Petronas Dagangan (29.5.2012)

		Financial		EPS	Dividend	NTA	ttm-EPS	Qtr
Date		Quarter		(Cent)	(Cent)	(RM)	(Cent)	No
21/5/2012		1/1/2012		24.8	17.5	4.95	90.7	1
24/2/2012		31/12/2011		22.3	50	4.81	88.9	5
23/11/2011		30/9/2011		22.6	15	4.7	90.4	5
10/8/2011		30/6/2011		21	15	5.04	88.5	0
26/5/2011		31/3/2011		23	60	4.83	87.6	4
16/2/2011		31/12/2010		23.8	0	4.6	80.8	3
25/11/2010		30/9/2010		20.7	40	4.66	75.8	2
24/8/2010		30/6/2010		20.1	0	4.79	75.2	1
25/5/2010		31/3/2010		16.2	45	4.59	75.8	4
19/2/2010		31/12/2009		18.8	0	4.43	76.9	3
23/11/2009		30/9/2009		20.1	15	4.35	62.4	2
25/8/2009		30/6/2009		20.7	0	4.4	55.6	1
25/5/2009		31/3/2009		17.3	33	4.19	58.3	4
24/2/2009		31/12/2008		4.3	0	4.02	57.8	3
25/11/2008		30/9/2008		13.3	12	4.06	72.9	2
28/8/2008		30/6/2008		23.4	0	4.18	72.5	1
26/5/2008		31/3/2008		16.8	33	3.94	66.8	4
26/2/2008		31/12/2007		19.4	0	3.78	67	3
29/11/2007		30/9/2007		12.9	12	3.67	64.3	2
27/8/2007		30/6/2007		17.7	0	3.69	66.3	1
28/5/2007		31/3/2007		17	20	3.51		4
26/2/2007		31/12/2006		16.7	0	3.34		3
30/11/2006		30/9/2006		14.9	10	3.25		2

		Financial		ttm-EPS				Qtr
Date		Quarter		(Cent)	Price	PE	P/NTA	No
21/5/2012		1/1/2012		90.7	19.48	21.48	3.9	1
24/2/2012		31/12/2011		88.9	18	20.25	3.7	5
23/11/2011		30/9/2011		90.4	16.36	18.10	3.5	5
10/8/2011		30/6/2011		88.5	16.54	18.69	3.3	0
26/5/2011		31/3/2011		87.6	16.3	18.61	3.4	4
16/2/2011		31/12/2010		80.8	12.5	15.47	2.7	3
25/11/2010		30/9/2010		75.8	11.7	15.44	2.5	2
24/8/2010		30/6/2010		75.2	11	14.63	2.3	1
25/5/2010		31/3/2010		75.8	9.23	12.18	2.0	4
19/2/2010		31/12/2009		76.9	8.92	11.60	2.0	3
23/11/2009		30/9/2009		62.4	8.57	13.73	2.0	2
25/8/2009		30/6/2009		55.6	8.33	14.98	1.9	1
25/5/2009		31/3/2009		58.3	7.78	13.34	1.9	4
24/2/2009		31/12/2008		57.8	7.36	12.73	1.8	3
25/11/2008		30/9/2008		72.9	6.71	9.20	1.7	2
28/8/2008		30/6/2008		72.5	5.99	8.26	1.4	1
26/5/2008		31/3/2008		66.8	6.57	9.84	1.7	4
26/2/2008		31/12/2007		67	7.01	10.46	1.9	3
29/11/2007		30/9/2007		64.3	7.57	11.77	2.1	2
27/8/2007		30/6/2007		66.3	7.6	11.46	2.1	1
28/5/2007		31/3/2007						4
26/2/2007		31/12/2006						3
30/11/2006		30/9/2006						2

ttm-EPS  90.7 sen
LFY Dividend  80 sen

Price (29.5.2012)   RM 20.48

PE  22.6x
DY  3.9%

Bonia (29.5.2012)

		Financial		EPS	Dividend	NTA	ttm-EPS	Qtr
Date		Quarter		(Cent)	(Cent)	(RM)	(Cent)	No.
29/05/2012		31/03/2012		3.32	0	1.33	23.81	3
23/02/2012		31/12/2011		6.55	0	1.29	26.33	2
29/11/2011		30/09/2011		9.93	0	1.25	24.33	1
26/08/2011		30/06/2011		4.01	2.5	1.15	19.37	4
25/05/2011		31/03/2011		5.84	2.5	1.13	20.37	3
23/02/2011		31/12/2010		4.55	0	1.07	18.91	2
24/11/2010		30/09/2010		4.97	0	1.04	17.91	1
30/08/2010		30/06/2010		5.01	5	1.01	16.49	4
26/05/2010		31/03/2010		4.38	0	0.96	14.21	3
25/02/2010		31/12/2009		3.55	0	0.92	12.02	2
26/11/2009		30/09/2009		3.55	0	0.92	10.82	1
28/08/2009		30/06/2009		2.73	4	0.88	10.22	4
28/05/2009		31/03/2009		2.19	0	0.85	9.43	3
27/02/2009		31/12/2008		2.35	0	0.87	10.65	2
24/11/2008		30/09/2008		2.95	0	0.84	12.8	1
28/08/2008		30/06/2008		1.94	2.5	0.81	14.22	4
26/05/2008		31/03/2008		3.41	0	0.8	17.08	3
20/02/2008		31/12/2007		4.5	0	0.76		2
15/11/2007		30/09/2007		4.37	0	0.74		1
27/08/2007		30/06/2007		4.8	3	0.7		4

ttm-EPS  23.81 sen
LFY  Dividend  5 sen

Price RM 2,33

PE  9.8x
DY  2.15%

UMW (29.5.2012)

Announcement		Financial		Earning	Dividend	NTA (RM)	ttm-EPS	Quarter
Date		Quarter		Per Share (Cent)	(Cent)		(Cent)	Number
29/05/2012		31/03/2012		18.83	0	3.82	49	1
24/02/2012		31/12/2011		4.4	7.5	3.65	43.24	4
24/11/2011		30/09/2011		14.51	13.5	3.69	40.46	3
19/08/2011		30/06/2011		11.26	10	3.662	39.12	2
25/05/2011		31/03/2011		13.07	0	3.635	46.6	1
24/02/2011		31/12/2010		1.62	6.5	3.485	45.34	4
22/11/2010		30/09/2010		13.17	13.5	3.594	52.76	3
20/08/2010		30/06/2010		18.74	10	3.622	51.04	2
20/05/2010		31/03/2010		11.81	0	3.515		1
23/02/2010		31/12/2009		9.04	9	3.369		4
20/11/2009		30/09/2009		11.45	5	3.325		3

ttm-EPS  49 sen

LFY Dividend 31 sen

Price  RM 7.85

PE 16x

DY 3.95%

Stock Investing is not Rocket Science!

The test of real expertise is wealth protection in bad times and solid growth in good times. So that, over a longer horizon covering boom and bust, you get attractive growth, say 20% CAGR. Of course there are a few rare, real experts (but you won’t see them on TV every day, predicting the market) who have consistently been doing this. Each Stock Shastra is the distilled wisdom of such rare, real experts. The real Gurus! And from them, here is Stock Shastra #1: Stock Investing is not Rocket Science! Now, how do you feel when you say this Shastra?

• Benjamin Graham, one of the Gurus of stock investing, did not have a background of finance when he started investing. However, he learnt stock investing, eventually pioneering the concept of value investing; his philosophy was simple: Buy great businesses at extremely cheap prices.
• Warren Buffett, one of the greatest stock investors of all time, started investing when he was 12, without any formal finance education. He regarded Benjamin Graham as his Guru and today is amongst the richest people in the world.
• The common thread binding these great investors is the same. They weren’t experts when they started. But they learnt to do it on their own by following a simple and sound framework of investing and sticking to it with discipline.
• It involved buying into a great business with the mindset of an owner. Finding such a business might require some search and analysis, but is something you can certainly manage.
• Most importantly, sooner or later, the market gives you many opportunities to buy such wonderful businesses at throw-away prices; or sell your holdings at unbelievably high prices. The proof: Look at the 52-week Highs and lows of any of the Sensex stocks.

Once we change our mindset and decide to invest in stocks on our own, the next step is to find a wonderful business worth owning. The next Stock Shastra will tell you how to start doing this.

http://stockshastra.moneyworks4me.com/stock-shastra-1/

Different styles of framing choices causes different preferred outcomes.

Loss Aversion, Risk, & Framing

The next stop in the framing inquiry involves the unique relationship of risk taking to positive and negative framing. Since losses loom larger than gains, it appears that humans follow conservative strategies when presented with a positively-framed dilemma, and risky strategies when presented with negatively-framed ones. To illustrate, consider Kahneman & Tversky's 1984 study where they asked a representative sample of physicians the following question. Read and answer it before you continue.

Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs are as follows: If program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. If program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 600 people will be saved and a two-thirds probability that no people will be saved. Which of the two programs would you favor? 

Be sure to answer this question before you proceed.

Have you answered? OK.

Notice that the preceding dilemma is positively framed. It views the dilemma in terms of "lives saved." When the question was framed in this manner, 72% of physicians chose A, the safe-and-sure strategy, but only 28% chose program B, the risky strategy. An equivalent set of physicians considered the same dilemma, but with the question framed negatively:

Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs are as follows: If program C is adopted, 400 people will die. If program D is adopted, there is a one-third probability that nobody will die and a two-thirds probability that 600 people will die. Which of the two programs would you favor? 

You can see that the two questions examine an identical dilemma. Two hundred of 600 people saved is the same as 400 of 600 lost. However, when the question was framed negatively, and physicians were concentrating on losses rather than gains, they voted in a dramatically different fashion. When framed negatively, 22% of the physicians voted for the conservative strategy and 72% of them opted for the risky strategy!

As you can see, framing the choice positively vs. negatively caused an almost perfect reversal in the choices of highly-trained experts making a decision in their field of expertise--saving (or is that 'not losing'?) lives! Clearly, framing can powerfully influence the way a problem is perceived, which in turn can lead to the favoring of radically different solutions.

Let's consider the same "negative frame => risky behavior" phenomenon from a somewhat less theoretical and more practical perspective. Imagine that you are a medical practitioner, and you have just seen your third case of advanced breast cancer in a single week. "Why," you wonder to yourself, "aren't these women performing breast self-exams (BSEs) and finding these lumps before they become full-fledged, life-endangering metastatic cancers?" Your clinic hands a brochure on BSE to every woman that enters the door, BSE is regularly described in newspapers and on TV; information on this topic isn't exactly scarce! Why do your patients choose to die rather than comply? you wonder.

But consider the act of a BSE. Logically, it's safe--but psychologically, it's a risky procedure. If you perform BSE, you may feel a lump. So performing BSE is a risky behavior, because by looking, you may find something you don't want to find. Not performing a BSE is a logical health risk behavior, but is safer psychologically. By not looking, you won't find anything that may cause you to worry.

Researchers Meyerowitz and Chaiken explored this very question in a 1987 research project. They distributed one of two brochures on BSE to equivalent patients in equivalent clinics. The brochures were identical in terms of content, but one stressed the gains associated with performing a BSE, and the other focused on the losses associated with inaction. You can guess the result, can't you? The negatively-framed brochure lead to higher positive BSE-related attitudes and behaviors. Actually, the true strength of the negative frame emerged four months after patients received the brochures. Those who received negatively-framed brochures showed significantly greater intentions to perform BSE at the later date.

Why is it that negative information causes increased persuasion in these types of situations? Psychologists have long known of the existence of the "positivity bias," which states that humans overwhelmingly expect good things (as opposed to neutral or bad things) to occur. If perceivers construct a world in which primarily positive elements are expected, then negative information becomes perceptually salient as a jolting disconfirmation of those expectations (Kanouse & Hanson, 1972). We also know that people stop to examine disconfirmations to a much higher degree than confirmations. Negative information is often highly informative and thus may be assigned extra weight in the decision-making process (Fiske, 1980; Smith & Petty, 1996). Let me ask you: if you learned that your friend's auto mechanic performed an excellent valve job but botched his automatic transmission repair, would you take your car to that mechanic? No, because negative information overwhelms positive information. You expect a mechanic to be effective, period.

---

This topic is considered in further detail for the benefit of my students, who must enter the URLs found on the syllabus to access the following pages (if you're not a student of mine, please don't ask! The answer will be "Sorry."):

• Positive & Negative Frames (They're both effective in the appropriate circumstances, but you need to know which is best to use when.)
• Why Experts Fail to Predict (One reason experts make stupid mistakes.)
• Framing by Position (The real reason for the cheap and expensive models in the product lineup.)
• Framing by Contrast (How contrast is used to make you do things you wouldn't otherwise do.)
• Framing by Attribution (One of the most seductive persuasion tactics around because it makes people feel good!)

Ref:

http://www.workingpsychology.com/lossaver.html

http://www.workingpsychology.com/mediafr.html
Media framing (How the media frames the news and shapes public opinion.)

Should investors switch from bonds to shares?

Savers have preferred bonds to shares for the past seven months. But those saving for long-term goals such as retirement should remember that equities, unlike bonds, can offer a growing income.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/investing/9290399/Should-investors-switch-from-bonds-to-shares.html

SITUATIONS MATTER by Sam Sommers

BETTER BY MISTAKE: The Unexpected Benefits of Being Wrong

How Mating and Self-Protection Motives Alter Loss Aversion

Loss Aversion: The Shortsightedness of “Playing Not to Lose”

We experience the pain of a loss much more acutely than we experience the pleasure of a gain. One result is that we overreact to price increases.

Asymmetrical reaction to price fluctuations

Imagine you’re at the supermarket, about to buy your favorite brand of peanut butter. If you see that the price has dropped, you’re mildly pleased. But if you see the price has increased by the same amount, you get that awful sinking feeling. Disappointed, you put it back on the shelf and go without.

But it’s not just the potential loss of money that we overreact to. It can be the loss of time, prestige… or a game of football.

The best explanation of loss aversion I’ve ever read appears the book, Sway: The Irresistible Pull of Irrational Behavior. Authors Ori and Rom Brafman give some great examples of how loss aversion can lead us to make the most irrational, self-defeating decisions. Below are two real-world examples from Sway:

1.  A pilot’s obsession with getting back on schedule

In the 1970’s, Captain Jacob van Zanten was KLM’s most esteemed pilot. He was their chief flight instructor and even appeared in KLM advertising.

On a flight to the Canary Islands in March of 1977, van Zanten’s 747 was diverted to a smaller, nearby airport. After several frustrating delays, van Zanten — driven by an obsession to get back on schedule — started to take off in thick fog without full takeoff clearance. What he didn’t know was that a fully loaded Pan Am 747 was sitting on the runway, directly in his path.

The KLM jumbo smashed into the Pam Am plane. Everyone on board the KLM flight was killed, as were most of those on the Pan Am flight. There were 584 fatalities – the worst air disaster ever. And it was caused mainly by the KLM pilot’s obsession with living up to KLM’s claim of being “the people who made punctuality possible”. In other words, avoiding a loss.

2.  Playing not to lose

When Steve Spurrier took over as coach for the University of Florida Gators in 1990, he spotted a weakness in his opponents’ strategy. The other teams in his conference all played very conservative, defensive games. In other words, they were playing not to lose.

Spurrier exploited his opponents’ obsession over avoiding losses. He had his team take some chances, pass more often, play more aggressively, and try to score. The strategy was a huge success and it illustrates the opportunities that exist when we recognize irrational behavior for what it is.

You’d think the opposing coaches, seeing what was happening, would have changed strategy and played more aggressively. But they simply couldn’t. They had become so committed to the goal of avoiding a loss that for years they continued their losing strategy.

http://www.cardinalpath.com/loss-aversion-the-shortsightedness-of-%E2%80%9Cplaying-not-to-lose%E2%80%9D/