Psychology and Investing: Confirmation Bias and Hindsight Bias

Confirmation Bias

How do we look at information?

Too often we extrapolate our own beliefs without realizing it and engage in confirmation bias, or treating information that supports what we already believe, or want to believe, more favourably.

If we have purchased a certain stock in a certain sector, we may overemphasize positive information about the sector and discount whatever negative news we hear about how these stocks are expected to perform.


Hindsight Bias

This is the tendency to re-evaluate our past behavior surrounding an event or decision knowing the actual outcome.

Our judgment of a previous decision becomes biased to accommodate the new information. 

For example, knowing the outcome of a stock's performance, we may adjust our reasoning for purchasing it in the first place. 

This type of "knowledge updating" can keep us from viewing past decisions as objectively as we should.

The 10 Mistakes Investors Most Commonly Make

All investors make mistakes. Otherwise, we'd all be millionaires. The trick is figuring out what our investing mistakes are -- and then trying to avoid them.

Meir Statman, one of the nation's leading experts in behavioral finance (the study of why people do irrational things with their money), has written a new book on the topic. In What Investors Really Want, published in October by McGraw-Hill, Statman goes a long way toward helping investors understand that many of their mistakes are caused by their own deep-seated emotions rather than, say, a company's unexpectedly poor earnings. 

In an interview with DailyFinance, Statman, a professor of finance at Santa Clara University in California, shared his top 10 errors that trip up average investors:

1. Hindsight error. "One of the most pernicious mistakes," Statman says. Because you can see the past clearly, you think you have a similar ability to tell the future. Hindsight error is common at the moment, Statman says, because many people are convinced they saw the crash coming in 2007. In reality, they may have thought a crash was possible, but they also thought the market might continue to zoom upward. Now, investors are convinced they actually saw the problem in 2007 but just didn't act on it. So, they believe wrongly that they can act correctly today. They think they know to sell at the precise moment the market is high and buy when the market is low. Based on their hindsight of 2007, portfolio diversification doesn't protect you from losses. But market timing rarely works, Statman says.

2. Unrealistic optimism. This is loosely related to overconfidence. Psychological studies have shown that when you ask people if they think they have the ability to pick stocks that will have above-average returns, men tend to say yes more often than women. "It's not because men are so smart. It's because men are unrealistically optimistic about their abilities," Statman says. This quality is great for job interviews, where you need to stand out from a crowd, but lousy for investing. "When you are unreasonably optimistic in the stock market, you are just readying yourself for an accident," he says.

3. Extrapolation errors. People expect that trends that existed in the recent past will continue in the future. For example, the fact that gold has gone up for the last 10 years has led many to believe it will always go up. But a study of a longer period -- going back to 1971 when President Richard Nixon ended the gold standard -- shows that gold hit a high of $850 an ounce in 1980 but was selling for $345 as long as 10 years later.

4. Framing errors. Often, Statman says, investing is like a game of tennis. People tend to see themselves hitting a ball against a wall, which seems easy. But that's the wrong frame. Investing is really like playing against another player -- when the other player is Warren Buffett or Goldman Sachs. Investors make framing errors when they see a CEO on TV talking up his stock. If it sounds good and you buy that stock, that's a framing error. Instead, you should be asking yourself: "Who else is watching this program, and what do I know that is uniquely mine?" "The answer is nothing," Statman says.

5. Availability errors. This refers to what information is available in your memory. Investors are often lulled into this error by investment companies. When you see an advertisement for a fund, it's almost invariably for one that has a four- or five-star rating from Morningstar. That way, the one- and two-star funds, with lackluster results, aren't available in your memory. "You say to yourself that there's a 90% chance I will be a winner," Statman says. Instead, look at results of entire fund families -- including the losers, not just the winning funds for a particular period, he says.

6. Confirmation errors. Investors tend to look for information that confirms their hypothesis, but they disregard evidence that contradicts it. Gold bugs, for example, constantly remind us that gold is a good hedge against inflation and a declining dollar. But when confronted with the evidence that gold actually fell price for an entire decade, they dismiss that as a different era because Ronald Reagan changed the rules of the investing game, and that problem won't be repeated.

7. Illusion of control. This is a sense investors have that they can make the market go up or down. It's like gamblers blowing on their dice before rolling. "These investors think they're riding the tiger, when in fact they're holding the tiger by the tail," Statman says. If you think you have a trick that can get the market to go your way, you better think twice: This is the illusion of control. "When you realize the market is actually a wild beast that can devour you, you try to put it in a cage," he says. A much safer approach.

8. Anger. This is an emotion we all know: It leads to things like road rage. In investing, you try to get even with the market. You do such things as double down or even sell all your stocks impulsively. "If you feel angry, it's better to wait 10 days before buying or selling, or you'll regret it later on," Statman says,

9. Fear. The other side of exuberance. When you're afraid, everything looks like a threat, and when you're exuberant, everything looks like an opportunity. Lots of investors are still afraid because of the market crash two years ago. They're sitting on the sidelines in cash earning no return or investing in things like Treasury bills, which aren't much of a bargain. "Risk and return go together," Statman says. "So, if you think the market is risky today, then you should also think the market has a good potential for high returns."

10. Affinity of groups. Also known as herding. You hear from your pediatrician that he's buying gold, so you think you should, too. But what do these people really know? What is the analysis based on? Statman notes that some herds are worth joining and some aren't. Many investors follow Warren Buffett's investment decisions and buy similar stocks. Since Buffett is usually a winner, perhaps that's a herd worth joining. But buying Internet stocks in 1999 or houses in 2005 based on what everyone else was doing was a horrible mistake.

Statman makes no grand conclusions in his book, but he does point out repeatedly that the average investor can rarely beat the market. Therefore, he recommends small investors put their money in index funds that provide average, if not spectacular returns -- and not catastrophic losses

"But if you like the pizazz of investing," he says, you might take a shot on individual stocks. Just be careful. 


By Charles Wallace

Posted 6:00AM 12/05/10
http://www.dailyfinance.com/2010/12/05/10-mistakes-investors-make/

Who knew? Things investors wish they saw coming

Hindsight bias: The inclination to see events that have occurred as being more predictable than they were before they took place.

That’s Wikipedia’s definition of a behavioural weakness we all have. We take credit for having seen something coming when we really didn’t (or at least our actions give no indication that we did). Investors are particularly susceptible to hindsight bias. So much so in fact, that a friend of mine suggested we start up a helpline to assist deluded portfolio managers who have convinced themselves they saw the tech wreck coming. She’s heard it too many times.

So in looking back at 2010, I’m going to focus on things that few people saw coming. I’m not talking about the obvious – the Leafs being bad or the Alouettes winning the Eastern Conference – but rather stuff that wasn’t even contemplated a year ago: LeBron James going from revered to despised, or curling emerging as a viewing highlight of the Vancouver Olympics. The stuff that prompts us to say, “Who knew?”

For instance, who knew Canada would continue to cruise along, seemingly immune to the troubles of its largest customer, the United States. And our residential and commercial real estate would be downright hot, while the market to the south was a sinkhole.

As for the U.S., who knew the government would go another year without showing any spending discipline, let alone austerity. Or that investors would continue to spend so much time listening to an institution that was discredited years ago, namely the U.S. Federal Reserve.

Who knew another year would go by without a plan to utilize one of Canada’s greatest resources – natural gas. I guess declining exports to the U.S. (they now have lots of gas, too) and environmental concerns about the oil sands weren’t enough of an incentive.

Who knew a major takeover (Potash Corp.) would get turned down after foreigners had effortlessly bought Alcan, Algoma, Anderson, ATI, Canadian Hunter, Cognos, Creo, Dofasco, Duvernay, Fairmont, Falconbridge, Four Seasons, Hudson’s Bay, Ipsco, Inco, Labatt, MacMillan Bloedel, Masonite and Newbridge, to name a few.

While most investors started the year worrying about rising interest rates, who knew bond yields would drop further (David Rosenberg, that’s who). In the face of the crises in Greece and Ireland, and a U.S. economy that was weak enough to require more quantitative easing, stock markets went up. And despite all the talk about the loonie’s strong fundamentals against the U.S. dollar, it remains where it was last January.

Who knew that after two excellent years in the markets, so many people would still hate stocks? Over the course of my career, I’ve never come across as many investors who are sitting on cash, making a huge bet again the market (and their own investment plan).

In the investment industry, who knew that Ned Goodman would sell out – to a bank, no less. Or that we’d have so many new exotic exchange-traded funds, including ones that play the spread between oil and gas, the volatility of the S&P 500 and the odds of “The Biebs” winning a Grammy.

Who knew the U.S. government would make money on its Citigroup investment, or that Government Motors (GM) would be one of the year’s hottest IPOs.

Who knew that Manulife would let another year pass without rebuilding the confidence of the investment community? Or that making women’s bums look good would be worth 55 times earnings to Lululemon shareholders.

And speaking of multiples, who knew RIM would be down 16.8 per cent on the year, and trading at well under 10 times earnings, after revenue grew by 35 per cent, earnings by 45 per cent and the company bought back $2-billion worth of stock?

The year once again demonstrated how perverse and unpredictable financial markets are, and how lucky we are to be living where we do.

Behavioural Finance

Behavioral Finance

By Albert Phung

Whether it's mental accounting, irrelevant anchoring or just following the herd, chances are we've all been guilty of at least some of the biases and irrational behavior highlighted in this tutorial. Now that you can identify some of the biases, it's time to apply that knowledge to your own investing and if need be take corrective action. Hopefully, your future financial decisions will be a bit more rational and lot more lucrative as well.

Here is a summary:

• Conventional finance is based on the theories which describe people for the most part behave logically and rationally. People started to question this point of view as there have been anomalies, which are events that conventional finance has a difficult time in explaining.
  
• Three of the biggest contributors to the field are psychologists, Drs. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, and economist, Richard Thaler.
  
• The concept of anchoring draws upon the tendency for us to attach or "anchor" our thoughts around a reference point despite the fact that it may not have any logical relevance to the decision at hand.
  
• Mental accounting refers to the tendency for people to divide their money into separate accounts based on criteria like the source and intent for the money. Furthermore, the importance of the funds in each account also varies depending upon the money's source and intent.
  
• Seeing is not necessarily believing as we also have confirmation and hindsight biases. Confirmation bias refers to how people tend to more attentive towards new information that confirms their own preconceived options about a subject. The hindsight bias represents how people believe that after the fact, the occurrence of an event was completely obvious.
  
• The gambler's fallacy refers to an incorrect interpretation of statistics where someone believes that the occurrence of a random independent event would somehow cause another random independent event less likely to happen.
  
• Herd behavior represents the preference for individuals to mimic the behaviors or actions of a larger sized group.
  
• Overconfidence represents the tendency for an investor to overestimate his or her ability in performing some action/task.
  
• Overreaction occurs when one reacts to a piece of news in a way that is greater than actual impact of the news.
  
• Prospect theory refers to an idea created by Drs. Kahneman and Tversky that essentially determined that people do not encode equal levels of joy and pain to the same effect. The average individuals tend to be more loss sensitive (in the sense that a he/she will feel more pain in receiving a loss compared to the amount of joy felt from receiving an equal amount of gain).
  

Table of Contents
1) Behavioral Finance: Introduction
2) Behavioral Finance: Background
3) Behavioral Finance: Anomalies
4) Behavioral Finance: Key Concepts - Anchoring
5) Behavioral Finance: Key Concepts - Mental Accounting
6) Behavioral Finance: Key Concepts - Confirmation and Hindsight Bias
7) Behavioral Finance: Key Concepts - Gambler's Fallacy
8) Behavioral Finance: Key Concepts - Herd Behavior
9) Behavioral Finance: Key Concepts - Overconfidence
10) Behavioral Finance: Key Concepts - Overreaction and Availability Bias
11) Behavioral Finance: Key Concepts - Prospect Theory
12) Behavioral Finance: Conclusion