Showing posts with label Return on Retained Capital. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Return on Retained Capital. Show all posts

Tuesday, 2 December 2025

Buffett (1980): The true value is determined by the intrinsic value of the company and not the dividends.


Wednesday, 31 March 2010

Buffett (1980): The true value is determined by the intrinsic value of the company and not the dividends.


Warren Buffett in his 1980 letter to the shareholders of Berks
hire Hathaway:

"The value to Berkshire Hathaway of retained earnings is not determined by whether we own 100%, 50%, 20% or 1% of the businesses in which they reside. Rather, the value of those retained earnings is determined by the use to which they are put and the subsequent level of earnings produced by that usage."



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Buffett’s thinking from that 1980 letter.

Let’s break down and expand upon the key ideas you’ve highlighted:


1. Intrinsic Value vs. Dividends in Accounting

Buffett was criticizing the accounting convention that focused on dividends received from partially owned companies as the measure of value for the owning company.
He argued that the real worth to Berkshire wasn’t the dividend payout, but the proportionate share of the underlying business’s intrinsic value — regardless of whether those earnings were paid out or retained.

Your Indian example — valuing M&M based only on dividends from Tech Mahindra, rather than 20% of Tech Mahindra’s intrinsic value — perfectly illustrates the flawed accounting viewpoint.
If Tech Mahindra reinvests its earnings profitably, the retained earnings compound and increase the intrinsic value of M&M’s stake far beyond the dividends received.
Accounting rules at the time (and to a large extent still today) fail to capture this unless ownership exceeds a certain threshold (e.g., consolidation or equity method with impairment tests, but still not intrinsic-value based).


2. Retained Earnings: Value Depends on Use

Buffett’s core point:

“The value of retained earnings is determined by the use to which they are put and the subsequent level of earnings produced.”

This means it’s not retention itself that creates value, but the return on reinvested capital. If a business can reinvest earnings at high rates of return, retaining earnings adds more value than paying dividends.
If it can’t find good reinvestment opportunities, returning capital to shareholders (via dividends or buybacks) is better.

For partial ownership, even if you don’t control the capital allocation decisions, if the investee company reinvests earnings well, your share of its value grows without you receiving cash dividends.
That’s why Berkshire’s holdings in companies like Coca-Cola or See’s Candies were worth far more than the dividends indicated — because retained earnings were deployed into high-return operations.


3. Buybacks at a Discount to Intrinsic Value

The second quote contrasts corporate acquisitions (often full-price or overpay in competitive bidding) with stock buybacks in the open market (where shares can sometimes be bought far below intrinsic value).

Key takeaways:

Buffett loves buybacks when:

  1. The stock trades below intrinsic value.

  2. The company has excess cash and no better investment opportunities.

Buybacks increase per-share intrinsic value by reducing shares outstanding, effectively giving remaining shareholders a larger claim on future earnings at a bargain price.


4. Relevance Today

These principles remain central to value investing:

  • Look-through earnings: When evaluating holdings, include your share of undistributed earnings of subsidiaries/associates if they are reinvested well.

  • Capital allocation priority:

    1. Reinvest in high-return projects.

    2. Acquire other businesses at fair prices.

    3. Buy back stock when cheap.

    4. Pay dividends if no better use.

The accounting standards (e.g., IFRS 9, ASC 323) still don’t fully reflect “look-through” intrinsic value for minority holdings — they focus on dividends, fair value changes, or equity-accounted earnings, but not necessarily the full economic value of retained earnings compounding inside the investee.


5. Buffett’s Broader Philosophy

The 1980 letter segment you’re discussing fits into Buffett’s larger framework:

  • Own businesses, not stocks → value comes from underlying business performance.

  • Mr. Market offers opportunities to buy/sell pieces of businesses at irrational prices.

  • Management’s job is to increase per-share intrinsic value over time, not to cater to short-term stock prices.

By ignoring dividends as the sole measure of value from investments and focusing on the growth in intrinsic value, Buffett built Berkshire’s worth far beyond what dividend-based accounting would suggest.



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SUMMARY


Here is a summary of the article's key points:

Core Argument

Warren Buffett, in his 1980 letter, argues that the true economic value of a company's stake in another business is not determined by the dividends it receives, but by its share of the intrinsic value of the underlying business. Accounting standards that focus on dividend income are misleading.

Main Points

  1. Intrinsic Value Over Dividends:

    • If Company A owns 20% of Company B, the stake should be valued as 20% of Company B's intrinsic value, not just 20% of the dividends paid out. This is because retained earnings reinvested into the business can create far more long-term value.

    • Example: Valuing M&M based only on the dividends from its stake in Tech Mahindra would be incorrect; one must value its 20% ownership of Tech Mahindra itself.

  2. Value of Retained Earnings:

    • The worth of retained earnings depends entirely on how effectively they are reinvested. If a business can reinvest earnings at a high rate of return, retaining them creates more value than paying them out as dividends.

  3. Buybacks vs. Acquisitions:

    • Acquisitions often occur in a competitive auction, forcing acquirers to pay a "full" or inflated price.

    • Stock Buybacks, however, allow a company to buy parts of its own business in the open market, often at a significant discount to intrinsic value, especially during market panics.

    • Buffett strongly advocates for buybacks when a company's stock is trading below its intrinsic value, as it is the most efficient use of capital to increase per-share value for remaining shareholders.

Conclusion

Buffett’s philosophy centers on economic reality over accounting convention. A value investor should focus on the growth of intrinsic value from reinvested earnings and take advantage of market irrationality to buy ownership stakes at a discount.



Saturday, 21 September 2019

The Possibility of Reinvesting More Capital in companies with High Returns on Capital

Bear in mind that the potential for companies with high returns on capital to reinvest a lot of capital are limited, since they tend not be be very capital intensive (e.g. Nestle Malaysia and Dutch Lady).

Furthermore, the market will probably be correctly pricing such gems which are capable of obtaining high returns over time, meaning we must wait for the right moment to acquire them at a reasonable price, because they are rarely gong to come cheap.

If some of these companies with high returns on capital in attractive sectors also offer a certain amount of growth, facilitating reinvestment of capital, then we are looking at a gem, with the added benefit of being coherent with our long term investment philosophy.

If a company can reinvest with a 20% return on investment over the next 20 years and we are able to buy the stock at a reasonable price, then the return on our investment will be close to this annual 20% over 20 years.

Thursday, 15 August 2013

Allocation of capital is crucial to business and investment management.

Managers and owners should think hard about the circumstances under which earnings should be retained and under which they should be distributed.

1.   All earnings are not created equal.

In many businesses, particularly those that have high asset/profit ratios, inflation causes some or all of the reported earnings to become ersatz (inferior substitutes).  The ersatz portion - let's call these earnings "restricted" - cannot, if the business is to retain its economic position, be distributed as dividends.  Were these earnings to be paid out, the business would lose ground in one or more of the following areas: its ability to maintain its unit volume of sales, its long-term competitive position, its financial strength.  No matter how conservative its payout ratio, a company that consistently distributes restricted earnings is destined for oblivion unless equity capital is otherwise infused.

2.  Restricted earnings are seldom valueless to owners, but they often must be discounted heavily.  In effect, they are conscripted by the business, no matter how poor its economic potential.

(This retention-no-matter how unattractive-the-return situation was communicated unwittingly in a marvelously ironic way by Consolidated Edison a decade ago.  At the time, a punitive regulatory policy was a major factor causing the company's stock to sell as low as one-fourth of book value; i.e., every time a dollar of earnings was retained for reinvestment in the business, that dollar was transformed into only 25 cents of market value.  But, despite this gold-into-lead process, most earnings were reinvested in the business rather than paid to owners.  Meanwhile, at construction and maintenance sites throughout New York, signs proudly proclaimed the corporate slogan, "Dig We Must.")

3.  The much-more-valued unrestricted variety of earnings may, with equal feasibility, be retained or distributed.  Management should choose whichever course makes greater sense for the owners of the business.

This principle is not universally accepted.  For a number of reasons, managers like to withhold unrestricted, readily distributable earnings from shareholders - to expand the corporate empire over which the managers rule, to operate from a position of exceptional financial comfort, etc.  But there is only one valid reason for retention.  Unrestricted earnings should be retained only when there is a reasonable prospect - backed preferably by historical evidence or, when appropriate, by a thoughtful analysis of the future - that for every dollar retained by the corporation, at least one dollar of market value will be created for owners.  This will happen only if the capital retained produces incremental earnings equal to, or above, those generally available to investors

4.  In judging whether managers should retain earnings, shareholders should not simply compare total incremental earnings in recent years to total incremental capital because that relationship may be distorted by what is going on in a core business.

During an inflationary period, companies with a core business characterized by extraordinary economic can use small amounts of incremental capital in that business at very high rates of return.  But unless they are experiencing tremendous unit growth, outstanding businesses by definition generate large amounts of excess cash.  If a company sinks most of this money in other businesses that earn low returns, the company's overall return on retained capital may nevertheless appear excellent because of the extraordinary returns being earned by the portion of earnings incrementally invested in the core business.  The situation is analogous to a Pro-Am golf event:  Even if all the amateurs are hopeless duffers, the team's best-ball score will be respectable because of the dominating skills of the professional.


Ref:  Warren Buffett

Thursday, 30 August 2012

KAF - Return on Retained Earnings

KAF
Year DPS EPS Retained EPS
2002 4.5 5.4 a 0.9
2003 5.4 7.9 2.5
2004 6.3 12.6 6.3
2005 5.4 13.7 8.3
2006 5.4 9.9 4.5
2007 30.1 15.8 -14.3
2008 5.6 12.5 6.9
2009 5.6 -2.5 -8.1
2010 5.6 17.3 11.7
2011 11.3 16.2 b 4.9
2012
Total 85.2 c 108.8 d 23.6 e
From 2002 to 2011
EPS increase (sen) b-a 10.8
DPO c/d 78%
Return on retained earnings  (b-a)/e 46%
(Figures are in sens)

CIMB - Return on Retained Earnings

CIMB
Year DPS EPS Retained EPS
2002 1.1 10.8 a 9.7
2003 1.9 14.9 13
2004 3.6 14 10.4
2005 7.2 15 7.8
2006 5.4 23.6 18.2
2007 14.6 30.9 16.3
2008 9.3 27.7 18.4
2009 9.9 38.3 28.4
2010 27.3 47 19.7
2011 20 50.9 b(P) 30.9
2012
Total 100.3 c 273.1 d 172.8 e
From 2002 to 2011
EPS increase (sen) b-a 40.1
DPO c/d 37%
Return on retained earnings  (b-a)/e 23%
(Figures are in sens)

PIE - Return on Retained Earnings

PIE
Year DPS EPS Retained EPS
2002 10 12.4 a 2.4
2003 10 12.2 2.2
2004 12 18.1 6.1
2005 12 27.2 15.2
2006 14.6 41.4 26.8
2007 22 55.6 33.6
2008 28.7 53 24.3
2009 26.3 39.5 13.2
2010 26.3 40.1 13.8
2011 26.3 59.5 b(P) 33.2
2012
Total 188.2 c 359 d 170.8 e
From 2002 to 2011
EPS increase (sen) b-a 47.1
DPO c/d 52%
Return on retained earnings  (b-a)/e 28%
(Figures are in sens)

Sime Darby - Return on Retained Earnings

Sime Darby
Year DPS EPS Retained EPS
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007 0 31.4 a 31.4
2008 38.2 56.6 18.4
2009 19.1 39.1 20
2010 10 14.4 4.4
2011 30 61.9 b 31.9
2012
Total 97.3 c 203.4 d 106.1 e
From 2007 to 2011
EPS increase (sen) b-a 30.5
DPO c/d 48%
Return on retained earnings  (b-a)/e 29%
(Figures are in sens)

Ajinomoto - Return on Retained Earnings

Ajinomoto
Year DPS EPS Retained EPS
2002 5.3 17 a 11.7
2003 6.5 19.9 13.4
2004 7.9 21.6 13.7
2005 7.9 14.6 6.7
2006 7.9 9.9 2
2007 8.9 24.7 15.8
2008 12.9 34.4 21.5
2009 15 31.2 16.2
2010 15.8 36.6 20.8
2011 17.3 42.6 b 25.3
2012
Total 105.4 c 252.5 d 147.1 e
From 2002 to 2011
EPS increase (sen) b-a 25.6
DPO c/d 42%
Return on retained earnings  (b-a)/e 17%
(Figures are in sens)

BAT - Return on Retained Earnings

BAT
Year DPS EPS Retained EPS
2002 201 232 a 31
2003 298 266 -32
2004 247 283 36
2005 216 208 -8
2006 275 252 -23
2007 329 256 -73
2008 263 284 21
2009 250 262 12
2010 239 256 17
2011 276 252 b (P) -24
2012
Total 2594 c 2551 d -43e
From 2002 to 2011
EPS increase (sen) b-a 20.0
DPO c/d 102%
Return on retained earnings  (b-a)/e -47%
(Figures are in sens)

Fraser & Neave - Return on Retained Earnings


Fraser & Neave
Year DPS EPS Retained EPS
2002 12 24.6 a 12.6
2003 10 29.1 19.1
2004 18 32.7 14.7
2005 27.4 37 9.6
2006 31.7 40.1 8.4
2007 33.2 42.9 9.7
2008 39.8 46.8 7
2009 35.3 68.2 32.9
2010 45.5 86.3 40.8
2011 183 88.7 b -94.3
2012
Total 435.9 c 496.4 d 60.5 e
From 2002 to 2011
EPS increase (sen) b-a 64.1
DPO c/d 88%
Return on retained earnings  (b-a)/e 106%
(Figures are in sens)

Coastal - Return on Retained Earnings

Coastal
Year DPS EPS Retained EPS
2002
2003 0 3 a 3
2004 0.9 3.1 2.2
2005 0.6 3.5 2.9
2006 0.7 7.5 6.8
2007 1.4 14.6 13.2
2008 2.6 20.3 17.7
2009 2.2 33.2 31
2010 3.7 41 37.3
2011 8.3 39.5 b(P) 31.2
2012
Total 20.4 c 165.7 d 145.3e
From 2003 to 2011
EPS increase (sen) b-a 36.5
DPO c/d 12%
Return on retained earnings  (b-a)/e 25%
(Figures are in sens)

Tower Reit - Return on Retained Earnings

Tower Reit
Year DPS EPS Retained EPS
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006 0 7.5 a 7.5
2007 9.3 8.5 -0.8
2008 9.5 9.9 0.4
2009 9.4 10.7 1.3
2010 9.5 10.6 1.1
2011 10.7 11.9 1.2
2012
Total 48.4 c 59.1 d 10.7 e
From 2006 to 2011
EPS increase (sen) b-a 4.4
DPO c/d 82%
Return on retained earnings  (b-a)/e 41%
(All figures are in sens)