How to identify potentially threatening asset price bubbles?

In a globalized world, with few barriers to capital flows, investors around the world can bid up prices for stocks, bonds and real estate in local markets from New York to Shanghai.  

Central banks have fueled these purchases with record low interest rates and by entering the bond market as major buyers themselves  

Largely as a result, global financial assets (including only stocks and bonds) are worth $280 trillion and amount to about 330% of global GDP, up from $12 trillion and just 110% in 1980.

Traditionally, economists have looked for trouble in the economy to cause trouble in the markets.  

They see no cause for concern when loose financial policy is inflating prices in the markets, as long as consumer prices remain quiet.  

Even conservatives who worry about easy money "blowing bubbles" still look mainly for economic threats to the financial markets, rather than the threat that overgrown markets pose to the economy.   

But financial markets are now so large, that the tail wags the dog.

A market downturn can easily trigger the next big economic downturn.

Summary:

The general rule is that strong growth is most likely to continue if consumer prices are rising slowly, or even if they are falling as the result of good deflation, driven by strengthening supply network.

In today's globalized economy, in which cross-border competition tends to suppress prices for consumer goods but drive them up for financial assets, watching consumer prices is not enough.  

Increasingly, recessions follow instability in the financial market.  

To understand how inflation is likely to impact economic growth,  keep an eye on stock and house prices too.

Housing bubbles and Stock bubbles fueled by borrowings

Be alert when prices are rising at a pace faster than underlying economic growth for an extended period, particularly for housing.  

• Home prices typically rise by about 5% a year.  
• This pace speeds up to between 10% and 12% in the two years before a period of financial distress.
• Once prices for stocks or housing rise sharply above their long-term trend, a subsequent drop in prices of 15% or more signals that the economy is due to face significant pain.  

In general, housing bubbles were much less common than stock bubbles but were much more likely to be followed by a recession.  The downturn is much more severe if borrowing fuels the bubble.  

• When a recession follows a bubble that is not fueled by debt, 5 years later the economy will be 1% to 1.5% smaller than it would have been if the bubble had never occurred.
• If the investors borrow heavily to buy stock, the economy 5 years later will be 4% smaller.
• If they borrow to purchase housing, the economy will be as much as 9% smaller.

Growing threat of Asset bubbles

Globalization

Rising global competition and the emergence of independent central banks have helped countries contain consumer prices.  But globalization is pushing asset prices in the opposite direction.

In a world with few barriers to the flow of capital, foreigners are often the main buyers of stocks, bonds and real estate in markets from New York to Seoul, making prices for these assets less stable, and an increasingly telling signal of a coming economic crash.

Debt-fueled property booms and recessions

Many postwar economic "miracles," ranging from Italy and Japan in the 1950s to Latin America and Southeast Asia later, first took off because of strong fundamentals (like strong investment and low inflation) but were sustained by rapidly rising debts and ended with a bursting property bubble.

In recent decades, recessions have been more likely to originate in debt-fueled property booms, for the simple reason that there has been an explosion in mortgage finance.  Since the boom in modern finance began in the late nineteenth century, mortgage lending has grown much faster than other lending to households and private companies, which helps explain why economic booms and busts "seem to be increasingly shaped by the dynamics of mortgage credit."

The growing threat posed by asset bubbles

Before World War II, there were 78 recessions - including only 19 that followed a bubble in stocks or housing.  

After the war, there were 88 recessions, the vast majority of which, 62, followed a stock or housing bubble.

For the last 3 decades, every major economic shock has been preceded by a bubble in housing, stocks or both, including 

• Japan's meltdown in 1990, 
• the Asian financial crisis of 1997 - 1998, 
• the dot-com crash of 2000-2001, and, of course, 
• the global financial crisis of 2008.  

Asset price crashes can trigger bad consumer price deflation

Often, a crash in prices of houses or stocks will depress the economy, by making people feel suddenly less wealthy.  Thus shaken, they spend less, resulting in lower demand and a fall in consumer prices.  In other words, asset price crashes can trigger bouts of bad consumer price deflation.  

• This is what happened in Japan, where the real estate and stock crash of 1990 led to the long fall in both asset and consumer prices. 
• It also happened in the US, where the stock crash of 1929 was followed by consumer price deflation in the early years of the Great Depression.

The 4 basic signs of a stock bubble

 There are four basic signs of a stock bubble:

1.  high levels of borrowing for stock purchases;

2.  prices rising at a pace that can't be justified by the underlying rate of economic growth;

3.  overtrading by retail investors; and

4.  exorbitant valuation.

In 2015, the Shanghai market had reached the extreme end of all four bubble metrics which is rare.  

The amount that Chinese investors borrowed to buy stock had set a world record, equal to 9% of the total value of tradable stocks.

Stock prices were up 70% in just 6 months, despite slowing growth in the economy.

On some days, more stock was changing hands in China than in all other stock markets combined.

In April 2015, the state-run People's Daily crowed that the good times were "just beginning."

In June 2015 the Shanghai market started to crash, and it continued to crash despite government orders to investors not to sell.

Stock Market Bubble Threat

Stock Market Bubble Threat

By Jomo Kwame Sundaram



KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia, Mar 11 2020 (IPS) -


The US is currently still in a stock market bubble which, if history is any guide, is likely to end, as argued by Thomas Palley. While President Trump would, of course, like to sustain it to strengthen his November re-election prospects, the Covid19 black swan is already showing signs of pricking the bubble

Meanwhile, US business investment has declined for many years. As shares of GDP, corporate profits or even market capitalization, such investment has been in decline for at least four decades. Clearly, ‘neo-liberal’ economic policies have failed to decades-long trend.


Financialization ‘unreal’

Julius Krein has underscored some dangerous financialization trends. Global stocks are now worth almost US$90 trillion, more than world output. Including equities, bank deposits, (government plus private) debt securities, etc., the total value of financial assets rose from US$118 trillion in 2004 to over US$200 trillion in 2010, more than double world output then.

Half of Americans own no stocks, while just ten per cent own over 80 per cent of equities, and the top one per cent has almost 40 per cent. With no increase in real investments, more funds in financial markets have served to worsen wealth inequality.

‘Capital returns’ in 1980, in the form of share buybacks and dividends, were about two per cent of US GDP, when real investment was close to 15 per cent. By 2016, real investment had fallen to around 12 per cent of output, while capital returns had risen to about 6 per cent.

Ironically, in an age of ostensible globalization, rising capital returns has become increasingly national in some economies, rather than involving cross-border capital flows, which fell from US$12.4 trillion in 2007 to US$4.3 trillion, i.e., by 65%.

The rise of finance, at the expense of the real economy, over the last four decades has slowed productive investments and economic growth, ending the post-war Keynesian Golden Age quarter century. Meanwhile, as profit rates declined, debt has increased.



Inflating stock market bubbles

Since the 1980s, as Palley has shown, ‘engineered’ US stock market bubbles have obscured lessons from preceding busts, explaining them away as Schumpeterian creative destruction. While each new bubble may retrieve some of the preceding loss, it never fully restores earlier economic gains.

Investors buy stock, expecting to sell at higher prices. Such purchases push up share prices, drawing new investors into the price appreciation spiral. The share price bubble continues to inflate until faith in ever rising prices ends, with the bubble imploding when enough buyers start selling.

Each new stock market bubble seduces share market punters to invest ever more, to gain even more, while obscuring public understanding of the economic malaise. And when prices fall, many shareowners hold on to their stocks, hoping for prices to recover, to make more, or at least, to cut losses.

Thus, stock market dynamics resemble Ponzi frauds, with earlier investors profiting from new investments. Handsome gains draw in more investments until even these are insufficient to meet rising expectations. Changes in market sentiments can slow the bubble’s growth, or cause reversals, even collapse.

Along the way, all investors feel richer, triggering wealth effects and market exuberance, typically irrational. When downturns occur, many are too embarrassed to admit to losses, especially if they have induced others, relatives and friends, to invest.

Thus, the dynamics of stock market speculative bubbles are akin to a collectively self-inflicted fraud as most retail investors lack the ‘inside’ information needed to make sound portfolio investment judgements.



Promoting stock market addiction

The US Federal Reserve’s apparent commitment to the stock market since Alan Greenspan was in the chair, and its growing, albeit varying influences on financial asset prices has been seen as giving the green light to speculation, enabling serial asset price bubbles over at least three decades.

Despite its balanced official mandate, unsurprisingly, US Fed leadership is widely believed to favour Wall Street, while mainstream economists view asset price inflation as the unavoidable price of overcoming recession, sustaining economic growth and the bubble’s wealth effect.

Unlike the Roosevelt era, when economic policy and war achieved full employment and improved labour conditions, decision-making in recent decades has been seen as better serving capital, with the bias justified by insisting that the interests of capital and labour are ‘joined at the hip’.

With 401K (a US employer sponsored retirement savings plan allowing employees to invest a portion of their salaries before taxes) and other investments in the stock market, widespread ‘middle class’ addiction to stock price inflation has also been economically and politically self-deluding.

But despite the sustained US stock market bubble after the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, the US ‘middle class’ continues to be economically squeezed, with relatively few having benefited significantly.

This stock market addiction is rooted in an illusion promoted by Wall Street, their enablers in the public authorities, and their cheerleaders among mainstream economists and the business media who identify the notion of shared prosperity with stock market indices.

But the history and dynamics of stock market bubbles imply that they simply cannot be the basis for shared prosperity, as suggested by all too many emerging markets’ governments. Sadly, wishful thinking to the contrary perpetuates the mass delusion promoted and perpetuated by those who stand to gain most.

Stock market bubbles serve to obscure the dangers of neoliberal financialization for the economy. Demystification of obfuscating narratives can not only improve public understanding of the problems, dangers and challenges involved, but also inform the reforms needed to address them.


http://www.ipsnews.net/2020/03/corrected-version-stock-market-bubble-threat/?utm_source=English+-+IPS+Weekly&utm_campaign=632464bdfe-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2020_03_15_04_37&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_eab01a56ae-632464bdfe-5479385&fbclid=IwAR3nWVA4e7I-IeHH88Vu2BjDk1zKs054pSBUVX108-1Ly9GukR0rBDEV79w

Definition of a Stock Bubble

Definition of a stock bubble


A bubble occurs in a stock when:

1.  Implausible assumptions are applied to justify its present price using normal valuation (e.g.  DCF) models.

2.  There are people buying at these prices ignoring these implausible assumptions.


Based on this defintition, Tesla is a bubble while Apple and Microsoft are not at current prices.  

Speculators, Investors and Market Fluctuations

Speculators versus Investors

Mark Twain mentioned the two times in life when one shouldn't speculate: "when you can't afford it, and when you can!". 

Speculators buy in the hopes or assumptions that others will want to buy the same asset (be it a painting, a baseball card, or a stock) later.

Investors buy the cash flow the investment returns to its owner. (As such, a painting can never be an investment by this definition!)

Stock Market Bubbles

Bubbles in the stock market form due to faulty logic that first propels speculators to bid up prices followed by the inevitable bursting which destroys the wealth of many.

What determines whether an investor will make money in the market or not?  

The answer is his psychological make-up. 

If he does his own stock analysis and views the prices offered by Mr. Market as an opportunity to buy low and sell high, he will do fine. 

If Mr. Market's offering prices guide the investor's outlook of what the stock price should be, he should get someone else to manage his money!

Market fluctuations

Most market fluctuations are the result of day-to-day distortions between supply and demand of particular stocks, not of changes in fundamentals.

Investors who take advantage of these distortions by focusing on the fundamentals will be successful. 

Those who invest with their emotions are sure to fail in the long-run.

Read also:

• 
  
• Your investments using Mutual Funds or Money Managers
• Trading and portfolio management from a value investing point of view
• Value Investor's Opportunities in Distressed Securities
• Value Investing Opportunities in the Banking Sector
• Look at FUNDAMENTALS and POTENTIAL CATALYSTS when making investment decisions
• Where to look for Investment Opportunities
• Business value cannot be precisely determined. Make use of ranges of values
• Central elements to a Value Investing Philosophy
• The Philosophy of Value Investing and Why It Works
• Philosophy of value investing. Need to have clear strategies too
• How Wall Streets can create investment fads? The Junk Bond Market of mid-1980s
• Understanding these changes in the investment world allows investors to earn superior returns
• What's good for Wall Street is not necessarily good for investors
• Speculators, Investors and Market Fluctuations

Effects of a stock market bubble on the markets and on the broader economy.

Effects of a bubble on the markets are obvious.

1.  On the way up, investors become too confident about their anticipated returns.

2.  Money floods in - part of the definition of a bubble - and prices rise to even more unrealistic levels.

3.  At some point, air starts to come out of the bubble.

4.  Share prices drop and some investors, including pension plans and other institutional holders, lose a lot of money.

5.  Many equity investors feel burned and move out of the stock market for good, and it takes years for new ones to take their place.

6.  The consequence of a bubble for markets, then, is to reward winners and punish losers with a savage intensity.  


The influence of a bubble market on the broader economy maybe even more long lasting and more perverse.  Here are some of the more important consequences of the technology bubble of 2000 in the U.S.:

1.  Excessive investment in telecommunications and related industries, thanks to the funds available from stock offerings and borrowings that the bubble market made possible.

2.  Expansion to the point of collapse, or near-collapse, by companies that were profitable but used the high price of their shares to make foolish acquisitions or increase capacity beyond what a sensible view of the future would have allowed.

3.  Incompetent, dishonest, and fraudulent behaviour by corporate executives, boards of directors, auditors, investment bankers, security analysts, and other market participants.


Conclusion:

Competitive market economies have always been subject to business cycles.

Like all cycles, they are painful on the way down.

A wider acceptance of the principles of value investing may ease some of that pain the next time the mania sets in.

Extraordinary Popular Delusions And The Madness Of Markets

The twin bubbles of today: Government bonds (which are set to burst) and gold (which is getting ready to enter the mania phase).

Market Mania Montage - A New Mania coming to Market near You SOON

Market Behaviour: Irrational Exuberance

When a bull run goes on for too long, it can morph into irrational exuberance.  People tend to think that the market has changed and that stock will continue to go up forever.  In reality, it won't - instead, a stock market bubble is gradually inflating.

Unfortunately, most people get caught in the hype and continue to buy while the bubble continues to inflate.  Then that bubble bursts without warning, sending shares of stock down 50 percent and more.  Asset bubbles have formed repeatedly over time, but most people can't recognize a bubble until after it bursts.

The most recent stock bubble was the Internet stock bubble, which inflated in the 1990s and burst in the early 2000s.  Many people who got caught up in Internet stocks lost 50% to 70% on their portfolio - and some lost as much as 90%.

Value investors such as Warren Buffett didn't play in that market.  Value investors will not buy a stock that doesn't have a proven cash flow.  Internet stocks were losing money every year.  Most hadn't even figured out how they would make a profit.  Yet analysts recommended them based on future earnings projections.

If you can't figure how a company will generate its cash flow, walk away from it.  Don't ever get caught up in promises of future earnings that have not yet materialized.

Related topics:

Market Behaviour: The Least You Need to Know
Market Behaviour: Crowd Impacts on Stock Prices

Market Behaviour: Can You Beat the Market?
Market Behaviour: Bull Runs
Market Behaviour: Bear Stalls
Market Behaviour: Pendulum Swings (Volatility)
Market Behaviour: Irrational Exuberance
Market Behaviour: Unjustifiable Pessimism
Market Behaviour: Control Yourself (Patience)

My Investment Experience: My portfolio depreciated from RM3,000,000 to a mere RM50,000

My Investment Experience
by Gan Hong Leong


“Investment is most intelligent when it is most businesslike.” Benjamin Graham, widely known as the father of value investing, taught Warren Buffet this philosophy. Based on this wisdom, Warren Buffet invested in the stock market. Today he is the second richest man in the world. Learn from him, learn from his success, and you too can become rich.

The stock market was virtually a virgin jungle to me when I bought my first share. That was in 1960, and I was 21. At that time, I was as naïve and ignorant as a schoolboy regarding stocks and shares. So long as the price was low I would call it cheap. Undervalued stocks, fairly-priced stocks, or overvalued stocks are all the same to me. The chaff and the grains have no difference.

However, I was lucky to insist that the stocks which I bought must give good dividend yield. Buying shares o a cum-dividend basis was my preference. I would sell whenever I had a good capital gain of more than 50%. I continued to invest in that manner which turned out to be profitable. Little did I realised, I was actually buying fundamentally sound stocks at fairly low prices. My investment strategy was businesslike.

In April 1993, the Malaysian stock market had a super bull run. From a low of 645 points, the KLSE Composite Index hit its all time high of 1332. Speculation was rampant. Price rise was spectacular. The market was a hive of activities. To get a seat to watch the market in the broker firm, you need to cue up as early as 7:30 a.m.! In every corner of the town, people were talking about the market. There were no losers. Everyone was a winner. I sold at the later stage of the bull market and made a windfall. By February, 1997 the value of my portfolio appreciated to RM3,000,000 from RM48,000 about 20 years ago. However, I was still none the wiser about the stock market.

The years 1997 and 1998 were traumatic. The KLSE Composite Index was at 1279 in February, 1997. I bought the shares of an investment holding company listed on the main board and the share price was around RM15 per share in early 1997. By August 1997, it had declined to RM7.70 per share.

After I bought some at that price, the price kept on declining. Against the principle of wise investing, I started averaging down whenever there was a small decline. By November 1997, it had declined to RM1.83. I thought it would stop there. Alas! It was not to be. The price continued to decline. By August 1998, it reached a low of 40.5 sen per share.

Meanwhile, my portfolio depreciated from RM3,000,000 to a mere RM50,000. Suddenly, I realised that buying in a downtrend and holding on to a falling stock was extreme stupidity. “Never catch a falling dagger!” became my favourite phrase.

After the introduction of capital control in Malaysia in September 1998, the country slowly nursed back to health. By then, I had become smarter, having learned fundamental and technical analysis. My investment was starting to become intelligent and more businesslike.

In April 2001, I started to accumulate some stocks based on fundamentals. I chose company that had excellent management and great potential for growth. If it pays good dividends and the company was undervalued, I held on to the shares. By September 2003, the stocks that I had bought had appreciated and together with the dividends received, I got another windfall.

Words of Advice
For all stock market investors and speculators out there, here is my advice:
Value for money you must insist.
Buying in a downtrend you must resist.
The trend is your friend.
Follow it to the very end.
Holding on to a falling stock is unwise.
Cut your loses quickly is advised.
Never kill the golden goose when you have one.
Never sell prematurely, let it run for once.
Undervalued unpopular stock is never a fancy.
Glamour stock is the choice normally.
Join the crowd; enjoy the ride, if you wish.
Be careful though, lest you fall out and vanish.
The market is most tempting at the top.
Lock in your profit before volume has a good drop.
Sell your stocks when you love them most.
Take your money & let the deal be closed.
Buy when volume traded is at its lowest.
The market will then be at its dullest.
Investors should buy low and sell high.
Traders should buy high and sell higher.
Some day you will know what I mean.
By then, you are a stock market dean.


Success in any field requires your labour. The stock market is no exception. To be successful, ensure that you have the knowledge and wisdom to plan your strategies, the discipline to carry out your plans, the patience to wait, the perseverance and temperament to endure, the capital to implement, and above all, the will to win. Incidentally, these are traits of a successful businessman; hence, the usefulness of Graham’s advice.

Investment in knowledge pays the best dividends. I share this philosophy.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are strictly those of the author.

Securities Industry Development Corporation (SIDC) organised an essay writing competition titled My Investment Experience with the objective of getting investors to share their investment experience, good or bad. We present you, the winning essay by Gan Hong Leong from Bentong, Pahang.

http://www.min.com.my/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=63

Will emerging markets be 2011’s great bubble?

INVESTING
Will emerging markets be 2011’s great bubble?

SUJATA RAO
LONDON— Reuters
Published Friday, Dec. 17, 2010 10:01AM EST
Last updated Wednesday, Dec. 22, 2010 5:50PM EST


Emerging markets, the consensus trade for 2011, look set for further heavy inflows of investment dollars, raising questions over how much more new money they can comfortably absorb without igniting an asset bubble.

Most fund managers at a recent Reuters summit picked emerging markets as a top bet for next year, citing double-digit returns, underpinned by rising incomes and fast economic growth.

Equity portfolio flows to emerging markets are set to reach $186-billion (U.S.) this year, and, while they are seen falling a touch to $143-billion next year, according to the Institute for International Finance (IIF), they will still be more than double the $62-billion annual average seen between 2005 and 2009.

Yet, some are starting to ask if investors are getting carried away. Not only do unbridled portfolio flows risk inflating sector valuations into bubble territory, but the flows may be based on unrealistic expectations of long-term returns.

“The bigger bubble risk is the investor expectation of EM, there’s such euphoria,” said Mark Donovan, chief executive officer of Robeco, which manages €146-billion ($194.3-billion). “I’m always wary of these herd moves into certain asset classes, generally they are not well-timed.”

SWEET SPOT HIDES BITTER TRUTH

Mr. Donovan does not question the underlying emerging markets growth story. But he and some others believe new investors may be ignoring potential problems, within and outside the sector.

Emerging markets have been in a sweet spot this past year or two as liquidity unleashed by Western central banks has pumped up the market, fuelling double-digit returns.

A Reuters poll forecasts emerging returns will far outstrip U.S. and UK equity gains in 2011. Excess liquidity, however, is fuelling inflation in developing economies, potentially leading to overheating. Higher U.S. Treasury yields could also become a headwind.

“My central scenario is that in 2011 emerging markets will be okay. Given where valuations are you will still get a positive absolute return,” said John-Paul Smith, chief emerging markets strategist at Deutsche Bank in London.

“But some of the outsize returns forecasts are probably way too high ... I’m concerned that if people become too optimistic we could see a bubble-type situation developing. When the bubble bursts, it has horrible repercussions for the real economy.”

EMERGING MARKETS ARE ... STILL EMERGING

One worry, Mr. Smith says, is that the inflows risk encouraging emerging policymakers’ hubris, removing the pressure for reform.

Some doomsayers note big capital inflow peaks often precede crises. This may be especially true of emerging markets which remains a relatively small, illiquid asset class: the market capitalization of the 37-country MSCI emerging index, is less than a third of the U.S. S&P 500.

That means a large-scale cash influx can quickly inflate asset prices to unsustainable levels, risking a repeat of the familiar boom-bust emerging market cycles.

RBC estimates that a 1 per cent re-allocation of global equity and debt holdings will send $500-billion into emerging markets – more than 10 per cent of the MSCI emerging market cap.

NOT YET A BUBBLE

At present, emerging valuations are not in bubble territory – they trade at a discount to developed markets at around 11.5 times forward earnings.

Valuations are still below 2007 peaks and well off levels during the dot-com bubble in the late 1990s when some stocks were trading at 60-80 times forward earnings. And the volume of securities available for investment is growing.

The MSCI EM’s market capitalisation has grown by around 10 per cent a year in the past decade and emerging markets’ share of the world index has tripled to 14 per cent. The emerging debt universe too has doubled to around $6-trillion over the past five years, JPMorgan says.

Still, with investors piling in, too much cash could in coming years end up chasing too little market cap.

Global equity fund allocations to emerging markets now stand at 16 per cent of assets under management – in dollar terms that is $1.5-trillion, Barclays Capital said, noting bond allocations are at 7.2 per cent. Both are close to pre-crisis highs.

“(Positioning) has reached levels at which investors rightly question the sustainability of the EM flows story going into 2011,” Barclays analysts said in a note.

SIGNS OF NERVOUSNESS

There are signs of wariness. Many investors say that instead of increasing outright EM longs, they prefer multinationals such as Unilever that have exposure to emerging markets.

Another tactic has been to hedge EM exposure via Australian bonds, which are seen making big gains in case of a hard landing in China – a scenario feared by many.

Michael Power, global strategist at Investec Asset Management, says 2011 may well shape up to be the year in which investors learn not to be unequivocally bullish on the sector.

“People are looking at EM as a cake and saying ‘I want a slice,’ without looking at the ingredients of that cake. So some countries that are not born equal are being swept along in the trade along with the deserving ones,” he said.

“When bubbles burst, there is a fallout and the deserving emerging markets will be considered guilty by association.”

Jeremy Grantham Interview

Airtime: Thurs. Nov. 11 2010
In an extended interview, Jeremy Grantham, chairman of Grantham Mayo Van Otterloo (GMO), talks to Maria Bartiromo about the markets, the economy, and his investment strategy.

http://www.gmo.com/America/

Bubble

Sorry to burst your bubble, your investment is overpriced

Annette Sampson
October 9, 2010

They're frothy and insubstantial. Mere lightweights in the world of solid matter. But bubbles can prove mighty dangerous phenomena, especially in the world of investments.

Investment bubbles have been brought back into focus by the mere uttering of the word by the Reserve Bank head of financial stability, Luci Ellis, in relation to the residential property market at a conference in Brisbane this week.

Let's be quite clear. Despite continuing speculation that Australian house prices are in bubble territory this was not what Ellis was claiming. Rather, Ellis said the market was showing ''welcome signs'' of cooling. But low yields on residential property, she said, limited the potential for price appreciation.

Advertisement: Story continues below ''Buying an asset because you expect the price to rise in the future, well, that is actually the academic definition of a bubble,'' were the attention-grabbing words. ''So that would be undesirable and seen as a problem.''

Never mind that future capital gains have long been the prime motivation for Australian residential property investors. Ellis said recent rises in rental yields and a levelling off in prices were a good thing, but this has not dampened the speculation over whether Australia, like the US and so many other countries, is in danger of a housing bubble burst.

The International Monetary Fund also bought into the housing bubble debate this week cautioning that our house prices may be overvalued and a correction could hit household wealth and consumer confidence.

The arguments on the Australian housing market have been well-documented. Those holding the bubble view point to historically high levels of debt by households, high house prices in relation to incomes, and low rental yields as being unsustainable. The property bulls point to continuing undersupply of housing and strong immigration as putting a floor under house values.

Both have a point. But in the post global financial crisis environment where debt still has the potential to derail the economic recovery, it would certainly be prudent to err on the side of caution.

However the argument raises the broader issue of how investors can shield themselves from the inevitable crashes that follow investment bubbles, while enjoying some of the profits while markets are rising.

As the chief economist of AMP Capital Investors, Shane Oliver, points out, investment asset bubbles are an inevitable outcome of human nature. Investors have a natural inclination to jump onto popular fads by buying into investments that have been star performers - a trend that pushes prices up further and further until they become overpriced and unsustainable.

While you would think investors would be once bitten, twice shy, history also shows that bubbles emerge regularly, often arising from the ashes of the most recent crash. While it's easy to get caught up in bubbles, the fact that we've had so many of them also provides investors with the tools to identify when and where bubbles are emerging. There are always those who will claim each bubble is different, but the reality is that they all follow similar patterns. The signs are there for those prepared to look for them.

Dr Oliver identifies a combination of conditions that tend to lead to bubbles.

• Chief among these is a supply of easy money, though the bubble generally does not start to form until something happens that generates popular interest in the investment, it becomes overvalued, and speculators jump in fearing that if they don't buy now they'll miss out on the next chance to make some fast profits.
• Other commentators have pointed out that bubbles are also characterised by overconfidence. Even when it is obvious that prices are overvalued, pundits come up with arguments to justify why ''this is different'' or why the old rules don't apply to this investment. A classic example was the tech boom of the late 1990s when any company claiming a vague connection to information technology could command a heady price on the sharemarket regardless of its earnings. Indeed, even if it had no earnings.
• Another common feature of bubbles is that they are generally fostered by government policy that encourages speculation to grow.

Oliver says the liquidity that has been generated by governments in response to the global financial crisis and the bursting of the bubble in US house prices has created fertile conditions for the next bubble. Easy money is providing the fuel for investors to jump into something seen as safe, offering a good return, and removed from the assets that caused the last set of problems.

His pick of prime bubble candidates are shares in emerging markets, gold and commodity prices, and resource shares.

However for a bubble to exist, speculation and overvaluation must also be present - and while there is definitely speculation in these markets, and prices have risen strongly, Oliver argues they have not yet reached bubble levels.

His verdict is that we are in the ''foothills'' of the next bubble, which more than likely has several years to run.

It is also important to note that while the most memorable bubbles are those that come to a spectacular end, not all investment bubbles lead to a sudden collapse in prices. Bubbles can end with a bang, or they can simply run out of steam, providing investors with a long period of underperformance rather than overnight losses. Historically this has been the more common trend for less volatile (and less liquid) assets such as direct property investments.

In that respect, a cooling in Australian house prices should indeed be welcomed.


http://www.smh.com.au/business/sorry-to-burst-your-bubble-your-investment-is-overpriced-20101008-16bz5.html

Stocks that don't fare well in a post-crash environment

Stocks that tend to be sub-par performers in a post-crash environment are:

1. OTC issues
2. Low-priced stocks
3. Small total-capitalization issues
4. Thinly-traded, under- or non-covered stocks
5. Industry laggards
6. Recession-sensitive by industry
7. Discredited groups
8. Panic-trigger related groups

Because of fear, nervousness and lack of speculative appetite after a crash or panic, the first five groups (some of which overlap) lack sponsorship.  

In addition, because market panics generate immediate scare headlines in the media, there is talk of recession and parallels drawn with 1929.  So recession-sensitive stocks by industry do not bounce back much for a period of time.

There may, in fact, be no recession following the market's downmove (as in 1988), but perception and expectation drive prices near-term more than facts do.  So cyclicals like steels, chemicals, paper and capital-good producers are not solid choices for participating in the bounce.  Similarly, vacation and luxury stocks fare poorly.

The discredited groups vary from one market period to another.  Their identity depends on what was in the headlines in recent months.

• Basic industry stocks were taboo in the early 1980s, known as the 'rust-belt' period.  
• High-tech stocks suffered through a private, one-industry recession in the mid-1980s.  
• Banks were whipping boys in the early era of bad third-world loans.  
• Most recently, savings and loans have been in the doghouse due to bailout legislation and highly visible failures and scandals.

Again in a longer-term perspective, the facts may prove that the fear about leading companies in discredited groups was unfounded.  But in the short term after a crash there are few who have the courage to sponsor tarnished-image stocks with either money or written advice.  Such issues are early recovery laggards.

The final category should be off the hold list for similar reasons.  Sometimes there is an industry or category of stocks related to the news that triggers the panic selling.  

• In 1962, it was steel stocks sensitive to pricing confrontation with the Kennedy administration.  
• Brokerage stocks would have been poor choices to hold after the 1987 crash because of all the controversy surrounding program trading.  
• The 1989 crash was triggered by the collapse of the propose buyout of UAL, Inc., so airlines and other proposed leveraged buyout candidates were identifiable as the trigger-related group at that time.

The Fundamental Mechanics Of Investing

The Fundamental Mechanics Of Investing
by Andrew Beattie (Contact Author | Biography)

In this article, we tell a simple story that demonstrates why stocks and bonds are created.

A Business Is Created
Jack is a farmer, and he is interested in starting up an apple stand for the tourists who pass his place. Since Jack has fairly good credit, he got a business loan to cover the costs of set up, and he now has the ideal land for apple growing. Unfortunately Jack only set aside enough money for getting his land in shape. He forgot all about buying seeds. By a stroke of luck, Jack finds a store that will sell him a magic high-growth, high-yield seed for $100, but Jack only has $50 left.

The Initial Public Offering to Raise Capital for Growth
Our clever farmer goes to five of his closest friends (you're included) and asks if they'll each give him $10 to help his business. However, Jack doesn't know if he can take it in the form of a loan because he may not be able to pay it back if the seed doesn't turn a profit. No worries: Jack promises everyone they'll receive a percentage of the tree's apples that is equal to the percentage they gave. In other words, Jack has given his friends a share in his tree. They agree and the seed is in the ground before you can sing "Johnny Appleseed".

The Distinction Between Being a Partner and Being a Shareholder
This tree, being magic and all, grows rapidly. In the first month, it is five feet tall and there are two apples. Jack keeps one apple because he owns 50% of the business's product, which he paid for with the $50 dollars he put in for the seed. He cuts the other one into five pieces, each of which goes to each of his investors, who can sell or eat it. The investors have a quick meeting and decide they'd rather have Jack sell their portion of the product and give them a percentage of the profit. So Jack makes up little papers saying, "Jack's Apple Company: you have one share guaranteeing you 10% (10/100) of the profits."

Trading Occurs in Jack's Undervalued Stock
So this tree really takes off now - the magic is coursing through the wood and it grows to 10 feet tall! There are 20 apples and Jack sells them all for $10 a piece, keeping $100 for himself and giving his friends $20 each. Jack uses his $100 to buy another seed and plants it. Pretty soon, Jack has two trees producing 40 apples and earning $400 a month.

Some of his neighbors want in on the deal Jack gave his friends, and Tim, Jack's first investor, is interested in selling his 10% of Jack's Apple Company. Judy, Jack's neighbor, wants to buy it and she offers Tim the $10 that he originally paid. However, Tim is not stupid: he realizes that this share is producing $40 a month and Jack is about to buy another seed. So Tim asks for $40 dollars and Judy snaps up the share, which pays for itself immediately.

A Bit of a Bubble Forms
The other original shareholders see how much Tim got and want to sell too, and the other neighbors notice how quickly Judy's investment paid off so they really want to buy in. The offers steadily climb until Jack's shares are being bought for over $100 a piece - more than Jack's trees are producing in a month. Only one original shareholder, Betty, is still in there and holding out on offers like $120 because she is still getting a regular payment that is pure profit for her. Suddenly, Jack's trees (four in total) are ravaged by aphids. The entire month's production is ruined and several shareholders are wondering if they can pay rent since they used their savings to buy shares.

The Bubble Bursts
The shareholders that need the money sell to Betty at a discount ($40), and then the other shareholders notice, all of a sudden, that their $100 shares are worth $40. This is very disconcerting. The remaining shareholders offer their shares to Betty, but she says she's quite content with three shares. The other shareholders are desperate now, so when the town sheriff offers them $20 a piece for the shares, they take their losses and get out.

Meanwhile, the main drive of Jack's business hasn't changed: people still want apples. Jack needs to get rid of these pesky aphids and he needs the money to buy insecticide.

Jack Issues a Bond
Jack's not too keen on issuing more stock after the fiasco with his neighbors, so he decides to go for a loan instead. Unfortunately, Jack used up his credit with the land preparation so he is once again looking for divine inspiration. He's looking at his equipment to see what he can sell and what he can't, and then it hits him: he'll try to sell his apple crates without actually selling them. The crates are useless without aphid-free product to fill them, but as soon as the aphids are gone he'll need them back.

So Jack calls up Judy (in hopes of making amends) and offers her a deal, "Judy, my good friend, I have an offer for you. I'll sell you my apple crates, which are worth $100 total, for a mere $60 and then buy them back next week for the full $100." Judy thinks about this and sees that in the worst case scenario, she can just sell the crates… sounds good. And a deal is made.

"But Judy," Jack adds, "I don't want to run my crates down there and pick them up again. Can I just write up a piece of paper? It'll save my back."

"I don't know - can we call it a promissory note?" Judy asks enthusiastically.

"Sure can, but I was thinking more of calling it a bond or a certificate," says Jack.

And lo and behold, Jack eliminates the aphids, pays Judy back, and turns a healthy profit that month and every month thereafter.

What Did We Learn?
This story will not explain everything about investing in stocks, but it does highlight one very important point: the price of Jack's stock followed investors' opinion of the stock's value rather than just the performance of Jack's company. Because the stock market is an auction, there is no set price for a certain stock, there is a concept that derails most people's trains of thought: the price paid for a stock is what it's "worth" until a lower or higher price is offered.

This fluctuation of worth is good and bad for investors because it allows for profit (when you buy an undervalued stock) but also makes losses possible (when you pay too much for a stock). If you would like to advance your understanding of stocks, please check out this Stock Basics.

For more on bonds, see the Bond Basics.
by Andrew Beattie (Contact Author | Biography)

http://www.investopedia.com/articles/basics/03/062703.asp?partner=basics5

Why do bubbles sometimes last so long?

Bubbles are fueled by speculators who are willing to pay even greater prices for already overvalued assets sold to them by the speculators who bought them in the preceding round.

Each financial bubble in history has been different, but they all involve a mix of fundamental business and psychological forces.  In the beginning stages, an attractive return on a stock or commodity drives prices higher and higher.  People make questionable investments with the assumption that they will be able to sell later at a higher price to a "greater fool."  Unrealistic investor expectations take hold and become self-fulfilling until the bubble "pops" and prices fall back to a more reasonable underlying value.

Why do bubbles sometimes last so long?   One reason is that nobody likes to be a "party pooper" and people ARE getting rich.  In addition, there is nothing inherently illegal about profiting during a bubble.  The only problem is getting out BEFORE the collapse.  Whoever owns the overpriced asset when the bubble pops is the loser, just as the last person standing in a game of musical chairs.

17th century in Holland:  Tulip Bulbs bubble (1630s)
1995 - 2001:  Technology Stocks bubble
2007:   U.S Housing Crisis bubble

Investing in bubbles can be quite profitable if you can get out before the bubble bursts.  However, many people who did not get out before the 'pop' saw their market crashed and their wealth value evaporated.

Bubbles are not caused by fraudulent activity.  However, swindles and accounting fraud often come to light just after bubbles pop.  Nobody is looking and few care while the good times roll.  Highly leveraged frauds often run out of cash and collapse when bubbles pop.

1963:  Salad Oil Scandal
2001:  Enron
2002:  WorldCom


Comment:  
Is the economy in a bubble?  Is the present market a bubble?  A definite not.  However, some individual stocks had been speculated up to bubble proportions and some had already popped.  Individual stock bubbles are a lot  more common than whole market bubble.

Alan Greenspan on the Financial Collapse

By Morgan Housel 
March 23, 2010 | Comments (81)

Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan just published a 66-page letter on the causes of the financial meltdown and how to avoid a repeat. He presents some great points, and several ridiculous ones as well. Here are a few of each.

Great points
1. Fannie Mae (NYSE: FNM) and Freddie Mac's (NYSE: FRE) role in subprime:

"The firms accounted for an estimated 40% of all subprime mortgage securities … during 2003 and 2004. That was an estimated five times their share of newly purchased and retained in 2002, implying that a significant proportion of the increased demand for subprime mortgage-backed securities during the years 2003-2004 was effectively politically mandated ..."

Wall Street gets vilified for blowing up the financial system. As it should. But a big part of the mortgage mess had nothing to do with Wall Street. It started with commercial banks making shady loans and ended with Fannie and Freddie's political obligation to buy up these loans in bulk. What's scary is there isn't a plan on what to do with these two rascals. Functionally,nothing has changed since they collapsed.

2. On the role of the rating agencies:  

"[A]n inordinately large part of investment management subcontracted to the 'safe harbor' risk designations of the credit rating agencies. No further judgment was required of investment officers who believed they were effectively held harmless by the judgments of government-sanctioned rating organizations."

It's easy to have no sympathy for those who bought collateralized debt obligations only to learn they were filled with packing peanuts. And I don't. But stupidity wasn't these people's shortfall, to their credit. It was relying on the word of the ratings agencies -- Moody's (NYSE:MCO), Standard & Poor's, and Fitch -- that told them everything was fine and well. And as Greenspan points out, ratings agencies are government-sanctioned entities, so competition for good, high-quality analysis gets stifled.

3. On regulating financial markets:

"In dealing with nonbanks that come in all varieties under the label of 'shadow banking,' it is probably best to regulate financial products rather than institutions."

Bingo. Don't simply regulate Goldman Sachs (NYSE: GS). Its bankers will throw up smokescreens all day around regulators trying to decode its balance sheet. Start at the bottom and regulate (or ban) things like credit default swaps. The only way you'll outsmart these guys is to regulate from the bottom up, not the top down.

4. On "too big to fail":

"Federal Reserve research had been unable to find economies of scale in banking beyond a modest-sized institution."

Hear that, JPMorgan Chase (NYSE: JPM) CEO Jamie Dimon? Now quit acting like civilization will be forced back into hunting and gathering if four banks don't control the economy.

5. On crisis forecasting:

"Forecasters as a group will almost certainly miss the onset of the next financial crisis, as they have so often in the past and I presume any newly designated 'systemic regulator' will also."

I'm like my colleague Matt Koppenheffer on this one: The thought of risk-regulation committees and advisory boards makes me nauseated. Most regulators didn't even acknowledge anything was wrong until chaos was everywhere. And once you realize a bank such as Citigroup (NYSE: C) or Bank of America (NYSE: BAC) is in deep water, it's too late. You've got to install firm rules that prevent insanity in the first place, rather than rely on crisis committees or reactionary policies the way we did in 2008.

Ridiculous points
1. On the Fed's role in the housing boom: 

"The global house price bubble was a consequence of lower interest rates, but it was long-term interest rates that galvanized home asset prices, not the overnight rates of central banks, as has become the seeming conventional wisdom. … No one, to my knowledge, employs overnight interest rates -- such as the fed-funds rate -- to determine the capitalization rate of real estate ..."

If you assume everyone uses a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage, he's right. But how about the roughly one-third of borrowers in 2005 who used adjustable-rate mortgages linked to short-term interest rates set by the Fed? These borrowers represent some of the most egregious excesses of the housing boom, and they couldn't have done it without you, Al.

2. On the impracticality of controlling bubbles:

"At some rate, monetary policy can crush any bubble. If not 6 1/2%, try 20%, or 50% for that matter. Any bubble can be crushed, but the state of prosperity will be an inevitable victim."

Let's look at how this has played out in the past. Facing an inflation bubble in the early 1980s, Greenspan's predecessor, Paul Volcker, raised interest rates to 20%. That hurt for a while, but he's now considered an economic hero for doing it. Inflation collapsed, and real growth boomed. He looked past the short run to save the long run. Greenspan, on the other hand, let this bubble burn itself out. The result, in his own words, was "the most virulent global financial crisis ever." But we preserved prosperity in 2006, people, so apparently it was all worth it.

3. On choices: 

"Unless there is a societal choice to abandon dynamic markets and leverage for some form of central planning, I fear that preventing bubbles will in the end turn out to be infeasible. Assuaging their aftermath seems the best we can hope for."

It's a bit dramatic to assume we can pick either crippling bubbles or central planning, but nothing else. You can simultaneously have dynamic free markets and common-sense rules that prevent pizza delivery guys from living like they're on MTV Cribs. We had something close to this from the end of World War II up until the late '90s. And it was awesome. Bubbles are a natural part of human behavior. That's a given. But it's pretty weak to just roll over and accept their wrath as inevitable.

What do you think? How responsible is Greenspan for the financial meltdown, and what should he have done differently?

http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2010/03/23/alan-greenspan-on-the-financial-collapse.aspx?source=ihpdspmra0000001&lidx=1