****Buffett (1992): Do not categorise stocks into growth and value types, the two approaches are joined at the hip

 

****Buffett (1992): Do not categorise stocks into growth and value types, the two approaches are joined at the hip

https://myinvestingnotes.blogspot.com/2010/04/buffett-1992-do-not-categorise-stocks.html

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Here is a summary of Warren Buffett's key points from his 1992 shareholder letter:

Core Argument: The traditional division between "value" and "growth" investing is a false and unhelpful dichotomy. True investing is always about seeking value.

Key Takeaways:

1. Growth and Value Are Inseparable: Growth is a critical component in calculating a business's intrinsic value. Its impact can be positive, negative, or negligible, but it is always a variable in the valuation equation.

2. "Value Investing" is Redundant: All legitimate investing is the pursuit of value. Paying more for a stock than its calculated intrinsic value is speculation, not investing.

3. Surface Metrics Are Misleading: Traditional "value" indicators (low P/E, low P/B, high yield) or "growth" indicators (high P/E, high P/B) are not definitive. A stock with a high P/E can still be a "value" purchase if its intrinsic value is even higher.

4. Growth Alone Does Not Create Value: Growth only benefits investors when the business can generate returns on its incremental capital that exceed its cost of capital. Profitable growth that consumes vast amounts of capital can destroy shareholder value (e.g., the airline industry).

5. The Crucial Metric is Return on Capital: The primary determinant of value is not profit growth itself, but the amount of capital required to achieve that growth. The lower the capital consumed for a given level of growth, the higher the intrinsic value.

Practical Investor Lesson: Investors should avoid companies and sectors where fast profit growth is accompanied by low returns on capital employed (below the cost of capital). The focus must be on the relationship between growth, capital required, and the resulting returns.

Buffett (1980): The true value is determined by the intrinsic value of the company and not the dividends.

Wednesday, 31 March 2010

Buffett (1980): The true value is determined by the intrinsic value of the company and not the dividends.

https://myinvestingnotes.blogspot.com/2010/03/buffett-true-value-is-determined-by.html

Warren Buffett in his 1980 letter to the shareholders of Berks

hire Hathaway:

"The value to Berkshire Hathaway of retained earnings is not determined by whether we own 100%, 50%, 20% or 1% of the businesses in which they reside. Rather, the value of those retained earnings is determined by the use to which they are put and the subsequent level of earnings produced by that usage."

======

Buffett’s thinking from that 1980 letter.

Let’s break down and expand upon the key ideas you’ve highlighted:

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1. Intrinsic Value vs. Dividends in Accounting

Buffett was criticizing the accounting convention that focused on dividends received from partially owned companies as the measure of value for the owning company.
He argued that the real worth to Berkshire wasn’t the dividend payout, but the proportionate share of the underlying business’s intrinsic value — regardless of whether those earnings were paid out or retained.

Your Indian example — valuing M&M based only on dividends from Tech Mahindra, rather than 20% of Tech Mahindra’s intrinsic value — perfectly illustrates the flawed accounting viewpoint.
If Tech Mahindra reinvests its earnings profitably, the retained earnings compound and increase the intrinsic value of M&M’s stake far beyond the dividends received.
Accounting rules at the time (and to a large extent still today) fail to capture this unless ownership exceeds a certain threshold (e.g., consolidation or equity method with impairment tests, but still not intrinsic-value based).

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2. Retained Earnings: Value Depends on Use

Buffett’s core point:

“The value of retained earnings is determined by the use to which they are put and the subsequent level of earnings produced.”

This means it’s not retention itself that creates value, but the return on reinvested capital. If a business can reinvest earnings at high rates of return, retaining earnings adds more value than paying dividends.
If it can’t find good reinvestment opportunities, returning capital to shareholders (via dividends or buybacks) is better.

For partial ownership, even if you don’t control the capital allocation decisions, if the investee company reinvests earnings well, your share of its value grows without you receiving cash dividends.
That’s why Berkshire’s holdings in companies like Coca-Cola or See’s Candies were worth far more than the dividends indicated — because retained earnings were deployed into high-return operations.

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3. Buybacks at a Discount to Intrinsic Value

The second quote contrasts corporate acquisitions (often full-price or overpay in competitive bidding) with stock buybacks in the open market (where shares can sometimes be bought far below intrinsic value).

Key takeaways:

• Acquisition market = auction between corporations → often pays premium to intrinsic value.

• Stock market = sometimes an auction where sellers panic → can buy parts of a business at a discount.

Buffett loves buybacks when:

1. The stock trades below intrinsic value.

2. The company has excess cash and no better investment opportunities.

Buybacks increase per-share intrinsic value by reducing shares outstanding, effectively giving remaining shareholders a larger claim on future earnings at a bargain price.

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4. Relevance Today

These principles remain central to value investing:

• Look-through earnings: When evaluating holdings, include your share of undistributed earnings of subsidiaries/associates if they are reinvested well.

• Capital allocation priority:

  1. Reinvest in high-return projects.

  2. Acquire other businesses at fair prices.

  3. Buy back stock when cheap.

  4. Pay dividends if no better use.

The accounting standards (e.g., IFRS 9, ASC 323) still don’t fully reflect “look-through” intrinsic value for minority holdings — they focus on dividends, fair value changes, or equity-accounted earnings, but not necessarily the full economic value of retained earnings compounding inside the investee.

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5. Buffett’s Broader Philosophy

The 1980 letter segment you’re discussing fits into Buffett’s larger framework:

• Own businesses, not stocks → value comes from underlying business performance.

• Mr. Market offers opportunities to buy/sell pieces of businesses at irrational prices.

• Management’s job is to increase per-share intrinsic value over time, not to cater to short-term stock prices.

By ignoring dividends as the sole measure of value from investments and focusing on the growth in intrinsic value, Buffett built Berkshire’s worth far beyond what dividend-based accounting would suggest.

=====

SUMMARY

Here is a summary of the article's key points:

Core Argument

Warren Buffett, in his 1980 letter, argues that the true economic value of a company's stake in another business is not determined by the dividends it receives, but by its share of the intrinsic value of the underlying business. Accounting standards that focus on dividend income are misleading.

Main Points

1. Intrinsic Value Over Dividends:

   • If Company A owns 20% of Company B, the stake should be valued as 20% of Company B's intrinsic value, not just 20% of the dividends paid out. This is because retained earnings reinvested into the business can create far more long-term value.

   • Example: Valuing M&M based only on the dividends from its stake in Tech Mahindra would be incorrect; one must value its 20% ownership of Tech Mahindra itself.

2. Value of Retained Earnings:

   • The worth of retained earnings depends entirely on how effectively they are reinvested. If a business can reinvest earnings at a high rate of return, retaining them creates more value than paying them out as dividends.

3. Buybacks vs. Acquisitions:

   • Acquisitions often occur in a competitive auction, forcing acquirers to pay a "full" or inflated price.

   • Stock Buybacks, however, allow a company to buy parts of its own business in the open market, often at a significant discount to intrinsic value, especially during market panics.

   • Buffett strongly advocates for buybacks when a company's stock is trading below its intrinsic value, as it is the most efficient use of capital to increase per-share value for remaining shareholders.

Conclusion

Buffett’s philosophy centers on economic reality over accounting convention. A value investor should focus on the growth of intrinsic value from reinvested earnings and take advantage of market irrationality to buy ownership stakes at a discount.

12 Experts Explain The Secret To Buffett’s Success.

12 Experts Explain The Secret To Buffett’s Success. 

If you’re interested in finance, trying to crack the secret of Warren Buffett‘s success is as entertaining as it is maddening — an enticing Rubik’s cube for anyone looking to get rich. Buffett’s success is so elusive — and so far, unreplicated — that it took a team of Yale academics to determine the Oracle of Omaha does not owe his $73 billion fortune to magic.

“Buffett’s returns appear to be neither luck nor magic,” found a 2013 research paper published on Yale’s website, which boiled down Buffett’s actual secret sauce to “reward for use of leverage combined with a focus on cheap, safe, quality stocks.” (Not-so-secret, really: Buffett admitted to this strategy more than 30 years ago.)

Still, if asked to explain the source of his “alpha,” Buffett is as divided as his devotees — at times shmaltzy (“I found what I love to do very early”), other times coy (“You can’t produce a baby in one month by getting nine women pregnant”) and more often than not, completely blunt: “‘Price is what you pay; value is what you get.’ Whether we’re talking about socks or stocks, I like buying quality merchandise when it is marked down.”

We interviewed some of America’s biggest money experts, and threw them a gauntlet: Tell us the secret to Warren Buffett’s success.

Here’s how they explained the Oracle’s track record.

12 Experts on Why Warren Buffett Is Successful

1. His No. 1 focus is growing his wealth

According to Brandon Turner, real estate investor and co-host of “BiggerPockets Podcast,” Buffett has a single-track mind — and that’s worked well for him.

“I think Warren Buffett succeeded because he focused 100 percent on growing wealth above all other things,” Turner said. “He made it a point to continue his education his entire life and stick to sound business principles.“

2. He invests in businesses that aren’t competitive

“Warren Buffett identifies companies that generally don’t face an enormous amount of competition, and holds them for years — or forever,” said Clark Howard, a consumer expert and host of “The Clark Howard Show.” “His failures have tended to be in businesses that were too competitive.”

3. He doesn’t scare easy

Andrew Horowitz, CFP, author and host of “The Disciplined Investor,” told us Buffett owes his wealth to one factor: “Time. He has a holding period that appears to be infinite so he does not get spooked by market moves. He also knows that the best time to buy is when everyone else is selling.“

4. He doesn’t let his ego get in the way

Journalist Emma Johnson, host of “Like a Mother with Emma Johnson,” mentioned Buffett’s famous penchant for value investing — but said his real X-factor was his personality.

“As an investor, Buffett’s success is well-documented — he buys easy-to-understand companies with reasonable management and an intrinsic value. So easy, anyone can understand it,” Johnson said. “But Buffett’s success as a beloved public character is the real magic. We can attribute that to his humble persona: We love him for his habits that include banjo-playing, cheeseburger devotion and that he has lived in the same, relatively modest house in not-so-glamorous Omaha for 55 years. That he is self-made and earned 99 percent of his wealth after age 50 inspires us to believe that success is possible for all of us, and his adherence to a modest life of family and charity are great lessons on wealth that apply to us all. He’s both fabulous and accessible, and we love him for it.”

5. He takes advantage of a simple and age-old combination

Buffett uses a straightforward formula that pays off for anyone who gives it the time, said John Lee Dumas, founder and host of the podcast “Entrepreneur On Fire“: “Compound interest plus patience .”

6. He sticks to what he knows

“I don’t know much about Warren Buffett other than I’ve heard that he invests in what he ‘knows‘ and/or has ‘learned,'” said Matt Theriault, host of the podcast “Epic Real Estate Investing.” “In my experience, with the right education and information backing investment decisions, most people would be a success.“

7. He’s aggressively anti-stupid

According to Stephen Dubner, co-author of the best-selling “Freakonomics” series and host of “Freakonomics Radio,” Buffett has an unerring sense for what is just plain dumb.

8. He tries to be the best at one thing

Buffett focuses all his energy in one place, according to Laura Adams, a personal finance expert and host of “Money Girl.”

“Buffet’s success seems to come from passion for his work, good mentors early in his career, and striving to be the best at one thing — his consistent knack for identifying undervalued companies to invest in,” she said.

9. He thinks years in the future

Most investors are too short-sighted, Chris Hill, host of “Motley Fool Money,” told us.

“While many on Wall Street are thinking about the next quarter, Warren Buffett is thinking about the next five, ten, and twenty years,” he said. “That may seem like a small thing, but it is a radical departure from the short-term mindset that drives so much trading activity. It’s also why Buffett is the greatest investor we will ever see in our lifetimes.“

10. His investments are diversified and long-term

“He has said it many times: He invests only in things he understands (relying on his common sense, which we all have), he doesn’t put too much of his money into any one investment (called diversification), and his holding period is “forever” (called a long-term approach),” said Ric Edelman, chairman and CEO of Edelman Financial Services, and host of “The Truth About Money with Ric Edelman.” “The best part is that anyone can replicate the strategy used by Warren — and since it made him the world’s most successful investor, we all can become financially successful, too!“

11. He plays the No. 1 game for investors

When Robert Kiyosaki — inveterate investor and founder of “Rich Dad Radio Show” — was young, he learned about business and money by playing Monopoly.

Apparently, the Oracle of Omaha invests like he’s played the game a couple times himself. “He, too, plays the game of Monopoly in real life,” Kiyosaki told us.

12. He’s a “go-giver”

Farnoosh Torabi, financial strategist, author, and host of “So Money with Farnoosh Torabi,” told us Buffett’s truly outstanding factor is his largesse.

“He’s a go-giver,” she said. “He’s incredibly philanthropic and I’ve discovered from countless interviews with some of the most successful people on the planet that being a giving person with your money, time, ideas yields abundance in your life. Warren, consistently ranked as one of the world’s wealthiest individuals, has pledged to give away 99 percent of his fortune. That’s outstanding.”

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Trying to crack the secret of Warren Buffett's Success - use of leverage combined with a focus on cheap, safe, quality stocks.

According to Forbes' latest list of worldwide billionaires, Warren Buffett is worth more than $50 billion.

The octogenarian’s massive fortune was built through Berkshire Hathaway (NYSE: BRK-A)(NYSE: BRK-B), the company he’s been a controlling shareholder of since 1965. Since that time, Berkshire’s stock has appreciated nearly 600,000% (no, that’s not a typo!) versus 7,400% for the S&P 500 index.

At that rate of return, a $1,000 investment in Berkshire would have become roughly $6 million.

Much of the success at Berkshire has been driven by Buffett’s uncanny skill as an investor. During his career as CEO, he’s made billions for the company and its investors by buying top-notch companies like American Express (NYSE: AXP) and Coca-Cola (NYSE: KO) and holding the stocks for decades.

There’s a lot we can learn from Buffett

Fortunately, not only has Buffett been one of the most effective CEOs of the modern age, he’s also been one of the most transparent. For Berkshire, each year is capped by a letter to shareholders from Buffett that not only details the company’s results, but teaches readers general investing lessons in Buffett’s down-to-earth, folksy style. Outside of those letters, Buffett is also known for delivering some of the all-time most concise, elucidating quips about investing.


Ref:

Warren Buffett's Greatest Wisdom

Warren Buffett: Why stocks beat gold and bonds

February 9, 2012:

In an adaptation from his upcoming shareholder letter, the Oracle of Omaha explains why equities almost always beat the alternatives over time.

By Warren Buffett

FORTUNE -- Investing is often described as the process of laying out money now in the expectation of receiving more money in the future. At Berkshire Hathaway (BRKA) we take a more demanding approach, defining investing as the transfer to others of purchasing power now with the reasoned expectation of receiving more purchasing power -- after taxes have been paid on nominal gains -- in the future. More succinctly, investing is forgoing consumption now in order to have the ability to consume more at a later date.

From our definition there flows an important corollary: The riskiness of an investment is not measured by beta (a Wall Street term encompassing volatility and often used in measuring risk) but rather by the probability -- the reasoned probability -- of that investment causing its owner a loss of purchasing power over his contemplated holding period. Assets can fluctuate greatly in price and not be risky as long as they are reasonably certain to deliver increased purchasing power over their holding period. And as we will see, a nonfluctuating asset can be laden with risk.

Investment possibilities are both many and varied. There are three major categories, however, and it's important to understand the characteristics of each. So let's survey the field.

Investments that are denominated in a given currency include money-market funds, bonds, mortgages, bank deposits, and other instruments. Most of these currency-based investments are thought of as "safe." In truth they are among the most dangerous of assets. Their beta may be zero, but their risk is huge.

Over the past century these instruments have destroyed the purchasing power of investors in many countries, even as these holders continued to receive timely payments of interest and principal. This ugly result, moreover, will forever recur. Governments determine the ultimate value of money, and systemic forces will sometimes cause them to gravitate to policies that produce inflation. From time to time such policies spin out of control.

Even in the U.S., where the wish for a stable currency is strong, the dollar has fallen a staggering 86% in value since 1965, when I took over management of Berkshire. It takes no less than $7 today to buy what $1 did at that time. Consequently, a tax-free institution would have needed 4.3% interest annually from bond investments over that period to simply maintain its purchasing power. Its managers would have been kidding themselves if they thought of any portion of that interest as "income."

For taxpaying investors like you and me, the picture has been far worse. During the same 47-year period, continuous rolling of U.S. Treasury bills produced 5.7% annually. That sounds satisfactory. But if an individual investor paid personal income taxes at a rate averaging 25%, this 5.7% return would have yielded nothing in the way of real income. This investor's visible income tax would have stripped him of 1.4 points of the stated yield, and the invisible inflation tax would have devoured the remaining 4.3 points. It's noteworthy that the implicit inflation "tax" was more than triple the explicit income tax that our investor probably thought of as his main burden. "In God We Trust" may be imprinted on our currency, but the hand that activates our government's printing press has been all too human.

High interest rates, of course, can compensate purchasers for the inflation risk they face with currency-based investments -- and indeed, rates in the early 1980s did that job nicely. Current rates, however, do not come close to offsetting the purchasing-power risk that investors assume. Right now bonds should come with a warning label.

Warren Buffett: Your pick for Businessperson of the Year

Under today's conditions, therefore, I do not like currency-based investments. Even so, Berkshire holds significant amounts of them, primarily of the short-term variety. At Berkshire the need for ample liquidity occupies center stage and will never be slighted, however inadequate rates may be. Accommodating this need, we primarily hold U.S. Treasury bills, the only investment that can be counted on for liquidity under the most chaotic of economic conditions. Our working level for liquidity is $20 billion; $10 billion is our absolute minimum.

Beyond the requirements that liquidity and regulators impose on us, we will purchase currency-related securities only if they offer the possibility of unusual gain -- either because a particular credit is mispriced, as can occur in periodic junk-bond debacles, or because rates rise to a level that offers the possibility of realizing substantial capital gains on high-grade bonds when rates fall. Though we've exploited both opportunities in the past -- and may do so again -- we are now 180 degrees removed from such prospects. Today, a wry comment that Wall Streeter Shelby Cullom Davis made long ago seems apt: "Bonds promoted as offering risk-free returns are now priced to deliver return-free risk."

The second major category of investments involves assets that will never produce anything, but that are purchased in the buyer's hope that someone else -- who also knows that the assets will be forever unproductive -- will pay more for them in the future. Tulips, of all things, briefly became a favorite of such buyers in the 17th century.

This type of investment requires an expanding pool of buyers, who, in turn, are enticed because they believe the buying pool will expand still further. Owners are not inspired by what the asset itself can produce -- it will remain lifeless forever -- but rather by the belief that others will desire it even more avidly in the future.

The major asset in this category is gold, currently a huge favorite of investors who fear almost all other assets, especially paper money (of whose value, as noted, they are right to be fearful). Gold, however, has two significant shortcomings, being neither of much use nor procreative. True, gold has some industrial and decorative utility, but the demand for these purposes is both limited and incapable of soaking up new production. Meanwhile, if you own one ounce of gold for an eternity, you will still own one ounce at its end.

What motivates most gold purchasers is their belief that the ranks of the fearful will grow. During the past decade that belief has proved correct. Beyond that, the rising price has on its own generated additional buying enthusiasm, attracting purchasers who see the rise as validating an investment thesis. As "bandwagon" investors join any party, they create their own truth -- for a while.

Over the past 15 years, both Internet stocks and houses have demonstrated the extraordinary excesses that can be created by combining an initially sensible thesis with well-publicized rising prices. In these bubbles, an army of originally skeptical investors succumbed to the "proof " delivered by the market, and the pool of buyers -- for a time -- expanded sufficiently to keep the bandwagon rolling. But bubbles blown large enough inevitably pop. And then the old proverb is confirmed once again: "What the wise man does in the beginning, the fool does in the end."

Today the world's gold stock is about 170,000 metric tons. If all of this gold were melded together, it would form a cube of about 68 feet per side. (Picture it fitting comfortably within a baseball infield.) At $1,750 per ounce -- gold's price as I write this -- its value would be about $9.6 trillion. Call this cube pile A.

Let's now create a pile B costing an equal amount. For that, we could buy all U.S. cropland (400 million acres with output of about $200 billion annually), plus 16 Exxon Mobils (the world's most profitable company, one earning more than $40 billion annually). After these purchases, we would have about $1 trillion left over for walking-around money (no sense feeling strapped after this buying binge). Can you imagine an investor with $9.6 trillion selecting pile A over pile B?

Beyond the staggering valuation given the existing stock of gold, current prices make today's annual production of gold command about $160 billion. Buyers -- whether jewelry and industrial users, frightened individuals, or speculators -- must continually absorb this additional supply to merely maintain an equilibrium at present prices.

A century from now the 400 million acres of farmland will have produced staggering amounts of corn, wheat, cotton, and other crops -- and will continue to produce that valuable bounty, whatever the currency may be. Exxon Mobil (XOM) will probably have delivered trillions of dollars in dividends to its owners and will also hold assets worth many more trillions (and, remember, you get 16 Exxons). The 170,000 tons of gold will be unchanged in size and still incapable of producing anything. You can fondle the cube, but it will not respond.

Admittedly, when people a century from now are fearful, it's likely many will still rush to gold. I'm confident, however, that the $9.6 trillion current valuation of pile A will compound over the century at a rate far inferior to that achieved by pile B.

Our first two categories enjoy maximum popularity at peaks of fear: Terror over economic collapse drives individuals to currency-based assets, most particularly U.S. obligations, and fear of currency collapse fosters movement to sterile assets such as gold. We heard "cash is king" in late 2008, just when cash should have been deployed rather than held. Similarly, we heard "cash is trash" in the early 1980s just when fixed-dollar investments were at their most attractive level in memory. On those occasions, investors who required a supportive crowd paid dearly for that comfort.

My own preference -- and you knew this was coming -- is our third category: investment in productive assets, whether businesses, farms, or real estate. Ideally, these assets should have the ability in inflationary times to deliver output that will retain its purchasing-power value while requiring a minimum of new capital investment. Farms, real estate, and many businesses such as Coca-Cola (KO), IBM (IBM), and our own See's Candy meet that double-barreled test. Certain other companies -- think of our regulated utilities, for example -- fail it because inflation places heavy capital requirements on them. To earn more, their owners must invest more. Even so, these investments will remain superior to nonproductive or currency-based assets.

Whether the currency a century from now is based on gold, seashells, shark teeth, or a piece of paper (as today), people will be willing to exchange a couple of minutes of their daily labor for a Coca-Cola or some See's peanut brittle. In the future the U.S. population will move more goods, consume more food, and require more living space than it does now. People will forever exchange what they produce for what others produce.

Our country's businesses will continue to efficiently deliver goods and services wanted by our citizens. Metaphorically, these commercial "cows" will live for centuries and give ever greater quantities of "milk" to boot. Their value will be determined not by the medium of exchange but rather by their capacity to deliver milk. Proceeds from the sale of the milk will compound for the owners of the cows, just as they did during the 20th century when the Dow increased from 66 to 11,497 (and paid loads of dividends as well).

Berkshire's goal will be to increase its ownership of first-class businesses. Our first choice will be to own them in their entirety -- but we will also be owners by way of holding sizable amounts of marketable stocks. I believe that over any extended period of time this category of investing will prove to be the runaway winner among the three we've examined. More important, it will be by far the safest.

This article is from the February 27, 2012 issue of Fortune.

http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2012/02/09/warren-buffett-berkshire-shareholder-letter/

http://warrenbuffettresource.wordpress.com/2012/02/14/warren-buffett-why-stocks-beat-gold-and-bonds-fortune/

WARREN BUFFETT THE BILLIONAIRE NEXT DOOR GOES GLOBAL

Buffett (2002): Three suggestions to help an investor avoid firms with management of dubious intentions.

After enthralling readers with a wonderful treatise on how good corporate governance need to be practiced at firms in his 2002 letter to shareholders, Warren Buffett rounded off the discussion with three suggestions that could go a long way in helping an investor avoid firms with management of dubious intentions. What are these suggestions and what do they imply? Let us find out.

The 3 that count

The master says,  "First, beware of companies displaying weak accounting.There is seldom just one cockroach in the kitchen." If a company still does not expense options, or if its pension assumptions are fanciful, watch out. When managements take the low road in aspects that are visible, it is likely they are following a similar path behind the scenes.

On the second suggestion he says, "Unintelligible footnotes usually indicate untrustworthy management. If you can't understand a footnote or other managerial explanation, its usually because the CEO doesn't want you to."

And so far the final suggestion is concerned, he concludes, "Be suspicious of companies that trumpet earnings projections and growth expectations. Businesses seldom operate in a tranquil, no-surprise environment, and earnings simply don't advance smoothly (except, of course, in the offering books of investment bankers)."

Attention to detail

From the above suggestions, it is clear that the master is taking the age-old adage,  'Action speak louder than words', rather seriously. And why not! Since it is virtually impossible for a small investor to get access to top management on a regular basis, it becomes important that in order to unravel the latter's conduct of business; its actions need to be scrutinized closely. And what better way to do that than to go through the various filings of the company (annual reports and quarterly results) and get a first hand feel of what the management is saying and what it is doing with the company's accounts. Honest management usually does not play around with words and tries to present a realistic picture of the company. It is the one with dubious intentions that would try to insert complex footnotes and make fanciful assumptions about the company's future.

We would like to draw curtains on the master's 2002 letter to shareholders by putting up the following quote that dispels the myth that manager ought to know the future and hence predict it with great accuracy. Nothing could be further from the truth.

CEOs don't have a crystal ball

The master has said, "Charlie and I not only don't know today what our businesses will earn next year; we don't even know what they will earn next quarter. We are suspicious of those CEOs who regularly claim they do know the future and we become downright incredulous if they consistently reach their declared targets. Managers that always promise to 'make the numbers' will at some point be tempted to make up the numbers."

Hence, next time you come across a management that continues to give profit guidance year after year and even meets them, it is time for some alarm bells.

http://www.equitymaster.com/p-detail.asp?date=8/20/2008&story=2

Buffett (2002): The primary job of an Audit committee and the four questions the committee should ask auditors.

Buffet explained some key corporate governance policies in his 2002 letter to shareholders. After driving home his views on independent directors and their compensation, he has now turned his attention towards the audit committees that are present at every company.

Audit committees - Substance and not form

The primary job of an audit committee, says Buffett, is to make sure that the auditors divulge what they know. Hence, whenever reforms need to be introduced in this area, they have to be introduced keeping this aspect in mind. He was indeed alarmed by the growing number of accounting malpractices that happened with the firm's numbers. And he believed this would continue as long as auditors take the side of the CEO (Chief Executive Officer) or the CFO (Chief Financial Officer) and not the shareholders. Why not? So long as the auditor gets his fees and other assignments from the management, he is more likely to prepare a book that contains exactly what the management wants to read. Although a lot of the accounting jugglery may well be within the rule of the law, it nevertheless amounts to misleading investor. Hence, in order to stop such practices, it becomes important that the auditors be subject to major monetary penalties if they hide something from the minority shareholders behind the garb of accounting. And what better committee to monitor this than the audit committee itself! Buffett has also laid out four questions that the committee should ask auditors and the answers recorded and reported to shareholders. What are these four questions and what purpose will they serve? Let us find out.

The acid test
As per Buffett, these questions are -

1.  If the auditor were solely responsible for preparation of the company's financial statements, would they have in any way been prepared differently from the manner selected by management? This question should cover both material and nonmaterial differences. If the auditor would have done something differently, both management's argument and the auditor's response should be disclosed. The audit committee should then evaluate the facts.

2.  If the auditor were an investor, would he have received - in plain English - the information essential to his understanding the company's financial performance during the reporting period?

3.  Is the company following the same internal audit procedure that would be followed if the auditor himself were CEO? If not, what are the differences and why?

4.  Is the auditor aware of any actions - either accounting or operational - that have had the purpose and effect of moving revenues or expenses from one reporting period to another?

Toe the line or else...

Buffett goes on to add that these questions need to be asked in such a manner so that sufficient time is given to auditors and management to resolve any conflicts that arise as a result of these questions. Furthermore, he is also of the opinion that if a firm adopts these questions and makes it a rule to put them before auditors, the composition of the audit committee becomes irrelevant, an issue on which the maximum amount of time is unnecessarily spent. Finally, the purpose that these questions will serve is that it will force the auditors to officially endorse something that they would have otherwise given nod to behind the scenes. In other words, there is a strong chance that they resisting misdoings and give the true information to the shareholder.

 http://www.equitymaster.com/p-detail.asp?date=8/13/2008&story=1