recognition rules, lengthening amortization or depreciation periods.

Changes like these should be a red flag.  There may be valid reasons for these accounting policy changes, but not many.  Be warned.

Related:

• Cooking the Books: Why do managers cook the books?
• Cooking the Books: This is very different from "Creative Accounting"
• Cooking the Books: Puffing up the Income Statement
• Cooking the Books: Techniques to Puff Up the Income Statement
• Cooking the Books: Sweetening the Balance Sheet
• Cooking the Books: Techniques to Sweeten the Balance Sheet
• Cooking the Books: The Auditor's Job
• Cooking the Books: Investors, be warned.

Buffett (1989): We've never succeeded in making a good deal with a bad person.

Warren Buffett mentioned about his investment mistakes of the preceding 25 years in his 1989 letter to shareholders. Let us round off that list of what he feels were his key investment mistakes.

"My most surprising discovery: the overwhelming importance in business of an unseen force that we might call 'the institutional imperative'. In business school, I was given no hint of the imperative's existence and I did not intuitively understand it when I entered the business world. I thought then that decent, intelligent, and experienced managers would automatically make rational business decisions. But I learned over time that isn't so. Instead, rationality frequently wilts when the institutional imperative comes into play."

How often have we seen merger between two companies not producing the desired outcome as was projected at the time of the merger? Or, how often have we seen management retain excess cash under the rationale that it will be used for future acquisitions? Further still, a lot of companies do things just because their peers are doing it even though it might bring no tangible benefits to them. The master has labeled these so called propensities to do things just for the sake of doing them 'the institutional imperatives' and has termed them as one of his most surprising discoveries. Further, he advises investors to steer clear of such companies and instead focus on companies, which appear alert to the problem of 'institutional imperative'.

Given the master's great predisposition towards choosing business owners with the highest levels of integrity and honesty, it comes as no surprise that one of his investment mistake concerns the quality of the management. This is what he has to say on the issue.

"After some other mistakes, I learned to go into business only with people whom I like, trust, and admire. As I noted before, this policy in itself will not ensure success: A second-class textile or department store company won't prosper simply because its managers are men that you would be pleased to see your daughter marry. However, an owner - or investor - can accomplish wonders if he manages to associate himself with such people in businesses that possess decent economic characteristics. Conversely, we do not wish to join with managers who lack admirable qualities, no matter how attractive the prospects of their business. We've never succeeded in making a good deal with a bad person."

Next on the list of investment mistakes is a confession that makes us realise that even the master is human and is prone to slip up occasionally. But what makes him a truly outstanding investor is the fact that he has had relatively fewer mistakes of commission rather than omission. In other words, while he may have let go of a couple of very attractive investments, he's hardly ever made an investment that cost him huge amounts of money.

This is what he has to say: "Some of my worst mistakes were not publicly visible. These were stock and business purchases whose virtues I understood and yet didn't make. It's no sin to miss a great opportunity outside one's area of competence. But I have passed on a couple of really big purchases that were served up to me on a platter and that I was fully capable of understanding. For Berkshire's shareholders, myself included, the cost of this thumb-sucking has been huge."

The master rounds off the list with a masterpiece of a comment. It gives us an insight into his almost inhuman like risk aversion qualities and goes us to show that he will hardly ever make an investment unless he is 100% sure of the outcome. It comes out brilliantly in this, his last comment on his investment mistakes of the past twenty-five years: "Our consistently conservative financial policies may appear to have been a mistake, but in my view were not. In retrospect, it is clear that significantly higher, though still conventional, leverage ratios at Berkshire would have produced considerably better returns on equity than the 23.8% we have actually averaged. Even in 1965, perhaps we could have judged there to be a 99% probability that higher leverage would lead to nothing but good. Correspondingly, we might have seen only a 1% chance that some shock factor, external or internal, would cause a conventional debt ratio to produce a result falling somewhere between temporary anguish and default.

We wouldn't have liked those 99:1 odds - and never will. A small chance of distress or disgrace cannot, in our view, be offset by a large chance of extra returns. If your actions are sensible, you are certain to get good results; in most such cases, leverage just moves things along faster. Charlie and I have never been in a big hurry: We enjoy the process far more than the proceeds - though we have learned to live with those also."

http://www.equitymaster.com/detail.asp?date=10/25/2007&story=3

When things go wrong: Towards better decision making - quality of decision and the role of chance

Business results are the outcome of the interaction between our decisions, our actions and chance. Even if we make no error, there is always the cahnce that a bad outcome will result from a 'good' decision. For example, we might play dice game version A (http://spreadsheets.google.com/pub?key=te9MzyHoIN6EyuoHmfDxMaw&output=html) ten times and lose every time, despite having established that hte risk had a positive expected value. But how would such a decision be regarded in business?

 

If we were rewarded solely on results, with no attention paid to the way we took our decisions, our $10 loss would look pretty bad.  Our performance report might read as follows:  'Despite your poor results, you played this game again and again, throwing good money after bad on the off-chance of things somehow coming right.  You recklessly gambled company money on an uncertain future.  Your poor results are evidence of your bad judgement.  What were you thinking?'

 

But if we were rewarded on the quality of our decision-making process, our actions would appear in a very different light, resulting in a different review:  'Although results have been poor, due to circumstances beyond your control, the quality of your decision making was excellent.  You obtained all the information that you could on possible outcomes, and the probabilities of each, and took a decision on that basis.  The negative results, though disappointing, have not bankrupted the company.  You will be rewarded on the basis of decision-making quality.'

 

The flip side of this is that people might make decisions on impulse, or randomly, and still get good results by chance. 

• By rewarding or promoting these individuals, the business risks having lucky managers rather than competent ones - fine, until their luck runs out. 
• Also, although spontaneous decisions may turn out to bring some business benefit, they don't teach us anything.  We can't use them to improve the way we take decisions, or to instruct others.

Quality of company's management in determining its success

The quality of a company's management is by far the most crucial factor in determining its success

You have seen bad management mess up the most amazing opportunities where companies have failed despite having everything else going for them.

Often, the investor made many mistakes by focusing too much on the product, and not enough on the management. Good management will find a way to make their product work, while poor management can mess up good products.

Even big companies can make mistakes. Xerox had a fantastic product in photocopiers in the 1970s. They had a fantastic platform to expand into the technology market, by developing printers and similar devices, yet a few years ago, the company was struggling for survival. They've had a very tough time after never really grabbing the opportunity. It does seem to have been a management problem.

On the other hand, good management can often build something out of almost nothing. They are good at developing the business in the right direction. They spot opportunities, and have creative solutions. If their products are not selling, they may find ways to improve the product by research and development, or by buying or merging with other companies. They can weed out the wrong people and they face up to difficulties early.

It is easier to assess the management of smaller companies than larger ones.

There is a much greater variation in the level of talent within smaller companies. Just about all managers of big companies are very talented, even those who fail. Unfortunately, for smaller companies that is not always the case.

During the tech wreck, many small tech companies fall while others somehow survive. The survivors generally had good management. They weren't necessarily those with the best product, but they were those that cut expenditure when times were getting tough, and made plans for keeping the business alive for three or four years until the market recovered.

The track record of the managers is also very useful. Sometimes the managers are very appealing because previously they have taken a company all the way from nothing to good valuation. They may have built up a good reputation and made money for themselves in the process, and you know that they have choices apart from working for the company in which you're potentially investing.

Management strategy can also reveal a lot about their quality. Many investors focus too much on current revenue and profits while ignoring strategy. It's this that can be vital to a company's future, particularly with smaller companies that have fewer resources to recover from mistakes.