Buffett's Ratio Says Stocks Are Getting Interesting

17 August 2011
The art of cheap.

One of the hardest things to grasp in investing is that when the present turns the darkest, the future becomes the brightest. Warren Buffett once captured this with a famous and oft-repeated quote: "I will tell you how to become rich: Be fearful when others are greedy, and greedy when others are fearful."

There's another, more specific Buffett rule that gets less attention. In 2001, Buffett wrote an article for Fortune magazine laying out a few investing truisms. In short, you want to buy stocks when the total market capitalization of all public companies looks cheap in relation to that country's gross national product (similar to gross domestic product, or GDP). He called this technique "probably the best single measure of where valuations stand at any given moment."

He even threw around some numbers. "If the percentage relationship falls to the 70% or 80% area, buying stocks is likely to work very well for you."

Tallying up the total market value of all listed stocks isn't easy. Different analysts come up with different numbers. The most widely used method is the full capitalization version of the Wilshire 5000 index, which tracks the market cap of all U.S. companies "with readily available price data." Divide that index by gross national product, and you get Buffett's ratio.

Where are we today? After the market bloodbath of the past few weeks, the ratio of U.S. stocks to GNP recently hit 79% -- just below what I'd call Buffett's comfort zone.

^{Source: Dow Jones, St. Louis Fed, author's calculations.}

Understand what this does not mean:

• It does not mean stocks are bound to go up in the short run. No metric can predict that.
• It does not mean stocks won't fall further from here. A ratio becoming mildly attractive doesn't rule out the possibility of it becoming much more attractive. In fact, that's usually how it works. The history of bear markets is that of stocks becoming not just a little cheap, but obnoxiously cheap.

And importantly, other valuation metrics, such as the cyclically adjusted P/E ratio created by Yale professor Robert Shiller, still peg stocks as slightly overvalued.

But Buffett's metric means things start getting interesting. Forty years of data show there's a fairly strong correlation between Buffett's ratio and stock returns two years hence. At 79%, today's ratio is in a range that has historically set investors up for decent future returns:

U.S. Stocks as % of GNP	Average Subsequent 2-Year Return
< 60%	21%
60%-80%	24%
80%-100%	13%
> 100%	(4%)

^{Source: Dow Jones, St. Louis Fed, author's calculations. Data since 1971.}

There are no certainties. There are no promises. But investing gets interesting when the odds of success are in your favour. Buffett's ratio suggests those odds are now pretty good. If you were excited about stocks a month ago, you should be thrilled about them today. Indeed, many of us are. 

"The lower things go, the more I buy," Buffett said last week. How about you?

http://www.fool.co.uk/news/investing/2011/08/17/buffetts-ratio-says-stocks-are-getting-interesting.aspx

Is the Stock Market Cheap?

Is the Stock Market Cheap?
March 19, 2010  mid-month update 
Here's the latest update of my preferred market valuation method using the most recent Standard & Poor's "as reported" earnings and earnings estimates and the index monthly averages of daily closes through February 2010, with the latest numbers based on the current index price around 1165.

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● TTM P/E ratio = 20.6
● P/E10 ratio = 21.5

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Background
A standard way to investigate market valuation is to study the historic Price-to-Earnings (P/E) ratio using reported earnings for the trailing twelve months (TTM). Proponents of this approach ignore forward estimates because they are often based on wishful thinking, erroneous assumptions, and analyst bias.


The "price" part of the P/E calculation is available in real time on TV and the Internet. The "earnings" part, however, is more difficult to find. The authoritative source is the Standard & Poor's website, where the latest numbers are posted on the earnings page. Click on the Index Earnings link in the right hand column. Free registration is now required to access the data. Once you've downloaded the spreadsheet, see the data in column D.
The table here shows the TTM earnings based on "as reported" earnings and a combination of "as reported" earnings and Standard & Poor's estimates for "as reported" earnings for the next few quarters. The values for the months between are linear interpolations from the quarterly numbers.

The average P/E ratio since the 1870's has been about 15. But the disconnect between price and TTM earnings during much of 2009 was so extreme that the P/E ratio was in triple digits — as high as 122 — in the Spring of 2009. At the top of the Tech Bubble in 2000, the conventional P/E ratio was a mere 30. It peaked north of 47 two years after the market topped out.

As these examples illustrate, in times of critical importance, the conventional P/E ratio often lags the index to the point of being useless as a value indicator. "Why the lag?" you may wonder. "How can the P/E be at a record high after the price has fallen so far?" The explanation is simple. Earnings fell faster than price. In fact, the negative earnings of 2008 Q4 (-$23.25) is something that has never happened before in the history of the S&P 500.

The P/E10 Ratio
Legendary economist and value investor Benjamin Graham noticed the same bizarre P/E behavior during the Roaring Twenties and subsequent market crash. Graham collaborated with David Dodd to devise a more accurate way to calculate the market's value, which they discussed in their 1934 classic book, Security Analysis. They attributed the illogical P/E ratios to temporary and sometimes extreme fluctuations in the business cycle. Their solution was to divide the price by the 10-year average of earnings, which we'll call the P/E10. In recent years, Yale professor Robert Shiller, the author of Irrational Exuberance, has reintroduced the P/E10 to a wider audience of investors. As the accompanying chart illustrates, this ratio closely tracks the real (inflation-adjusted) price of the S&P Composite. The historic P/E10 average is 16.3.

The Current P/E10
After dropping to 13.4 in March 2009, the P/E10 rebounded above 20. The chart below gives us a historical context for these numbers. The ratio in this chart is doubly smoothed (10-year average of earnings and monthly averages of daily closing prices). Thus the fluctuations during the month aren't especially relevant (e.g., the difference between the monthly average and monthly close P/E10).

Of course, the historic P/E10 has never flat-lined on the average. On the contrary, over the long haul it swings dramatically between the over- and under-valued ranges. If we look at the major peaks and troughs in the P/E10, we see that the high during the Tech Bubble was the all-time high of 44 in December 1999. The 1929 high of 32 comes in at a distant second. The secular bottoms in 1921, 1932, 1942 and 1982 saw P/E10 ratios in the single digits.

Where does the current valuation put us?
For a more precise view of how today's P/E10 relates to the past, our chart includes horizontal bands to divide the monthly valuations into quintiles — five groups, each with 20% of the total. Ratios in the top 20% suggest a highly overvalued market, the bottom 20% a highly undervalued market. What can we learn from this analysis? Over the past several months, the decline from the all-time P/E10 high dramatically accelerated toward value territory, with the ratio dropping from the 1st to the upper 4th quintile in March 2009. The price rebound since the 2009 low has now pushed the ratio into the 1st quintile — quite expensive!

A more cautionary observation is that every time the P/E10 has fallen from the first to the fourth quintile, it has ultimately declined to the fifth quintile and bottomed in single digits. Based on the latest 10-year earnings average, to reach a P/E10 in the high single digits would require an S&P 500 price decline below 600. Of course, a happier alternative would be for corporate earnings to make a strong and prolonged surge. When might we see the P/E10 bottom? These secular declines have ranged in length from over 19 years to as few as three. The current decline is now in its tenth year.

Or was March 2009 the beginning of a secular bull market? Perhaps, but the history of market valuations doesn't encourage optimism. 

http://dshort.com/articles/SP-Composite-pe-ratios.html