Warren Buffett on Economic Goodwill (Intangible asset)

WARREN BUFFETT ON ECONOMIC GOODWILL

This is what Warren Buffett calls economic good will which he explained in 1983 like this:

‘[B]usinesses logically are worth far more than net tangible assets when they can be expected to produce earnings on such assets considerably in excess of market rates of return.’

Using by analogy, one of the favorite examples of Warren Buffett, take two separate companies. Company A has a net worth of $100,000, $40,000 of which is net tangible assets and $60,000 of which is intangible (brand name, goodwill, patents etc). Company B has the same net worth but $90,000 its assets are tangible. Each company earns $10,000 a year.

• So Company A is earning $10,000 from tangible assets of $40,000 and Company B is earning $10,000 from tangible assets of $90,000.

If both companies wanted to double earnings, they might have to double their investment in tangible assets. 

• For Company A to do this, it would have to spend $40,000 to add $10,000 of earnings. 
• For Company B to do this, it would have to spend another $90,000 to add $10,000 to earnings. 

All other things being equal, Company A would have better future prospects of increase in real earnings than Company B.

THE REAL PROFITABILITY OF A COMPANY

For these reasons, Warren Buffett has said that, in calculating the real profitability of a company, there should be no amortisation of economic goodwill. Does the Gillette brand name actually decrease in value each year? Of course not.

The thoughts of both Graham and Warren Buffett are worth consideration. Book value is another ingredient in the investment equation.

Benjamin Graham and Warren Buffett appear to have differences in importance on tangible and intangible assets.

The assets of a company can be either tangible or intangible and, on this point, Benjamin Graham and Warren Buffett appear to have differences in importance.

WHAT BENJAMIN GRAHAM SAID ABOUT INTANGIBLE ASSETS

‘Earnings based on these intangibles [eg goodwill] may be even less vulnerable to competition than those which require only a cash investment in productive facilities.

'Furthermore, when conditions are favorable, the enterprise with the relatively small capital investment is likely to show a more rapid rate of growth.

Ordinarily it can expand its sales and profits at slight expense and therefore more rapidly and profitably for its stockholders than a business requiring a large plant investment per dollar of sales.’ Emphasis added.

HOW WARREN BUFFETT LOOKS AT INTANGIBLE ASSETS

This last comment of Graham has importance for Warren Buffett, who seems to really like companies with valuable, and sometimes irreplaceable, goodwill. 

To Warren Buffett, it is this intangible good will, an asset that continually produces profits without the need to spend money on maintenance, upgrading or replacement, that adds value to a company. 

Consider what it is that is most important in producing profits for Coca Cola: its name and recipe, or the various factories that produce the drink.

http://www.buffettsecrets.com/book-value.htm

THE BENJAMIN GRAHAM APPROACH TO BOOK VALUE

Graham clearly considered book value an important factor in assessing share investment. He did not include intangibles in his calculations of book value and was attracted towards companies that sold at below their book value. 

This was a big factor in making a judgment about the company as an investment. He said this:

‘It is an almost unbelievable fact that Wall Street never asks, "How much is the business selling for?". Yet this should be the first question in considering a stock purchase.

'If a business man were offered a 5% interest in some concern for $10,000, his first mental process would be to multiply the asked price by 20 and thus establish a proposed value of $200,000 for the entire undertaking. The rest of his calculation would turn about whether the business was a "good buy" at $200,000.’

Graham did however acknowledge that under ‘modern conditions’ intangibles were just as much an asset as tangibles, assuming of course that a proper value could be determined. They could, in some situations, even be superior assets.

WHAT IS BOOK VALUE?

WHAT IS BOOK VALUE?

The book value of a company is generally considered its net worth; the book value per share would be the net worth of a company divided by the number of shares outstanding.

BENJAMIN GRAHAM DEFINITIONS

There is a need, in considering the book value of a company share, to know what certain terms mean - and who better to explain them than the doyen of investment analysis, Benjamin Graham. His definitions are:

Tangible assets: Assets either physical or financial in character eg plant, inventory, cash, receivables, investments.

Intangible assets: Assets which are neither physical nor financial in character. Include patents, trademarks, copyrights, franchises, good will, leaseholds and such deferred charges as unamortised bond discount.

Graham took the view in Security Analysis that intangible assets should not be taken into account when calculating book value; hence, in this sense, book value per share would be the same as net tangible assets per share (NTA) as opposed to net assets per share (NA).

So, the assets of a company can be either tangible or intangible and, on this point, Benjamin Graham and Warren Buffett appear to have differences in importance.

Buffett (1983): Great business fortunes built up during the inflationary years arose from ownership of operations that combined intangibles of lasting value with relatively minor requirements for tangible assets.

While corporate excesses and the concept of economic earnings, different from accounting earnings remained the focal points in the master's 1982 letter to shareholders, let us see what Warren Buffett has to offer in his 1983 letter.

In this another enlightening letter, Warren Buffett, probably for the first time discussed at length the concept of 'goodwill' and believed it to be of great importance in understanding businesses. Further, he blames the discrepancies between the 'actual intrinsic value' and the 'accounting book value' of Berkshire Hathaway to have arisen because of the concept of 'goodwill'. This is what he has to say on the subject.

"You can live a full and rewarding life without ever thinking about goodwill and its amortization. But students of investment and management should understand the nuances of the subject. My own thinking has changed drastically from 35 years ago when I was taught to favor tangible assets and to shun businesses whose value depended largely upon economic goodwill. This bias caused me to make many important business mistakes of omission, although relatively few of commission."

From the above quote, it is clear that the master's investment philosophy had undergone a sea change from when he first started investing. Further, with his company becoming too big, he could no longer afford to churn his portfolio as frequently as before. In other words, he wanted businesses where he could invest for the long haul and what better investments here than companies, where the economic goodwill is huge. The master had been kind enough in explaining this concept at length through an appendix laid out at the end of the letter. Since we feel that we couldn't have explained it better than the master himself, we have reproduced the relevant extracts below verbatim.

"True economic goodwill tends to rise in nominal value proportionally with inflation. To illustrate how this works, let's contrast a See's kind of business with a more mundane business. When we purchased See's in 1972, it will be recalled, it was earning about US$ 2 m on US$ 8 m of net tangible assets (book value). Let us assume that our hypothetical mundane business then had US$ 2 m of earnings also, but needed US$ 18 m in net tangible assets for normal operations. Earning only 11% on required tangible assets, that mundane business would possess little or no economic goodwill.

A business like that, therefore, might well have sold for the value of its net tangible assets, or for US$ 18 m. In contrast, we paid US$ 25 m for See's, even though it had no more in earnings and less than half as much in "honest-to-God" assets. Could less really have been more, as our purchase price implied? The answer is "yes" - even if both businesses were expected to have flat unit volume - as long as you anticipated, as we did in 1972, a world of continuous inflation.

To understand why, imagine the effect that a doubling of the price level would subsequently have on the two businesses. Both would need to double their nominal earnings to $4 million to keep themselves even with inflation. This would seem to be no great trick: just sell the same number of units at double earlier prices and, assuming profit margins remain unchanged, profits also must double.

But, crucially, to bring that about, both businesses probably would have to double their nominal investment in net tangible assets, since that is the kind of economic requirement that inflation usually imposes on businesses, both good and bad. A doubling of dollar sales means correspondingly more dollars must be employed immediately in receivables and inventories. Dollars employed in fixed assets will respond more slowly to inflation, but probably just as surely. And all of this inflation-required investment will produce no improvement in rate of return. The motivation for this investment is the survival of the business, not the prosperity of the owner.

Remember, however, that See's had net tangible assets of only $8 million. So it would only have had to commit an additional $8 million to finance the capital needs imposed by inflation. The mundane business, meanwhile, had a burden over twice as large - a need for $18 million of additional capital.

After the dust had settled, the mundane business, now earning $4 m annually, might still be worth the value of its tangible assets, or US $36 m. That means its owners would have gained only a dollar of nominal value for every new dollar invested. (This is the same dollar-for-dollar result they would have achieved if they had added money to a savings account.)

See's, however, also earning US$ 4 m, might be worth US$ 50 m if valued (as it logically would be) on the same basis as it was at the time of our purchase. So it would have gained US$ 25 m in nominal value while the owners were putting up only US$ 8 m in additional capital - over US$ 3 of nominal value gained for each US $ 1 invested.

Remember, even so, that the owners of the See's kind of business were forced by inflation to ante up US$ 8 m in additional capital just to stay even in real profits. Any unleveraged business that requires some net tangible assets to operate (and almost all do) is hurt by inflation. Businesses needing little in the way of tangible assets simply are hurt the least.

And that fact, of course, has been hard for many people to grasp. For years the traditional wisdom - long on tradition, short on wisdom - held that inflation protection was best provided by businesses laden with natural resources, plants and machinery, or other tangible assets. It doesn't work that way. Asset-heavy businesses generally earn low rates of return - rates that often barely provide enough capital to fund the inflationary needs of the existing business, with nothing left over for real growth, for distribution to owners, or for acquisition of new businesses.

In contrast, a disproportionate number of the great business fortunes built up during the inflationary years arose from ownership of operations that combined intangibles of lasting value with relatively minor requirements for tangible assets. In such cases earnings have bounded upward in nominal dollars, and these dollars have been largely available for the acquisition of additional businesses. This phenomenon has been particularly evident in the communications business. That business has required little in the way of tangible investment - yet its franchises have endured. During inflation, goodwill is the gift that keeps giving.

But that statement applies, naturally, only to true economic goodwill. Spurious accounting goodwill - and there is plenty of it around - is another matter. When an overexcited management purchases a business at a silly price, the same accounting niceties described earlier are observed. Because it can't go anywhere else, the silliness ends up in the goodwill account. Considering the lack of managerial discipline that created the account, under such circumstances it might better be labeled 'No-Will'. Whatever the term, the 40-year ritual typically is observed and the adrenalin so capitalized remains on the books as an 'asset' just as if the acquisition had been a sensible one."

http://www.equitymaster.com/detail.asp?date=8/9/2007&story=3

Value Investing: Focus on Intangibles

Today's value investors are as intently focussed on business intangibles, like brand and customer loyalty, as on the "hard" financials.

It is all about looking at what's behind the numbers, and moreover, what will create tangible value in the future.

So a look at the market or markets in which the company operates is important.

Therefore, it is so important to look at:

• products,
• market position,
• brand,
• public perception,
• customers and customer perception,
• supply chain,
• leadership,
• opinions, and
• a host of others factor.