Should You Sell Company ABC At This PE Ratio of 36.4x?

Should You Sell Company ABC At This PE Ratio?


ABC is trading with a trailing P/E of 36.4x, which is higher than the industry average of 23.5x.

• While ABC might seem like a stock to avoid or sell if you own it, it is important to understand the assumptions behind the P/E ratio before you make any investment decisions. 
• You should understand what the P/E ratio is, how to interpret it and what to watch out for. 

1.   Breaking down the P/E ratio

The P/E ratio is one of many ratios used in relative valuation. 

• By comparing a stock’s price per share to its earnings per share, we are able to see how much investors are paying for each dollar of the company’s earnings.

P/E Calculation for ABC

Price-Earnings Ratio = Price per share ÷ Earnings per share



On its own, the P/E ratio doesn’t tell you much; however, it becomes extremely useful when you compare it with other similar companies.

• Your goal is to compare the stock’s P/E ratio to the average of companies that have similar attributes to ABC, such as company lifetime and products sold. 
• A quick method of creating a peer group is to use companies in the same industry. 
• ABC’s P/E of 36.4x is higher than its industry peers (23.5x), which implies that each dollar of  ABC’s earnings is being overvalued by investors. Therefore, according to this analysis, ABC is an over-priced stock.

2.  Assumptions to watch out for

Before you jump to the conclusion that ABC should be banished from your portfolio, it is important to realise that your conclusion rests on two assertions. 

(a)  Firstly, your peer group contains companies that are similar to ABC.

• If this isn’t the case, the difference in P/E could be due to other factors. 
• For example, if you compared lower risk firms with ABC, then investors would naturally value it at a lower price since it is a riskier investment. 

(b)  The second assumption that must hold true is that the stocks we are comparing ABC to are fairly valued by the market.

• If this is violated, ABC’s P/E may be lower than its peers as they are actually overvalued by investors.

3.   What this means for you:


(a)  Are you a shareholder? 

You may have already conducted fundamental analysis on the stock as a shareholder, so its current overvaluation could signal a potential selling opportunity to reduce your exposure to ABC.

Now that you understand the ins and outs of the PE metric, you should know to bear in mind its limitations before you make an investment decision.


(b)  Are you a potential investor? 

If you are considering investing in ABC, looking at the PE ratio on its own is not enough to make a well-informed decision.

You will benefit from looking at additional analysis and considering its intrinsic valuation along with other relative valuation metrics like PEG and EV/Sales.

PE is one aspect of your portfolio construction to consider when holding or entering into a stock. But it is certainly not the only factor. 

Another limitation of PE is it doesn’t properly account for growth, you can use a list of stocks with a high growth potential and see if their PE is still reasonable.




The thought process using Relative Valuation

Price based on past earnings
PE 36.4x
ABC is overvalued based one earnings compared to the industry average.
ABC is overvalued based on earnings compared to the local market.


Price based on expected growth
PEG 3.0x
ABC is poor value based on expected growth next year.


Price based on value of assets
P/B 15.3x
ABC is overvalued based on assets compared to the industry average

Examine growth expectations

Understand what kind of growth rates are incorporated into the share price.

If the rates of growth are unrealistic, avoid the stock.

Peter Lynch's strategy for all seasons

More than 80% of investment managers don't beat the market. Peter Lynch did it consistently over 13 years with Magellan. His secret: PEG ratios, and staying power.

20 September 07, John Reese

It stands to reason that professional mutual fund managers should be considerably more successful at picking stocks than the average investor. After all, people who have degrees in finance and years of practical experience in the market -- and who are willing to take your money in exchange for their expertise -- should be very good at what they do, right?

Unfortunately, many times that is not the case. In fact, my own research has shown that 80 to 90 percent of active fund managers fail to beat the market in the long term.

But there are, of course, fund managers who have proved you can beat the market over the long haul, and if you're looking for inspiration there's probably no better example than Peter Lynch. During his 13-year tenure as the head of Fidelity Investments' Magellan Fund, Lynch guided the fund to a 29.2 percent average yearly return -- nearly twice the 15.8 percent return that the S&P 500 posted during the same period. According to Barron's, over the last five years of Lynch's tenure, Magellan beat 99.5 percent of all other funds. Looked at another way, if you had invested $10,000 in Magellan the day Lynch took the helm, you would have had $280,000 on the day he retired 13 years later.

How did Lynch achieve such success where so many other professional investors failed? Interestingly, a big part of his approach involved something that is not at all exclusive to being a renowned professional fund manager: He invested in what he knew. Lynch believed that if you personally know something positive about a stock if you buy the company's products, like its marketing, etc. -- you can get a beat on successful businesses before professional investors get around to them. In fact, one of the things that led him to one of his most successful investments -- undergarment manufacturer Hanes -- was his wife's affinity for the company's new pantyhose years ago.

Investing in what you know is really just a starting point for Lynch, however. His strategy also has many quantitative aspects, and I was so impressed by it that it became the basis for one of my "Guru Strategies", computer models each of which mimics the approach of a different investing great. Here's a look at how my Lynch-based strategy works, and some examples of companies that fit the bill.

Different criteria on one PEG

An important aspect of Lynch's strategy is that he didn't apply the same rules to all stocks. He classified companies by their size and growth rate (and sometimes by the nature of their business), and used different sets of criteria to analyze these different groups.

His favorite type of investment was "fast-growers" -- companies whose earnings have been increasing at a rate of 20 to 50 percent per year. Other groups he focuses on in his book are large "stalwarts", which grow at a more moderate pace, and "slow-growers", which have single-digit growth rates but are attractive for their high dividend payouts.

Before I examine what Lynch looks for in each of these categories of stocks, however, I should note that there is one variable that Lynch considers crucial no matter what the stock's classification: the P/E/Growth ratio.

While the price/earnings ratio (which compares a company's per-share price to its per-share earnings) may be the best-known stock market variable, Lynch found that looking at the P/E ratio by itself was less useful than looking at it in comparison to a company's growth. The rationale was that higher P/E ratios are okay, provided that the firm is growing at an appropriate pace. If a company's P/E ratio was about even with or less than its growth rate (i.e. P/E divided by growth rate equals 1.0 or less), Lynch saw that as acceptable

Lynch found that this P/E/Growth ratio -- or "PEG" -- was a great way to identify growth stocks that were still selling at good prices. In fact, the P/E/G ratio became the most important variable he considered when looking at a stock, and his reliance on it is one of the things he is most known for in the investing world.

To show how the P/E/G can be more useful than the P/E ratio, Lynch cited Wal-Mart, America's largest retailer. In his book "One Up On Wall Street", he notes that Wal-Mart's P/E was rarely below 20 during its three-decade rise. Its growth rate, however, was consistently in the 25 to 30 percent range, generating huge profits for shareholders despite the P/E ratio not being particularly low. That also proved another one of Lynch's tenets: that you have plenty of time to identify and invest in exceptional growth companies, even after they have exhibited years, or even a decade, of rapid growth and have become quite large.

An example of a company with a very strong P/E/G ratio is energy giant Exxon Mobil (NYSE:XOM), which has a P/E of 12.15. When we divide that by its growth rate of 31.69 percent (based on the average of its three-, four-, and five-year earnings per share growth figures), we get a P/E/G ratio of 0.38. This not only betters my Lynch-based model's 1.0 maximum; it also falls into the strategy's best-case category (0.5 or below).

Fast-growers

Now let's take a look at those three categories I mentioned earlier, beginning with fast-growers. Exxon Mobil is an example of one such stock, because of its 31.69 percent growth rate.

For fast-growers, Lynch looks not only at the P/E/G, but also at the P/E ratio by itself. For large companies -- which my model views as those with annual sales greater than $1 billion -- he likes to see P/E ratios below 40, because he found that larger companies have trouble maintaining high enough growth to support P/Es over that threshold. (Smaller firms can have very high P/E ratios during their growth years, however).

Another quality Lynch looks for in fast-growers is manageable debt. He likes companies that are conservatively financed, and my Lynch-based model calls for debt to be no greater than 80 percent of equity. Exxon again makes the grade, with a debt/equity ratio of 7.56 percent.

An even better example of a fast-grower that meets this criterion is computer software power Microsoft (NASD:MSFT). Microsoft has no long-term debt, which my model considers exceptional. (Its 0.89 P/E/G ratio is another reason it passes my Lynch-based method.)

Lynch also made an astute observation about inventory, which can be applied not only to fast-growers but to other firms as well. He viewed it as a red flag when inventory increased more quickly than sales. (Inventory piling up indicates the products aren't as in-demand as the company had hoped.) My Lynch-based model thus likes the inventory/sales ratio to stay the same or decrease from year to year, but will allow for an increase of up to 5 percent if all other financials are in order. Exxon's inventory/sales ratio increased by just 0.32 percent this year while Microsoft's dropped by 1.13 percent, so each passes the test.

One caveat about "fast-growers": to Lynch, there is such a thing as too much growth. When a firm's historic growth rate is greater than 50 percent, he avoids it. Growth that high is unlikely to be maintained over the long run, and an investor shouldn’t pay for a stock on the basis of the assumption that a growth rate this high or higher will be maintained for long.

Stalwarts

Because of their large size (sales in the multi-billion-dollar range) and moderate earnings growth rate (10 to 19 percent per year), Lynch always keeps a few stalwarts in his portfolio, as they offer protection during recessions or hard times. An example of a stalwart that my Lynch-based model likes is credit card giant American Express (NYSE:AXP), which has a growth rate of 18.1 percent (again based on the average of the three-, four-, and five-year EPS growth rate figures) and annual sales of $29.8 billion.

One of the main differences between stalwarts and fast-growers is that dividends are often important for stalwarts, so Lynch adjusted the earnings portion of their P/E/G calculations for dividend yield. (He makes this adjustment by adding the yield, 1.01%, to the growth rate in the P/E/G formulathe yield supplements the EPS growth.) American Express's yield-adjusted P/E/G is 0.93, which comes in under my model's 1.0 upper limit.

Lynch also looked at debt for stalwarts, and my model again calls for debt to be no greater than 80 percent of equity.

When it comes to financial companies like American Express, however, debt is often a required part of business. Recognizing this, Lynch didn't apply the debt/equity ratio to financials. Instead, he looks at how a company's equity compares with its assets for a sign of financial health, and at how much of a return it is generating on those assets for a sign of its profitability.

The model I base on Lynch's writings calls for financial firms to have an equity/assets ratio of at least 5 percent, and a return on assets of at least 1 percent. At 8 percent and 3.18 percent, respectively, American Express passes both tests. (Note that while American Express is a stalwart, the equity/assets and return on assets figures are used for fast-growing and slow-growing financials as well.)

Slow-growers

Lynch was less keen on slow-growers and their single-digit growth than he was on fast-growers or stalwarts. But they can have high dividend yields, so they may be a good option if you're investing for income.

Lynch liked slow-growers to be large companies, so the model I base on his writings requires their sales to be greater than $1 billion. Just as with stalwarts, the P/E/G ratio for slow-growers is adjusted for dividend yield, and the debt-equity ratio should be below 80 percent (unless the firm is a financial).

One key difference when it comes to slow-growers: Because by definition they don't post big earnings increases, their dividend yields must be greater than 3 percent or greater than the yield of the S&P 500, whichever is larger.

Few slow-growers currently pass my Lynch-based model, but one that does is the US financial firm Comerica (NYSE: CMA), a Texas-based company that offers banking and financial management services in the US, Canada, and Mexico. Comerica's growth rate (7.34 percent, based on the average of the three-, four-, and five-year EPS figures) and high sales ($3.6 billion) make it a slow-grower, and its yield of 4.78 percent (which more than doubles the S&P's current 2.09 percent yield) is one reason my Lynch strategy considers it a good slow-grower. In addition, Comerica's yield-adjusted P/E/G is an acceptable 0.91, its equity/assets ratio is a healthy 9 percent, and its ROA is a strong 1.32 percent.

Be ready for all weathers

There is another critical aspect of Lynch's approach not specifically included in my quantitative model. It's simple in theory, but in practice it is one of the hardest things for an investor: Stay in the market.

Lynch recognized that the stock market was unpredictable in the short term, even to the smartest investors. In fact, he once said in an interview with American television station PBS that putting money into stocks and counting on having nice profits in a year or two is like "just like betting on red or black at the casino. ... What the market's going to do in one or two years, you don't know."

Over the long-term, however, good stocks rise like no other investment vehicle, something Lynch recognized. His philosophy: Use a proven strategy and stay in the market for the long term and you'll realize those gains; jump in and out and there's a good chance that you'll miss out on a chunk of them.

That, of course, means resisting the temptation to bail when the market takes some short-term hits, no easy task. But as Lynch once said, "The real key to making money in stocks is not to get scared out of them." If you have the fortitude to follow that advice -- and the discipline to follow Lynch's quantitative blueprints -- your portfolio should be much the better for it.

http://www.globes.co.il/serveen/globes/docview.asp?did=1000256306&fid=3011

Published by Globes [online], Israel business news - www.globes.co.il - on September 20, 2007

Stock valuation. Why does the value of a share of stocks depend on dividends?

Does the value of stocks depend on dividends or earnings?

Management determines its dividend policy by evaluating many factors, including:

• the tax differences between dividend income and capital gains,
• the need to generate internal funds to retire debt or invest, and,
• the desire to keep dividends relatively constant in the face of fluctuating earnings.

Since the price of a stock depends primarily on the present discounted value of all expected future dividends, it appers that dividend policy is crucial to determining the value of the stock.

However, this is not generally true. It does not matter how much is paid as dividends and how much is reinvested AS LONG AS the firm earns the same return on its retained earnings that shareholders demand on its stock. The reason for this is that dividends not paid today are reinvested by the firm and paid as even larger dividends in the future.

Dividend Payout Ratio

Management's choice of dividend payout ratio, which is the ratio of cash dividends to total earnings, does influence the timing of the dividend payments. 

The lower the dividend payout ratio (that is more earnings are retained), the smaller the dividends will be in the near future. Over time, however, dividends will rise and eventually will exceed the dividend path associated with a higher payout ratio.

Moreover, assuming that the firm earns the same rate on investment as the investors require from its equity (for example, ROE of 15%), the present value of these dividend streams will be identical no matter what payout ratio is chosen.

How to value Stocks?

Note that the price of the stock is always equal to the present value of ALL FUTURE DIVIDENDS and not the present value of future earnings. 

Earnings not paid to investors can have value only if they are paid as dividends or other cash disbursements at a later date. Valuing stock as the present discounted value of future earnings is manifestly wrong and greatly overstates the value of a firm. (Note: Firms that pay no dividends, such as Warren Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway, have value because their assets, which earn cash returns, can be liquidated and disbursed to shareholders in the future.)

John Burr Williams, one of the greatest investment analysts of the early part of the centrury and author of the classic The Theory of Investment Value, argued this point persuasively in 1938. He wrote: 

"Most people will object at once to the foregoing formula for valuing stocks by saying that it should use the present worth of future earnings, not future dividends. But should not earnings and dividends both give the same answer under the implicit assumptions of our critics? If earnings not paid out in dividends aree all successfully reinvested at compound interest for the benefit of the stockholder, as the critics imply, then these earnings should produce dividends later; if not, then they are money lost. Earnings are only a means to an end, and the means should not be mistaken for the end."


Ref: Stock for the Long Run, by Jeremy Siegel

http://myinvestingnotes.blogspot.com/2009/05/does-value-of-stocks-depend-on.html

Using PEG ratio: Not all growth is created equal.

As the risk increases, the PEG ratio of a firm decreases. When comparing the PEG ratios of firms with different risk levels, even within the same sector, the riskier firms should have lower PEG ratios than safer firms.

Not all growth is created equal. A firm that is able to grow at 20% a year, while paying out 50% of its earnings to stockholders, has higher quality growth than another firm with the same growth rate that reinvests all of its earnings back. Thus, the PEG ratio should increase as the payout ratio increases, for any given growth rate.

As with the PE ratio, the PEG ratio is used to compare the valuations of firms that are in the same business.  The PEG ratio is a function of:

• the risk,
• growth potential and
• the payout ratio of a firm.

http://zonecours.hec.ca/documents/A2009-1-1877347.ch18-earning-multiple(1).pdf

http://myinvestingnotes.blogspot.com/2009/11/using-peg-ratio-not-all-growth-is.html

Ranking Stocks using the PEG Ratio

PEG = PE / EPS Growth Rate

PEG Ratio Key Points
1. Less reliable for large low-growth companies.
2. Estimates can differ from future realities.
3. Compare individual PEG Ratio to industry and market averages.
4. Beware of speculative and low-dollar stocks with low PEG Ratios.

PE/G ratio

Some investment strategies seek growth for its own sake or growth for the sake of growth rather than growth for the sake of value. 


Wall Street wisdom (pardon the oxymoron) adheres to the KISS principle as its highest virtue: Keep It Short and Simple. Most highly prized by brokers are slogans that fit easily on t-shirts and bumper stickers. 


As an example, one popular investment rule of thumb is that for a fully and fairly valued growth stock, the stock's price-to-earnings ratio should be equal to the percentage of the growth rate of the earnings per share of the associated company, i.e. PE = G. As with any such rule of thumb, this is not only superficial but also arbitrary and capricious. 


A common screen based on this heuristic is the ratio of the PE ratio to the EPS growth rate, or the PE/G. In an effort to better fit the historical performance of cyclical stocks and large-cap stocks, ad hoc variations on the PE/G ratio include 

• (1) using an estimated future growth rate instead of an historical growth rate or PE/FG, 
• (2) adding the dividend yield percentage to the EPS growth rate percentage or PE/DG, and 
• (3) adding two time the dividend yield percentage to the EPS growth rate percentage or PE/2DG.

When choosing a stock to buy, don't overlook the PEG ratio

The figurative earnings can indicate a bargain

Stocks

Dollars & Sense

April 02, 2000|By Laura Pavlenko Lutton | Laura Pavlenko Lutton,MORNINGSTAR.COM

Bankers are sticklers for the details. It's their business to invest money in loans to individuals and businesses, and they expect to be repaid, on time and in full -- no excuses.

As stockholders, we should think like bankers. When we buy shares in a company, we're making an investment, and we should be paid back, too. The payback for shareholders is figurative, of course, but consider how much a company would have to earn before its cumulative earnings equal its current stock price. That period is called the PEG payback period, and it's based on the PEG ratio: a firm's price/earnings ratio divided by its expected growth rate. The PEG payback period is the time it would take a company to pay back its investors with earnings.

Take Schlumberger, the oil- and gas-services company. It has a PEG payback period of 15.3 years, so at the company's expected growth rate, Schlumberger would have to add up its earnings per share for 15.3 years straight before those earnings would equal its current stock price. (Morningstar includes each stock's PEG payback period in the "stock valuation" portion of its Quicktake report.)

The PEG payback period is good for gauging whether a company's expected earnings justify its current stock price. A high PEG payback period generally means shareholders are paying for a company with relatively low earnings. Stocks with low PEG payback periods aren't risk-free, but they're cheaper based on expected future earnings.

For this week's analyst picks, we stayed with companies that have PEG payback periods of less than 11 years. One company worth noting is Alltel, the nation's fifth-largest wireless telephone carrier. The Little Rock, Ark.-based company has a PEG payback period of 10.6 years -- a figure that has increased recently with Alltel's stock price.

Alltel's appeal comes from its growing wireless network. The company recently inked a deal to buy wireless assets from Bell Atlantic and GTE, two companies that have been forced by regulators to divest some assets in conjunction with their merger this spring.

The deal will give Alltel customers inexpensive access to Bell Atlantic and GTE's wireless networks so Alltel phones may "roam," or operate on the other companies' infrastructures, at a low cost. Alltel's sales growth has been outpacing the telecommunications-industry average. The company has also posted strong profitability ratios, which earns it B-plus grades from Morningstar for profitability.

Another PEG-payback qualifier is Tyco, the conglomerate that fell out of favor last year due to questions about past accounting practices. Those still-unproven accusations tarnished Tyco's reputation, but with a PEG payback period of 8.1 years and an otherwise solid track record, this company may be worth a look.

http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2000-04-02/business/0004080794_1_payback-periods-peg-ratio-alltel

The Longer the Payback Period, the Greater the Risk

The most useful thing about payback periods is that they give a good (albeit rough) idea of how risky an investment is. 

We may feel fairly confident in our assessment of a company's earnings potential over the next year or so, but that confidence usually diminishes as we peer farther into the future. 

Thus, the longer the payback period, the greater risk we run that we won't get the return we expect. 

That is especially true if the company we're looking at is a young firm without an established market position or is dependent on a rapidly changing technology.

Take Qualcomm QCOM, for example. This digital-wireless-communications powerhouse was the hottest stock on Wall Street in 1999 after appreciating 12-fold in 11 months. Its PEG payback is 12.4 years--not too bad considering its $350-plus stock price. But compare that with Allstate ALL, which watched its stock drop about 30% in 1999. Its PEG payback is 6.6 years. 

Qualcomm may be the sexier company and certainly has had upside for its investors, but sometimes the cheaper stock looks like a better deal.

After all, stocks with longer payback periods aren't just riskier, they also have lower rewards. 

Remember that the payback period is the amount of time it takes to double your money. 

If a stock has a payback period of five years, that means it doubles the amount of the original investment in five years. An investment that doubles in five years has an average rate of return of 15% per annum (on a scientific calculator, take the fifth root of 2, subtract 1, and multiply by 100). 

A payback period of 10 years implies a rate of return of a little more than 7%. At 20 years, the rate is less than 4%. And so on. 

The longer the payback period, the lower the rate of return.

Payback Period = Double Your Money

A payback period is the amount of time it takes for a company to accumulate enough in earnings to equal the amount of your original investment. 

That sounds complicated, but in simple terms, it is the time it would take you to double your money based on the profits a company is generating. 

There are a couple of payback periods to consider, and one of the simplest can be determined by looking at the stock's P/E, or the ratio of its price to its earnings per share. 

P/E is one way you can estimate how many years it would take for the company to accumulate earnings equal to its share price. 

• Imagine a $10 stock with $1 per share in earnings. 
• Based on its P/E of 10 ($10/$1), if the company continues to earn $1 per share every year, it would take 10 years for all those dollars to add up to the original $10 stock price. 
• So a stock with a P/E of 10 has a payback period of 10 years, assuming its earnings are the same each year.

But most companies don't make the same earnings year after year. As an investor, you're hoping the earnings will grow. 

To account for growth, there is something called the PEG payback period, which is based on the price/earnings growth (or PEG) ratio. 

The PEG ratio relates a company's price/earnings ratio (P/E) to its earnings growth. 

It is calculated by dividing a stock's forward P/E, or its P/E based on consensus analyst earnings estimates (what Wall Street analysts expect the company to earn over the next 12 months), by its forecasted earnings-growth rate (the rate at which analysts expect the company to grow).

PEG ratio = forward P/E / expected growth rate

Like P/E, the PEG ratio tells you how many years it will take for earnings to equal the stock price. But unlike P/E, it assumes earnings will grow at a certain rate.

Take our $10 stock with $1 per share in earnings. 

• If analysts' consensus estimates say the company will grow at a rate of 10%, we would increase each year's earnings by 10% before adding it up. 
• Therefore, the first year's earnings would be $1.10 (that's $1 times 1.1), the second year's would be $1.21 ($1.10 times 1.1), and so on. 
• Based on a 10% growth rate, it would take seven years before earnings added up to the original stock price. 

As you can see, the PEG payback period for any growing company will be shorter than the P/E payback period.

PEG and Payback Periods

If you own a home or a car, you are probably all too familiar with what happens when you take out a loan.

• A bank lends you a certain amount of money that you must pay back at a specified rate, such as one payment per month for five to 30 years. 
• In exchange for taking a risk that you won't repay the loan, the bank earns some revenue on top of its investment, based on the interest rate it charges.

 As a shareholder in a company, you're a lot like a bank. 

• When you buy stock, you're in essence lending a company your money so it can buy what it needs for its business and (hopefully) grow. 
• You get paid back as the company's earnings grow and its stock appreciates. 

But whereas a bank clearly establishes its profit margin and a timetable for being repaid, shareholders aren't that lucky. (It's a different story for bondholders, who literally loan the company money and do get scheduled interest payments.) 

It is possible, however, to estimate what you may earn on your investment and when you'll earn it by examining a stock's payback period. 

Characteristics of Growth Companies and their Value Drivers

Characteristics of growth companies

            Growth companies are diverse in size, growth prospects and can be spread out over very different businesses but they share some common characteristics that make an impact on how we value them. In this section, we will look at some of these shared features:

1. Dynamic financials: Much of the information that we use to value companies comes from their financial statements (income statements, balance sheets and statements of cash flows). One feature shared by growth companies is that the numbers in these statements are in a state of flux. Not only can the numbers for the latest year be very different from numbers in the prior year, but can change dramatically even over shorter time periods. For many smaller, high growth firms, for instance, the revenues and earnings from the most recent four quarters can be dramatically different from the revenues and earnings in the most recent fiscal year (which may have ended only a few months ago).
2. Private and Public Equity: It is accepted as conventional wisdom that the natural path for a young company that succeeds at the earliest stages is to go public and tap capital markets for new funds. There are three reasons why this transition is neither as orderly nor as predictable in practice. The first is that the private to public transition will vary across different economies, depending upon both institutional considerations and the development of capital markets. Historically, growth companies in the United States have entered public markets earlier in the life cycle than growth companies in Europe, partly because this is the preferred exit path for many venture capitalists in the US. The second is that even within any given market, access to capital markets for new companies can vary across time, as markets ebb and flow. In the United States, for instance, initial public offerings increase in buoyant markets and drop in depressed markets; during the market collapse in the last quarter of 2008, initial public offerings came to a standstill. The third is that the pathway to going public varies across sectors, with companies in some sectors like technology and biotechnology getting access to public markets much earlier in the life cycle than firms in other sectors such as manufacturing or retailing. The net effect is that the growth companies that we cover in chapter will draw on a mix of private equity (venture capital) and public equity for their equity capital. Put another way, some growth companies will be private businesses and some will be publicly traded; many of the latter group will still have venture capitalists and founders as large holders of equity.
3. Size disconnect: The contrast we drew in chapter 1 between accounting and financial balance sheets, with the former focused primarily on existing investments and the latter incorporating growth assets into the mix is stark in growth companies. The market values of these companies, if they are publicly traded, are often much higher than the accounting (or book) values, since the former incorporate the value of growth assets and the latter often do not. In addition, the market values can seem discordant with the operating numbers for the firm – revenues and earnings. Many growth firms that have market values in the hundreds of millions or even in the billions can have small revenues and negative earnings. Again, the reason lies in the fact that the operating numbers reflect the existing investments of the firm and these investments may represent a very small portion of the overall value of the firm.
4. Use of debt: While the usage of debt can vary across sectors, the growth firms in any business will tend to carry less debt, relative to their value (intrinsic or market), than more stable firms in the same business, simply because they do not have the cash flows from existing assets to support more debt. In some sectors, such as technology, even more mature growth firms with large positive earnings and cash flows are reluctant to borrow money. In other sectors, such as telecommunications, where debt is a preferred financing mode, growth companies will generally have lower debt ratios than mature companies.
5. Market history is short and shifting: We are dependent upon market price inputs for several key components of valuation and especially so for estimating risk parameters (such as betas). Even if growth companies are publicly traded, they tend to have short and shifting histories. For example, an analyst looking at Google in early 2009 would have been able to draw on about 4 years of market history (a short period) but even those 4 years of data may not be particularly useful or relevant because the company changed dramatically over that period – from revenues in millions to revenues in billions, operating losses to operating profits and from a small market capitalization to a large one. 

While the degree to which these factors affect growth firms can vary across firms, they are prevalent in almost every growth firm.

Growth companies- Value Drivers

Scalable growth

The question of how quickly revenue growth rates will decline at a given company can generally be addressed by looking at the company's specifics – the size of the overall market for its products and services, the strength of the competition and quality of both its products and management.  Companies in larger markets with less aggressive competition (or protection from competition) and better management can maintain high revenue growth rates for longer periods.

            There are a few tools that we can use to assess whether the assumptions we are making about revenue growth rates in the future, for an individual company, are reasonable:

1.     Absolute revenue changes: One simple test is to compute the absolute change in revenues each period, rather than to trust the percentage growth rate. Even experienced analysts often under estimate the compounding effect of growth and how much revenues can balloon out over time with high growth rates. Computing the absolute change in revenues, given a growth rate in revenues, can be a sobering antidote to irrational exuberance when it comes to growth.

2.     Past history: Looking at past revenue growth rates for the firm in question should give us a sense of how growth rates have changed as the company size changed in the past. To those who are mathematically inclined, there are clues in the relationship that can be used for forecasting future growth.

3.     Sector data: The final tool is to look at revenue growth rates of more mature firms in the business, to get a sense of what a reasonable growth rate will be as the firm becomes larger.

In summary, expected revenue growth rates will tend to drop over time for all growth companies but the pace of the drop off will vary across companies.

Sustainable margins

To get from revenues to operating income, we need operating margins over time. The easiest and most convenient scenario is the one where the current margins of the firm being valued are sustainable and can be used as the expected margins over time. In fact, if this is the case, we can dispense with forecasting revenue growth and instead focus on operating income growth, since the two will be the equivalent. In most growth firms, though, it is more likely that the current margin is likely to change over time.

            Let us start with the most likely case first, which is that the current margin is either negative or too low, relative to the sustainable long-term margin. There are three reasons why this can happen. One is that the firm has up-front fixed costs that have to be incurred in the initial phases of growth, with the payoff in terms of revenue and growth in later periods. This is often the case with infrastructure companies such as energy, telecommunications and cable firms. The second is the mingling of expenses incurred to generate growth with operating expenses; we noted earlier that selling expenses at growth firms are often directed towards future growth rather than current sales but are included with other operating expenses. As the firm matures, this problem will get smaller, leading to higher margins and profits. The third is that there might be a lag between expenses being incurred and revenues being generated; if the expenses incurred this year are directed towards much higher revenues in 3 years, earnings and margins will be low today.

            The other possibility, where the current margin is too high and will decrease over time, is less likely but can occur, especially with growth companies that have a niche product in a small market. In fact, the market may be too small to attract the attention of larger, better-capitalized competitors, thus allowing the firms to operate under the radar for the moment, charging high prices to a captive market. As the firm grows, this will change and margins will decrease. In other cases, the high margins may come from owning a patent or other legal protection against competitors, and as this protection lapses, margins will decrease. 

            In both of the latter two scenarios – low margins converging to a higher value or high margins dropping back to more sustainable levels – we have to make judgment calls on what the target margin should be and how the current margin will change over time towards this target. The answer to the first question can be usually be found by looking at both the average operating margin for the industry in which the firm operates and the margins commanded by larger, more stable firms in that industry. The answer to the second will depend upon the reason for the divergence between the current and the target margin. With infrastructure companies, for instance, it will reflect how long it will take for the investment to be operational and capacity to be fully utilized.

Quality Growth

A constant theme in valuation is the insistence that growth is not free and that firms will have to reinvest to grow. To estimate reinvestment for a growth firm, we will follow one of three paths, depending largely upon the characteristics of the firm in question:

1.     For growth firms earlier in the life cycle, we will adopt the same roadmap we used for young growth companies, where we estimated reinvestment based upon the change in revenues and the sales to capital ratio.

Reinvestment_t = Change in revenues_t/ (Sales/Capital)

The sales to capital ratio can be estimated using the company's data (and it will be more stable than the net capital expenditure or working capital numbers) and the sector averages. Thus, assuming a sales to capital ratio of 2.5, in conjunction with a revenue increase of $ 250 million will result in reinvestment of $ 100 million.  We can build in lags between the reinvestment and revenue change into the computation, by using revenues in a future period to estimate reinvestment in the current one.

2.     With a growth firm that has a more established track record of earnings and reinvestment, we can use the relationship between fundamentals and growth rates that we laid out in chapter 2:

Expected growth rate in operating income = Return on Capital * Reinvestment Rate + Efficiency growth (as a result of changing return on capital)

In the unusual case where margins and returns and capital have settled into sustainable levels, the second term will drop out of the equation.

3.     Growth firms that have already invested in capacity for future years are in the unusual position of being able to grow with little or no reinvestment for the near term. For these firms, we can forecast capacity usage to determine how long the investment holiday will last and when the firm will have to reinvest again. During the investment holiday, reinvestment can be minimal or even zero, accompanied by healthy growth in revenues and operating income.

With all three classes of firms, though, the leeway that we have in estimating reinvestment needs during the high growth phase should disappear, once the firm has reached its mature phase. The reinvestment in the mature phase should hew strictly to fundamentals:

Reinvestment rate in mature phase = 

In fact, even in cases where reinvestment is estimated independently of the operating income during the growth period, and without recourse to the return on capital, we should keep track of the imputed return on capital (based on our forecasts of operating income and capital invested) to ensure that it stays within reasonable bounds.

The Little Book of Valuation

Aswath Damodaran

It's actually growth that determines value. You can't encapsulate the inherent value of a business in a P/E ratio.

Some of the market's biggest winners were trading at prices above 30 times earnings before they made their move.

A stock with a P/E below 10 may be a better deal than another trading at a P/E above 20. But then again it might not. 

The point is, when you become a part owner in a company, you have a claim not just on today's earnings, but all future profits as well. The faster the company is growing, the more that future cash flow stream is worth to shareholders.

That's why Warren Buffett likes to say that "growth and value are joined at the hip."

You can't encapsulate the inherent value of a business in a P/E ratio.  It's actually growth that determines value.  

The PEG ratio is used to evaluate a stock's valuation while taking into account earnings growth. A rule of thumb is that a PEG of 1.0 indicates fair value, less than 1.0 indicates the stock is undervalued, and more than 1.0 indicates it's overvalued.  Here's how it works:

If Stock ABC is trading with a P/E ratio of 25, a value investor might deem it "expensive." But if its earnings growth rate is projected to be 30%, its PEG ratio would be 25 / 30 PEG.83. The PEG ratio says that Stock ABC is undervalued relative to its growth potential.

It is important to realize that relying on one metric alone will almost never give you an accurate measure of value. Being able to use and interprete a number of measures will give you a better idea of the whole picture when evaluating a stock's performance and potential. 

Why We Look at the PEG Ratio

One of the more popular ratios stock analysts look at is the P/E, or price to earnings, ratio. The drawback to a P/E ratio is that it does not account for growth. A low P/E may seem like a positive sign for the stock, but if the company is not growing, its stock's value is also not likely to rise. The PEG ratio solves this problem by including a growth factor into its calculation. PEG is calculated by dividing the stock's P/E ratio by its expected 12 month growth rate. 

How to Score the PEG Ratio
Pass—Give the PEG Ratio a passing score if its value is less than 1.0.
Fail—Give the PEG Ratio a failing score if its value is greater than 1.0.

Calculating a Stock’s Risk-Reward Ratio by Jim Cramer

Calculating a Stock’s Risk-Reward Ratio
Published: Tuesday, 30 Aug 2011
By: CNBC.com


Focusing on a stock’s upside without giving proper consideration to potential losses, Cramer said Tuesday, can be “a grave mistake.” Too often people think only of the reward, without assessing the risk. And investors must calculate both.

“Because the pain from a big loss,” Cramer said, “hurts a whole lot more than the pleasure from an equivalent-sized gain.”

But how do you figure out the risk-reward on a stock? As a general rule, Cramer looks at the lowest price that a value-oriented money manager would pay for that stock to calculate the downside. For the upside, he uses the most a growth-focused manager would pay.

To arrive at these numbers, Cramer refers to something called “growth at a reasonable price,” or GARP, a method of stock analyzing first popularized by Peter Lynch. If you want to know just how much growth investors will pay, you need to understand GARP. And it involves a comparison of a stock’s growth rate to its price-to-earnings multiple.

But you can use this rule of thumb to figure out the value side of the equation, too, and here’s how Cramer does it: If a stock has a price-to-earnings multiple (PE) that’s lower than its growth rate, it’s probably cheap. And any stock that’s selling at a multiple that is twice the size of its growth rate or greater is probably too expensive and should be sold.

Example: A stock trading at 20 times earnings with only a 10 percent growth rate would be considered expensive. But the reverse—10 times earnings on a 20 percent growth rate—would be incredibly cheap.

This gives rise to another piece of Wall Street jargon: the PE-to-growth ratio, or PEG, which is the multiple divided by the stock’s long-term growth rate. A PEG of one or less is “extremely cheap,” Cramer said, while a PEG of two or more is “prohibitively expensive.”

This means then that the risk floor created by value investors will probably be somewhere near a stock’s PEG of one, while its ceiling, created by growth investors, rarely exceeds a PEG of two. That’s why Google [GOOG  570.11    -9.89  (-1.71%)   ] back between 2004 and 2007 was considered cheap, because its 30 percent long-term growth rate matched its 30 multiple. But if that multiple reached 60, growth managers would probably cash out of their positions.

There is one caveat to keep in mind, that this is a general rule of thumb, an approximation. But there are times when the numbers can be wrong. Cramer said stocks can look cheap based on earnings when those earnings estimates need to be cut, much like the banks and brokers were ahead of the 2008 crash. Or a stock could look cheap because its growth is slowing, like Dell[DELL  14.30    -0.53  (-3.57%)   ] after the dot-com collapse between 2000 and 2003. In these cases, the stock could trade well below a PEG of one, but that obviously doesn’t mean it’s a buy.

One final anomaly of multiples regards industrial companies, or cyclical names in general. The time to buy these stocks is when their multiples look outrageously high, Cramer said, because the earnings estimates are too low and read to be raised to catch up with their strengthening businesses.

(Written by Tom Brennan; Edited by Drew Sandholm)

http://www.cnbc.com/id/44334471/Calculating_a_Stock_s_Risk_Reward_Ratio