No of ordinary shares 16,710.8 million
Market price of MAS RM 0.315 (21.11.2013)
Market capitalization 5,263.9 m
18.11.2013
Income Statement
Latest quarterly result Q3 2013
Revenue 3,782.7 m
Loss -373.2 m
EPS -2.25 sen
Cumulative 9M 2013
Revenue 10,766.0 m
Loss -827.0 m
EPS -6.67 sen
Finance costs -331.5 m
Unrealised foreign exchange loss -175.7 m
Balance Sheet (30.9.2013)
NCA 15,378.6 m
CA 7,446.6 m
CL 8,211.6 m
NCL 10,253.8 m
TL 18,465.4 m
Equity 4,359.6 m
Cash 5,443.4 m
ST Borrowings 1,591.9 m
LT Borrowings 10,253.8 m
Total Borrowings 11,845.7 m
Net assets per share RM 0.26
Cash Flow Statement
CFI
Purchase of aircraft, PPE -3,242.7 m
Disposal of aircraft, PPE 846.5 m
CFF
Proceeds from:
Rights issue 3,074.8 m
Aircraft refinancing 833.0 m
Borrowings 1,910.0 m
Repayment of:
Borrowings -166.2 m
Finance lease -486.3 m
Capital changes
Weighted average number of ordinary shares
30.9.2013 16,710.8 m
30.9.2012 7,102.1 m
Keep INVESTING Simple and Safe (KISS) ****Investment Philosophy, Strategy and various Valuation Methods**** The same forces that bring risk into investing in the stock market also make possible the large gains many investors enjoy. It’s true that the fluctuations in the market make for losses as well as gains but if you have a proven strategy and stick with it over the long term you will be a winner!****Warren Buffett: Rule No. 1 - Never lose money. Rule No. 2 - Never forget Rule No. 1.
Showing posts with label MAS. Show all posts
Showing posts with label MAS. Show all posts
Thursday, 21 November 2013
Tuesday, 2 October 2012
The Malaysian Airline Business
The Malaysian Airline Business
by etheorist
Now that the "low-cost" airline has successfully crippled the "national flag carrier", it does look like the small fly may eat the big bug, in small snatches.
Introducing the low cost airline cannot be to "increase competition" of the Malaysian aviation industry. You have two totally different products: one "full cost" and the other "low cost". In no way should "full cost" be thought of as "high cost" and "low cost" to be "better value". It is just the way the competitor has cleverly maneuvered itself into the public psyche that created this perception. If pricing is cost-plus, then one should be getting probably almost the same value for the services rendered.
As a corollary, it is also true that "low cost" means "low price" (which the airline is now trying to reposition itself) but not necessarily "better value." The apparent disgust that the low cost operator treats its customers must be something that the average consumer must constantly deal with which in more technical parlance means the loss of consumer rights. It is OK for the operator not to deliver as promised, but woe betide the consumer who happens to try to alter a little bit of the contract. It is this lopsidedness that is the peculiar feature of the "business model" of the low cost flyer, and not its much touted greater "operational efficiency". If you set a computer system to deal with customers who have not way to communicate back to the system, and if you program the computer system to generate a certain amount of profit from every customer, then obviously you are going to get that profit as programmed. Once the "parameters" change, as we see the low cost flyer pulling out of Europe, then you know that it is out of its depth to cope with a more challenging environment.
It is not rocket science to know that to get the average price down, every flight must operate at a certain high capacity. It is this targeting that we see to be promotional strategy of the low cost flyer, as well as the constant attempt to juggle flights in order to pack passengers into a certain targeted "high capacity" which is otherwise termed as operational efficiency.
The national carrier becomes disoriented when the low cost flyer enters the story. How does one compete with a "low cost" competitor? This is the wrong question. The correct response is how to redefine the full-cost market now that the competitor is going to soak up all the cheap customers. It is not surprising if the first impact the national carrier feels is that more than half of its customers are all gone. If we work on the simple Pareto rule of 20% business class and 80% economy class and if the normal capacity on the economy class is 60% and if half of the 80% is lost to the competitor, then you have a mix of 20% business class and 20% economy class. It is instant death to the national carrier.
The objective of the national carrier must be to concentrate on how to get back its economy class passengers. By imitating the competitor in its treatment of customers, the national carrier takes the risk of alienating itself from its customer base. Its computer system is not geared to dealing with online booking and changes to online booking. It simply does not know how to handling this cut-throat business of low price. Instead, the national carrier should build up a new market for traditional full-service flying and at the same time overhaul its operating system to lower cost by automating more of its internal operations. Instead, the national carrier tries to become a low cost flyer and in the process simply cannot compete as the low cost competitor is king in the business of low cost flying. It automates all its external communications with the customers, an area where the old method should have given it an edge. The national carrier has fallen into a trap, all on its own doing.
At the end of the day, probably one of the most vital factors that determines which airline survives in this globally competitive business is its management of its cost of fuel - supposedly a major cost element. If this is set right, all the other costs are small in comparison. If the fuel cost is too high, then it has to weather it. The low cost flyer simply pass this down to the average consumer in the form of a "fuel surcharge" which really is one of the most appalling abuses of consumers in the market place. Unable to get a team to get its fuel cost right, the response to saving the national carrier is to send in a marketing and accounting team to manage the accounts, and probably not the operations. The operations can only deteriorate with neglect.
So how does one then "rationalise" the national carrier with the low cost flyer? It is as if the low cost flyer has business class travellers to bring to the table, while it will certainly try to soak up the remaining of the economy class passengers from the national carrier. There is also room for further cannibalism by the small of the big. What other experience and expertise does one have that the other does not have.
The Malaysian airline business may just be one episode that shows the general fragility of the national economic fabric. There is a lot of communications and clever talk, but all those who could do are sidelined and relegated to the dungeon to work in the galley to keep the ship going.
Introducing the low cost airline cannot be to "increase competition" of the Malaysian aviation industry. You have two totally different products: one "full cost" and the other "low cost". In no way should "full cost" be thought of as "high cost" and "low cost" to be "better value". It is just the way the competitor has cleverly maneuvered itself into the public psyche that created this perception. If pricing is cost-plus, then one should be getting probably almost the same value for the services rendered.
As a corollary, it is also true that "low cost" means "low price" (which the airline is now trying to reposition itself) but not necessarily "better value." The apparent disgust that the low cost operator treats its customers must be something that the average consumer must constantly deal with which in more technical parlance means the loss of consumer rights. It is OK for the operator not to deliver as promised, but woe betide the consumer who happens to try to alter a little bit of the contract. It is this lopsidedness that is the peculiar feature of the "business model" of the low cost flyer, and not its much touted greater "operational efficiency". If you set a computer system to deal with customers who have not way to communicate back to the system, and if you program the computer system to generate a certain amount of profit from every customer, then obviously you are going to get that profit as programmed. Once the "parameters" change, as we see the low cost flyer pulling out of Europe, then you know that it is out of its depth to cope with a more challenging environment.
It is not rocket science to know that to get the average price down, every flight must operate at a certain high capacity. It is this targeting that we see to be promotional strategy of the low cost flyer, as well as the constant attempt to juggle flights in order to pack passengers into a certain targeted "high capacity" which is otherwise termed as operational efficiency.
The national carrier becomes disoriented when the low cost flyer enters the story. How does one compete with a "low cost" competitor? This is the wrong question. The correct response is how to redefine the full-cost market now that the competitor is going to soak up all the cheap customers. It is not surprising if the first impact the national carrier feels is that more than half of its customers are all gone. If we work on the simple Pareto rule of 20% business class and 80% economy class and if the normal capacity on the economy class is 60% and if half of the 80% is lost to the competitor, then you have a mix of 20% business class and 20% economy class. It is instant death to the national carrier.
The objective of the national carrier must be to concentrate on how to get back its economy class passengers. By imitating the competitor in its treatment of customers, the national carrier takes the risk of alienating itself from its customer base. Its computer system is not geared to dealing with online booking and changes to online booking. It simply does not know how to handling this cut-throat business of low price. Instead, the national carrier should build up a new market for traditional full-service flying and at the same time overhaul its operating system to lower cost by automating more of its internal operations. Instead, the national carrier tries to become a low cost flyer and in the process simply cannot compete as the low cost competitor is king in the business of low cost flying. It automates all its external communications with the customers, an area where the old method should have given it an edge. The national carrier has fallen into a trap, all on its own doing.
At the end of the day, probably one of the most vital factors that determines which airline survives in this globally competitive business is its management of its cost of fuel - supposedly a major cost element. If this is set right, all the other costs are small in comparison. If the fuel cost is too high, then it has to weather it. The low cost flyer simply pass this down to the average consumer in the form of a "fuel surcharge" which really is one of the most appalling abuses of consumers in the market place. Unable to get a team to get its fuel cost right, the response to saving the national carrier is to send in a marketing and accounting team to manage the accounts, and probably not the operations. The operations can only deteriorate with neglect.
So how does one then "rationalise" the national carrier with the low cost flyer? It is as if the low cost flyer has business class travellers to bring to the table, while it will certainly try to soak up the remaining of the economy class passengers from the national carrier. There is also room for further cannibalism by the small of the big. What other experience and expertise does one have that the other does not have.
The Malaysian airline business may just be one episode that shows the general fragility of the national economic fabric. There is a lot of communications and clever talk, but all those who could do are sidelined and relegated to the dungeon to work in the galley to keep the ship going.
Thursday, 30 August 2012
Malaysia Airline System (MAS) - Return on Retained Earnings
MAS | ||||||
Year | DPS | EPS | Retained EPS | |||
2002 | 0 | -2.9 | -2.9 | |||
2003 | 1.9 | 18.9 | 17 | |||
2004 | 1.9 | 18.2 | 16.3 | |||
2005 | 1.9 | -101 | -102.9 | |||
2006 | 0 | -17.7 | -17.7 | |||
2007 | 0 | 26.1 | 26.1 | |||
2008 | 2.1 | 16.3 | 14.2 | |||
2009 | 0 | 25.2 | 25.2 | |||
2010 | 0 | 5.2 | 5.2 | |||
2011 | 0 | -79.7 | P | -79.7 | ||
2012 | ||||||
Total | 7.8 | -91.4 | -99.2 | |||
From | 2002 | to | 2011 | |||
EPS increase (sen) | -76.8 | |||||
DPO | -9% | |||||
Return on retained earnings | 77% | |||||
(Figures are in sens) |
Saturday, 23 June 2012
Investor's Checklist: Business Services
Understand the business model. Knowing if a company leverages technology, people, or hard assets will provide insight as to the kind of financial results the company may produce.
Look for scale and operating leverage. These characteristics can provide significant barriers to entry and lead to impressive financial performance.
Look for recurring revenue. Long-term customer contracts can guarantee certain levels of revenue for years into the future. This can provide a degree of stability in financial results.
Focus on cash flow. Investors ultimately earn returns based on a company's cash-generating ability. Avoid investments that aren't expected to generate adequate cash flow.
Size the market opportunity. Industries with big, untapped market opportunities provide an attractive environment for high growth. In addition, companies chasing markets perceived to be big enough to accommodate growth for all industry participants are less likely to compete on price alone.
Examine growth expectations. Understand what kind of growth rates are incorporated into the share price. If the rates of growth are unrealistic, avoid the stock.
Ref: The Five Rules for Successful Stock Investing by Pat Dorsey
Read also:
Investor's Checklist: A Guided Tour of the Market...
Look for scale and operating leverage. These characteristics can provide significant barriers to entry and lead to impressive financial performance.
Look for recurring revenue. Long-term customer contracts can guarantee certain levels of revenue for years into the future. This can provide a degree of stability in financial results.
Focus on cash flow. Investors ultimately earn returns based on a company's cash-generating ability. Avoid investments that aren't expected to generate adequate cash flow.
Size the market opportunity. Industries with big, untapped market opportunities provide an attractive environment for high growth. In addition, companies chasing markets perceived to be big enough to accommodate growth for all industry participants are less likely to compete on price alone.
Examine growth expectations. Understand what kind of growth rates are incorporated into the share price. If the rates of growth are unrealistic, avoid the stock.
Ref: The Five Rules for Successful Stock Investing by Pat Dorsey
Read also:
Investor's Checklist: A Guided Tour of the Market...
Labels:
Air Asia,
Business services,
CHECK LIST,
Freight,
Integrax,
JobStreet,
MAS,
maybulk,
Moody,
MYEG,
Transmile,
VADS
Friday, 14 May 2010
Investor's Checklist: Hard-Asset-Based Businesses
Companies in the hard asset based subsector depend on big investments in fixed assets to grow their businesses. Airlines, waste haulers and expedited delivery companies all fall into this subsector. In general, these companies aren't as attractive as technology-based businesses, but investors can still find some wide-moat stocks and good investments in this area.
Industry Structure
Growth for hard asset based businesses inevitably requires large incremental outlays for fixed assets. After all, once an airline is flying full planes, the only way to get more passengers from point A to point B is to acquire an additional aircraft, which can cost US $35 million or more.
Because the incremental fixed investment occurs before asset deployment, companies in this sector generally finance their growth with external funding. Debt can be used to finance almost all of the asset's cost, so lenders generally require the asset to provide collateral against the loan. With this model, high leverage is not necessarily a bad thing, provided that the company can make enough money deploying the asset to cover the cost of debt financing and earn a reasonable return for shareholders.
Subsector: Airlines
(With this in mind, airlines are generally the least attractive investment of all the companies in this subsector. Airlines must bear enormous fixed costs to maintain their fleets and meet the demands of expensive labour contracts, yet they sell a commodity service that's difficult to differentiate. As a result, price competition is intense, profit margins are razor-thin - and often non-existent - and operating leverage is so high that the firms can swing from being wildly profitable to nearly bankrupt in a short time. If you don't think this sounds like a recipe for good long-term investments, you're right - airlines have lost a collective $11 billion (excluding the impact of recent government handouts) between deregulation in 1978 and 2002. Over the same time period, 125 airlines had filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection and 12 of them filed for Chapter 7 liquidation.)
Hallmarks of Success for Hard-Asset-Based Businesses
Cost leadership: Because hard-asset based companies have large fixed costs, those that deliver their products most efficiently have a strong advantage and can achieve superior financial performance, such as Southwest in the airline industry. To get an idea about how efficiently a company operates, look at its fixed asset turnover, operating margins and ROIC - and compare its numbers to industry peers.
Prudent financing: Remember, having a load of debt is not itself a bad thing. Having a load of debt that cannot be easily financed by the cash flow of the business is a recipe for disaster. When analysing companies with high debt, always be sure that the debt can be serviced from free cash flow, even under a downside scenario.
Investor's Checklist: Hard-Asset-Based Businesses
Industry Structure
Growth for hard asset based businesses inevitably requires large incremental outlays for fixed assets. After all, once an airline is flying full planes, the only way to get more passengers from point A to point B is to acquire an additional aircraft, which can cost US $35 million or more.
Because the incremental fixed investment occurs before asset deployment, companies in this sector generally finance their growth with external funding. Debt can be used to finance almost all of the asset's cost, so lenders generally require the asset to provide collateral against the loan. With this model, high leverage is not necessarily a bad thing, provided that the company can make enough money deploying the asset to cover the cost of debt financing and earn a reasonable return for shareholders.
Subsector: Airlines
(With this in mind, airlines are generally the least attractive investment of all the companies in this subsector. Airlines must bear enormous fixed costs to maintain their fleets and meet the demands of expensive labour contracts, yet they sell a commodity service that's difficult to differentiate. As a result, price competition is intense, profit margins are razor-thin - and often non-existent - and operating leverage is so high that the firms can swing from being wildly profitable to nearly bankrupt in a short time. If you don't think this sounds like a recipe for good long-term investments, you're right - airlines have lost a collective $11 billion (excluding the impact of recent government handouts) between deregulation in 1978 and 2002. Over the same time period, 125 airlines had filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection and 12 of them filed for Chapter 7 liquidation.)
Hallmarks of Success for Hard-Asset-Based Businesses
Cost leadership: Because hard-asset based companies have large fixed costs, those that deliver their products most efficiently have a strong advantage and can achieve superior financial performance, such as Southwest in the airline industry. To get an idea about how efficiently a company operates, look at its fixed asset turnover, operating margins and ROIC - and compare its numbers to industry peers.
Prudent financing: Remember, having a load of debt is not itself a bad thing. Having a load of debt that cannot be easily financed by the cash flow of the business is a recipe for disaster. When analysing companies with high debt, always be sure that the debt can be serviced from free cash flow, even under a downside scenario.
Investor's Checklist: Hard-Asset-Based Businesses
- Understand the business model. Knowing a company leverages on hard assets will provide insight as to the kind of financial results the company may produce.
- Look for scale and operating leverage. These characteristics can provide significant barriers to entry and lead to impressive financial performance.
- Look for recurring revenue. Long-term customer contracts can guarantee certain levels of revenue for years into the future. This can provide a degree of stability in financial results.
- Focus on cash flow. Investors ultimately earn returns based on a company's cash-generating ability. Avoid investments that aren't expected to generate adequate cash flow.
- Size the market opportunity. Industries with big, untapped market opportunities provide an attractive environment for high growth. In addition, companies chasing markets perceived to be big enough to accommodate growth for all industry participants are less likely to compete on price alone.
- Examine growth expectations. Understand what kind of growth rates are incorporated into the share price. If the rates of growth are unrealistic, avoid the stock.
The Five Rules for Successful Stock Investing
by Pat Dorsey
Thursday, 24 December 2009
Sunday, 3 May 2009
Understanding the business model: Hard-Asset-Based Businesses
Companies in the hard-asset-based subsector depend on big investments in fixed assets to grow their businesses. Airlines, waste haulers (Waste Management, Allied Waste, Republic Services), and expedited delivery companies (FedEx, UPS) all fall into this subsector.
In general, these companies aren't as attractive as technology-based businesses, but investors can still find some wide-moat stocks and good investments in this area.
Industry Structure
Growth for hard-asset-based businesses inevitably requires large incremental outlays for fixed assets. After all, once an airline is flyinng full planes, the only way to get more passengers from point A to point B is to acquire an additional aircraft, which can cost $35 million or more.
Because the incremental fixed investment occurs before asset deployment, companies in this sector generally finance their growth with external funding. Debt can be used to finance almost all of the asset's cost, so lenders generally require the asset to provide collateral against the loan. With this model, high leverage is not necessarily a bad thing, provided that the company can make enough money deploying the asset to cover the cost of debt financing and earn a reasonable return for shareholders.
With this in mind, airlines are generally the least attractive investment of all the companies in this subsector. Airlines must bear enormous fixed costs to maintain their fleets and meet the demands of expensive labour contracts, yet they sell a commodity service that's difficult to differentiate. As a result price competition is intense, profit margins are razor-thin - and often non-existent - and operating leverage is so high that the firms can swing from being wildly profitable to nearly bankrupt in a short time. If you don't think this sounds like a recipe for good long-term investments, you're right - airlines have lost a collective $11 billion (excluding the impact of recent government handouts) between deregulation in 1987 and 2002. Over the same time period, 125 airlines had filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, and 12 of them filed for Chapter 7 liquidation.
But despite the terrible performance for airlines in general, a few carriers have fared very well. Southwest, for one, has been profitable for 30 consecutive years - an amazing achievement considering the cyclicality of its business and the dismal operating environment for the industry in 2002. Southwest's superior financial performance is largely because of its main strategic advantage: a low cost structure driven by its practice of flying one type of aircraft for all its no frills, point-to-point routes. In an industry with less-than-desirable fundamentals, Southwest has achieved superior financial results by deploying a different and dominant, business strategy.
Other characteristics of hard-asset-based businesses make this segment worth watching. The idea of limited or shrinking assets, for example, can go a long way to provide stability in the competitive landscape for these companies. Because of the NIMBY (not in my back yard) principle, it is very difficult to get approval for new landfill sites. As a result, it is highly unlikely that new competitors will enter the landfill side of the waste management business. That puts a company such as Waste Management, which owns 40 percent of the total U.S. disposal capacity via its 300 landfills, at an advantage.
The majority of hard-asset-based companies fall into the narrow- or no-moat buckets. With few, if any, competitive advantages for many of these companies, investors should look for a pretty steep discount to a fair value estimate before buying shares.
Hallmark of Success for Hard-Asset-Based Businesses
Cost leadership: Because hard-asset-based companies have large fixed costs, those that deliver their products most efficiently have a strong advantage and can achieve superior financial performance, such as Southwest in the airline industry. Firms don't usually advertise their cost structures per se, so to get an idea about how efficiently a company operatees, look at its fixed assets turnover, operating margins, and ROIC - and compare its numbers to industry peers.
Unique assets: When limited assets are required to fulfill the delivery of a particular service, ownership of those assets is key. For example, Waste Management's numerous, well-located landfill assets represent a significant competitive advantage and brrier to entry in the waste management market because it's unlikely that enough new landfill locations will get government approval to diminish its share of this business.
Prudent financing: Remember, having a load of debt is not itself a bad thing. Having a load of debt that cannot be easily financed by the cash flow of the business is a reccipe for disaster. When analyzing companies with high debt, always be sure that the debt can be serviced from free cash flow, even under a downside scenario.
(Some Malaysian companies in this hard-asset-based businesses are Air Asia, MAS, Maybulk and Transmile.)
Ref: The Five Rules for Successful Stock Investing by Pat Dorsey
In general, these companies aren't as attractive as technology-based businesses, but investors can still find some wide-moat stocks and good investments in this area.
Industry Structure
Growth for hard-asset-based businesses inevitably requires large incremental outlays for fixed assets. After all, once an airline is flyinng full planes, the only way to get more passengers from point A to point B is to acquire an additional aircraft, which can cost $35 million or more.
Because the incremental fixed investment occurs before asset deployment, companies in this sector generally finance their growth with external funding. Debt can be used to finance almost all of the asset's cost, so lenders generally require the asset to provide collateral against the loan. With this model, high leverage is not necessarily a bad thing, provided that the company can make enough money deploying the asset to cover the cost of debt financing and earn a reasonable return for shareholders.
With this in mind, airlines are generally the least attractive investment of all the companies in this subsector. Airlines must bear enormous fixed costs to maintain their fleets and meet the demands of expensive labour contracts, yet they sell a commodity service that's difficult to differentiate. As a result price competition is intense, profit margins are razor-thin - and often non-existent - and operating leverage is so high that the firms can swing from being wildly profitable to nearly bankrupt in a short time. If you don't think this sounds like a recipe for good long-term investments, you're right - airlines have lost a collective $11 billion (excluding the impact of recent government handouts) between deregulation in 1987 and 2002. Over the same time period, 125 airlines had filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, and 12 of them filed for Chapter 7 liquidation.
But despite the terrible performance for airlines in general, a few carriers have fared very well. Southwest, for one, has been profitable for 30 consecutive years - an amazing achievement considering the cyclicality of its business and the dismal operating environment for the industry in 2002. Southwest's superior financial performance is largely because of its main strategic advantage: a low cost structure driven by its practice of flying one type of aircraft for all its no frills, point-to-point routes. In an industry with less-than-desirable fundamentals, Southwest has achieved superior financial results by deploying a different and dominant, business strategy.
Other characteristics of hard-asset-based businesses make this segment worth watching. The idea of limited or shrinking assets, for example, can go a long way to provide stability in the competitive landscape for these companies. Because of the NIMBY (not in my back yard) principle, it is very difficult to get approval for new landfill sites. As a result, it is highly unlikely that new competitors will enter the landfill side of the waste management business. That puts a company such as Waste Management, which owns 40 percent of the total U.S. disposal capacity via its 300 landfills, at an advantage.
The majority of hard-asset-based companies fall into the narrow- or no-moat buckets. With few, if any, competitive advantages for many of these companies, investors should look for a pretty steep discount to a fair value estimate before buying shares.
Hallmark of Success for Hard-Asset-Based Businesses
Cost leadership: Because hard-asset-based companies have large fixed costs, those that deliver their products most efficiently have a strong advantage and can achieve superior financial performance, such as Southwest in the airline industry. Firms don't usually advertise their cost structures per se, so to get an idea about how efficiently a company operatees, look at its fixed assets turnover, operating margins, and ROIC - and compare its numbers to industry peers.
Unique assets: When limited assets are required to fulfill the delivery of a particular service, ownership of those assets is key. For example, Waste Management's numerous, well-located landfill assets represent a significant competitive advantage and brrier to entry in the waste management market because it's unlikely that enough new landfill locations will get government approval to diminish its share of this business.
Prudent financing: Remember, having a load of debt is not itself a bad thing. Having a load of debt that cannot be easily financed by the cash flow of the business is a reccipe for disaster. When analyzing companies with high debt, always be sure that the debt can be serviced from free cash flow, even under a downside scenario.
(Some Malaysian companies in this hard-asset-based businesses are Air Asia, MAS, Maybulk and Transmile.)
Ref: The Five Rules for Successful Stock Investing by Pat Dorsey
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