The 10-year Treasury note yield just broke below 1%.

The 10-year Treasury note yield TMUBMUSD10Y, -1.71% tumbled 12.4 basis points to 0.967%, carving out a record intraday low of 0.914% in Tuesday trading, according to Tradeweb data.


The direction of the benchmark maturity’s yield is important for economists, households and central bankers as it serves as a benchmark for all kinds of loans including long-term mortgages. The long-dated bond also serves as a broader barometer of how easy it is to borrow money, and an indication of how investors perceive the U.S. economy’s prospects.




Analysts say the Fed’s move to ease monetary policy ahead of its scheduled policy meeting in two weeks suggests the central bank wanted to demonstrate its willingness to act, in line with research by Fed officials suggesting that early and aggressive rate cuts are more effective when interest rates are near zero.


https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-10-year-treasury-note-yield-just-broke-below-1-heres-how-it-happened-2020-03-03

The U.S. bond-market’s benchmark yield plunged below 1% on Tuesday, a possibility that few analysts and investors contemplated at the beginning of the year.

Investors have attributed the slide in U.S. Treasury yields to a combination of factors including 

• slower global economic growth, 
• the attraction of a positive return when negative-yielding debt is the alternative in Europe and Japan abroad, and 
• the absence of any inflation threat.

But in the end, the spark for the furious rally in Treasurys on Tuesday came from a less abstract source: 

• a surprise 50 basis point interest rate cut from the Federal Reserve to counteract worries that the spread of the COVID-19 epidemic would deliver a painful blow to consumer and market confidence.

Doubts grow over wisdom of Ben Bernanke 'super-put': Soaring bourses may have stolen the headlines, but equities are rising for an unhealthy reason.

Doubts grow over wisdom of Ben Bernanke 'super-put'

The early verdict is in on the US Federal Reserve's $600bn of fresh money through quantitative easing. Yields on 30-year Treasury bonds jumped 20 basis points to 4.07pc

By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, International Business Editor
Published: 7:58PM GMT 04 Nov 2010

60 Comments

Mr Bernanke is targeting maturities of 5 to 10 years with purchases of Treasuries. Photo: GETTY

It is the clearest warning shot to date that global investors will not tolerate Ben Bernanke's openly-declared policy of generating inflation for much longer.

Soaring bourses may have stolen the headlines, but equities are rising for an unhealthy reason: because they are a safer asset class than bonds at the start of an inflationary credit cycle.

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Meanwhile, the price of US crude oil jumped $2.5 a barrel to $87. It is up 20pc since markets first concluded in early September that 'QE2' was a done deal.

This amounts to a tax on US consumers, transferring US income to Mid-East petro-powers. Copper has behaved in much the same way. So have sugar, soya, and cotton.

The dollar plunged yet again. That may have been the Fed's the unstated purpose. If so, Washington has angered the world's rising powers and prompted a reaction with far-reaching strategic consequences.

Li Deshui from Beijing's Economic Commission said a string of Asian states share China's "deep bitterness" over dollar debasement, and are examining ways of teaming up to insulate themselves from the tsunami of US liquidity. Thailand said its central bank is already in talks with neighbours to devise a joint protection policy.

Brazil's central bank chief Henrique Mereilles said the US move had created "excessive dollar liquidity which we are absorbing," forcing his country to restrict inflows. Mexico's finance minister warned of "more bubbles."

These countries cannot easily shield themselves from the inflationary effect of QE2 by raising interest rates since this leads to further "carry trade" inflows in search of yield. They are being forced to eye capital controls, with ominous implications for the interwoven global system.

In London and Frankfurt the verdict was just as harsh. "In our view, this is one of the greatest policy mistakes in the Fed's history," said Toby Nangle from Baring Asset Management.

"The Fed is gambling that the so-called 'portfolio balance channel effect' – pushing money out of government bonds and into other assets – will lift risk asset prices. The gamble is that this boosts profits and wages, rather than simply prices. We remain unconvinced. How will a liquidity solution correct a solvency problem?" he said.

"A policy error," said Ulrich Leuchtmann from Commerzbank. The wording of the Fed statement is "potentially dangerous" because it leaves the door open to a further flood of Treasury purchases if unemployment stays high. "It is a bottomless pit," he said.

Of course, it is precisely this open door that has so juiced risk trades, from Australian dollar futures, to silver contracts, and junk bonds. Goldman Sachs thinks QE2 will ultimately reach $2 trillion, with no exit until 2015. Such moral hazard is irresistible. It is the Bernanke 'super-put'.

Yet the reluctance of investors to leap back into the US Treasury market as they did after QE1 is revealing. The 30-year segment of the Treasury market is too small to matter, but symbolism does matter. Vigilantes sniff stealth default. "If long bond investors continue to throw their collective toys out of the cot, it risks upending the Fed's policy," said Michael Derk from FXPro.

Mr Bernanke is targeting maturities of 5 to 10 years with purchases of Treasuries. These bonds have behaved better: 10-year yields fell 14 points on Thursday to 2.48pc. However, Mark Ostwald from Monument Securities said foreign funds may take advantage of QE2 to dump their holdings on the Fed, rotating the money emerging markets rather than US assets.

Bond funds are already restive. Pimco's Bill Gross says the great bull market in bonds is over, denigrating Fed policy as the greatest "ponzi scheme" in history. Warren Buffett has chimed in too, warning that anybody buying bonds at this stage is "making a big mistake",

Fed chair Ben Bernanke uses the term 'credit easing' to describe his strategy because the goal is to lower borrowing costs. If he fails to achieve this over coming months - because investors balk - the policy will backfire.

No clear rationale for fresh QE can be found in orthodox monetarism. Data from the St Louis Federal Reserve show that M2 money supply stopped contracting in the early summer and has since been expanding at an accelerating rate, topping 9pc over the last four-week bloc.

The Fed has used the 'Taylor Rule' on output gaps as a theoretical justification for QE, but Stanford Professor John Taylor has more or less said his theories have been hijacked. "I don't think (QE) will do much good, and I also worry about the harm down the road," he said.

It has not been lost on markets that the Fed's purchases of $900bn of Treasuries by June (with reinvested funds from mortgage debt) covers the Treasury's deficit over the same period. The slipperly slope towards 'monetization' of public debt beckons.

Global investors mostly accepted that the motive for QE1 was emergency liquidity, and that stimulus would later be withdrawn. But there are growing suspicions that QE2 is Treasury funding in disguise.

If they start to act on this suspicion, they could push rates higher instead of lower, and overwhelm the Bernanke stimulus. That would precipitate an ugly chain of events for the US.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/8111153/Doubts-grow-over-wisdom-of-Ben-Bernanke-super-put.html


Note:


Pimco's Bill Gross says the great bull market in bonds is over, denigrating Fed policy as the greatest "ponzi scheme" in history. 


Warren Buffett has chimed in too, warning that anybody buying bonds at this stage is "making a big mistake",

Why I'm with Warren Buffett on bonds versus equities

Follow the herd or follow Warren Buffett? That sounds like it should be a pretty simple choice for most investors given the average investor's consistent ability to buy and sell at the wrong time and the sage of Omaha's ranking as one of the world's richest men.

 

By Tom Stevenson
Published: 6:15PM BST 09 Oct 2010

18 Comments

Warren Buffett told a conference he couldn't imagine anyone having bonds in their portfolio when they could have equities Photo: GETTY

Curious then that Mr Buffett is doing a passable imitation of Cassandra – she who was cursed so that she could foretell the future but no one would ever believe her.

Here's Buffett, speaking last week to Fortune magazine's Most Powerful Women Summit: "It's quite clear that stocks are cheaper than bonds. I can't imagine anyone having bonds in their portfolio when they can have equities ... but people do because they lack the confidence."

 

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And here's what everyone else is doing. According to Morgan Stanley, the speed of inflows to bond funds is even greater than retail inflows into equity funds at the height of the technology bubble in 2000 – $410bn (£256bn) in the 12 months to April 2010 in the US versus $340bn into equities in the year to September 2000.

Over here, too, investors can't get enough fixed income. According to the Investment Management Association, net sales of global bonds and corporate bonds both exceeded £600m during August. Only absolute return funds were anywhere close to these inflows. The staple British equity fund sector, UK All Companies, saw £291m of redemptions and even the previously popular Asia ex-Japan sector raised a paltry £22m.

So, is this a bubble waiting to burst or a logical investment choice in a deflationary world where interest rates could stay lower for longer as governments adopt more desperate strategies to prevent another slump?

The case for bond prices staying high has received a boost in recent weeks as speculation has grown that the US government is contemplating a second round of quantitative easing. Printing yet more money to buy bonds creates a buyer of last resort and would underpin the price of Treasuries even at today's elevated levels.

Indeed, the talk on Wall Street has turned to a measure the US government has not employed since the Second World War when a target yield for government securities was set with the implied promise that the authorities would buy up whatever they needed to keep the cost of money low.

Ben Bernanke, the Fed chairman, referred to this policy in his famous "Helicopter Ben" speech of 2002 when he reminded financial markets of the US government's ultimate weapon in the fight against deflation – the printing press. It really is no wonder that the price of gold is on a tear.

For a few reasons, however, I'm not convinced that the theoretical possibility that interest rates could go yet lower à la Japan makes a good argument for buying bonds at today's levels.

First, to return to fund flows, extremes of buying have in the past been a very good contrarian indicator of future performance. Equity flows represented around 4pc of total assets in 2000 just as the bubble was bursting. At the same time, there were very significant outflows from bond funds just ahead of a strong bond market rally.

My second reason for caution is illustrated by the chart, which shows how little reward investors are receiving for lending money to the US government (and the UK, German or Japanese governments for that matter). Accepting this kind of yield makes sense only if you believe the US economy is fatally wounded and that the dragon of inflation has been slain. I don't believe in either thesis.

History shows very clearly that investing in bonds when the starting yield is this low has resulted in well-below-average returns if and when rates start to rise. Between 1941 and 1981, when interest rates last rose for an extended period, the total return from bonds was two and a half times lower when the starting point was a yield of under 3pc than when it started above this level. Investing when yields are low stacks the odds against you.

My final reason for caution is that there is no need to put all your eggs in the bond basket. Around a quarter of FTSE 100 shares are yielding more than 4pc while the income from gilts is less than 3pc. More income and the potential for it to rise over time too. I'm with Warren on this one.

tomrstevenson@fil.com

Tom Stevenson is an investment director at Fidelity Investment Managers. The views expressed are his own.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/tom-stevenson/8052896/Why-Im-with-Warren-Buffett-on-bonds-versus-equities.html

Why government bond markets have become the latest mad and bad asset bubble

By Jeremy Warner Economics Last updated: October 22nd, 2010

The five year gilt yield has fallen to a new low (Photo: AP)

The benchmark five year gilt yield fell to a new low of 1.43 per cent on Thursday, which astonishingly takes it to a 25 basis point discount to that of its German bund counterpart. The UK Government likes to think of the record lows to which gilt yields have sunk to be a vote of confidence by international investors in its plans for fiscal consolidation, and no doubt there is a small element of truth in this contention. But the main factors driving government bond yields ever lower, not just here in the UK, but in the US too, are much more worrying and have little to do with the bravery of George Osborne’s deficit reduction programme.

In essence, both the UK and US government bond markets have become giant bubbles which are now largely divorced from underlying realities and almost bound to end badly. Yes, for sure if the UK Government hadn’t done something about the deficit, then we might be looking at far less benign conditions in the gilts market, but just to repeat the point, it’s not really enhanced credit worthiness which is causing these abnormally low yields.

The US is experiencing much the same phenomenon, even though its public finances are in just as big a mess as the UK’s and it has virtually no plan that I can discern for deficit reduction, besides the wing and a prayer hope that growth will eventually come to the rescue.

So what’s really driving this dash for government debt? One possibility is that bond markets are already pricing in a depression, or at least a Japanese style lost decade of deflation. Despite ever more mountainous quantities of public debt, bond yields in Japan have been at abnormally low levels for years. Indeed, in Japan the abnormal is now normal. If you think the price of goods and services will soon be deflating, then even bonds on 1 per cent yields offer a healthy rate of return.

But no, the real reason lies in the market distortions that result from ultra easy monetary policy and the demands being put by regulators on banks to hold “riskless” assets. This is leading to a profound mis-pricing of government bonds, which now take virtually no account of significant medium term inflation risks.

If you think markets are always right, then bond prices are indeed signalling the inevitability of a depression, but if there is one thing we have been forced by the events of the last three years to relearn about markets it is that they are prone to episodes of extreme mispricing. The bond phenomenon is very likely one of them.

There are a number of ways in which bond markets are being distorted. One is regulatory demands on banks to hold bigger “liquidity buffers”. The asset of choice in boosting these buffers is government bonds. These have already been proved by Europe’s sovereign debt crisis to be very far from the “riskless” assets of regulatory supposition. Even so, banks are still being forced to max out on government debt.

A second distortion is caused by the “carry trade” opportunities of exceptionally low short term interest rates. Put crudely, you can borrow from the central bank for next to zero, lend the money out at a higher rate further up the yield curve, and pocket the difference. In a sense, that’s the purpose of ultra-easy monetary policy – to create a generally low interest rate environment – but the dangers of it are obvious. Central banks are creating a bubble in government debt.

And so to the biggest reason of the lot. Look at the chart above (created from Bloomberg data), which shows the yield gap between the five and thirty year gilt, and you can see that it has widened substantially over the past year. The reason is that investors are anticipating another bout of quantitative easing from the Bank of England. In the last round of QE, the Bank concentrated purchases initially on UK gilts in the five to 25 year range, but then widened this to include three year gilts and some 25 year plus bonds after running up against supply constraints. Investors are buying up the five year gilt because they know this is where the Bank, if it does more QE, will find most scarcity. Exactly the same thing is happening in the US, where more QE is already pretty much a done deal.

Anyone with half a brain can see that Germany is a rather more credit worthy and naturally inflation proofed country than either the UK or the US, yet the cost of five year money in Germany is now higher. How can this be? The explanation lies in the absence of overt QE in the eurozone. There have been no purchases of German bunds by the European Central Bank.

In fighting the aftermath of the last bubble by flooding the market with ultra-cheap liquidity, the Fed and the Bank of England seem only to be inflating new ones. There are others besides government bonds, commodities and emerging market assets being the most obvious. I’m not saying these policies are as a consequence flawed and wrong. That wider debate involves an altogether more complex and diverse range of issues. But the risks are self evident.

http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/finance/jeremywarner/100008271/why-government-bond-markets-have-gone-mad-and-bad/

Wall Street Legend: This Market Just Flashed a Huge Warning Signal

Wall Street Legend: This Market Just Flashed a Huge Warning Signal By Tom Dyson Tuesday, August 17, 2010

David Rosenberg calls it the smoking gun… Rosenberg and I just spoke on the phone. You might not know his story, but David Rosenberg is a Wall Street legend. He is famous for being a bearish economist at the most bullish firm on Wall Street. When the housing market was in a roaring boom, Merrill Lynch was making billions. But Rosenberg, Merrill's chief economist, was warning about recession and a bear market in stocks. He said the housing and mortgage bubble would pop and a severe economic downturn would follow. Last year, he quit Merrill Lynch. Many people thought Merrill fired him for not being bullish enough. "That's nonsense," he told me. "My wife and three kids live in Toronto. I wanted to be with them. So I left New York." He's now Chief Economist at Gluskin Sheff, a boutique money-management firm in Canada. Of course, Rosenberg's bearish views were spectacularly right… Rosenberg is now one of the most popular economists in the media. You'll often find him giving an interview on CNBC or a quote to the Wall Street Journal. So what's Rosenberg's smoking gun? It's the bond market. First, check out this chart of the yield on the 10-year Treasury note. It's collapsing… now at March 2009 levels. Some markets are smarter than others. Lumber is a great leading indicator of the housing market. The Baltic Dry Index often leads the shipping stocks. Rosenberg says the bond market is smarter than the stock market. Rosenberg writes a great, free daily newsletter, Breakfast With Dave, where he summarizes and comments on all the major economic news of the day. In one of his issues last week, he showed that whenever the economy heads into a downturn, bond traders start anticipating the recession before the stock market. Take the 1990 recession, for example. The 10-year note yield peaked on May 2, 1990 at 9.09%. The S&P 500 peaked two months later… In the 2001 recession, the 10-year yield topped out on January 20, 2000 at 6.79%. The stock market peaked eight months later, on September 1, 2000. In the 2008 recession, the 10-year yield reached its high on June 12, 2007. The S&P 500 peaked on October 9, 2007, a few months later… And finally, the smoking gun for the 2010 recession… The 10-year Treasury yield peaked on April 5 at 3.99%. It's now at 2.60% four months later. The stock market peaked on April 26, three weeks later… In other words, if the action in the bond pits is any guide, the economy is going back into recession. I asked Rosenberg what investors should do about this. He likes gold and the highest-quality natural resource companies. But bonds are his favorite investments. He says most people think cash is king. But they're wrong. In a deflationary recession, income is king. He calls his strategy "SIRP," which stands for Safety and Income at a Reasonable Price. Rosenberg thinks interest rates will continue to decline like they did in Japan, and bond investments will continue to rise in value. Corporate bonds are his favorite. Rosenberg says American corporate balance sheets are loaded with cash and extremely healthy, so corporate bonds are safe. Good investing, Tom

What Fuels The National Debt?

What Fuels The National Debt?
by Reem Heakal (Contact Author Biography)


First established in 1789 by an act of Congress, the United States Department of the Treasury is responsible for federal finances. This department was created in order to manage the expenditures and revenues of the U.S. government, and hence the means by which the state could raise money in order to function. Here we examine the responsibilities of the Treasury and the reasons and means by which it takes on debt.


Responsibilities of the Treasury



The U.S. Treasury is divided into two divisions: the departmental offices and the operating bureaus. The departments are mainly in charge of policy making and management of the Treasury, while the bureaus' duties are to take care of specific operations. Bureaus such as the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), which is responsible for tax collection, and the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP), in charge of printing and minting all U.S. money, take care of the majority of the total work done by the Treasury. (For related reading, see Buy Treasuries Directly From The Fed.)



The primary tasks of the Treasury include:

• The collection of taxes and custom duties
  


• The payment of all bills owed by the federal government
  


• The printing and minting of U.S. notes and U.S. coinage and stamps
  


• The supervision of state banks
  


• The enforcement of government laws including taxation policies
  


• Advising the government on both national and international economic, financial, monetary, trade and tax legislation
  


• The investigation and federal prosecution of tax evaders, counterfeiters and/or forgers
  


• The management of federal accounts and the national public debt

The National Debt



A government creates budgets to determine how much it needs to spend to run a nation. Oftentimes, however, a government may run a budget deficit by spending more money than it receives in revenues from taxes (including customs duties and stamps). In order to finance the deficit, governments may seek to raise money by taking on debt, that is, by borrowing it from the public. The U.S. government first found itself in debt in 1790, after taking on the war debts following the Revolutionary War. Since then, the debt has been fueled by more war, economic recession and inflation. As such, the public debt is a result of accumulated budget deficits. (For more insight, read The Treasury And The Federal Reserve.)



The Role of Congress



Up until World War I, the U.S. government needed approval from Congress every time it wanted to borrow money from the public. Congress would determine the number of securities that could be issued, their maturity date and the interest they would pay. With the Second Liberty Bond Act of 1917, however, the U.S. Treasury was given a debt limit, or a ceiling of how much it could borrow from the public without seeking Congress' consent. The Treasury was also given the discretion to decide maturity dates, interest rate levels and the type of instruments that would be offered. The total amount of money that can be borrowed by the government without further authorization by Congress is known as the total public debt subject to limit. Any amount above this level has to receive additional approval from the legislative branch.



Who Owns the Debt?



The debt is sold in the form of securities to both domestic and foreign investors, as well as corporations and other governments. U.S. securities issued include Treasury bills (T-bills), notes and bonds as well as U.S. savings bonds. There are both short-term and long-term investment options, but short-term T-bills are offered regularly, as well as quarterly notes and bonds. When the debt instrument has matured, the Treasury can either pay the cash owed (including interest) or issue new securities.



Debt instruments issued by the U.S. government are considered to be the safest investments in the world because interest payments do not have to undergo yearly authorization by Congress. In fact, the money the Treasury uses to pay the interest is automatically made available by law.



The public debt is calculated on a daily basis. After receiving end-of-day reports from about 50 different sources (such as Federal Reserve Bank branches) regarding the amount of securities sold and redeemed that day, the Treasury calculates the total public debt outstanding, which is released the following morning. It represents the total marketable and non-marketable principal amount of securities outstanding (i.e. not including interest).



War Time



In times of war, a government needs more money to support the effort. To finance its needs, the U.S. government will often issue what are commonly known as war bonds. These bonds appeal to the nation's patriotism to raise money for a war effort. Following September 11, 2001, the U.S.A. Patriot Act was passed by Congress. Among other things, it authorized Federal agencies to initiate ways to combat global terrorism. To raise money for the "war on terrorism", the U.S. Treasury issued war bonds known as patriot bonds. These Series EE savings bonds hold a five-year maturity.



The U.S. Treasury has also become a key institution working with financial institutions to draft new policies aimed at battling counterfeiting and money laundering related to terrorism.



Conclusion



The public debt is a liability to the U.S. government, and the Bureau of Public Debt is responsible for the technical aspects of its financing. However, the only way to reduce debt is for the federal budget's expenditures to cease to exceed its revenues. Budget policy lies with the legislative branch of government, and thus, depending on the circumstances at the time of budget formulation, running a deficit may be the country's only choice.



For more insight, read Giants Of Finance: John Maynard Keynes.
by Reem Heakal, (Contact Author Biography)



http://www.investopedia.com/articles/04/011404.asp?partner=NTU3

There will be slim pickings if China loses its appetite for Western debt

There will be slim pickings if China loses its appetite for Western debt
Last week I argued that the idea of large Asian economies "decoupling" from the West was unhelpful. Globalization makes nations more interrelated, not less. So export-oriented nations like China and India were always going to feel the impact of a massive Western contraction.

By Liam Halligan
Last Updated: 6:11PM GMT 21 Feb 2009

Comments 0 Comment on this article

But I have to admit that China, with its massive 1,400m population, isn't doing badly. Retail sales remain strong – up 17pc in real terms. Growth has slowed, but GDP still expanded by a pretty spectacular 6.8pc during the fourth quarter of last year.

Japan – that other Asian giant – continues to suffer. Tumbling exports have sparked the worst slump in 35 years. Japanese GDP contracted 3.3pc during the last three months of 2008 – equivalent to a 12.7pc annualized drop. The Nikkei 225 index of leading Japanese shares is down 16pc since the start of 2009. Chinese shares, in contrast, have gained 25pc this year – the best return of any stock market in the world. London's FTSE-100 shed 12pc over the same period, with New York's S&P 500 down 15pc.

Optimism in China has been boosted by the government's Rmb4,000bn (£405bn) support package. Unlike Japan and the cash-strapped Western nations, China is funding its fiscal stimulus using reserves, not extra borrowing.

As the West's predicament has worsened, and China's relative strength has punched through, the political mood music has changed. Just a few weeks ago, in his first speech as US Treasury Secretary, Timothy Geithner accused Beijing of "manipulating" its currency. So what if the renminbi has appreciated more than 20pc against the dollar since 2005, undermining Chinese exports? Wanting to appear tough, "Tiny Tim" attacked China.

Last week's G7 Finance Minister's meeting in Rome produced far more measured tones. "We welcome China's fiscal measures and continued commitment to move to a more flexible exchange rate," purred the post-Summit communiqué.

Hillary Clinton also perfected her "China bashing" rhetoric as she bid for the White House. But now, as US Secretary of State, and on a visit to China, she insists "a positive co-operative relationship" between Beijing and Washington "is vital to peace and prosperity, not only in the Asia-Pacific region, but worldwide".

So, what's different – apart from US politicians no longer being in election mode? Well, behind the scenes, the Chinese government has started demanding guarantees for the $700bn of US Treasury bills on its books.

China has been keeping the States afloat for the best part of a decade, buying up vast quantities of T-bills to fund America's enormous budget and trade deficits. At any point, China could seriously damage the world's largest economy – by refusing to lend more money. So reliant is America on funding from Beijing that, by turning off the cash taps, China could spark an instant run on the dollar.

The Chinese haven't done that as it would harm their dollar-based holdings and they understand we live in an inter-dependent world.

But the ever-greater use of Asian savings to fund the "advanced" economies' deficits is unsustainable. And, as such, we're reaching the point where it will not be sustained. With Western governments intent on printing money and debauching their currencies, the big emerging market creditors – not only China, but Taiwan, Russia, South Korea and others – are now privately raising doubts about their future appetite for Western debt.

This demand drop-off will happen just as the West's dependence on such credit peaks. America and the UK are starting to issue sovereign paper like confetti, to fund highly-irresponsible "recovery programs".

The "rush from risk" that followed the Lehman collapse last September caused the repatriation of billions of dollars invested in emerging markets back to the "safe haven" of the West. That has so far allowed the US and UK authorities to get their larger debt issues away.

But the upcoming volumes are simply enormous. Last year, the US sold bonds to cover its $460bn deficit – around $200bn to foreigners, with China taking the lion's share. But America is on course to issue a staggering $2,000bn of debt in each of the next two years.

Over the same period, the UK will be flogging three times more gilts annually than during 2008. Right across the Western world, crisis-ridden governments will be issuing more and more debt.

Worried about falling currencies and rising inflation, the emerging markets – not least the Chinese – are demanding better returns to buy Western sovereign bonds. This is entirely justified. The debtor governments are weak, confused, and piling loans on top of loans with little sign of future growth.

But how will the Western world react when the creditor countries finally refuse to buy? How will America respond – with resignation, understanding, or aggression? That's the crucial question the world faces over the next three to five years. Just what happens when China stops buying US government debt?

This 'crank' sticks by his prediction that the single currency will not survive

The euro has just surged 2pc against the dollar, up from a three-month low. Why? Certainly not because the eurozone's economic prospects have improved.

New data shows a sharp drop in the 16-member states' PMI index – a bellwether for future growth. The single currency area is still contracting at breakneck speed, and now faces a 1.2pc fall in GDP during the first three months of this year.

So why did the euro strengthen? Because Peer Steinbrueck, Germany's finance minister, indicated the currency union's largest economy would consider bailing-out weaker members if they defaulted on their sovereign debts.

Since the euro was launched in 1999, those of us arguing it would eventually break-up have been dismissed as cranks. But now, by admitting it "will show itself capable of acting", Germany has acknowledged bail-outs may be needed, suggesting collapse is a genuine possibility. The only surprise is that it's taken so long for the politicians to face up to economic reality.

For some time now, eurozone countries with large budget and/or trade deficits have been forced to pay high interest rates when issuing sovereign debt. These problem nations – Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain – are known collectively in global debt markets by the unfortunate acronym of "PIIGS".

The gap between their average 10-year bond yield and the rate needed to sell German government debt – "the PIIGS-spread" – has just topped 200 basis points. Austria has also now joined this high-risk group – given the exposure of its banking system to the emerging markets of Eastern Europe.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel refuses to comment on whether Germany would help eurozone members in trouble. No wonder. As German exports suffer, unemployment is rising. And after years of budgetary restraint, German voters won't take kindly to paying for excesses elsewhere.

But signals coming out of the German Finance Ministry indicate a plan is anyway being hatched – for countries with better credit ratings to sell bonds and then lend the proceeds to the ailing PIIGS. In return for doing this, though, the stronger members will surely want some say over how the money is spent and when taxes will be raised to pay it back.

At that point, eurozone voters will become extremely nervous at an implicit transfer of sovereignty – and the central contradictions of monetary union will be exposed. I've predicted the demise of the single currency since long before it's launch. I'm sticking to that view.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/liamhalligan/4741093/There-will-be-slim-pickings-if-China-loses-its-appetite-for-Western-debt.html

China is right to have doubts about who will buy all America's debt

China is right to have doubts about who will buy all America's debt
Chinese doubts about the value of US Treasury bonds highlight a crucial question: who will buy the estimated $2.7 trillion (£1.9 trillion) to $4.2 trillion of debt expected to be issued over the next two years?

By Martin Hutchinson
Last Updated: 12:14PM GMT 13 Feb 2009

With annual foreign purchases accounting for less than a tenth of the low end of that range, and domestic investors unable to bridge the gap, the Chinese are right to worry.

Yu Yongding, former adviser to the People’s Bank of China, recently demanded guarantees for the value of China’s $682bn of Treasury securities. Then Luo Ping, director of the China Banking Regulatory Commission, said that China had misgivings about the US economy, but despite this it would continue to buy Treasuries. The two statements appear designed to raise the issue non-confrontationally before new chief US diplomat Hillary Clinton’s visit to Beijing on February 20.

China worries about the dollar’s value against other currencies, particularly the yuan. With US interest rates so low, the dollar’s value may slide. However, President Barack Obama has repeatedly said he wants a strong dollar, and indeed its trade-weighted value rose 13.9pc between April and December 2008.

The other area of concern for China is the value of its Treasuries. Given the US borrowing requirement and its lax monetary policy, Treasury bond yields could well rise sharply, causing a corresponding price decline. If China’s holdings match Treasuries’ average 48-month duration, then a 5pc rise in yields, from 1.72pc on the 5-year note to 6.72pc, would lose China 17.5pc of its holdings’ value, or $119bn.

Foreign buyers have absorbed a little over $200bn of Treasuries annually, a useful contribution to financing the $459bn 2008 deficit, but only a modest help towards the $1.35 trillion minimum average deficit forecast for 2009 and 2010.

Unless that changes substantially, there will be $1trillion annually to be raised by the Treasury from domestic sources, more than double the previous record from domestic and foreign sources together, plus whatever is needed to bail out the banks.

Even if the US savings rate were to rise from zero to its long-term average of 8pc of disposable personal income, that would create only an additional $830bn of savings -- not enough to fund the domestic share of the deficit. Interest rates would probably have to rise substantially to pull in more foreign investors.

Yu is right to worry.

For more agenda-setting financial insight, visit www.breakingviews.com

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/breakingviewscom/4611408/China-is-right-to-have-doubts-about-who-will-buy-all-Americas-debt.html

**Desperate times: how the Fed plans to save the world

Economic policy
Desperate times: how the Fed plans to save the world
Larry Elliott, economics editor
The Guardian, Thursday 18 December 2008

The unusual measures unveiled this week by the Federal reserve chairman, Ben Bernanke, promise to usher in an era of free money unprecedented in the history of financial markets. They include tools designed to lower long-term interest rates and boost growth in the world's biggest economy. Here we look at what the measures are, what they mean for you, and what will happen if they don't work.
Why has the Fed been forced to take such drastic steps?
After 18 months in which they have cut interest rates sharply, nationalised leading banks and provided tax rebates for consumers, US policymakers are now desperate to halt America's slide into a deep and painful recession. For historical reasons, fear of a slump runs as deep in the US as does fear of inflation in Germany, but all the conventional policy tools have so far failed. Non-farm jobs fell by more than 500,000 in November, the biggest drop since the mid-1970s, and the housing market is in freefall. Ben Bernanke is a former academic who specialised in the lessons of the Great Depression, one of which is that policymakers have to act fast and decisively to prevent a deflationary spiral setting in.
So what is the Fed proposing?
There are various forms of interest rates. Policy, or short-term, rates are set by central banks and affect the cost of money to the financial system. In the UK, the policy, or bank rate, is 2%. In the US, after Tuesday's cut, the Fed has set a target range of 0% to 0.25% - an all-time low. In normal circumstances, ultra-low policy rates make it easier for banks to lend money to their business and personal customers but these are not normal circumstances. The supply of credit has dried up as banks repair the damage to their balance sheets caused by losses on their ill-judged investments during the boom. Real borrowing rates for households and firms have fallen but not nearly so rapidly as have policy rates. The Fed's actions this week are aimed at cutting real borrowing costs.
How does it do this?
The Federal Reserve has already bought up mortgage-backed securities and the debts of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two giant state-owned mortgage finance companies. This week it said this programme would be stepped up and perhaps extended to purchases of longer-term treasury securities. Buying treasury bonds, the remedy proposed by Keynes in the 1930s and taken up by Franklin Roosevelt, is a radical step and as yet only being "evaluated" by the US central bank. But its aim is to drive down the long-term interest rates, normally set by buying and selling in the financial markets, through large-scale purchases of bonds. The interest rate - or yield - on bonds goes down as the price goes up, and buying bonds makes them more attractive by reducing the supply. Bringing down the interest rate on long-term bonds also brings down all other long-term interest rates, on fixed-rate mortgages, for example. It also gives the banks more money to lend because they exchange their bonds for money from the central bank.
So what's the drawback?
This process, known as quantitative easing, involves a huge expansion of the central bank's balance sheet so it can buy the bonds. It is not "printing money" since it no extra banknotes are churned out, but it gives the commercial banks more capital to lend on to their customers. To be effective, the central bank has to reassure financial markets that it will hold down long-term interest rates for as long as it takes to get credit markets working again. This means expanding the money supply, with the risk of re-igniting inflation once growth picks up. Bond markets are traditionally terrified by inflation and if investors start to believe that the central bank has lost control, a bond market bubble could potentially turn into a bond market bust.
What happens if it doesn't work?
In those circumstances, the next step will be wholesale use of fiscal policy. Keynes said in his General Theory that there might be cases when spirits in the private sector were so low that there would be no desire to borrow at any level of short-term or long-term interest rates. The state would then try to boost activity itself, either by public works or tax cuts. President-elect Barack Obama's plan for a fiscal boost worth 4% of GDP is an acceptance that quantitative easing might not be enough.
Anything else?
The economist Milton Friedman once said it would be theoretically possible for policymakers to end a depression by dumping wads of cash on the populace below from helicopters. This was cited by Bernanke in a paper in 2002, winning him the nickname Helicopter Ben. Other "unconventional" suggestions include providing consumers with time-limited spending vouchers that would force them to spend, or even making people pay banks for holding their money.
What does it mean for the UK?
The Bank of England and the Treasury are looking at whether quantitative easing would be possible in the UK. The upside would be that mortgage rates, overdrafts and business finance costs would fall if long-term interest rates declined. The downside would be if the markets became alarmed at the risks to inflation, turning the recent run on the pound into a full-blown sterling crisis. The pound does not have the dollar's reserve currency status so the UK is more vulnerable than the US.
Is there an alternative?
The other option is to do what the Austrian school of economists suggest: wait for the crisis to blow itself out. What is needed, they argue, is not shoring up a failed system but a period of creative destruction that will lay the foundations for stronger long-term growth. Politicians, who have elections to fight, find the do-nothing option somewhat unattractive.

Related
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American economy is in freefall
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Harold James: A new Bretton Woods hinges on negotiations between today's economic superpowers
15 Nov 2008
The G20: Who is there and how desperate are they?
16 Oct 2008
Joseph Stiglitz: Paulson tries again

http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/dec/18/federal-reserve-measures-ben-bernnake