http://www.slideshare.net/thadeshvar/basics-of-wealth-mgt
Showing posts with label intelligent speculation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label intelligent speculation. Show all posts
Saturday, 4 October 2014
Wednesday, 31 July 2013
Investing is NOT Speculation
There is a difference between speculation and investing.
One distinction defined this by the length of time over which the investor expects to realise their investment; or to put it another way, how quickly one expects to make money.
Speculation is high-risk-get-rich-quick territory.
Investing is managed risk over long periods of time where you can acquire wealth slowly.
[ I am an investor by nature, not a speculator.
I am in it for the long haul, and having bought many good shares at fair or bargain prices in the past and presently, I intend to hang onto to them.
My view is that they will move yet higher over time.
Sometimes, the massive and largely unprecedented increase in the share price of my stocks over a short period was not anticipated by me or probably by many others.
So, did I get lucky? Well, yes and no.
It was my view that the share price of these companies would rise further or eventually recover from recent corrections, whilst the past is no way of accurately predicting the future, I felt that it would rise to around a certain price in the medium term.
The difference between my expectations and what happened is that I would have been happy for it to return to that price within five years. As it happened, it did so in less than a few months. ]
Monday, 6 February 2012
A Pricey P/E
High Pricey P/E
A company may be selling at an exceptionally high P/E because it is considered to have remarkably good prospects for growth.
No matter how high the quality of the car you are looking at, there is a price at which it is no longer worth buying. No matter how junky a car is, there is a price at which it is a bargain. Stocks are no different.
Some stocks with high multiples work out, but investors who consistently buy high multiple stocks are likely to lose money in the long run.
Often the highest multiples are present in a bull market which increases the risk.
Graham and Dodd observed, " It is a truism to say that the more impressive the record and the more promising the prospects of stability and growth, the more liberally the per-share earnings should be valued, subject always to our principle that a multiplier higher than 20 (i.e., 'earning basis' of less than 5%) will carry the issue out of the investment range."
It is not wrong to pay more, Graham and Dodd noted; it is simply that doing so enters the realm of speculation.
A company may be selling at an exceptionally high P/E because it is considered to have remarkably good prospects for growth.
No matter how high the quality of the car you are looking at, there is a price at which it is no longer worth buying. No matter how junky a car is, there is a price at which it is a bargain. Stocks are no different.
Some stocks with high multiples work out, but investors who consistently buy high multiple stocks are likely to lose money in the long run.
Often the highest multiples are present in a bull market which increases the risk.
Graham and Dodd observed, " It is a truism to say that the more impressive the record and the more promising the prospects of stability and growth, the more liberally the per-share earnings should be valued, subject always to our principle that a multiplier higher than 20 (i.e., 'earning basis' of less than 5%) will carry the issue out of the investment range."
It is not wrong to pay more, Graham and Dodd noted; it is simply that doing so enters the realm of speculation.
Saturday, 7 January 2012
Speculative-Growth Stocks - Conclusion: Numbers Matter
Some investors like to have a gut feeling about the business they are buying.
In the speculative-growth market, unfortunately, that's often difficult.
Many of these companies are bringing new concepts to market, and in the case of Internet companies, they're doing it in a new and evolving medium.
Experience can be a poor judge of their viability.
Five years ago in 1994, it would have been hard to believe that an Internet company (Internet? What's that?) would have a market capitalization of more than $100 billion by the end of 1999.
And that may be a good lesson for investing in the speculative-growth market: Trust the numbers, not your gut.
Sure, Yahoo is a risk. The Internet is still evolving, and could look very different a few years from now.
But a disciplined analysis of its financial statements indicates that Yahoo is making increasingly efficient use of its assets, generating consistent sales growth, increasing net margins, and delivering cash from operations.
That's what we want from a speculative-growth stock.
Comment: The Internet bubble burst in 2000. To make profit in your investments, valuations and earnings were as important then as now.
In the speculative-growth market, unfortunately, that's often difficult.
Many of these companies are bringing new concepts to market, and in the case of Internet companies, they're doing it in a new and evolving medium.
Experience can be a poor judge of their viability.
Five years ago in 1994, it would have been hard to believe that an Internet company (Internet? What's that?) would have a market capitalization of more than $100 billion by the end of 1999.
And that may be a good lesson for investing in the speculative-growth market: Trust the numbers, not your gut.
Sure, Yahoo is a risk. The Internet is still evolving, and could look very different a few years from now.
But a disciplined analysis of its financial statements indicates that Yahoo is making increasingly efficient use of its assets, generating consistent sales growth, increasing net margins, and delivering cash from operations.
That's what we want from a speculative-growth stock.
Comment: The Internet bubble burst in 2000. To make profit in your investments, valuations and earnings were as important then as now.
Saturday, 13 November 2010
What’s Wrong with the Stock Market?
What’s Wrong with the Stock Market?
April 14th, 2009
The problem with the stock market started back before the end of the 18th century—in 1792 as a matter of fact. This was when the stock market as we know it was born under a tree in lower Manhattan. It was there and then that those who first bought and sold stocks as a business got together and formed what became the New York Stock Exchange. From those beginnings, an industry was born that has grown to be one of the most powerful and financially influential in the world.
Transaction-based Compensation – the Wrong Dynamic
Actually, the problem arose from the fact that these people made their money not from any appreciation in the value of the investments they bought and sold but rather from just putting buyers and sellers of those shares together. They profited from the transaction itself. To this day, the majority of brokers receive their compensation as a result of the purchase or sale. It makes no financial difference to them whether their customer gains or loses.
I don’t mean to imply that, just because these people fill a need and are compensated for doing so, they’re bad people. Certainly the existence of this industry is what makes the ownership of stock feasible for the average person. It’s responsible for elevating common stock to the level of liquidity that allows us to own it without fear of being stuck with it when or if we choose to sell it. And it certainly makes it much easier for us to buy those shares when we wish to. If we’re interested in putting our money to work for us in what is arguably the most lucrative manner possible for the least amount of risk, we can’t get along without this industry. But, the difference in perception and fact between what a broker does or is qualified to do and what the uninitiated think he or she is qualified to do is a major source of the problem.
In the beginning, the whole idea of shares was just that: sharing in the fortunes of an enterprise. Where it might be difficult for a company or individual to come up with enough money to finance all that was necessary alone, sharing the business with others in a fashion that limited their liability and exposure to only the amount of money invested was a great way to obtain the necessary funds. Anyone who wanted to participate in a business—sharing both the rewards and the risks—would buy shares and hold them as legal documents that vouched for their entitlement to a proportionate share in the fruits of that enterprise’s operations. Originally, therefore, folks bought shares because they thought the business would be profitable one and they wanted a piece of the action.
The formation of a ready market for stocks, while it performed a very useful service in terms of liquidity and convenience, had a serious side effect. So easy was it to trade that the perception of what a share of stock really was became obscured, giving way to the notion that the stock, like currency, had some intrinsic value that could vary for reasons other than the success or failure of the underlying enterprise.
Easy Trading changed the Nature of the Market
Moreover, the ability to manipulate the perceived value of those shares erected a persistent barrier between those that manipulated it and those that didn’t. It was de rigueur for unscrupulous traders to spread rumors appealing to the fear of the uninitiated, driving down the price of a certain stock, and furnishing an opportunity to pick up a large position at that favorable price. And then it was an equally simple process for those same individuals to spread favorable rumors that appealed to the greedy, drove up the price, and resulted in a great selling opportunity for those who then owned it. Not until well into the 20th century, after the devastating crash of 1929, was there a real effort to address that issue legislatively and make such activities illegal.
However, there was—and is—no way to legislate the greed and fear out of the stock market. Those are still its basic drivers. In fact, as recently as within the last decade, a young kid from New Jersey managed to make nearly a million dollars when he flooded the Internet with glowing stories about a penny stock he had selected for his venture. Unwitting investors bid up the price of the stock with no more to go on than his fiction; and he made a killing.
Disconnect Between Value and Price Creates Bubbles and Busts
The very same dynamics of greed and fear were responsible for an even more spectacular event that impacted millions of shareholders. The appeal of the dot.coms, most of them with no visible means of support—and the technology companies that depended upon them for their burgeoning customer base—inflated one of history’s biggest bubbles. Investors, eager to make a killing, continued to bid up the price of the stock in those companies with no regard for or even any understanding of the factors that comprised their underlying value. This was what the Street refers to as the Greater Fool Theory: “I may be a fool to buy this stock at this price; but I’ll find a greater fool to take it off my hands for more than I paid for it!”
The market of course collapsed when those companies—like Wiley Coyote racing off a cliff only to discover he had nothing under him—learned the hard way that a company had to earn money to live. The extent of that collapse went well beyond rational concerns about the profitability of the affected companies, being exacerbated in large measure by irrational fears growing out of the September 11th, 2001, attack on New York’s World Trade Center and our country’s bellicose activities following that tragedy.
http://www.financialiteracy.us/wordpress/articles/what%E2%80%99s-wrong-with-the-stock-market/
April 14th, 2009
The problem with the stock market started back before the end of the 18th century—in 1792 as a matter of fact. This was when the stock market as we know it was born under a tree in lower Manhattan. It was there and then that those who first bought and sold stocks as a business got together and formed what became the New York Stock Exchange. From those beginnings, an industry was born that has grown to be one of the most powerful and financially influential in the world.
Transaction-based Compensation – the Wrong Dynamic
Actually, the problem arose from the fact that these people made their money not from any appreciation in the value of the investments they bought and sold but rather from just putting buyers and sellers of those shares together. They profited from the transaction itself. To this day, the majority of brokers receive their compensation as a result of the purchase or sale. It makes no financial difference to them whether their customer gains or loses.
I don’t mean to imply that, just because these people fill a need and are compensated for doing so, they’re bad people. Certainly the existence of this industry is what makes the ownership of stock feasible for the average person. It’s responsible for elevating common stock to the level of liquidity that allows us to own it without fear of being stuck with it when or if we choose to sell it. And it certainly makes it much easier for us to buy those shares when we wish to. If we’re interested in putting our money to work for us in what is arguably the most lucrative manner possible for the least amount of risk, we can’t get along without this industry. But, the difference in perception and fact between what a broker does or is qualified to do and what the uninitiated think he or she is qualified to do is a major source of the problem.
In the beginning, the whole idea of shares was just that: sharing in the fortunes of an enterprise. Where it might be difficult for a company or individual to come up with enough money to finance all that was necessary alone, sharing the business with others in a fashion that limited their liability and exposure to only the amount of money invested was a great way to obtain the necessary funds. Anyone who wanted to participate in a business—sharing both the rewards and the risks—would buy shares and hold them as legal documents that vouched for their entitlement to a proportionate share in the fruits of that enterprise’s operations. Originally, therefore, folks bought shares because they thought the business would be profitable one and they wanted a piece of the action.
The formation of a ready market for stocks, while it performed a very useful service in terms of liquidity and convenience, had a serious side effect. So easy was it to trade that the perception of what a share of stock really was became obscured, giving way to the notion that the stock, like currency, had some intrinsic value that could vary for reasons other than the success or failure of the underlying enterprise.
Easy Trading changed the Nature of the Market
Moreover, the ability to manipulate the perceived value of those shares erected a persistent barrier between those that manipulated it and those that didn’t. It was de rigueur for unscrupulous traders to spread rumors appealing to the fear of the uninitiated, driving down the price of a certain stock, and furnishing an opportunity to pick up a large position at that favorable price. And then it was an equally simple process for those same individuals to spread favorable rumors that appealed to the greedy, drove up the price, and resulted in a great selling opportunity for those who then owned it. Not until well into the 20th century, after the devastating crash of 1929, was there a real effort to address that issue legislatively and make such activities illegal.
However, there was—and is—no way to legislate the greed and fear out of the stock market. Those are still its basic drivers. In fact, as recently as within the last decade, a young kid from New Jersey managed to make nearly a million dollars when he flooded the Internet with glowing stories about a penny stock he had selected for his venture. Unwitting investors bid up the price of the stock with no more to go on than his fiction; and he made a killing.
Disconnect Between Value and Price Creates Bubbles and Busts
The very same dynamics of greed and fear were responsible for an even more spectacular event that impacted millions of shareholders. The appeal of the dot.coms, most of them with no visible means of support—and the technology companies that depended upon them for their burgeoning customer base—inflated one of history’s biggest bubbles. Investors, eager to make a killing, continued to bid up the price of the stock in those companies with no regard for or even any understanding of the factors that comprised their underlying value. This was what the Street refers to as the Greater Fool Theory: “I may be a fool to buy this stock at this price; but I’ll find a greater fool to take it off my hands for more than I paid for it!”
The market of course collapsed when those companies—like Wiley Coyote racing off a cliff only to discover he had nothing under him—learned the hard way that a company had to earn money to live. The extent of that collapse went well beyond rational concerns about the profitability of the affected companies, being exacerbated in large measure by irrational fears growing out of the September 11th, 2001, attack on New York’s World Trade Center and our country’s bellicose activities following that tragedy.
http://www.financialiteracy.us/wordpress/articles/what%E2%80%99s-wrong-with-the-stock-market/
Saturday, 24 July 2010
Value Investor versus Speculative Investing
http://www.theintelligentinvestor.net/
While you contemplate a major investment decision, you need to ask yourself if you will be making a value investment or a speculative investment. You can use Benjamin Graham’s extensive writing about the difference between value and speculative investments to categorize potential investments you are considering.
Speculative investors buy a stock with a hunch that the price will go up or down quickly.
Value investors buy a stock after determining the long-term value of the business.
Although value investors outperform speculative investors in the long-run, value investors do not expect to outperform the market. Value investors accept the reality that no one can predict market behavior; instead, value investors work to control their own investment behavior.
So before I make a trade I ask myself how easily I will be able to sleep at night, or as Benjamin Graham puts it, I ask myself if the trade promises “safety of principle and a satisfactory return.”
Wednesday, 10 February 2010
There is ALWAYS a Speculative Component of Stock Investment. There is no sure thing.
There is no sure thing. There is always risk in stock market investing.
Risks are inherent in buying stocks and the investors should have a clear idea of these risks when buying.
These risks are inseparable from the opportunities of profit that they offer. Both of these must be allowed for in the investor's calcuations.
Investors should be aware of this speculative component of investing. This should be distinguished from stock speculation explained below.
It is the investor's task to keep this speculative component of investing within minor limits and to be prepared financially and psychologically for adverse results that may be of short or long durations. There is no way around this market effect.
Speculative Component of Stock Investment vs Stock Speculation
There is always a speculative component of investing when you buy and hold.
However, this speculative component of investing should be distinguished from stock speculation.
Benjamin Graham, in his texbook, Security Analysis, attempted a precise formulation to distinguish the difference between investment and speculation.
"An investment operation is one which, upon thorough analysis promises safety of principal and an adequate return. Operations not meeting these requirements are speculative."
This is what he wrote on speculation.
"An investment operation is one which, upon thorough analysis promises safety of principal and an adequate return. Operations not meeting these requirements are speculative."
This is what he wrote on speculation.
- Some speculation is necessary and unavoidable, for in many common stock situations, there are substantial possibilities for both profit and loss, and the risks therein must be assumed by someone.
- There is intelligent speculation as there is intelligent investing.
- There are also many ways in which speculation may be unintelligent:
- speculating when you think you are investing;
- speculating seriously instead of as a pastime, when you lack proper knowledge and skill for it; and
- risking more money in speculation than you can afford to lose.
- Every nonprofessional who operates on margin (investing with money borrowed from your broker with your shares as collateral) should recognize that he is ipso facto speculating.
- And everyone who buys a so-called "hot" stock is either speculating or gambling.
Benjamin Graham recognised that speculation can be a lot of fun while you are ahead of the game. He advised those who want to try their luck at it, to put aside a portion -- the smaller the better -- of your money in a separate fund for this purpose.
- Never add more money to this account just because the market has gone up and profits are rolling. (That's the time to think of taking money out of your speculative fund.)
- Never mingle your speculative and investment operations in the same account, nor in any part of your thinking.
Sunday, 25 October 2009
Probability of Return in Investment, Speculation and Gambling
The main difference between investment, speculation and gambling is the "ex ante probability of obtaining a reasonable return which is known at the time when each of these three activities is carried out".
Ex-Ante Probability of Return
Investment - Good
Speculation - Uncertain
Gambling - Negative
What this means is that we are fairly confident that we can make a reasonable amount of money by making a true investment; we are uncertain as to whether we can make money from speculation but we are sure that we will lose money by gambling.
The sidetracking of investors into speculation and even gambling is the worst enemy of good investment.
We must be ultraconservative and maximise the odds in our favour. If a stock analyst warns you that there is only a 10 percent chance that prices would rise above this level, you should avoid buying shares at that level. On the other hand, if he says that there is a 90 percent chance that share prices would not fall further, we should certainly grasp the opportunity and buy.
Ex-Ante Probability of Return
Investment - Good
Speculation - Uncertain
Gambling - Negative
What this means is that we are fairly confident that we can make a reasonable amount of money by making a true investment; we are uncertain as to whether we can make money from speculation but we are sure that we will lose money by gambling.
The sidetracking of investors into speculation and even gambling is the worst enemy of good investment.
We must be ultraconservative and maximise the odds in our favour. If a stock analyst warns you that there is only a 10 percent chance that prices would rise above this level, you should avoid buying shares at that level. On the other hand, if he says that there is a 90 percent chance that share prices would not fall further, we should certainly grasp the opportunity and buy.
Tuesday, 20 October 2009
There is intelligent speculation as there is intelligent investing.
April 14, 2009
Wellcare Group – An Intelligent Speculation?
Filed under: From the co-founders — Tags: Marcelo Lima, WCG, Wellcare Group — Jane Scottsdale @ 1:11 pm
Common stock investing is inherently risky, and those risks cannot be divorced from the rewards that come with them. Often, it isn’t easy to separate the speculative from the investment component of a common stock commitment. On this topic, Ben Graham, author of the classic The Intelligent Investor, has written most clearly:
Outright speculation is neither illegal, immoral, nor (for most people) fattening to the pocketbook. More than that, some speculation is necessary and unavoidable, for in many common-stock situations there are substantial possibilities of both profit and loss, and the risks therein must be assumed by someone. There is intelligent speculation as there is intelligent investing. But there are many ways in which speculation may be unintelligent. Of these the foremost are:
(1) speculating when you think you are investing;
(2) speculating seriously instead of as a pastime, when you lack proper knowledge and skill for it; and
(3) risking more money in speculation than you can afford to lose.
With that caveat, here’s Wellcare Group (WCG), a stock that has a reasonable chance of going higher once its legal problems are resolved and its earnings normalized. As such, it may present an intelligent speculation.
First, a quick background. Wellcare is a healthcare management organization focused on Medicare and Medicaid, government-run entitlement programs for the elderly and low-income population. It has over 2.5 million members enrolled in its programs nationwide, with a large portion of them in Florida.
Its stock hovered around $120 per share when in October 2007 about 200 FBI agents raided its Tampa campus. The stock collapsed to $40, wiping out $3.3bn in shareholder value. The uncertainty was large; there was no official word of what the FBI raid was for, although newspaper reports stated that one of Wellcare’s subsidiaries had overbilled the government by $35m. In this context, the share price collapse was wildly overdone.
A quick resolution of the problem didn’t happen. Instead, the company went “dark,” not filing its quarterly and yearly financial statements and risking stock exchange delisting for its non-compliance. Periodic SEC filings kept shareholders apprised of the slow progress, but it wasn’t until early 2009 that things became clearer. The company finally filed all of its late financial statements and set a shareholder’s meeting – the first since the FBI raid – for July 30.
Wellcare is well capitalized. As of 12/31/2008, it had about $1.2 billion in cash and $153 million in debt. This debt proved to be another Achilles heel for the stock. When the company reported in 2008 that it was in technical default for not having filed its financial statements, the price dropped precipitously yet again. Fairholme Capital, which owns nearly 20% of the stock, bought a majority of the debt, likely in a move to protect its equity investment.
Throughout this misadventure, the stock has swung wildly, hitting a low of $6.12 in November and $6.23 in March of this year. Yet Wellcare’s core business remains sound, generating substantial free cash flows. The exact number for 2008 involves reversing a goodwill write-down and removing a non-recurring $103m in litigation expenses, but a normalized estimate of $4 in free cash flow per share is probably on the conservative side. While there is significant regulatory uncertainty surrounding its Medicare and Medicaid businesses, at the current price of around $13.80, it’s hard to find a way to lose.
Yet all of these uncertainties – particularly those surrounding the FBI investigation – are still large, which is where the speculative component of this investment comes in. There might be a probability of the government’s penalties being larger than expected. The company is also facing various lawsuits related to its illegal activities, including a class-action lawsuit. Defending against these will cost management’s time and shareholders’ cash.
On the other hand, Wellcare may soon begin conducting conference calls with shareholders and analysts, may soon settle with the government by paying a fine, and may ultimately get sold to a larger competitor, such as UnitedHealth Group. After it fired its disgraced former management, the board brought in Charles Berg, formerly a UnitedHealth executive, Oxford Health Plans CEO and “deal guy.”
With these factors in mind, and taking into account Graham’s three points above, Wellcare may seem like an intelligent speculation after all.
Marcelo P. Lima is a securities analyst. He may be reached at MPL4@cornell.edu
http://blog.valueinvestingcongress.com/2009/04/14/wellcare-group-%e2%80%93-an-intelligent-speculation/
http://blog.valueinvestingcongress.com/?utm_source=VIC&utm_medium=W&utm_campaign=BLOGLA09T
Wellcare Group – An Intelligent Speculation?
Filed under: From the co-founders — Tags: Marcelo Lima, WCG, Wellcare Group — Jane Scottsdale @ 1:11 pm
Common stock investing is inherently risky, and those risks cannot be divorced from the rewards that come with them. Often, it isn’t easy to separate the speculative from the investment component of a common stock commitment. On this topic, Ben Graham, author of the classic The Intelligent Investor, has written most clearly:
Outright speculation is neither illegal, immoral, nor (for most people) fattening to the pocketbook. More than that, some speculation is necessary and unavoidable, for in many common-stock situations there are substantial possibilities of both profit and loss, and the risks therein must be assumed by someone. There is intelligent speculation as there is intelligent investing. But there are many ways in which speculation may be unintelligent. Of these the foremost are:
(1) speculating when you think you are investing;
(2) speculating seriously instead of as a pastime, when you lack proper knowledge and skill for it; and
(3) risking more money in speculation than you can afford to lose.
With that caveat, here’s Wellcare Group (WCG), a stock that has a reasonable chance of going higher once its legal problems are resolved and its earnings normalized. As such, it may present an intelligent speculation.
First, a quick background. Wellcare is a healthcare management organization focused on Medicare and Medicaid, government-run entitlement programs for the elderly and low-income population. It has over 2.5 million members enrolled in its programs nationwide, with a large portion of them in Florida.
Its stock hovered around $120 per share when in October 2007 about 200 FBI agents raided its Tampa campus. The stock collapsed to $40, wiping out $3.3bn in shareholder value. The uncertainty was large; there was no official word of what the FBI raid was for, although newspaper reports stated that one of Wellcare’s subsidiaries had overbilled the government by $35m. In this context, the share price collapse was wildly overdone.
A quick resolution of the problem didn’t happen. Instead, the company went “dark,” not filing its quarterly and yearly financial statements and risking stock exchange delisting for its non-compliance. Periodic SEC filings kept shareholders apprised of the slow progress, but it wasn’t until early 2009 that things became clearer. The company finally filed all of its late financial statements and set a shareholder’s meeting – the first since the FBI raid – for July 30.
Wellcare is well capitalized. As of 12/31/2008, it had about $1.2 billion in cash and $153 million in debt. This debt proved to be another Achilles heel for the stock. When the company reported in 2008 that it was in technical default for not having filed its financial statements, the price dropped precipitously yet again. Fairholme Capital, which owns nearly 20% of the stock, bought a majority of the debt, likely in a move to protect its equity investment.
Throughout this misadventure, the stock has swung wildly, hitting a low of $6.12 in November and $6.23 in March of this year. Yet Wellcare’s core business remains sound, generating substantial free cash flows. The exact number for 2008 involves reversing a goodwill write-down and removing a non-recurring $103m in litigation expenses, but a normalized estimate of $4 in free cash flow per share is probably on the conservative side. While there is significant regulatory uncertainty surrounding its Medicare and Medicaid businesses, at the current price of around $13.80, it’s hard to find a way to lose.
Yet all of these uncertainties – particularly those surrounding the FBI investigation – are still large, which is where the speculative component of this investment comes in. There might be a probability of the government’s penalties being larger than expected. The company is also facing various lawsuits related to its illegal activities, including a class-action lawsuit. Defending against these will cost management’s time and shareholders’ cash.
On the other hand, Wellcare may soon begin conducting conference calls with shareholders and analysts, may soon settle with the government by paying a fine, and may ultimately get sold to a larger competitor, such as UnitedHealth Group. After it fired its disgraced former management, the board brought in Charles Berg, formerly a UnitedHealth executive, Oxford Health Plans CEO and “deal guy.”
With these factors in mind, and taking into account Graham’s three points above, Wellcare may seem like an intelligent speculation after all.
Marcelo P. Lima is a securities analyst. He may be reached at MPL4@cornell.edu
http://blog.valueinvestingcongress.com/2009/04/14/wellcare-group-%e2%80%93-an-intelligent-speculation/
http://blog.valueinvestingcongress.com/?utm_source=VIC&utm_medium=W&utm_campaign=BLOGLA09T
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