Monday 5 March 2012

The stock market's obsession with the short term gives private investors an advantage.

Why The Stock Market Is Failing Britain

Published in Investing on 5 March 2012

A new report highlights fundamental failings.
Last year John Kay, a very accomplished economist who is a director of several companies, was asked by the government to see if the stock market is serving the needs of Britain's investors and companies. His interim findings were published last week and they make interesting reading.
Kay argues that today's stock market primarily serves the interests of the fund management industry, rather than those of companies and investors. He goes on to say that a culture of chasing short-term performance targets has developed, which is damaging the British economy and also harms investors' returns.

Secondary markets are good

The London Stock Exchange (LSE: LSE) consists of two markets. Companies come to the primary market to raise capital by selling shares and bonds through initial public offerings, but afterwards these are traded on the secondary market, which is where most of the action occurs.
Many investors would be reluctant to invest in the first place if they didn't have an easy way out via the secondary market. Since they do, this encourages them to buy shares and bonds, and it allows companies to charge a higher price for their shares and bonds in the primary market.
You can always sell your shares in BP (LSE: BP), HSBC (LSE: HSBA), or indeed most other quoted companies when the market is open, but if you couldn't access the secondary market, you'd have to find a willing buyer, which could take quite some time and would greatly increase your transaction costs.
Another well-known secondary market, one which has revolutionised the trade in second-hand goods, is the auction website eBay (NASDAQ: EBAY.US). Before eBay you had to rely on word-of-mouth, classified newspaper adverts and/or specialist dealers -- today eBay gives you access to a global marketplace.

Obsessed with the short-term

Kay and his team say that the stock market tail now wags the economic dog to such an extent that it damages Britain's interests. Many contributors to the report consider that the combination of quarterly reporting and institutional fund management has caused the investing community to obsess about the next set of figures at the expense of everything else.
As a result, many companies focus on meeting the institutions' short-term expectations, often by "managing" their quarterly earnings, to such an extent that they take their eye off the long term.
Another problem is that chasing short-term targets and concentrating on beating the forecasts can encourage excessive risk-taking. This can reduce your long-term returns, as well as having some serious consequences for the economy.
We saw this happen in a big way several years ago when Royal Bank of Scotland (LSE: RBS) collapsed during the credit crunch, due to a reckless expansion programme, and it had to be bailed out by the long-suffering taxpayer.

Take advantage of the short termers

I believe that the stock market's obsession with the short term gives private investors an advantage. Unlike the typical fund manager, you won't be sacked if you have a bad quarter, so you should be able to take a long-term view.
This can pay off handsomely when the stock market is having one of its hissy fits, because when this happens, there are bargains to be had. Benjamin Graham summed this up nicely when he said; "In the short run, the market is a voting machine, but in the long run it is a weighing machine."

Separation of owner and manager

Another of Kay's concerns is that because most people nowadays invest through funds, rather than by directly owning shares, the economic interest of share ownership has been separated from the decision-making process. The choice of whether to buy, sell and exercise the voting rights attaching to shares is now overwhelmingly concentrated in the hands of the institutions.
This is nothing new; separating the control over property from its ownership has been a cornerstone of English trust law ever since the 11th century, when the King's Knights left their lands under stewardship before they went off to fight in the Crusades.
But it has mushroomed with the growth of the fund management industry during the last few decades, and the result is that most shareholders are absentee landlords with little interest in how their companies are run. The industry encourages this by offering nominee accounts, and making it very hard (and often expensive) for shareholders to exercise their votes.

The paradox of voting your shares

The difficulty that private investors have in voting shares held in nominee accounts is a bone of contention for some people. Personally I couldn't care less about exercising my voting rights unless my stake is large enough that that it might actually have an effect. If I don't like what I see, I "vote" by selling my shares.
When it comes to voting I'm a big fan of Downs Paradox, named after the public policy expert Anthony Downs who described it in his 1957 book An Economic Theory of Democracy. Downs says that if a rational self-interested person has just one vote in a very large electorate, then they should not bother to vote because this will not influence the outcome.
So, if you own 1% of the company, your vote is substantial and is thus worth exercising. The same goes if you are a constituent in a parliamentary election, which was won last time by just a few hundred votes. In both of these instances, your vote is very valuable.
But if you own 0.0005% of a company's shares, Downs Paradox says that a much better use of your time is to do something else, such as reading its report and accounts! Even though I attended Diageo's (LSE: DGE) annual general meeting last October, I didn't bother to vote -- my stake, whilst fairly substantial, is but one vote amongst more than a million others.
Kay's full report will be published this summer along with his recommendations. If you want to read his interim report you can find it at this webpage.

http://www.fool.co.uk/news/investing/2012/03/05/why-the-stock-market-is-failing-britain.aspx?source=ufwflwlnk0000001

Definition of 'Market Capitalization'

Definition of 'Market Capitalization'
The total dollar market value of all of a company's outstanding shares. Market capitalization is calculated by multiplying a company's shares outstanding by the current market price of one share. The investment community uses this figure to determine a company's size, as opposed to sales or total asset figures.

Frequently referred to as "market cap".

Investopedia explains 'Market Capitalization'
If a company has 35 million shares outstanding, each with a market value of $100, the company's market capitalization is $3.5 billion (35,000,000 x $100 per share).

Company size is a basic determinant of asset allocation and risk-return parameters for stocks and stock mutual funds. The term should not be confused with a company's "capitalization," which is a financial statement term that refers to the sum of a company's shareholders' equity plus long-term debt.

The stocks of large, medium and small companies are referred to as large-cap, mid-cap, and small-cap, respectively. Investment professionals differ on their exact definitions, but the current approximate categories of market capitalization are:


Large Cap: $10 billion plus and include the companies with the largest market capitalization.
Mid Cap: $2 billion to $10 billion
Small Cap: Less than $2 billion


Read more: http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/marketcapitalization.asp?partner=TOD03&utm_source=22&utm_medium=Email&utm_campaign=TOD-3/5/2012#ixzz1oFXiR874

Guinness (At a Glance)


Guinness 30.6.2011 30.6.2010 Change
Revenue 1,488.72 1,358.63 9.57%
Gross Profit 469.47 385.373 21.82%
Operating Profit 240.598 203.332 18.33%
Financing costs -0.429 -0.345 24.35%
PBT 242.883 204.991 18.48%
PAT 181.378 152.691 18.79%
EPS (basic) sen 60 50.5 18.81%
NCA 233.229 239.677 -2.69%
CA 451.909 422.885 6.86%
Total Assets 685.138 662.562 3.41%
Total Equity 516.616 470.928 9.70%
NCL 32.592 31.846 2.34%
CL 135.93 159.788 -14.93%
Total Liabilities 168.522 191.634 -12.06%
Total Eq + Liab 685.138 662.562 3.41%
Cash & Eq 179.777 149.626 20.15%
LT Borrowings 0 0 #DIV/0!
ST Borrowings 0 0 #DIV/0!
Inventories 65.402 75.691 -13.59%
Trade receivables 205.966 196.135 5.01%
Trade payables 132.577 155.064 -14.50%
CA 451.909 422.885 6.86%
CL 135.93 159.788 -14.93%
Current Ratio 3.32 2.65 25.62%
PBT 242.88 204.99 18.48%
OPBCWC 286.19 233.07 22.80%
Cash from Operations 256.82 201.00 27.78%
Net CFO 196.345 143.12 37.19%
CFI -30.25 -33.406 -9.45%
CFF -135.944 123.86 -209.76%
Capex -31.81 -29.91 6.35%
FCF 164.535 113.21 45.34%
Dividends paid -135.944 -123.86 9.76%
No of ord shares 302.098 302.098 0.00%
Financial Ratios
Net Profit Margin 12.18% 11.24% 8.41%
Asset Turnover 2.17 2.05 5.96%
Financial Leverage 1.33 1.41 -5.74%
ROA 26.47% 23.05% 14.87%
ROC 53.85% 47.52% 13.31%
ROE 35.11% 32.42% 8.28%
Valuation
Price (5.3.2012) 13.68
Market cap 4132.70
P/E 22.79
P/BV 8.00
P/FCF 25.12
P/Div 30.40
DPO ratio 0.75
EY 4.39%
FCF/P 3.98%
DY 3.29%








Announcement
Date
Financial
Yr. End
QtrPeriod EndRevenue
RM '000
Profit/Lost
RM'000
EPSAmended
23-Feb-1230-Jun-12231-Dec-11468,32265,82221.79-
02-Nov-1130-Jun-12130-Sep-11444,62355,20818.28-
04-Aug-1130-Jun-11430-Jun-11348,75929,0769.63-
04-Aug-1130-Jun-11430-Jun-11348,75929,0769.63-




Stock Performance Chart for Guinness Anchor Berhad


FYE 30th June
Qtr  Year Revenue Earnings  EPS ttm-EPS
Q2 2012 468.322 65.822 21.79 65.91
Q1 2012 444.623 55.208 18.28 65.52
Q4 2011 348.759 29.076 9.63 60.05
Q3 2011 351.916 48.972 16.21 62.16
Q2 2011 421.414 64.635 21.4 61.4
Q1 2011 366.631 38.695 12.81 54.51
Q4 2010 308.713 35.477 11.74 50.54
Q3 2010 370.817 46.679 15.45
Q2 2010 378.134 43.836 14.51
Q1 2010 300.969 26.699 8.84




Petronas Dagangan (At a Glance)






Announcement
Date
Financial
Yr. End
QtrPeriod EndRevenue
RM '000
Profit/Lost
RM'000
EPSAmended
24-Feb-1231-Dec-11Other31-Dec-117,422,923223,06122.30-
23-Nov-1131-Dec-11Other30-Sep-117,304,943225,72822.60-
10-Aug-1131-Dec-11Other30-Jun-117,539,927210,51121.00-
26-May-1131-Mar-11431-Mar-116,382,665229,77323.00-

ttm-EPS 88.9 sen
Price RM 18.34
PE (ttm) 20.6x
EY 4.85%



Stock Performance Chart for Petronas Dagangan Berhad



















Is Mr. Market still around? Is he still bipolar? You bet he is.


 M  R .   M A R  K  E T

Most of the time, the market is mostly accurate in pricing most stocks.  Millions of buyers and sellers haggling over price do a remarkably good job of valuing companies—on average. But sometimes, the price is not right; occasionally, it is very wrong indeed. And at such times, you need to understand Graham’s image of Mr. Market, probably the most brilliant metaphor ever created for explaining how stocks can become mispriced.

The manic-depressive Mr. Market does not always price stocks the way an appraiser or a private buyer would value a business. Instead, when stocks are going up, he happily pays more than their objective value; and, when they are going down, he is desperate to dump them for less than their true worth.  Is Mr. Market still around? Is he still bipolar? You bet he is

Keep these 113 words of Graham close at hand and let them guide you throughout your investing life.


The true investor scarcely ever is forced to sell his shares, and at  all other times he is free to disregard the current price quotation. He need pay attention to it and act upon it only to the extent that it suits his book, and no more.* Thus the investor who permits himself to be stampeded or unduly worried by unjustified market declines in his holdings is perversely transforming his basic advantage into a basic disadvantage. That man would be better off if his stocks had no market quotation at all, for he would then be spared the mental anguish caused him by other persons’ mistakes of judgment.†



* “Only to the extent that it suits his book” means “only to the extent that the price is favorable enough to justify selling the stock.” In traditional brokerage lingo, the “book” is an investor’s ledger of holdings and trades.

† This may well be the single most important paragraph in Graham’s entire book. In these 113 words Graham sums up his lifetime of experience. You cannot read these words too often; they are like Kryptonite for bear markets.  If you keep them close at hand and let them guide you throughout your investing life, you will survive whatever the markets throw at you.

Scientex (At a Glance)


Scientex 31.7.2011 31.7.2010 Change
Revenue 804.022 694.815 15.72%
Gross Profit 159.3 123.008 29.50%
Other Income 3.759 12.499 -69.93%
Operating Profit 97.437 70.046 39.10%
Finance costs -1.573 -1.26 24.84%
PBT 96.64 70.753 36.59%
Income tax expense  -16.521 -8.613 91.81%
Earnings  80.118 62.14 28.93%
EPS (basic) sen 36 28 28.57%
NCA 444.069 435.676 1.93%
CA 281.005 239.386 17.39%
Total Assets 725.075 675.062 7.41%
CL  182.175 171.144 6.45%
NCL 36.778 53.121 -30.77%
Total Liabilities 218.985 224.265 -2.35%
Total Equity 506.121 450.796 12.27%
Total Equity and Liabilities 725.075 675.062 7.41%
Net asset per share *RM) 2.17 1.92 13.02%
Cash and bank balances 40.952 23.353 75.36%
ST Loans and borrowings 37.509 42.018 -10.73%
LT Loans and borrowings 10 26.168 -61.79%
Net Cash -6.557 -44.833 -85.37%
Inventories 67.763 63.374 6.93%
Trade receivables 105.497 95.746 10.18%
Trade payables 136.721 125.184 9.22%
PBT 96.64 70.753 36.59%
OPFBWCC 118.915 90.431 31.50%
CFO 123.981 86.25 43.75%
Net CFO 110.941 78.137 41.98%
CFI -39.682 -89.999 -55.91%
CFF -53.666 19.596 -373.86%
Capex -16.406 -24.017 -31.69%
FCF 94.535 54.12 74.68%
Dividends paid -30.13 -10.77 179.76%
DPS sen 11 8 37.50%
No of ordinary shares 215.20 215.40 -0.10%
Net Profit Margin 0.10 0.09 11.42%
Asset Turnover 1.11 1.03 7.74%
Financial Leverage 1.43 1.50 -4.33%
ROA 0.11 0.09 20.04%
ROC 0.16 0.13 24.64%
ROE 0.16 0.14 14.84%
Price per share (2.3.2012) 2.55
Market cap 548.76
P/E 6.85
P/BV 1.08
P/FCF 5.80
P/Div 18.21
EY 14.60%
FCF/P 17.23%
DY 5.49%








Announcement
Date
Financial
Yr. End
QtrPeriod EndRevenue
RM '000
Profit/Lost
RM'000
EPSAmended
15-Dec-1131-Jul-12131-Oct-11213,76221,3909.59-
28-Sep-1131-Jul-11431-Jul-11205,20021,7889.66-
21-Jun-1131-Jul-11330-Apr-11217,31221,1389.48-
15-Mar-1131-Jul-11231-Jan-11194,88619,7368.86-






Announcement
Date
Financial
Yr. End
QtrPeriod EndRevenue
RM '000
Profit/Lost
RM'000
EPSAmended
15-Dec-1031-Jul-11131-Oct-10186,62517,4577.89-

















Stock Performance Chart for Scientex Berhad



Year Revenue Earnings
2007 613.092 35.184
2008 656.596 47.698
2009 509.731 37.458
2010 694.816 60.318
2011 804.023 77.246
Year EPS net DPS NA/share ROE
2007 18.29 9.44 1.5 12.19%
2008 24.14 16 1.61 14.99%
2009 17.41 10 1.74 10.01%
2010 28 18 1.92 14.58%
2011 35.9 24 2.17 16.54%

Sunday 4 March 2012

The Investor and Market Fluctuations: Price fluctuations have only one significant meaning for true investor (8)



The true investor when he owns a listed common stock, can take advantage of the daily market price or leave it alone, as dictated by his own judgment and inclination.

  • He must take cognizance of important price movements, for otherwise his judgment will have nothing to work on. 
  • Conceivably they may give him a warning signal which he will do well to heed—this in plain English means that he is to sell his shares because the price has gone down, foreboding worse things to come. 
  • In our view such signals are misleading at least as often as they are helpful. 
Basically, price fluctuations have only one significant meaning for the true investor. 

  • They provide him with an opportunity to buy wisely when prices fall sharply and 
  • to sell wisely when they advance a great deal. 
  • At other times he will do better if he forgets about the stock market and pays attention to his dividend returns and to the operating results of his companies

The Investor and Market Fluctuations: Mr. Market Parable (7)


Mr.Market Parable.

Imagine that in some private business you own a small share that cost you $1,000. One of your partners, named Mr. Market, is very obliging indeed.

  • Every day he tells you what he thinks your interest is worth and furthermore offers either to buy you out or to sell you an additional interest on that basis. 
  • Sometimes his idea of value appears plausible and justified by business developments and prospects as you know them. 
  • Often, on the other hand, Mr.Market lets his enthusiasm or his fears run away with him, and the value he proposes seems to you a little short of silly.


If you are a prudent investor or a sensible businessman, will you let Mr. Market’s daily communication determine your view of the value of a $1,000 interest in the enterprise? Only in case you agree with him, or in case you want to trade with him. 

  • You may be happy to sell out to him when he quotes you a ridiculously high price, and 
  • equally happy to buy from him when his price is low. 
  • But the rest of the time you will be wiser to form your own ideas of the value of your holdings, based on full reports from the company about its operations and financial position.

The Investor and Market Fluctuations: Stock Market Equity Ownership has the important attribute of Liquidity (6)


Critics of the value approach to stock investment argue that listed common stocks cannot properly be regarded or appraised in the same way as an interest in a similar private enterprise, because the presence of an organized security market “injects into equity ownership the new and extremely important attribute of liquidity.”

But what this liquidity really means is, 

  • first, that the investor has the benefit of the stock market’s daily and changing appraisal of his holdings, for whatever that appraisal may be worth, and, 
  • second, that the investor is able to increase or decrease his investment at the market’s daily figure—if he chooses. 
Thus the existence of a quoted market gives the investor  certain options that he does not have if his security is unquoted.

But it does not impose the current quotation on an investor who prefers to take his idea of value from some other source.

The Investor and Market Fluctuations: The Single Most Important Paragraph in Graham's entire book for the Bear Markets (5)


Let us return to our comparison between the holder of marketable shares and the man with an interest in a private business.  We have said that the former has the option of considering himself merely

  • as the part owner of the various businesses he has invested in, or 
  • as the holder of shares which are salable at any time he wishes at their quoted market price.


But note this important fact:
The true investor scarcely ever is forced to sell his shares, and at all other times he is free to disregard the current price quotation. He need pay attention to it and act upon it only to the extent that it suits his book, and no more.* Thus the investor who permits himself to be stampeded or unduly worried by unjustified market declines in his holdings is perversely transforming his basic advantage into a basic disadvantage. That man would be better off if his stocks had no market quotation at all, for he would then be spared the mental anguish caused him by other persons’ mistakes of judgment.†



* “Only to the extent that it suits his book” means “only to the extent that the price is favorable enough to justify selling the stock.” In traditional brokerage lingo, the “book” is an investor’s ledger of holdings and trades.

This may well be the single most important paragraph in Graham’s entire book. In these 113 words Graham sums up his lifetime of experience. You cannot read these words too often; they are like Kryptonite for bear markets.  If you keep them close at hand and let them guide you throughout your investing life, you will survive whatever the markets throw at you.






Incidentally, a widespread situation of this kind actually existed during the dark depression days of 1931–1933.  There was then a psychological advantage in owning business interests that had no quoted market. 
  • For example, people who owned first mortgages on real estate that continued to pay interest were able to tell themselves that their investments had kept their full value, there being no market quotations to indicate otherwise. 
  • On the other hand, many listed corporation bonds of even better quality and greater underlying strength suffered severe shrinkages in their market quotations, thus making their owners believe they were growing distinctly poorer. 
In reality the owners were better off with the listed securities, despite the low prices of these.
  • For if they had wanted to, or were compelled to, they could at least have sold the issues—possibly to exchange them for even better bargains. 
  • Or they could just as logically have ignored the market’s action as temporary and basically meaningless. 
But it is self-deception to tell yourself that you have suffered no shrinkage in value  merely because your securities have no quoted market at all.

Returning to our A. & P. shareholder in 1938, we assert that as long as he held on to his shares he suffered no loss in their price decline, beyond what his own judgment may have told him was occasioned by a shrinkage in their underlying or intrinsic value. 
  • If no such shrinkage had occurred, he had a right to expect that in due course the market quotation would return to the 1937 level or better—as in fact it did the following year. 
  • In this respect his position was at least as good as if he had owned an interest in a private business with no quoted market for its shares. 
  • For in that case, too, he might or might not have been justified in mentally lopping off part of the cost of his holdings because of the impact of the 1938 recession—depending on what had happened to his company.


Ref:  Intelligent Investor by Benjamin Graham

The Investor and Market Fluctuations: The story of the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company Shares (4)


There are two chief morals to this story.

  • The first is that the stock market often goes far wrong, and sometimes an alert and courageous investor can take advantage of its patent errors. 
  • The other is that most businesses change in character and quality over the years, sometimes for the better, perhaps more often for the worse.  The investor need not watch his companies’ performance like a hawk; but he should give it a good, hard look from time to time.


The Investor and Market Fluctuations: The story of the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company Shares (3)

We see in this history how wide can be the vicissitudes of a major American enterprise in little more than a single generation, and also with what miscalculations and excesses of optimism and pessimism the public has valued its shares.
  • In 1938 the business was really being given away, with no takers; 
  • in 1961 the public was clamoring for the shares at a ridiculously high price. 
  • After that came a quick loss of half the market value, and some years later a substantial further decline. 
In the meantime the company was to turn from an outstanding to a mediocre earnings performer; 
  • its profit in the boom-year 1968 was to be less than in 1958;
  • it had paid a series of confusing small stock dividends not warranted by the current additions to surplus; and so forth. 
  • A. & P. was a larger company in 1961 and 1972 than in 1938, but not as well-run, not as profitable, and not as attractive.*



* The more recent history of A & P is no different.
  • At year-end 1999, its share price was $27.875; 
  • at year-end 2000, $7.00; 
  • a year later, $23.78; 
  • at year-end 2002, $8.06. 
Although some accounting irregularities later came to light at A & P, it defies all logic to believe that the value of a relatively stable business like groceries could
  • fall by three-fourths in one year, 
  • triple the next year, 
  • then drop by two-thirds the year after that.

Ref:  Intelligent Investor  by Benjamin Graham